Where's our gosh darn Corps General gone?

[Husserl]

OOB and Generals improvements are in our to do list.

[Seminole]

OOB and Generals improvements are in our to do list.

 

To the other question, when all of II Corps brigades are on the map, should the Corps commander (Hancock?) also be on the map?  I'm not sure if that was a bug, or if was a design decision to only have two generals on map for the three corps that were present (play balance, etc.).

[David Fair]

R.E.B. Blunt, You stated, "In the real battle Longstreet was offered the Command for the attack, but refused it cause he knew from the start it would not work. He delegated it down to General John Bell Hood. But he was wounded in the Battle for Round Top and then was delegated down to Hoods most capable Divisional Commander Pickett. Hence why it is called Pickett's Charge."

 

I'd suggest you take a second look at reliable historically accurate sources regarding Pickett's Charge.  General Pickett's name has been lent to a charge in which he commanded about one-third of the men and was under the supervision of his corps commander throughout. 

 

Longstreet was ordered to attack the center of the Union line at Lee's council of war on the night of July 2.  Longstreet was in command of Pickett's, Pettigrew's, and Trimble's Divisions with two of Anderson's brigades protecting the right flank.  Pickett's Division was fresh and did lead the charge.  Modern historian are frequently using the name Pickett-Prettigrew-Trimble Assault (or less frequently, Longstreet's Assault).

[R.E.B.Blunt]

R.E.B. Blunt, You stated, "In the real battle Longstreet was offered the Command for the attack, but refused it cause he knew from the start it would not work. He delegated it down to General John Bell Hood. But he was wounded in the Battle for Round Top and then was delegated down to Hoods most capable Divisional Commander Pickett. Hence why it is called Pickett's Charge."

 

I'd suggest you take a second look at reliable historically accurate sources regarding Pickett's Charge.  General Pickett's name has been lent to a charge in which he commanded about one-third of the men and was under the supervision of his corps commander throughout. 

 

Longstreet was ordered to attack the center of the Union line at Lee's council of war on the night of July 2.  Longstreet was in command of Pickett's, Pettigrew's, and Trimble's Divisions with two of Anderson's brigades protecting the right flank.  Pickett's Division was fresh and did lead the charge.  Modern historian are frequently using the name Pickett-Prettigrew-Trimble Assault (or less frequently, Longstreet's Assault).

 

Yes but you are missing some key things here and drawing conclusions that are not true.

 

It is true that Longstreet was in command of the Attack called Picketts charge.

 

But the battle plan itself was devised by Pickett and the Brigade Generals. Longstreet was distraught and wanted no part of the attack. He knew almost prophetically what the outcome already would be.

 

The next in line for the attack was Hood but because he was wounded the leadership role fell to Pickett. Hence why its called Pickett charge.

 

I have no idea what you are trying to argue about...

[David Fair]

R.E.B. Blunt, let's just say our discussion is about trying to get some facts accurately aligned with the historical record.

Lee's order to Ewell on July 1 was to take Culp's Hill "if practical". Lee did not order Ewell to launch a "full attack" as you've stated incorrectly above. If Lee wanted a full scale assault on Culp's Hill he had the authority and responsibility to order a "full attack". Lee did not. The responsibility lies squarely with Lee; not his subordinates. Ewell probed the Union defenses and given the state of his corps determined that it was not "practical" to take Culp's Hill.

Glad to see you've acknowledged Longstreet (not Pickett) was in command of Pickett's Charge.

Your current claim that, "...the [Pickett's Charge] battle plan itself was devised by Pickett and the Brigade Generals.." is inaccurate as well.

Lee was disappointed with his corps commanders' performance on July 2. Lee stated, "the failure on the second day had been due to a lack of coordination". Lee did not hold a council of war with his corps commanders on the night of July 2. Nor did he hold a council of war with the division commanders, or with Pickett specifically. When A.P. Hill reported to General Lee on the night of July 2nd, Hill reported that Lee said to him, "It is well, General [Hill],...Everything is well."

