Buford Protege

Therein still lies the question, if he was but 5 miles from the fighting, about a 2 hour march. John W. Geary (XII Corps Division Commander, this I picked from Hancock's memoirs) reported the sound of artillery fire from Gettysburg much earlier in the day. It stands to reason that initiative would have been to "march to the sound of guns." Say he couldn't hear the initial start at 7:30am approximately. The 6 hours of cannon firing must have told him something big was going on before the receipt of word from Meade at approx 1:30pm. Had he marched around the time the fighting got fierce and the cannons really got hot around 10am he would have arrived in time to send troops to bolster the XI Corps flank in theory. Unfortunately for Slocum, he was not privy to the information from Buford or Reynolds. Reynolds was in command of a grouping of the I, II, III, and XI Corps and Buford was in constant contact. Slocum was grouped with Sykes and Sedgewick. We don't know if Kilpatrick (definitely no Buford or Gregg in matters of reconnaissance) was keeping them apprised of the movements of Ewell as he was chasing Stuart more often than gathering information. It is possible that he was waiting for word from Reynolds or Buford, or anybody. The question still stands, what was he doing during the morning of the 1st day? The XII Corps was rather well led by veterans who would have known to march to the sound of guns, Williams and Geary coming up through the Valley Campaigns against Jackson the previous spring/summer, so it stands to reason, why were they so idle? We know once Slocum received word from Howard he sent word to Sykes to move also. But, still why wait? Unfortunately I don't think the question is easily answered. Yes, Slocum was very good once he was on the scene and performed well for Sherman later in the war so I would agree he was dependable. I would still take a Doubleday over Slocum ;). I just couldn't find a good fit for his command style/personality in my "dream team."

I completely agree with the criticism of Howard. I think his case comes down more to having the right friends and right political leanings. I always have wondered if Doubleday had gotten a bigger role or kept his role longer he would have done more. He commanded a brigade until Antietam. He was instrumental at the fight at Brawner's Farm in supporting Gibbon and creating the mythos of the Iron Brigade as he sent troops to aid Gibbon since there was no direction to do so as their division commander went down to a seizure and word never got out. He performed very well at Antietam under the direction of Joe Hooker in taking the Cornfield and running right up to Dunker Church before enfilade fire stopped his advance since the command sent to clear the forest was unsuccessful. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville his division (along with most of the 1st Corps) sat idle or in reserve. His next real chance came at Gettysburg when he definitely rose to the occasion. So, it brings the question of if he was good enough? He showed initiative on multiple occasions and held the 1st Corps together after the death of Reynolds. Definitely a man I think could have done more with a better chance. I find the choice of Slocum more interesting as he was a man who preferred not to have to take the initiative nor make major command decisions. He dawdled to Gettysburg when he was sorely needed because after news of Reynold's death he did not want to take command of the situation.

I supposed its only fair I should post my own dream commands. Union Army 85,000 Commanding General: George Thomas 1st Corps Commander: Winfield Scott Hancock 1st Division Commander: John Gibbon 2nd Division Commander: Joe Hooker 3rd Division Commander: Phil Kearny 2nd Corps Commander: Phil Sheridan 1st Division Commander: Joshua Chamberlain 2nd Division Commander: E.R. Canby 3rd Division Commander: Andrew J Smith 3rd Corps Commander: John F Reynolds 1st Division Commander: David Stanley 2nd Division Commander: James Blunt 3rd Division Commander: Abner Doubleday 4th Corps Commander: James McPherson 1st Division Commander: John Schofield 2nd Division Commander: John Logan 3rd Division Commander: John Sedgewick Cavalry Corps Commander: John Buford 1st Division Commander: James Wilson 2nd Division Commander: Wesley Merritt Artillery: Henry Hunt Confederate Army 70,000 Confederate Army Commander: Robert E Lee 1st Corps Commander: James Longstreet 1st Division Commander: Patrick Cleburne 2nd Division Commander: John B Hood 3rd Division Commander: Lewis Armistead 2nd Corps Commander: Thomas Jackson 1st Division Commander: Richard Taylor 2nd Division Commander: Richard Ewell 3rd Division Commander: D.H. Hill 3rd Corps Commander: A.S. Johnston 1st Division Commander: A.P. Hill 2nd Division Commander: William Hardee 3rd Division Commander: John B Gordon Cavalry Corps Commander: J.E.B. Stuart 1st Division Commander: Joe Wheeler 2nd Division Commander: N.B. Forrest Artillery: Edward Porter Alexander Not gonna lie, I did a lot of thinking of fitting command styles. Not many people were able to work with a very aggressive Sheridan, but given aggressive subordinates he is very dangerous.

