David Fair

Statistically what is the difference of calling casualties a "kill" or "wounded"? The point is that you have one less man on the firing line. Isn't this just semantics? I agree that on the final battlefield summary you could show the breakout. The algorithm to calculate the number of wounded vs. killed in the ACW is very simple. But during the game isn't "kills" succinct enough to represent what is going on? The suggestion would have battlefield relevance if you deducted men from the firing line that were removing the wounded. During the ACW men looking to get out of harms way would often accompany a wounded comrade to an aid station. When an officer was hit they could be accompanied by more than a dozen men. I guess the thought might be that "stretcher bearers" would be lost for the remainder of the phase and rejoin in a later phase?

Nick, Diversity in the units makes the game more interesting. If you make the cavalry more powerful then they become more like the infantry and can stand in the line with the infantry. Not only did this not happen historically during the ACW - it homogenizes your units and makes the game less interesting. (I'll just toss this cavalry in the line as they fight just the same anyway.) Rather than make the cavalry more powerful I'd suggest that using the cavalry in their historical role on the flanks and rear of the armies will vastly improve the tactical aspects of your game. I'd suggest going the other direction and add more variety (variety is, after all, the spice of life) by making Lee's irregular cavalry brigades less powerful - forcing them into the role they played during the battle - protecting the flanks/getting in position to attack the rear of the enemy. Imboden's and Jenkins cavalry brigades were both irregular cavalry brigades. Lee hated irregular cavalry as they were unreliable/inaccurate in reconnaissance, inept in battle, and useless in screening. Just about the only role they excelled in was destruction of telegraph lines, raiding soft targets, gobbling up pickets, and collecting supplies. See this U.S. Army presentation regarding these irregular cavalry brigades as a reference:

Great to hear you are addressing the flanking issues. This should really help the game.

Hi Gael, If you haven't watched Steve Knott of the Army War College he is a Southerner, expert on the ACW, and a wonderful presenter. Among his topics of presentation is the CSA cavalry during the Gettysburg Campaign. He discusses at length the strategic rational for the campaign. Specifically, that: means X will = power of resistance Steve notes that when you are the weaker side attacking the "means" of a more powerful enemy it is "insane." You might enjoy the presentation and having a dyed in the wool Southerner offer his input on the strategic goals of the campaign might help you bolster/alter some of your perspectives. Enjoy! PS - it was Robertson not Jones that won the heart of Stuart's affection. Jones and Stuart simply hated each other. So Jones and Robertson sat out the campaign while the irregular cavalry served with the ANV. Kind Regards

Hi Gael, For your consideration here are some of the facts regarding coal mining in West Virginia. Highlights: · Coal was used locally for the saltworks near :”Saltville” along the Kanawha River before and during the Civil War. · Coal was not mined extensively in West Virginia, nor were railroads used to transport coal out of the region until 1883. · Bituminous (soft coal) was used to fuel steamships. The first widespread use of West Virginia coal began when the saltworks along the Kanawha River expanded dramatically in the decades before the Civil War. Coal was used to heat the brine pumped from salt beds underneath the river. (After the Civil War) That modest use soon was dwarfed by the demands of a growing nation that looked to coal to heat its homes, power its factories and fuel its locomotives and steamships. When the anthracite fields of Pennsylvania no longer could provide the tonnage needed, American industrialists discovered the massive coalfields of West Virginia. Large-scale investment soon opened the remote valleys along the New, Bluestone, Tug, Monongahela, and Guyandotte rivers. http://www.friendsofcoal.org/a-history-of-coal-in-west-virginia.html On March 12, 1883, the first carload of coal was transported from Pocahontas in Tazewell County, Virginia, on the Norfolk and Western Railway. This new railroad opened a gateway to the untapped coalfields of southwestern West Virginia, precipitating a dramatic population increase. Virtually overnight, new towns were created as the region was transformed from an agricultural to industrial economy. With the lure of good wages and inexpensive housing, thousands of European immigrants rushed into southern West Virginia. In addition, a large number of African Americans migrated from the southern states. The McDowell County black population alone increased from 0.1 percent in 1880 to 30.7 percent in 1910. http://www.wvculture.org/history/minewars.html