In the early hours of July 3 Lee visited Longstreet [not Pickett] and ordered him to "attack again the next morning" according to the "general plan of July 2nd" (the "general plan" was from Lee's war council that he held with his corps commanders the night of July 1). Longstreet stated, “General, I have had my scouts out all night, and I find that you still have an excellent opportunity to move around to the right of Meade’s army and maneuver him into attacking us.”

Lee would have nothing of a defensive battle. Lee insisted “The enemy is there,” he said, pointing northeast as he spoke, “and I am going to strike him.”

Longstreet responded, “General, I have been a soldier all of my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position.”

Lt. Col. E.P. Alexander who was present for the discussion confirms Longstreet's statement.

See: http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/gettysburg/gettysburg-history-articles/e-p-alexander-at-gettysburg.html

Lee then consulted with Brigadier General William Wofford [not Pickett]. Wofford's brigade had help crush Sickle’s III Corps at the Peach Orchard and had nearly gotten to the crest of Cemetery Ridge on July 2nd. Wofford had to break off his attack when he realized that there were no units to support him. Lee asked if he could “go there again” to which Wofford replied “No, General I think not.” Lee asked “why not” and Wofford explained: “General, the enemy have had all night to intrench and reinforce. I had been pursuing a broken enemy, and now the situation is very different.”

Pickett arrived with his division on the night of July 2. Pickett did not meet with Lee on the night of July 2 nor did Pickett and the other division commanders involved in the July 3rd charge "plan" Pickett's Charge.

Walter Taylor of Lee’s staff wrote to his sister a few days after Pickett's Charge that the “position was impregnable to any such force as ours”. When Pickett received his orders Pickett’s brigadier Richard Garnett remarked “this is a desperate thing to attempt” and Lewis Armistead said “the slaughter will be terrible.”

Pickett’s fresh division was ordered to lead the attack supported by Johnston Pettigrew commanding the wounded Harry Heth’s division of Hill’s Third Corps and Isaac Trimble commanding two brigades of Pender’s division, Trimble having been given command just minutes prior to the artillery bombardment. How could Trimble have possibly "planned" Pickett's Charge? Note that few of the commanders had commanded alongside each other before July 3rd. Trimble having just recovered from wounds had never been with his men. Pettigrew had been given command when Pender was wounded was still new and relatively untested, and Pickett’s three brigadiers and their brigades had never fought together. Two of the divisions had never served under Longstreet.

About noon Longstreet told Alexander that when Pickett was ready Longstreet would give the signal for the CSA guns to open fire. Alexander was ordered to take one of General Pickett's staff with him, during the artillery barrage. Longstreet delegated the timing of the attack to E.P. Alexander. Alexander was responsible for "...selecting the moment for Pickett's advance to begin". Alexander reports that he found Pickett, "entirely sanguine of success in the charge and was only congratulating himself on the opportunity to lead [NOT COMMAND] the attack. "I [Alexander] had fully intended giving Pickett the order to advance as soon as I saw that our guns had gotten their ranges, say, in ten or fifteen minutes, but the enemy's fire was so severe that when that time had elapsed I could not make up my mind to order the infantry out into a fire which I did not believe they could face, for so long a charge, in such a hot sun, tired as they already were by the march from Chambersburg. I accordingly waited in hopes that our fire would produce some visible effect, or something turn up to make the situation more hopeful; but fifteen minutes more passed without any change in the situation, the fire on neither side slackening for a moment. Even then I could not bring myself to give a peremptory order to Pickett to advance, but feeling that the critical moment would soon pass, I wrote him a note to this effect: "If you are coming at all you must come immediately or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened materially, and at least 18 guns are still firing from the Cemetery itself."