Correct, no worries about rank. Some officers were excellent and then promoted beyond their abilities. This is more just put together a "dream team" of your best command structure.

Well, the thread by A.S. Johnston gave me an idea that I thought might make for a good thread. Here is the idea, AS Johnston's post about favorite generals put the idea in my head. Make up your own command of an army of each side. Who you would want in what position. I'll throw out a template to make things simpler. Just put the name of the officer you would love to put in charge of that level and unit. I thought about doing artillery units also, but that is going a bit too far I think, same going for brigades. But if you want, what the heck, throw those out too. I just went on the basic lines of the Eastern armies with the Union army being a tad bigger. Throw in why you would set the army up the way you would. Could make for lively discussion and interesting takes on everyone's views on how to set up each force. Union Army 85,000 Commanding General: 1st Corps Commander: 1st Division Commander: 2nd Division Commander: 3rd Division Commander: 2nd Corps Commander: 1st Division Commander: 2nd Division Commander: 3rd Division Commander: 3rd Corps Commander: 1st Division Commander: 2nd Division Commander: 3rd Division Commander: 4th Corps Commander: 1st Division Commander: 2nd Division Commander: 3rd Division Commander: Cavalry Corps Commander: 1st Division Commander: 2nd Division Commander: Confederate Army 70,000 Confederate Army Commander: 1st Corps Commander: 1st Division Commander: 2nd Division Commander: 3rd Division Commander: 2nd Corps Commander: 1st Division Commander: 2nd Division Commander: 3rd Division Commander: 3rd Corps Commander: 1st Division Commander: 2nd Division Commander: 3rd Division Commander: Cavalry Corps Commander: 1st Division Commander: 2nd Division Commander:

As for the Union I obviously going to say John Buford. Worked his way out of the inspector general's office to lead a brigade of cavalry at 2nd Manassas. Almost beat Robertson's brigade with a brigade he had only led for mere weeks and lacked training or reliable officers. Despite that he blocked Robertson from cutting off Reynold's fighting withdrawal. A major proponent of modern cavalry tactics and was tremendous in use of skirmishers. Only blemish was Stoneman's raid. Then was in constant contact with only 2 of his 3 brigades all the way up to Gettysburg and then all the way back down across the Potomac. He was the only Union officer to be in constant contact with the Confederate forces during the whole stretch. Essentially worked himself to death, but thanks to him Meade always had a clear picture of the Confederate forces and their direction. Died far too soon of pneumonia thanks to his body giving out after a year of being in the saddle constantly while wounded. Grant even remarked that had Buford not died, it is likely Sheridan would not have come east to lead cavalry, but might have replaced Warren in command of the 5th Corps. Other Union General would be George Thomas. Won at Mill Springs and destroyed a Confederate army there. Led troops all through the war and was never credited with a defeat in which he was in charge. Saved the Union at Chickamauga and Chattanooga. Was Sherman's battering ram to Atlanta and then despite his best troops being taken away. He was able to scrounge an army to destroy Hood at Nashville. Then made Wilson's raid possible at the end of the war. All while being a Virginian. Was given a bad rap for moving slowly due to a major back injury incurred just before the war started. Prior, he was an excellent artillerist and cavalryman whom a Lt. Colonel Robert E. Lee had the utmost respect for. For the Confederate side, to name someone different. John B. Gordon, rose through the ranks. Spent everything he had on his men and became the last General on the Southern side with the flair and aggression for a true fight other than Longstreet. Led troops capably throughout the entire war. Then was chosen by Lee to surrender the army. Was a self taught soldier, wounded multiple times and never lost being a gentleman. Ordered Francis Barlow cared for at Gettysburg. Then returned Chamberlain's salute at Appomattox. Led the last major Confederate attacks at Fort Stevens and then made a valiant effort against Sheridan and Griffin in a last gasp. Very forgotten and underrated in my opinion. Wanted to say D.H. Hill, but he had a bad habit of driving away good officers despite being an excellent battlefield leader.