Gael, You seems awfully sensitive about the burning of Southern homes but not at all concerned about the generations of slaves under the whips of white supremacists. There was no olive branch offered to the black population of America. I've always thought that the lives lost in that war were much more valuable than the property losses. If the South had been a bit less jubilant about starting a war none of their slaves would have been touched and none of their property burnt. I'd rather have my home burned one time than know my children, grandchildren, and all future generations of my bloodline were forever to be held in Southern bondage. Further, Lee's army was heavy handed in "requisitioning" the entire production capabilities of the farms in the North taking horses, mules, cattle, hogs, and as much grain, molasses, and other supplies as his supply trains could carry South. Though he didn't use fire he left a swath of economic destitution in his wake. Morally the Southern cause was bankrupt and if it took burning a swath of slaver's homes to get the message across it was well worth the effort. But the South didn't get the message and it took the Civil Rights movement to move the country in the direction of the truth that, "All men are created equal." But let's talk about the Civil War and not politics... Lee had seven cavalry brigades in the Eastern Theater at the start of the Gettysburg Campaign. Stuart had three of these brigades with him (including Mosby). Lee was given the two irregular brigades that were with the ANV. Grumble Jones brigade and the final brigade of CSA cavalry screened the Army of Northern Virginia's rear guard during the advance north through the Shenandoah Valley, by holding gaps in the mountains that separated them from Union observation and interference. Grumble Jones might have been better off from a career perspective if he had not won the girl of his dreams from the undying envy of JEB Stuart. I understand where Mosby was and what he was doing - which was much higher priority than the more difficult challenge of destroying the coal mining region of Pennsylvania. This is precisely why I brought up Mosby - Ewell didn't have sufficient cavalry with him as you've stated (inaccurately) above. The only cavalry with Ewell's 2nd Corps was the 39th VA Cavalry battalion, Company C, Capt. William F. Randolph commanding the 31 members of this battalion. The 39th served as both Ewell's escort and guides/recon. The 2nd Corps Details are provided below. Do you honestly want to argue that 31 men could have destroyed the entire coal producing area of Pennsylvania? Do you honestly believe that Lee would have allowed the entire 2nd Corp to detach from the ANV to embark on such a low-priority mission? Lee needed every man he could get at Gettysburg and still lost the battle. You have a number of lovely stories about your family members and seem to be very interested in the Civil War. I respect your enthusiasm knowledge. But your notion that the South would or could destroy the coal fields of Pennsylvania seems deeply misplaced to me. Further, that by destroying the coal mines that somehow the Northern blockade would evaporate also seems unsupportable. Finally, the "data" supporting your discussions seem ethereal as soon as they are challenged with facts related to coal production from other areas, the road network, and the composition of the 2nd Corps. It is possible for you to answer any of the questions I've raised? I'll tip my hat to your dogged determination - but IMHO you have fallen very far short of supporting your argument that the South could "win the war by destroying the coal fields". In fact as I've dug further into this the challenge look completely implausible for political, social, ethical, and logistical reasons. Which is exactly how this theory in "North with Lee..." seemed at the time I read the book. Now that I've taken a closer look at this topic you've convinced me that the theory is pure fantasy. The logistical realities and military situation simply could not support the effort required to destroy this coal producing region. Now you've inventing troops that do not exist on the OOB to support your theory. Its time for me to move on - I'm into a discussion of history not mythology. Let's just say its time to agree to disagree. I'll be delighted to let you have the final words in this discussion. P.S. I've dropped the Solferino and Pickett's Charge stuff question because you don't seem to have supporting facts for either of these theories either. Since we seem to be writing for the entertainment of the forum's readers here is a comedic summary of this discussion: If we add explosive spherical chickens to the 2nd Corps OOB then 1 man can destroy 10 mines per day which means the 39th VA Cavalry battalion alone could have set fires in 310 mines/day which means in three months the South could have destroyed all of the anthracite coal mines in Pennsylvania - tuning all six of the anthracite counties of Pennsylvania into an inferno like Centralia! See picture posted yesterday for details and grasp the possibilities of the South winning the Civil War by destroying the blockade! The heat from this inferno fractures the North America Continent at the Mason-Dixon line and the entire North is sucked into the vortex created by this burning hole left from the destruction of coal mines. Voila! The South maintains its peculiar institution and stars and bars flag waving citizens for racial subjugation win the war. Huzzah! For your consideration here is the actual force composition you are suggesting had enough manpower to destroy the entire coal mining region. In my opinion such a force would starve within two weeks of entering this vast, under-developed, and nonviable region for horse and musket logistics. I've enjoyed sparring. Kind Regards... 2nd Corps 20,572 Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell Escort, 39th VA Cavalry Battalion C, 31, Capt. William F. Randolph Early's Division, 16 guns, 5,460 men, Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early Hays's Brigade, 1,295, Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays 5th LA, 196, Col. Henry Forno, Maj. Alexander Hart (w), Capt. Thomas H. Briscoe 6th LA, 218, Col. Willia, Monaghan, Lt. Col. Joseph Hanlon 7th LA, 235, Col. Davidson B. Penn 8th LA, 296, Col. Travanion D. Lewis (k), Lt. Col. Alcibiades de Blanc (w), Maj. German A. Lester 9th LA A-I, 347, Col. Leroy A. Stafford Smith's Brigade, 806, Brig. Gen. William Smith 31st VA, 267, Col. John S. Hoffman 49th VA A-F, H-K, 281, Lt. Col. Jonathan Catlett Gibson 52nd VA, 254, Lt. Col. James H. Skinner (w), Lt. Col. John D. Ross Hoke's Brigade, 1,244, Col. Isaac E. Avery (mw), Col. Archibald C. Godwin 6th NC State Troops, 509, Lt. Col. Robert F. Webb, Maj. Samuel McD. Tate 21st NC A, C,D, F-M, 436, Col. William W. Kirkland 57th NC, 297, Col. Archibald C. Godwin Gordon's Brigade, 1,813, Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon 13th GA, 312, Col. James M. Smith 26th GA, 315, Col. Edmund D. Atkinson 31st GA, 252, Col. Clement A, Evans (w) 38th GA, 341, Capt. William L. McLeod (k) 60th GA, 299, Capt. Water B. Jones 61st GA, 288, Col. John H. Lamar Division Artillery Battalion, 16 guns, 290 men, Lt. Col Hilary P. Jones, Capt. James McD. Carrington, Lt. Col. Hilary P. Jones LA Guard Battery (2 3-inch rifles, 2 10-pound Parrotts), 60, Capt. Charles Thompson (k), Capt. Charles A. Green Charlottesville (VA) Battery (4 12-pound Napoleons), 71, Capt. James McD. Carrington Richmond ("Courtney", VA) Battery (4 3-inch rifles), 90, Capt. William A. Tanner Staunton (VA) Battery (4 12-pound Napoleons), 60, Capt. Asher W. Gardner Johnson's Division, 6,433, Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson Steuart's Brigade, 2,121, Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart 1st MD Battalion A-G, 400, Lt. Col. James R. Herbert (w), Maj. William C. Goldsborough (w, c), Capt. John W. Torsch, Capt. James P. Crane 1st NC State Troops, 377, Lt. Col. Hamilton A. Brown 3rd NC, 548, Maj. William A. Parsley 10 VA A-L, 276, Col. Edward T. H. Warren 23rd VA, 251, Lt. Col. Simeon T. Walton 37th VA A-F, G,I, H-K, 264, Maj. Henry C. Wood

