Pettigrew - a party of pussies?

[dagdriver]

not being an ACW buff, I wonder why Pettigrews allways routs on the first day. 

That huge line of men ever running away - is that based on history, or am I doing something wrong??

 

Maybe there should be an indication of the quality of the units? (veterans, greens etc)?

[Tormidal]

Its a combination of morale, condition, cover, and shock modifiers.
Historically, in both the ACW and Napoleonic Wars, regiments didn't really stand against each other for more than a volley. In UGG, units are a bit more tough than that. but not by much.

 

You may just want to make sure they don't take too much fire from the Union, make sure they have decent cover, and watch their condition/morale. If those two drop too low, the brigade will rout.

 

Also, I believe there is an indication of veterancy. I think it was stars on the brigade information?

[Sneak]

not being an ACW buff, I wonder why Pettigrews allways routs on the first day. 

That huge line of men ever running away - is that based on history, or am I doing something wrong??

 

Maybe there should be an indication of the quality of the units? (veterans, greens etc)?

i feel your pain with this one Pettiygrews 2581against biddles 1300 and after 3 or four volleys petty run like a rabbit  ,,,,,that cannot be the way

[blueakomoon]

There are many factors that go into the moral and retreat system.  Most now depend on flank fire and cover.  I believe that the conditions of units next to it (or lack of support) also influence moral.  But I think the problem with Pettigrew specifically, is that because the brigade is so large, it is a massive target, thus many units can fire on it at the same time from multiple directions, where Pettigrew can only fire at one target at a time.

Clarification:  The starts under the portrait of the general in command of each unit indicate the quality to troops.  1 star are normal units, 2 stars are veterans, and 3 stars are elite.  The quality effects not only firing rate, but how high the morale bar can go.  Notice sometimes you will have a brigade fight not at all but it's morale just sits at 56% even though its condition is 100%, then look at the Iron Brigade.  100% morale and 100% condition nearly all the time.

[Sneak]

well you can push number around all day but 2581 fresh troops  v 1300 men of a simular quality and there should be only one outcome on a one to one basis

[TomGuadalupe]

It is clear to me that Pettigrew's men are only there for the free cake and ice cream.

I have found I have to keep the general nearby or they try to bail.

 

When I keep the brigade inside the genera's command bubble they get the job done.

 

They require supervision.

[David Fair]

Honestly I don't have an opinion on Pettigrew's brigade.  I find them useful as second-line troops that can deployed in cover and hold defensive positions.  Especially when coupled with the Corps commander as pointed out above.

 

A couple of historical factors to consider:

Pettigrew:

Pettigrew joined the CSA forces as a private - but his civilian accomplishments (primarily lawyer and diplomat) resulted in his promotion from private to colonel (1st S. Carolina Rifles).  His political connections (including Jeff Davis) urged him to take yet higher grades of command - which he refused due to his lack of a military background.

Pettigrew was ordered to accept promotion to brigadier general in early 1862.

He was wounded multiple times at the Battle of Seven Pines (at least 2 bullets & a bayonet) then captured.

Two months later he was exchanged where he was assigned to a rear-area brigade commands near Richmond, North Carolina, and southern Virginia.

 

Pettigrew's Men:

For the Gettysburg Campaign Pettigrew was assigned to lead a fresh North Carolina brigade which had not had combat experience for about a year.  His fresh, and relatively green, troops fought an were routed by the Union Iron Brigade on July 1, 1863 - losing about 40% casualties.  They reformed and helped drive Union I Corps off McPherson's Ridge (including the Iron Brigade).

 

A couple of game factors to consider:

Pettigrew's division did not come into the battle with an established reputation.

It was the largest and least experienced unit with the ANV.

Pettiegrew himself did not have an distinguished military record - he was personally courageous, had great connections, but had not distinguished himself with military honors.  Note that when Heth was wounded Division command fell to Pettigrew.

 

There are times when historical "events" influence game design.

Pettigrew routed early in the battle - thus, he and his men earned low status in the UGG design.

The fact that his brigade was facing one of the toughest brigades in the Union AoP; and, eventually drove them off McPherson's Ridge didn't impress the game designers sufficiently to give him a higher rating.

 

IMO giving Pettigrew a lower rating helps add some variability to the ANV.

Without more research/compelling arguments why change their status?

[Clinch]

Its a combination of morale, condition, cover, and shock modifiers.

Historically, in both the ACW and Napoleonic Wars, regiments didn't really stand against each other for more than a volley. 

 

WHoa!  Where did you find such information?