I beg to differ, worst casting decision was having John Wayne play Temujin (Ghengis Khan) in "The Conquerer." The movie also got most of the cast killed of cancer due to the movie being shot on ground that was highly radioactive due to nuclear bomb testing.

Quite correct unfortunately. The Union kept politically backed generals who tended to hit the bottle heavily rather than make a mess politically. Daniel Tyler and Dixon Miles were both accused of drunkenness after just First Bull Run. It would continue until the end of the war with commanders such as Edward Ferrero who would get his troops massacred in the Crater. As Douglass Southall Freeman pointed out in Lee's Lieutenants, if a general crossed Lee or was too fond of the bottle or there issues he would be quickly transferred to less critical areas. Some later returned out of necessity due to lack of competent officers, but most were left behind or sent to other commands who then struggled thanks to them. John Magruder was sent to Texas after he couldn't leave Morphine alone after the Seven Day's battles. Nathan Evans was sent to the Carolina's because of his affinity for the bottle and fighting commanders. He would return as a brigade commander lat in the war. It went through both sides.

I definitely agree with you Mr Hill. Even you fell outside of Petersburg trying to valiantly rally your troops. In many cases the South did take a much higher percentage of the officer casualties as noted by Lee's Lieutenants. Many times it was officers doing just as A.P. Hill did, rallying troops on the defensive on the lines with the troops. Or displayed conspicuously to try and rally their men, and then pop, a rifle takes his life. Or their own troops did the shooting (see Jackson and Longstreet). Many times the Union army was on the offensive so many officers stayed back to help try and coordinate efforts which may have led to fewer casualties. Though it is just as likely that the officers who led from the front fell just as quickly as the Southern ones (Mr. Kearney riding right up to rebel troops in the rain) Also, there were more instances of Confederate generals picked off by cannon balls from the superior Union artillery (see poor Mr. Polk). It would be interesting to see someone go through and assess how each general from each side was killed/wounded and what they were doing to see a deeper look into the question.

I have actually found that there are two ways to crack the nut that is Marye's heights that don't ruin your force. Option A: Swing wide to your right and take the more lightly defended hill and sweep the defenses from the reverse. Dilemma here is the amount of time and exhaustion on your troops to do so. Not always the best if you aren't snappy with your movements. Cavalry can come in handy big time here to help open the engagement and adding enfilade fire anywhere possible. (note, I love using carbine cavalry to devastating effect whenever possible) Option B: 1 quick charge with 3 brigades on the Confederate brigade on their far right (your left). The 1st brigade will not succeed but the 2nd or 3 one always will. I usually build up an assault brigade or two during my play throughs and move them to the Corps I decide to put against Marye's Heights. These are used here, usually as the 2nd or 3rd brigade as I use one for the start to get the rebels out of the entrenchments. Then peel back the layers accordingly. I like to use carbine cavalry to exploit the breech and decimate artillery from the rear. Also its easy to repulse the enemy counter-attack if you utilize the creek and only requires 2-3 somewhat coherent brigades to hold them back easily. Always love using water to ruin an enemy charge.

If you follow Scott's campaigns in Mexico, he generally waited for as much information as he could. This led to a delay before Cerro Gordo, though it led to his victory, it cost time. He paused in front of Mexico City while the enemy fortified. He explored options. His subordinates necessitated his moves. David Twiggs (of the Texas infamy) was a full speed ahead type of General. William Worth was the bookish, probably best tactical commander, yet timid. His volunteer commanders were less reliable. He lost control of his own subordinates outside of Mexico City when Worth changed his orders and assaulted Molino Del Rey. Twiggs suddenly grew cautions and the Volunteers slammed and lost heavily due to his inability to control his subordinates. It is likely Scott may have taken even more time than McDowell. Perhaps Johnston still arrives, but Scott calls off the attack and assumes a defensive stance and gathered Patterson's command and forced a battle later.