Gale, Please explain the connection you believe Lee had with Solferino? You've gone silent on Pickett's Charge - Why? Why wouldn't the Union use non-anthracite coal to fuel the blockade? It is true that anthracite coal burns more cleanly which would be critical for blockade runners trying to keep a low profile - but softer coals were routinely used commercially and in the whaling fleet which operated globally. Note that the smoke from softer coals helped whalers identify their location for other ships. The goal of the blockade was to prevent ships entering the South - which the North never could achieve with or without anthracite coal. I believe Kriegel vastly overstates impact of anthracite coal and does not address the logistical realities of the effort to destroy this asset. Further his supporting arguments on the Molly's etc... are an absurd pile of rubbish IMHO. Just because someone published a book doesn't make it correct - and readers should be held to some standard of common sense and critical analysis. Please check out the map titled: PLATE 136 at page 319 of the Official Military Atlas of the Civil War. Let me understand how you think Lee would attempt the arson of the area on the map. The roads are very few and far between (less than half the density of other areas of the same map). Railroads provided access to much of this mining area - not roads. So unless Lee brought locomotives in his supply train his access to this area would be difficult at best. There was not a single macadamized road in the area. Additionally, the population could not be exploited for resources (as Lee was doing lavishly in the rest of Pennsylvania), because the population was limited to the mining towns - which had to import just about everything above their subsistence-level existence. A single picture of Centralia does not represent the difficulties of the topography generally of this vast area nor the road network, nor the population base. It is true Mosby and 150 men could have effectively penetrated and caused random acts of arson. But the systemic destruction of the area necessary to impact the blockade is far beyond the scope and scale that Mosby could have burned. There is no way Lee could have supported his army in an area of this size for the time required to disrupt the mining of anthracite coal. Lee told Ewell to head to Harrisburg - the State Capital of Pennsylvania for the political impact - not the coal regions beyond. Lee never authorized, or from anything I've ever found, contemplated turning arsonist. The bridges near Harrisburg were burned to protect Harrisburg. If Harrisburg were irrelevant then the militia would not have been deployed around Harrisburg. They would have been deployed to protect the entry routes into the anthracite coal region In fact, his policy was precisely the opposite. Lee personally dismounted his horse and rebuilt a fence in Pennsylvania to show his troops that his goal was not to infuriate the North further. The Union was fighting "with one arm behind their back" as Shelby Foote noted in the Kens Burns film. Lee understood this and was attempting to play the war weariness card so the Union would agree to peace. How would intentionally setting fire to these coal mines further Lee's policy/goal? The impact of disrupting the blockade would have come at a huge premium in Northern fury, and international condemnation. At this point in history this simply was not an acceptable way to play the game of war, or international politics. The South leaned an important lesson with the St Albans Raid - it is entirely probable that actions in war can disrupt international relations. My guess is if you asked Sherman about this threat he would have offered to provide rations to get Lee into this area. Because once the ANV entered this area they could never feed themselves and never get out. Damn the coal - end the war without further fighting. Its great that you had the opportunity to participate in an ACW reenactment at Gettysburg. That sounds like fun. My guess is the distance from the Southern perspective seemed much further on July 3 when they were staring at that ridge filled with men and guns. At least Longstreet says that's what he thought.