Alexander continued, "I afterwards heard what followed its receipt from members of the staff of both Generals Pickett and Longstreet, as follows: Pickett on receiving it galloped over to General Longstreet, who was not far off, and showed it to General L. The latter read it and made no reply. (General Longstreet himself, speaking of it afterwards, said that he knew the charge had to be made, but could not bring himself to give the order.) General Pickett then said: "General, shall I advance? "Longstreet turned around in his saddle and would not answer. Pickett immediately saluted, and said, "I am going to lead my division forward, sir," and galloped off to put it in motion; on which General L. left his staff and rode out alone to my position."

"General Longstreet rode up alone, having seen Pickett and left his staff as above. I showed him the situation, and said I only feared I could not give Pickett the help I wanted to, my ammunition being very low, and the seven guns under Richardson having been taken off. General Longstreet spoke up promptly: "Go and stop Pickett right where he is, and replenish your ammunition." I answered that the ordnance wagons had been nearly emptied, replacing expenditures of the day before, and that not over 20 rounds to the gun were left -- too little to accomplish much -- and that while this was being done the enemy would recover from the effect of the fire we were now giving him. His reply was: "I don't want to make this charge; I don't believe it can succeed. I would stop Pickett now, but that General Lee has ordered it and expects it."

The facts above are well documented by primary sources personally involved in the action. You are giving Pickett far too much credit [or blame] for the Pickett's Charge debacle. Pickett's Charge was Lee's plan. The gallantry of this suicidal effort was carried out with extreme courage and elan by the men involved. The decision and planning and responsibility fall on General Lee through General Longstreet who planned and ordered the charge.

I'm not clear what you mean when you say I've missed "some key things". Nor have I drawn any conclusions on my own. I'm simply documenting primary sources that demonstrate that your statements above are inaccurate.

Please share your sources regarding Pickett's involvement in planning Pickett's Charge. I'm very interested to learn more about Gettysburg and I'm unaware of any sources that supports your statements regarding Pickett's Charge.

[R.E.B.Blunt]

Your current claim that, "...the [Pickett's Charge] battle plan itself was devised by Pickett and the Brigade Generals.." is inaccurate as well.

 

 

The orders came down from Lee to Longstreet to attack the center. Hood would of been the next in line to take command but because of his injuries Pickett took command of the attack. Pickett did draw up the attack plans with his generals as I said before. The plans for this attack, to attack the patch of trees of at the base of the stoney wall were done by Pickett and his Generals just before the attack. Lee and Longstreet gave the orders to attack not how to specifically do it. I stand by my previous statement.

 

 

I'm not clear what you mean when you say I've missed "some key things". Nor have I drawn any conclusions on my own. I'm simply documenting primary sources that demonstrate that your statements above are inaccurate.

Please share your sources regarding Pickett's involvement in planning Pickett's Charge. I'm very interested to learn more about Gettysburg and I'm unaware of any sources that supports your statements regarding Pickett's Charge.

 

Pickett's Charge: The Last Attack at Gettysburg

By: Earl J Hess

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Among other books I own but this one is the most detailed.

 

The key things in the previous statement that have I have been trying to say but have fallen on deaf ears.

 

Make a few things clear I never said "you drew your own conclusions", only that you missed some details.

 

Details being Lee gave Longstreet the orders to attack. Longstreet being very depressed of the thought of the attack. The Attack would of been handed down to Hood but was wounded in the attack on the Round Top. This fell on the shoulders of Pickett. Pickett then just before the battle set the plan of the attack with his Brigade Generals, to mass attack the group of trees at the base of the stoney wall. Hence the battle plan itself WAS created by Pickett. Why it is also called Pickett's Charge. Not Lee's Folly or Longstreet's mistake or whatever name.

 

Also I am sure you have full sources for your statements you have obviously spent a lot of time copying and pasting trying to write this post to discount me. Be nice if you shared your sources just as you asked me to.

 

Seriously I have no idea what you are trying to prove.

I stand by All my previous statements.

Can we move on now?

[Seminole]

The history is great, but probably deserves another thread.