In all reality the only major difference between McDowell's planning and Scott's planning in Mexico was the thoroughness of his recon. Scott made do with few cavalry and used his engineers when the cavalry were overstretched to do the job. Scott likely would have done more checking on the Confederate position than McDowell. But, that is likely due to McDowell never leading men in battle prior to the Civil War where Scott had learned the hard was back in the War of 1812. The biggest problem with the what if question here is the arrival of Johnston's forces. McDowell had Beaureguard on the run, with a classic Scott end-around, until Johnston's troops stabilized the left. Scott was not able to control Patterson's army in the Valley so it would have still allowed Johnston to arrive at the time needed. The biggest mistake was placing a man like Patterson in charge in the Valley. What they needed was someone who would have been aggressive enough to stall Johnston. Unfortunately much of the remaining high command in the US army was scattered and trying to get all the veteran regular troops where they were needed and not on the field of battle. But, would a Sumner have been better? Wool? There is no way to know. McClellan was in Ohio complaining about everything and many regular officers were simply trying to make it to the theaters of war. So, to me the great what if of the early days is what if Johnston never arrives at Bull Run?

Usually when I played it I made my main push through the woods on the left. While keeping a force ready to flank the Confederates when they readjusted. A nice thing is keeping a brigade or even a few units of skirmishers or dismounted cavalry to finish an attack en echelon and when the Rebs have focused their whole strength to stopping your main push you can swing around and slap them in the rear. Attacks en echelon in this game are tremendous.

When you look at it the largest mistake in my opinion that the Confederacy made was changing their capital to Richmond. It essentially forced Lee to fight the quick response defense that he used. Had the capital stayed in Alabama it would have made a much larger buffer zone and thus become more of a difficult location to capture and would have allowed more freedom of movement for Lee and other Confederate commanders in general. Essentially, I for one believe that by the time Lee took command of the Confederate forces the chance to win a victory was gone. The best chance was lost by Beauregard after 1st Bull Run when the federal army was in disarray and the fortifications were not complete around Washington and no garrison to speak of. Had the Confederacy followed up their victory it would have likely been their best chance. When fighting an industrial behemoth the best thing is for quick victories to keep their strength from overwhelming you. Look at Japan vs USA during WWII, 6 months of Japanese victories ultimately overwhelmed by American industrialization. Unfortunately, or fortunately depending on your view, the Southern arms were split in leadership at the time and the forces under questionable leadership in many areas. Much of the ANV's right flank never engaged and could have followed up the Union retreat. Would have been a sight to see with an energetic Longstreet leading the charge (this was before his family succumbed to Scarlet Fever in the winter of 61-62 that took much of his zeal and brought on the moodiness). The Federal army was a mess, Tyler, Heintzelman, and Hunter's divisions were a mess. Runyon's was a motley assortment of militia and Dixon Miles was drunk. What few regulars there were on hand (300 cavalry, 300 marines, 400 infantry) would not have been able to stem the tide. I believe that even had Lee won Gettysburg it is likely he never would have been able to take Washington or subdue the Federal government as the ability of the Federals to reinforce Washington from New York, PA, Ohio etc was something that could suddenly bring about 15,000+ fresh troops in weeks notice and with the fortifications that Washington already had by 1863 he would have had to set up a fruitless siege. When you think of what Lee was faced with and the logistical and political problems he faced it is remarkable what he was able to do. I recommend reading Douglass Southall Freeman's work called "Lee's Lieutenants" to get a good feel for the command problems he faced. The South had a great chance as the 16,000 US regulars were spread across the country, far from the zones of early combat and the industrialization wasn't ready yet. Had they struck decisively and quickly they would have stood a puncher's chance.

The important point to remember is to look at the fact that nearly every war ever entered into the Armies were prepared for the previous war(s) and not the new one. We dissect everything In the past beyond any sense of realism. The blitz idea was formed long before the Germans or Prussians. It essentially used the tank as heavy cavalry of old. An concentrated attack at important strategic points and then followed up on by light cavalry that encircles the enemy that can not get away. Then the infantry hammers away at the enemy. Old ways of war adapted to modern wars is the explanation of basically any new breakthrough. Sun Tzu can be applied today, as can Jomini and Clauswitz and many others. What one has to do is analyze what they bring to the table and try to decipher how one can apply them with new tools. The side that does it the quickest or most efficient is generally the one who wins the day. I heard a great quote by Woodrow Wilson back during the First World War, before the United States entered. He said that with the state of modern war no nation is left untouched. When one remembers that we can see how the world has changed in the past hundred and fifty years. It is remarkable when one thinks that no outside nation got directly involved by sending troops or intervening. In the modern world when a Civil War breaks out everyone has to have a hand in the pot and push their ideologies. Leaves one to wonder how things would have been different.