Comments from the civilwartalk.com on the topic of North With Lee and Jackson... In North With Lee and Jackson the author makes a case — based upon a plan worked out by Stonewall a year or so earlier — that Pennsylvania’s anthracite coal mines would have become an important Rebel objective had Meade’s army not caught up with Lee at Gettysburg. But, as members of civilwartalk.com point out Stonewall’s plan would have experienced tremendous difficulties in implementation: “The anthracite coal region was large, covering several counties, there were hundreds of individual mines and the terrain would not have been ideal for military operations. Geologically and geographically the mines were in the ridge and valley topography north of Blue Mountain, pretty rough terrain (and easy to get trapped in). Though anthracite was the preferred fuel for steam driven warships (anthracite, or hard coal burns hot, produces less ash and far less smoke) the USN could make do with bituminous (soft) coal from the Ohio valley or southwestern Pa. It was Confederate blockade runners who desperately needed the hard coal to avoid detection from heavy dark smoke so while Confederate forces might have somewhat inconvenienced the USN by disrupting the anthracite mines in a glorified raid it would not have been some kind of great disaster and the CSA could not have gotten any captured hard coal back to Southern ports. If Jackson could have gotten across the Susquehanna there were more lucrative and practical targets than the coal mines.” “Assuming the Rebs could FIND Shamokin or Mauch Chunk, those valleys and steep ridges (think of narrow valleys with the Massanuten on all sides) once in I doubt they could have ever gotten out. It would have been quite easy to bottle up the few narrow exit routes and the CSA would have been far, very, very far from their supply bases and the coal region north of Blue Mountain is NOT Pennsylvania's equivalent of the Shenandoah's bread basket. Sorry, but I see Lee in the mountains of Northeastern Pa. in 1863 being about as successful as he was in the mountains of (West) Virginia in 1861.” Yet another book with a zany angle on a plan based on a spherical chicken theory that the South had the key to win the ACW. I particularly enjoy the notion that the Molly Maguires, with 5,000 members, would join the Southern cause to sabotage mining operations. These miners wanted improved working conditions - not the destruction of their livelihood by Southern arsonist destroying the mines. Attacking the mines of Pennsylvania would have had about the same impact of the St. Albans Raid in Vermont. The St Albans Raid pissed off Canadians and decreased support for the Confederacy in England. No further raids were attempted by the South due to the political fallout with Britain (and Canada returned of about half of the stolen money).