[Mtp34]

Wow where did you find that mask  ?

[N.C.rebel]

Blaine's mask? Lol

[Nick Thomadis]

Next patch will address Pettigrew and some issues that can make CS underpowered.

[Aldemar]

CAnt say that, he did great in my last Conf. Campaign.

[David Fair]

History Regarding Pettigrew's Brigade:

 

Heth sent Pettigrew forward because he believed Gettysburg did not have enemy infantry in the area.

 

Pettigrew brought several empty wagons with him on what he believed would be a "requisitioning" of supplies.

 

During Pettigrew's advance he met the 55th Virginia five miles west of Gettysburg who had been posted as pickets.  Pettigrew insisted that Colonel Christians 55th Virginia regiment (part of Brockengrough's Brigade) lead Pettigrew's brigade because, "while his men were well drilled and equipped, they were rather inexperienced".  

 

Pettigrew insisted that he needed a "seasoned" regiment and the 55th Virginia led his brigade to Gettysburg.

[Mr. Mercanto]

It is clear to me that Pettigrew's men are only there for the free cake and ice cream.

I have found I have to keep the general nearby or they try to bail.

 

When I keep the brigade inside the genera's command bubble they get the job done.

 

They require supervision.

LOL! XD

[RichardMcCor]

It will be fun to see how well Mr P's troops do in the new patch now they have upgraded long range capability (not sure if they have new guns/better training/smart bullets). However, if he still runs away as fast as he does in the current version then his new long range capability will be for nowt.

[Edgy]

 

Pettigrew's Men:

For the Gettysburg Campaign Pettigrew was assigned to lead a fresh North Carolina brigade which had not had combat experience for about a year.  His fresh, and relatively green, troops fought an were routed by the Union Iron Brigade on July 1, 1863 - losing about 40% casualties.

 

At no point, either on the first or the third of July (Pettigrew's Brigade took part in Pickets charge) did Petigrew's brigade rout.......

 

No. 550.--Report of Maj J. Jones, Twenty-sixth North Carolina Infantry, commanding Pettigrew's brigade.

AUGUST 9, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Pettigrew's brigade in the engagements beyond the Potomac:

On the night of June 30, ultimo, the brigade was on picket on the turnpike road leading from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, about half way between Cashtown and the latter place.

Early on the morning of July 1, we moved down the pike toward Gettysburg. When within about 2½ miles of the town, we deployed to the left of the pike, but soon crossed over to the right, other regiments of the division having been engaged for some time. We took up our position in rear of our batteries after we moved to the right. After remaining in this position about half an hour, exposed to a random fire from the enemy's guns, losing probably a dozen men killed and wounded, we received orders to advance. We moved forward about half a mile, and halted in a skirt of woods.

The following is the position of the regiments in the brigade: On the right, the Fifty-second North Carolina, next the Forty-seventh North Carolina, then the Eleventh North Carolina, and on the left the Twenty-sixth. In our front was a wheat-field about a fourth of a mile wide; then came a branch, with thick underbrush and briars skirting the banks. Beyond this was again an open field, with the exception of a wooded hill directly in front of the Twenty-sixth Regiment, about covering its front.

Skirmishers being thrown out, we remained in line of battle until 2 p.m., when orders to advance were received. The brigade moved forward in beautiful style, at quick time, just with the brigade on our left, commanded by Colonel Brockenbrough. When nearing the branch referred to, the enemy poured a galling fire into the left of the brigade from the opposite bank, where they had massed in heavy force while we were in line of battle in the woods. The Forty-seventh and Fifty-second, although exposed to a hot fire from artillery and infantry, lost but few in comparison with the Eleventh and Twenty-sixth. On went the command across the branch and up the opposite slope, driving the enemy at the point of the bayonet back upon their second line. This second line was encountered by our left (the Twenty-sixth), while the other regiments were exposed to a heavy shelling. The enemy's single line in the field was engaged principally with the right of the Eleventh and Forty-seventh. The enemy did not perceive the Fifty-second, which flanked their left, until they discovered themselves by a raking and destructive fire into their ranks, by which they were broken. On this second line, the fighting was terrible--our men advancing, the enemy stubbornly resisting, until the two lines were pouring volleys into each other at a distance not greater than 20 paces. At last the enemy were compelled to give way. They again made a stand in the woods, and the third time they were driven from their position, losing a stand of colors, which was taken by the Twenty-sixth; but, owing to some carelessness, they were left behind, and were picked up by some one else.