First gun I actually flinched from firing was a Sharps chambered to the government .45-70. The Quigley Down Under Buffalo Gun, not necessarily the carbine of yours. Maybe I'll have to upload when I break out my old Colt's Dragoon revolver. If I had to choose a civil war era revolver to carry, after using both the Colt Dragoon, Colt old Army and Remington, I would definitely carry the Remington. Have to love interchangeable cylinders.

Make full use of flanking abilities to help lower your cost in losses. Use Nicodemus Hill as a route to flank with a brigade or two of infantry. Then if you add a 3rd from your first set of reinforcements it makes for a nice sweeping movement that avoids much of the best defensive positions around the church. Then make sure to flank the southern flank of the Sunken Road. Or advance troops across with artillery support and let them try to hammer you and weaken their front in other areas. Hit in one area and the game accommodates and pulls troops away. Long story short, believe in Lee and turn the flank.

In truth when one looks at each side's uniform specifications there was mostly a difference in trim when it came to Northern Units. The Infantry uniforms were designed to have light blue trim. The artillery red. The cavalry yellow, the dragoons orange, and the mounted rifles green (though these were all re-designated as cavalry in 1861). In many cases the Union army was rebranded within the first year and a half of the war and eccentric uniforms removed unless someone else chose to foot the bill. The black hats of the Iron Brigade were gathered from extras from the regular units. The Southern arms had a much wider array and differing view. Many of the units were initially raised and clothed by their individual states or leaders. This was generally phased out due to the cost and inability of the south to provide that kind of differentiation to its units. This was the side that preferred to color the whole kepi for artillery officers and so on. On both sides there were different uniforms allowed, so long as the government did not have to foot the bill. Many a fortune was spent clothing a unit for its first engagement and then the person who funded the unit went broke trying to keep the regiment clothed and thereby the differing clothing was done away with. While I appreciate the idea of the uniform craze for a game I think this brings up a major argument that has been going on in various threads in regards to the game. The argument is generally perfect historical accuracy vs. better game play There are so many things that can be argued on both sides of that argument. As a historian of the U.S. Cavalry I would love to see that part more historically accurate, yet having played other massive strategy games in the past I understand the difficulty of balancing historical accuracy with gameplay. I think the best way to address the uniform question would be DLC later once the game is finished. In the armory screen you could purchase different uniforms at a higher cost. As for the unit formations, again while I agree with you in principle, allowing more flexibility would be awesome. I believe the game scale would have to be drastically redrawn with maps remade to a different scale for it to work correctly. There were a couple of the old Bull Run games that did a great idea of formation moving yet they did not continue the games long enough to make full campaigns. Though it could be possible, I don't know if the game is ready for that idea yet.

The big difference between the Volunteer units and militia units is federalization. Many militia companies and regiments were federalized into volunteer regiments. Lincoln, Cameron, Stanton, and Scott had learned a valuable lesson from the past. The reasoning behind this is that it took away one of the major problems seen in the War of 1812 and in the South during the Civil War where militia troops would refuse to campaign anywhere but in their home state. This can also be seen in the Gettysburg campaign and Antietam Campaign. It was very often that in every invasion that the U.S. would try against Canada the majority of the army would refuse to cross the border and thus destroyed any offensive's real power. To avoid this the federal government federalized militia regiments to make them part of the national army, not just a state's force. Some militia units were allowed to be kept in states that could see a potential invasion. In other situations heavy artillery units were the only regular troops left in many a northern state if it was not a border or frontier state. In the South many governors were loathe to release militia commands to aid the major field armies which could have added tens of thousands of men to Lee, Johnston, Smith, Bragg, etc. Many were afraid of a Northern invasion or cavalry raid that would slice through their little kingdoms and wreak havoc. As the war went along it was found that militia commands or state commands were great places to stash politically appointed officers who proved inept under fire or caused drama with a commanding general. Too bad they couldn't send Burnside on a sunny vacation to California after the Fredericksburg debacle

I really have to say one of the hardest things to do in the game is to launch coordinated assaults. I kind of wish you could give orders to a corps or division to try and hold or seize a location rather than having to micromanage the assaults. Though it is much more realistic in being very difficult to launch a coordinated assault, it would make Cold Harbor much easier. And any attack on an entrenched enemy for that matter.