Gael, It is not clear why you believe in the similarities between the Imperial Guard at Solferino and Gettysburg. My guess is you might have an agenda to somehow tie a winning result of the French Imperial Guard to the ANV and possibly Pickett's division in particular? I just don't understand the connection. It seems to me that Longstreet's Charge of July 3 was much more comparable with the forlorn hope of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo for these reasons: 1) both attacks failed, (Not so at Solferino) 2) both attacks were made by a smaller force on a larger force. (Not so at Solferino) 3) Blucher, Wellington, and Napoleon were all seasoned solders as were Lee, Longstreet and Meade (Not so at Solferino where the Austrians were led by their inexperienced 29-year-old emperor Franz Joseph; the French by the inexperience Napoleon III who relied on his experienced generals and veterans). 4) Gettysburg and Waterloo were both fought on ground favorable for the defensive. (Not so at Solerfino where the Austrians were surprised by Napoleon III's advance and had difficulty deploying their artillery). 5) The armies at Waterloo and Gettysburg both fought reasonably competently (modulo the deployment of XI Corps). (Not so at Solferino where "The commanders and staffs [of the French] were saved from total discredit only by the French genius for improvisation and the still greater incompetence of the Austrians see: http://battlefieldanomalies.com/the-battle-of-solferino/)." Note that Longstreet objected strenuously to the charge of July 3 and stated to Lee that there never were 15,000 men that could take the Federal position at Gettysburg. When a commander deems the task impossible but agrees to do his best - this seems to me to be the definition of a forlorn hope. This is precisely the term you used above to describe the attack of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo. So the similarities between Waterloo and Gettysburg appear to be more similar than the comparison of Solerfino to Gettysburg. I'd be interested to understand what you believe to be the connection between Solferino and Gettysburg. Here's what bothers me about your theory: General Lee may/may not have studied Solferino and taken lessons from this battle. Lee had fought from 1861 through 1863 and had a vast wealth of first-hand knowledge. We know for certain that Lee talked with General Longstreet who objected strenuously against the attack on July 3, 1863. My hunch is that Lee was more concerned with his lieutenant's perspective on July 3 than recalling the history of Solferino in 1859. So I just don't understand why you think Solferino was such a defining event in Lee's understanding in the conduct and art of war that that battle would influence Lee at Gettysburg. I've never read or heard any description by anyone close to Lee that on the evening of July 2, 1863 Lee pulled out a map of Solferino and said, "My God I've got it! The answer is charge the center of the Union line just like Napoleon III at Solferino!" Please enlighten me.

Actually "Pickett's Charge" was never called "Pickett's Charge" in the ANV or outside of Virginia during the war. Longstreet, and much of the South, objected to "too much Virginia" and the credit Virginia claimed in the victories - particularly when Longstreet - not Picket was in command. Virginia newspapers celebrated Pickett because he was the only Virginian among the divisional leadership that made the charge (and a FFV member). Pickett's division was the "lead division" which means the other divisions aligned on Pickett for the charge - Picket never exercised command over the charge - only his own division. Longstreet was in command throughout the attack. That is why historians currently identify the charge as the rather unwieldy Pickett, Pettigrew, & Trimble Charge. No wonder this reality never caught up with the punchier "Pickett's Charge." My personal preference is "Longstreet's Charge of July 3" to distinguish it from "Longstreet's Charge of July 2." Longstreet was ostracized after the war for his politics and leading African-American militia in the suppression of the southern ant-Reconstruction White League at the Battle of Liberty Place in 1874. Without Longstreet as a Southern hero the distinction of the charge fell to Pickett and "Pickett's Charge" was both a propaganda coup for Virginia and at the same time shunned Longstreet the traitor. Pickett never called the charge "Pickett's Charge" and during his lifetime he tried to distance himself from its notoriety. "Pickett's Charge" became know as "Pickett's Charge" beyond Virginia after the war when his wife hit the lecture circuit to support herself and family off of Pickett's name. She also spread the rumor that Pickett's West Point appointment was secured for him by Abraham Lincoln, but this is largely believed to be a story circulated by his widow following his death. Her glorious renditions of the attack unified Northern and Southern audiences in conveying/expanding the glory Pickett's role/responsibility in the charge. But historically her lectures were wildly inaccurate according to participants who fought at Gettysburg. One author has written a book celebrating Pickett's role in the attack and suggesting he was the commander - but this book is more fantasy than fact. The author's goal was to sell books by writing a biography that celebrated/glorified Pickett - but this work is peppered with historical inaccuracies. As for anthracite coal production here a map that shows the distribution of the resource in Pennsylvania. How exactly was the ANV going to prevent the mining of this coal over this region? In order for Lee to feed his army he had to keep it moving. How could Lee sustain his army for the period of time required to destroy all these coal deposits? This is not a small task and would have taken vast amounts of time/resource. It is obvious that the South could have disrupted this supply of coal - but wouldn't the North have used sail power in the interim until production normalized?