 

Anyone know about my earlier question on corps commanders?

Is it normal to have entire corps without their commander in some scenarios.  I'm not sure if this is a bug, or intended.  Can anyone shed light?

[David Fair]

A.P. Hill does not show up on July 2 in the morning (Phase 4) in the capture Seminary Ridge Scenario.

I've noticed Union II Corps commander doesn't show up in some of the scenarios.

[David Fair]

R.E.B. Blunt - now you've got your history right - Lee's Folly at Gettysburg. Aptly named! I never thought I'd see a confession like this from a man with the stars and bars on his avatar.

Thanks for the book reference. I'm genuinely interested in your resources. Knowledge is its own reward - there is nothing to prove only things to understand. Not sure I understand the deaf comment because I'm keenly interested in what you are saying; but, your demeanor seems consistent with your other posts to others in the forum. C'est la guerre.

Pickett's Charge is called Pickett's Charge both to glorify the Virginians at the "High Water Mark" and to make Lee appear infallible. Pickett's Charge was not called Pickett's Charge until about 1875 in conjunction with the Lost Cause myth. Note that Pickett died in 1875 and blamed Lee for the planning and ordering the charge at Gettysburg. John Mosby quoted Pickett as stating, "That old man destroyed my division" though this quote may not be true. What is clear is that Pickett never forgave Lee for the charge and was bitter about Lee for the remainder of Pickett's life. These facts don't align well with "Lee's infallibility" myth.

As requested here's a Virginia historical site to consider which references Earl J. Hess:

http://encyclopediavirginia.org/pickett_s_charge#start_entry

Pickett himself died in 1875, but his third and final wife, LaSalle Corbell Pickett, soon took to reinventing herself as an author, lecturer, and Lost Cause apologist, traveling the country to spread the good news of her husband's "grand charge." In Pickett and His Men (1913), she described the division's march across that open field: "Friend and foe looked on in wondering awe," she wrote. "A thrill of admiration held the waiting enemy silent and motionless as they watched this grand and unsurpassable display of Virginia's valor." Much of what she wrote about the man she called "my hero-soldier" has been shown either to have been plagiarized or fabricated; what mattered to her adoring audiences, however, was that she told a story that flattered all sides. "Virginia's valor" is acknowledged and appreciated by the Union men's "wondering awe." The North won, but in an act of reconciliation that only the story makes possible, the South is also redeemed. When LaSalle Corbell Pickett came to Boston in 1919, the band played "Dixie" and two thousand northerners, remarkably, stood out of respect. (African Americans were largely left out of this national reconciliation.) Voila - birth of an American myth.

The Lost Cause view of Pickett's Charge has survived, more or less, for the last hundred years. Ken Burns's 1990 public television documentary, The Civil War, left "uninformed viewers with the impression that George E. Pickett's division of Virginians made up all, rather than considerably less than half, of the assaulting column," the historian Gary W. Gallagher has written, "and that Pickett, rather than James Longstreet, oversaw the Confederate effort." Gallagher then adds a wry, parenthetical aside: "(LaSalle Corbell Pickett would no doubt cheer Burns's decision to make her husband the central figure of the famous assault.)" Shaara's novel and the subsequent film adaptation also tell a heroic tale, with Shaara (and Burns) relying in part on letters between Pickett and his wife that Gallagher has helped to prove that she largely fabricated.

Just as late in the twentieth century the Lost Cause lost most of its academic support, so did historians begin to challenge the traditional narrative of Pickett's Charge. Pickett's Charge in History and Memory (1997) by Carol Reardon and Pickett's Charge—The Last Attack at Gettysburg (2001) by Earl J. Hess attempted to untangle history and memory. They argued that the struggle to shape the memory of Pickett's Charge obscured its history, devalued the role of non-Virginians, and exaggerated the attack's importance in the context of the war.