To break it down, much of the army was built up of men fresh off the boat or had no where else to turn for the enlisted ranks. These men often knew little english to start out or were part of failed revolutions in Europe and all they knew was how to fight. Much of the officer ranks were populated by West Point trained officers by the time the Civil War rolled around. The upward mobility in the peacetime army moved about as fast as a glacier. Robert E. Lee after his West Point Graduation in 1829 did not receive the full rank of Lt. Colonel until 1855 when two new cavalry regiments were created. It was usually you had to wait until someone retired, resigned or died to advance in ranks. Hence why Jackson was no more than a Major and Lil Mac was but a Captain despite each having over a decade in the service (Jackson rose 3 ranks in Mexico and then never promoted after). Fortunately it was not like the English system where commissions were bought and sold by the landed gentry, see the charge of the light brigade and the general English cavalry debacles of the Crimean War to see how that goes. Wellington even disliked using his cavalry at Waterloo as the commander bought his generalship rather than earned it. The commissions were usually men of experience in military or pathfinding expeditions (or the rare political appointment) out west if they were not West Point graduates. The army began to focus on West Point as a training ground when Winfield Scott began putting more and more emphasis on the institution. It was the Mexican-American War where many a later Civil War general learned how to lead men under fire. T.J. Jackson with his little artillery section, Grant his infantry company, Lee leading scouting parties etc. Many other officers found themselves learning their trade in the numerous campaigns against the Natives throughout the western U.S. Lee once remarked that John Bell Hood was one of the few men who seemed to enjoy chasing Comanches across Texas. J.E.B. Stuart was wounded fighting on the plains. David Gregg would face his first combat as a company commander in a fighting withdrawal in the Pacific Northwest and saving multiple companies of cavalry (and protecting Charles S. Winder's howitzers in the meantime). I could go on and on but this makes for a general basis.

I believe the best way to put it is simply this: Officers were initially elected by them men in the regiment. Quite often they were the ones who were popular enough to recruit the unit in the beginning, all but ensuring their election as commanding officer. Other times it was the militia captain who brought his company in and then stayed a captain in the regiment when the company was accepted. This ran into problems with how long were the appointments for and if the person elected was actually up to the task. It meant many an officer was ill at ease to discipline their men or risk working them too hard. Not all states chose to set up their regiments this way though. This was done away with in 1862 in the Union army. The reason it was done away with is that there was an extreme number of problems with the officer elections electing sub-standard officers. Instead Governors were allowed to name the commanding officers (usually the Colonel, Lt Colonel and often Majors) and lower officers could still be elected. In this case many of the Governors chose to look for men with West Point training or military experience to lead the regiments. They would look for men who were born in the state or lived in the state for a good amount of time. This way they could put a solid man in charge and then perhaps hide a political appointee in another post of the regiment. A few examples: 20th Maine: Adelbert Ames was named its actual first commander. West Point class of 1861 and veteran of early Civil War campaigns. J.L. Chamberlain was appointed 2nd in command due to his intellectual abilities. 1st Minnesota (for Mr. Mercanto): Willis Gorman named commander. Mexican American War regimental commander and veteran of Buena Vista and Humantela. 2nd Minnesota: Horatio Van Cleve named commander. West Point class of 1831. 3rd Minnesota: Henry C. Lester, 1st MN veteran As the war went along the number of veteran officers for each state increased rapidly and therefor many new regiments called officers from other regiments who had earned distinction in action to lead the new regiments. This streamlined the approach and led to better officer selection. In the Southern Arms, the election process carried on much longer and was eventually done away with also because too many solid officers were ousted for being too tough on their troops. In some cases A.S. Johnston, J.E. Johnston, and R.E. Lee all used measures to circumvent the idea. For instance the Southern Army adopted a separate "Regular Army" commission to ensure that veteran officers of proper education would not be superseded by political appointees. The regular army rank always superseded the volunteer rank in the Southern Army. An officer with a regular army rank of Colonel would always outrank an officer in the volunteer or militia with the rank of Colonel. Made for a mess at times but it did keep political zealots on the back burner whenever possible.