Gael, Waterloo was lost in 1815 with an attack of the French Imperial Guard under the preeminent commander of the horse and musket era. Pickett's Charge was not composed of the French Imperial Guard so I'm ot sure what the point is of comparing the battle of Solferino to Gettysburg. Sometimes attacks work/sometimes not. Longstreet's/Hill's troops were the best the South had remaining - but many of these troops had been fought to a frazzle on July 1. They were hardly a hand picked reserve of fresh troops for a final attack - comparable to the Imperial Guard. I've got family members from both sides of the conflict and have had indoctrination/bias equally tainted from both sides. Always a hoot at family reunions with the Alabama and Pennsylvania clan pitch in on the ACW. Not certain if your facts are correct regarding coal mining. Pittsburgh was the center of Union Iron Manufacturing precisely because of the hard coal produced in the region. For example the Phoenix Iron Works is a prime example - at the heart of coal and steel production. It is true that anthracite was also mined on the Susquehanna and that these mines were primarily supplying the Union navy; but anthracite mines were not exclusive to those counties. So the South could have made it more logistically complex for the Union navy with the destruction of the Susquehanna coal producing region - but its a bit of a stretch to suggest that the naval blockade would collapse without that specific coal from that specific location. The Union Navy operated with both sail and steam power - to conserve coal. My guess is that the South would have discovered that the blockade would have been less effective - probably more tightly patrolling critical locations to make up for the mobility lost by the lack of coal. It is not at all clear that this would have broken up the blockade, or even have made it much less effective. The blockade was porous throughout the war and the South was able to import the most critical necessities - but it wasn't possible to feed a nation of 12 millions and support an army of 1 million men with steam powered blockage runners. The logistical infrastructure of supporting the South by sea would have been difficulty even if the North did not have a single ship blockading any Southern ports. Note that the South operated their commerce raiding fleet mostly on sail power with coal used sparingly to keep their ships at sea. Doesn't it logically follow that the North would have followed the same path if coal supplies had been constricted? The path suggested through the Appalachians is rugged and without much population in the 1860's to exploit for food and fodder. Those mountains in Pennsylvania are not the Shenandoah and even today the population of that area is small without much in the way of economic vitality. If the South had gone north to Lake Erie my guess is their army would have starved en route. I've got family in that area and it is hardscrabble life even today. Consider the difficulty the North had attempting to support their armies in Eastern Kentucky. Horse and wagon logistics just weren't up to the task. There are many civil war authors (and numerous civil war generals (Beauregard in particular)) that proposed wing-nut ideas that could not have been supported with the logistical reality of horse and musket supply. For the most part the battles occurred where they did because it was where the armies could go and feed themselves. Even today it can be difficult buying a hamburger/gas on stretches of that route to Lake Erie after 8 pm. As to Pickett's Charge - I understand WHY Lee order the charge. But it was a last gasp of a nation losing that war. Each year Northern armies had progressively taken huge chunks of the South. Lee didn't just need a victory at Gettysburg. He needed the complete and utter destruction of the AoP. Any victory that did not destroy the AoP would just result in the North regrouping and fighting again. As for a plan for Stuart to ATTACK from the rear. This is disputed by first hand accounts from Lee's staffers after the war. There was no plan for Stuart to attack. The plan was to have Stuart in place to pick up the broken remnants from Longstreet's charge on July 3. Stuart's orders were to get in position, fire two guns, and wait to harvest the shattered remains of the Union army. When Stuart fired his signal guns it drew in an equal number of Federal Cavalry. That battle was 3 miles from the front lines, basically a skirmish on the East Cavalry Field, and Stuart withdrew. Keep in mind that Stuart had already disappointed Lee by his tardiness on July 1 and 2. There was no way Stuart would have disobeyed orders by risking the destruction of his command on July 3. I've read a number of zany "what ifs" about the wish for a Southern victory but it is important to think some of these ideas through and test them against the reality of the situation. Lee's cavalry was outnumbered at Gettysburg 2:1. Additionally 1/3 of the CSA cavalry were irregulars - that Lee himself held in low regard as "unreliable" for recon/combat. Stuart was entrusted with a critical army asset and the destruction of his command would have effectively destroyed Lee's rearguard capabilities. While both men were gallant risk takers neither of these commanders were reckless/stupid. Both men knew that the survival of the CSA regular cavalry arm was essential to the survival of the ANV - and they behaved accordingly using their irregular cavalry to guard the wagons while the rear guard was made of Lee's regular cavalry brigades. Alternative perspectives based on spherical chicken theories of the South winning the war exemplify the definition of "red herring." I'd have to agree that you "might" have a bit of a Southern bias.