That this glorious disaster has come to be known as "Pickett's Charge"—when Pickett commanded only half the men and did not plan the assault—suggests that the Virginians had the upper hand [in promoting the post-war Lost Cause myth and Virginia's central role].

The misnomer of Pickett's Charge is the moral equivalent of calling Soult's attack at Austerlitz "Vandamme's Charge". Napoleon planned, Soult ordered, and Vandamme executed the attack just as Lee planned, Lonstreet ordered, and Pickett executed the attack [along with the other division commanders who were each given marching orders].

[Jethro]

To the other question, when all of II Corps brigades are on the map, should the Corps commander (Hancock?) also be on the map?  I'm not sure if that was a bug, or if was a design decision to only have two generals on map for the three corps that were present (play balance, etc.).

 

I had the same problem.  Check the VPs.  Units can get lost under the VP value.  That's where mine was hiding, anway.

[Nick Thomadis]

Just for info everybody, we will offer more distinguishable General appearance possibly in the next patch.

[Teutomatos]

Actually this is something we would like to improve and we need your opinions about the best way.

Some ideas are the following:

1) Improve Generals sprites (pending) to be more special looking

2) Make Fonts of Generals a different color to be more distinquishable

3) Have a special "General" button to toggle between your generals 

 

Any other proposal can help.

Sticking the thread.

 

 It's not a real problem.

 

 The best improvement concern eventualy to affect "a choosen" an initial tactical design for a troops assembly ( without wordplay ) under a general command. Line, several lines, line refused left, or right, triangle, arrow

So allocation of general and its identification will not be a problem

 

 Because actualy, general is supposed to restor morale or cohesion, but we can't see and appreciate "the cohesion" factor. Except when moral fall down, and a general is not enough to contain a disband unit.

 By this way to command a formation design, your gonna restor a common visual use for a géneral.

[Feretier]

I don't know if you guys decided yet but i suggest an animated flag. So it would be more option 1.

[MikeK]

Assuming divisional and corps commanders, I suggest Corps commander icons with name/number and portrait on the map edge which, when clicked, do not deselect the unit (unless the icon is double-clicked, which selects the Corps commander ) but make the location of the Corps commander  and divisional commanders very obvious with overlarge, easily clicked symbols, and use a different Corps color and secondary division color for each division commanders (e.g., one mix for 1st, another for 2nd, etc.). At the same time, highlight the units of the corps by their respective division color scheme on the map, and show the command radius of each. 

 

This solves the problem of finding commanders and the problem of getting corps and divisions intermixed in the battle.

 

One might add a quick formation button or option to recall and form up a division in a standard single or double line with its guns etc., but that gets into another topic. 

 

I read that the Corps commander bonus effect is reduced for forces outside his corps, and assume division commanders will be more limited. This motivates the grouping of forces by corps and a tool would be helpful.

[Don't Escrow Taxes]

Recently I had a scenario where I was using III Corps general to run up and down line to invigorate my boys and one of those damned annoying rouge union skirmisher regiments caused my general to retreat off the map, irrecoverably.  III Corps still got up and we swept the yanks off the field.

 

But that was a bummer about him running off the map for good

 

 

Edit:  Longstreet filled in well.  3-star general does provide a good bit of morale to units outside his Corps.

 

Edit:  I still say the easiest way to distinguish generals would be to have their flags flash or pulsate like a that of a unit about to rout, but on a slow repeat, and perhaps a darker (or brighter) color

[David Fair]

Pulsating generals - fine as an option - but man that sounds annoying as a permanent feature.  

 

Corps Commander HQ's carried unique Corps HQ flags.  

Can't these be used to keep history tangential to the game design?

 

Just a thought...