Actually a great example is to look in Joshua Chamberlain's autobiography. During the final campaigns in Virginia he talked about seeing veteran troops, men he had seen stand up to some of the worst of the war break and run to the rear. As the war went on many of the commanders who served on the front lines for long periods of time cared less about soldiers who broke during a battle and ran to the rear so long as it didn't ruin the performance of the remainder of the unit. It was generally known by many commanders that those veterans who ran due to battle fatigue or what we know today as PTSD would return eventually to their units once the episodes had passed. Chamberlain talked of bringing up his brigade past men who had run from a fight and were huddled under cover. He and his troops merely passed them by. I think this was the best thing they could have done in the time period they served. They knew far less about what the men were going through psychologically and most just called it various names. Chamberlain and many officers realized that veteran units rarely had cowards or shirkers (see Armistad's speech in Gettysburg for a good explanation) and would do their utmost and sometimes it wasn't what it might have been otherwise, see the faltering of the 2nd Corps at Spotsylvania Courthouse when many a man was content to stay on the taken earthworks when a concerted effort might have broken the Southern center. The Union army tried to alleviate the homesickness with offering leaves during the winter months and would offer leaves for men who re-enlisted after their term was up. Not all units served from Day 1 until the end. Even Mr. Mercanto's venerable 1st Minnesota saw their time up at the end of their 3 year enlistments. Those who re-enlisted got a furlough to visit home for a time and this was the same for any unit. When the 27th New York went home after their 2 year papers were up many re-enlisted but after their furloughs were put into other units. Not a perfect system, but it was better than that of many a southern soldier. Many of the units would have their élan broken at various times due to stress. Not just in the Overland campaign. For instance the Union 1st Corps is a great example of a unit crushed by prolonged exposure to fighting. Essentially from 2nd Bull Run through the Mine Run campaign it was virtually ruined. Part of it fought on the Peninsula and suffered heavily. The other two divisions skirmished with the Confederates in Central Virginia until John Pope pulled them under his command. They fought well under McDowell at Brawner's farm and 2nd Bull Run. Then Corps underwent a command change with Joe Hooker taking the helm due to Pope's attacks on McDowell. The Corps again engaged at South Mountain and finally at Antietam. At Antietam their numbers had shrunk considerably and their leadership was strained arguably to the point they were not really an effective offensive force. Despite it they still pushed Jackson back to Dunker Church only to fall apart. Had they been at their best as they had been at Brawner's Farm or Gettysburg when they had received rest it is likely they would have accomplished much more against Jackson's flank. Then after their ordeal at Gettysburg the Corps only continued to exist for the rest of the year until Grant folded what was left of their units into other Corps. Another example to look into would be Forrest's attempts to stop Wilson's raid late in the war. His men were so worn through that they barely stood a chance even when defending good entrenchments.

Well vren55 it is from any multitude of reasons. A big thing is the leadership of the brigade. This doesn't only mean the brigade commander but also the regimental commanders. The training varied wildly from regiment to regiment depending on political appointees, professional soldiers, retired soldiers and so on. Those who had served in front line units (infantry, cavalry, artillery) generally fared better in building their regiments than did many engineers. Though not to say some engineer backgrounded officers didn't build great brigades. Not all regiments utilized the same manuals in training and tactics. Some looked to ideas over seas and others to American manuals which were usually translated from other languages (predominantly French). Also those who realized that the most important part was drill and weapons proficiency tended to far better than regiments built to look pretty on parade. Many times great brigades were put together by happenstance and fortunately given good brigade commanders who could make adjustments. Creating a great command is much like creating a good team. Excellent leadership required that is fully invested in the unit, not just focused on their own advancement.

"Colonel, do you see those colors? Take them!" ~Winfield Scott Hancock to William Colvill, July 2nd 1863 Cemetery Ridge