Actually I'm more of a fan of the Napoleonic period as well. The tactics are more variable and the combined arms coordination much more difficult to orchestrate. 25mm-scale games on tabletops are visually wonderful - but the audience has been declining (at least in my area) in favor of the smaller scale figures. The trouble is you can't take a tabletop with you on an airplane. UGG right now would make a poor engine for a Napoleonic game - IMHO. There are simply too many limiting factors given the choice in favor of tablets that have constrained the design. We had a tremendous struggle to get Nick to change his artillery icon from 2 guys pushing a cannon to the current limber. The basic argument was that 2 guys pushing a canon would look like "Benny Hill" - the the artillery was slowed down to make the icon "look right" regardless of the historical impact. It will be interesting to see what the Game Labs Team does next.

Lannes, Once again your logic seems illusive to me. The goal of a historical title is usually to simulate the battlefield as it existed at the time of the battle. The closer the game gets to giving the flavor of the challenges on that field, while providing an entertaining and enjoyable game experience is kind of the goal of the game isn't it? Why would getting the correct relationship between the combat arms be like, "playing with blocks of wood and pen and paper calculations?" I guess the question is do you want to play a game that simulates the ACW or something different? If the company is going to have titles in different eras then the combat of each era should have differences representing the era that reasonably reflects the title of the game. Otherwise the only difference between eras will be the uniforms and the maps. The map is great and, other than the sprites carrying their arms on the left shoulder (a mirror image of the correct right shoulder) the game has potential to be a much more compelling simulation of Gettysburg. If you like artillery casualties then two eras might be more interesting to you: - Napoleonic artillery was more effective than ACW artillery because, relative to smoothbore muskets, artillery could move closer to infantry and safely blow away squares of tightly packed infantry. But these tactics no longer existed in the ACW. The ACW was a war fought with low-explosives. Artillery emerged as the queen of the battlefield after the introduction of high-explosives. WWI was the first war fought with trinitrotoluene (TNT) in artillery shells and the impact was immediate. More than 70% or casualties were inflicted by artillery and the percentage of artillery effectiveness in the mix of combat arms has only increased in modern warfare. Some of us are actually interested in the ACW. Artillery, as the Grapeshot states above, should be contributing more accurately to the role it played on the ACW battlefield. Specifically, making the battlefield miserable at longer range. One of the biggest humbugs of the war was the CSA artillery barrage on July 3, 1863 preceding Longstreet's Charge (aka "Pickett's" for those who favor the role of Virginia). Not a single regiment at Gettysburg, North or South, was routed by long-range artillery fire. Casualties from artillery were minimal at long-range. To have a game with artillery batteries that can inflict as much damage as an infantry brigade is a 5X multiplier for artillery. The men who fought the ACW knew, and stated, the effects of artillery. It is not like artillery effectiveness is a mystery. Hunt, Halleck, Pendleton, Alexander, Tidball and others who fought the was knew that an artillery battery firing canister was roughly equal to a 200 man regiment (the projectiles in canister roughly equal the projectiles fired by a regiment) and casualties tend to follow projectile count. The net result in UGG is that Union infantry is toned down to the level of cowardice to compensate for the over-powered Union artillery. At some point these distortions from reality compromise the integrity of the game. I agree that UGG, as a simulator of the battle of Gettysburg, is distorted to such an extent that you may as well be playing with blocks of wood. A distortion of the battlefield reality of this magnitude is undermining the balance of the combat arms at the battle of Gettysburg to such an extend that the game is not a reflection of the battle of Gettysburg. The relationship between the combat arms ts part and parcel of what makes this conflict is interesting. Nobody is trying to eliminate the role of artillery in the game. We would simply like to see it more in line with the ACW and the battle of Gettysburg specifically.