[MikeK]

Curious about the Corps without Corps commanders in some of the serial engagements. Defending Seminary Ridge on day 3 (against a very much weakened Confederate army, I, II, and XI Corps have their commanders, but III and V do not. (Matters little, since Pickett's Division advances to the opposing slope and stands there under bombardment  from about 16 batteries until the clock runs out. I need do nothing - though I adjust gun positions for better fields of fire just to fine tune things). A large battery under Nelson bombards the extreme right of the potential assault zone, so not helpful. The troops should remain on the reverse slope. Rebels are outnumbered significantly. Losses 24 Federal to 1835 Secesh  Epic Victory in "Forced Across the Barrier of Seminary Ridge."  AI was random-no way to know what it was?

[RichardMcCor]

I'm frustrated about the commanders as well. Some exist and some do not. Some are mentioned when new troops come in and never appear. Sometimes the text says a division and sometimes 3 brigades. I guess if i had an actual order of battle i could interpret the info but i think for a game i need a little more info to allow us folks with little ACW background to understand it all.

 

Like "here comes Early's division , part of IV corp, consisting of 4 brigades commanded by armistad, X, Y and Z"

[Captain Orso]

I think the best way to have on over-view of your forces is to have something giving you just that. A popup page with the Order of Battle (OOB) on the field at that time, with perhaps those formations yet to arrive with an estimate of their arrival. Double click on a unit or leader to close the page or have it move to the side and center the screen over that unit or leader.

 

With a leader selected, press a Keyboard Shortcut to have all the units under that commander highlighted (very noticeably) so the player can have a good view of units belonging to that command. Maybe have rays going out from that leader so the player has a way of following them to find units which may have gotten lost and mixed in with units under other leaders.

 

It would probably also not be bad to have the status of units displayed on the OOB page so the player could quickly recognize units with very low moral/condition and those with high moral/condition, which could be used to replace units that should be move from the front line to recover.

[Husserl]

In the upcoming update there is a detailed OoB included. Also in "decision room" a map has been added for each decision along with the existing text description where you will able to see the deployment of the player side and a generic reference about that of the AI. 

 

If a Corps is partly present in a battle, the General may not be present for that Corps. 

 

With a leader selected, press a Keyboard Shortcut to have all the units under that commander highlighted (very noticeably) so the player can have a good view of units belonging to that command. Maybe have rays going out from that leader so the player has a way of following them to find units which may have gotten lost and mixed in with units under other leaders.

 

 

If you select a General, all the units under his command will be highlighted. Moreover, if you double click on him, (only) the units that are currently inside his command radius will be grouped.

[Captain Orso]

In the upcoming update there is a detailed OoB included. Also in "decision room" a map has been added for each decision along with the existing text description where you will able to see the deployment of the player side and a generic reference about that of the AI. 

 

If a Corps is partly present in a battle, the General may not be present for that Corps.

Looking forward to seeing the update.

 

If you select a General, all the units under his command will be highlighted. Moreover, if you double click on him, (only) the units that are currently inside his command radius will be grouped.

Yes,

1. I'm red-green color blind. The green feet are a. not easy to see for me, and b. cannot be seen if a unit is outside the view of the map, in which case the unit is lost to its command.

2. I'm not sure, but doesn't double-clicking a leader simply group all units within the command radius of a leader and not just his own?

[Husserl]

1. I'm red-green color blind. The green feet are a. not easy to see for me, and b. cannot be seen if a unit is outside the view of the map, in which case the unit is lost to its command.

 

 

I am very sorry, didn't know. Your request has been noted and will be discussed.

 

2. I'm not sure, but doesn't double-clicking a leader simply group all units within the command radius of a leader and not just his own?

 

 

No, units must belong the General's Corps.

[Harnis]

I think the best way to have on over-view of your forces is to have something giving you just that. A popup page with the Order of Battle (OOB) on the field at that time, with perhaps those formations yet to arrive with an estimate of their arrival. Double click on a unit or leader to close the page or have it move to the side and center the screen over that unit or leader.

that could be useful. Just a little popup window with the command tree, so when it says "General Doubleday's Division has arrived!" you can look at the tree and see how many divisions, and which ones, as well as maybe the number of men. And even something like you said about an approximate time of arrival would be nice.