Why would balancing the combat arms to reflect the correct apportionment of casualties to the correct combat arm be a, "numerical and temporal impossibility?" This argument is not at all logical. Time and casualties would still be compressed as they are now - but infantry would be more lethal and artillery less so. The two sides in the conflict would have less differentiation. After all both sides were using precisely the same weapons. In some circumstances ammunition was picked up from the field and returned to sender. The casualties inflicted had more to do with the advantages of the defensive, topography and cover and much less to do with the color of the uniform. The ACW battlefield casualties were staggeringly balanced over the four-year conflict. UGG would do well to take a page from history and reflect the reality of the conflict. What makes the ACW so interesting is it is one of the few military conflicts in history that was determined almost solely by the qualities of the leaders. Often conflicts are imbalanced by technical or weapon advantages - but fortunately for the South the North had a couple of numbsculls in critical ordnance positions that thought men's lives were less valuable than the ammunition they fired. Specifically for example, General James Ripley who feared repeating rifles because men would waste ammunition fighting the war. The notion that winning the war sooner would save ammunition seemed beyond his depth. Add to this the industrialist who put tremendously limited artillery in the field (3" Ordnance Rifle for example). When McClellan tried to standardize on the 12 pounder Napoleon a bloody cry went directly to Lincoln to ensure the Union had an expensive logistical mess supporting all of the various, and often ineffective, diversity of artillery. General Tidball indicts this gun as, "the worst possible" for its small bore. Thus it had excellent precision at a time that artillery ammunition was so faulty that precision mattered very little. The only round that could reliably inflict multiple casualties was canister - and the 3" Ordnance Rifle was the poorest in the arsenal of both armies at delivering canister (small bore + rifling = limited canister effectiveness). Phil Leigh wrote an article for the NY Times in 2012 on General Ripley that is quite good. Here is the link... http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/the-unions-newfangled-gimcracks/?_r=0

WesleyBarras, Above you stated: "...Which is a slight problem that became major on the 3rd day. The CSA ran out of artillery ammunition. They couldn't support the army. When their fire slackened, the Union soldiers who were covering for dear life, stood up and went to the wall. Who knows how the battle would have been if the fire could have been maintained." This is simply not a correct statement. According to E.P. Alexander the CSA brought about 42,000 rounds of artillery ammunition with them on the Gettysburg Campaign. During the three day Battle of Gettysburg the CSA fired 22,000 rounds. This left them about 20,000 rounds which would allow another two or more days of very serious fighting, or more days if they slowed their rate of fire. The CSA had almost no opportunities to fire canister July 1-3 as they had been on the offensive for most of the fighting. This left Lee with a bountiful supply of ammunition for defensive work; which is why Lee waited, and hoped, that Meade would order an attack on the CSA positions on July 4. While the ammunition in the gun limbers and ammunition chests were exhausted by the barrage on July 3, it would take about 2 hours to refill these ammunition chests from the supply train and get the batteries back in action along the line with replenished supplies. Thus if you wanted to implement ammunition supply then the way to do it would be any guns that fire for about 2 hours without a break would exhaust their ammunition and need to return to the supply train to rearm. The game is already broken into phases so it would likely result in more annoyance than it is worth in a phase to need to run off to the supply train to replenish ammunition then return to the firing line. Keep in mind Alexander, Pendleton, Hunt, Tidball, and others were enforcing "deliberate fire" orders for their guns - which is no more than one round per gun every 5 minutes. This rate of fire would allow a battery to stay on the line for the duration of the day. The guns would then resupply during the evening to be ready for another day's action. The maniacal rate of fire sustained by the CSA on July 3rd for 90 minutes was the exception - not the rule for the ACW. Firing all the ammunition in the four chests carried by each gun over a 90 minute interval would mean the gun is essential "firing blind" as the smoke from the previous discharge could not dissipate before the next round was fired. While the barrage before Longstreet's Charge on July 3 was noisy, it was ineffective - not a single Union regiment was routed, and the batteries that were damaged in the barrage were rotated out of the line and replaced with fresh batteries from the artillery reserve (which was the standard practice by both sides during the war). Meade himself scolded the captain of an Ohio battery for attempting to pull out of the line to replenish his ammunition. He ordered the captain to send his caissons for more ammunition, slow his rate of fire, and stay in the line. Finally, ACW artillery inflicted only 6% of the battlefield casualties; but played an essential role in eroding the morale on the battlefield. I'd be more interested in seeing the artillery fixed to align more with the historical reality of black powder munitions during the conflict. The ammunition supply would be less problematic and less of a factor IF the artillery was playing its proper role in the combat of the ACW.