While the Twenty-sixth was thus engaged, the rest of the line, having cleared the field and being exposed to a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, were ordered to fall back, which they did in perfect order. The Twenty-sixth, not receiving the order, were now engaged in collecting ammunition from the enemy's dead, being entirely out themselves. Just as they were ready to advance again, General Pender's division passed over them. They followed on, and assisted in driving the enemy from the heights on the edge of the town. They then halted. That night the brigade bivouacked in the woods they had occupied previous to making the charge.

While the whole brigade behaved most admirably, especial credit is due the Eleventh and Twenty-sixth. The Twenty-sixth lost more than half its men killed and wounded, among them Col. H. K. Burgwyn, jr., killed, Lieut. Col. J. R. Lane seriously wounded, both with the colors, with many other most valuable officers. Col. C. Leventhorpe, of the Eleventh, and Major [E. A. J Ross were lost--the former wounded severely, the latter killed--with many officers and men.

We remained in this position until the evening of the 2d, when we moved about a mile to our right, and took position in rear of our batteries, facing the works of the enemy on Cemetery Hill.

We remained here until about 12 o'clock on the 3d, when our batteries opened upon the enemy's position. About 2 o'clock we were ordered to advance. It was an open field in front, about three-quarters of a mile in width. In moving off, there was some confusion in the line, owing to the fact that it had been ordered to close in on the right on Pickett's division, while that command gave way to the left. This was soon corrected, and the advance was made in perfect order. When about half across the intervening space, the enemy opened on us a most destructive fire of grape and canister. When within about 250 or 300 yards of the stone wall behind which the enemy was posted, we were met with a perfect hail-storm of lead from their small-arms. The brigade dashed on, and many had reached the wall, when we received a deadly volley from the left. The whole line on the left had given way, and we were being rapidly flanked. With our thinned ranks and in such a position, it would have been folly to stand, and against such odds. We therefore fell back to our original position in rear of the batteries. After this day's fight, but one field officer was left in the brigade. Regiments that went in with colonels came out commanded by lieutenants.

We remained in this position until the night of the 4th, when we took up line of march for Hagerstown, Md. We remained there and in the vicinage until the night of the 13th, for some days in line of battle. On that night, we took up line of march for the Potomac.

After traveling all night in mud and rain, about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 14th we took position in a wheat-field as a portion of the rear guard, while the rest of the troops crossed the river at the pontoon bridge (about 1½ miles) at Falling Waters. The men stacked arms, and most of them were asleep, feeling perfectly secure, as our cavalry were out in front. We had been here probably two hours when the enemy's cavalry dashed in upon us, causing some confusion, as the men were just aroused from sleep. Soon as they saw what was the matter, they seized their guns, and soon made way with the cavalry; all but 3 of them were killed or wounded. General Pettigrew was here mortally wounded. He had received a severe contusion on the hand on the 3d, but would not report off duty. I was informed of his condition, and that I was senior officer of the brigade, subject to the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel [s. G.] Shepard, commanding General Archer's brigade.

Soon after this, I received orders to fall back gradually to the river. I did so, fighting the enemy, who had now brought up an infantry force, all the way. In this I lost a few men killed and several taken prisoners, most of whom gave out from exhaustion. I could have saved most of those lost by a more hasty retreat along the road, but in that event would have left a brigade on my left completely in the hands of the enemy.

We crossed the pontoon about 12 m., just as the bridge was being cut loose. The brigade was marched next day to Bunker Hill, where it remained until I was relieved from command by the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel [W. J.] Martin, of the Eleventh.

The brigade deserves the highest praise, not more from its conduct on the battle-field than its soldierly bearing on the march. Where every one did his duty, it would be invidious to mention names.

For list of casualties, see reports before sent in.

I am, major, respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. JONES,

Major Twenty-sixth Regiment North Carolina Troops.

[David Fair]

Edgy,

 

There has always been a raging debate on the term "routing" during war:

Troops "redeploying to the rear" are "falling back" in their perspective.  

The troops that drove them to "redeploy to the rear" often depict the enemy's movement as a "rout". 

 

Too much UGG - it becomes second nature to throw the word "rout" around too loosely.

 

From a military perspective a rout implies that the units are hors de combat for at least the remainder of the daylight hours and incapable of defending themselves.  Routed troops sometimes recover at night, but often take days or weeks to return to combat readiness.

 

By this definition I can't think of any Divisions that were routed at Gettysburg.

Union XI Corps was back in the Cemetery Hill / Culp's Hill line after their earlier drubbing.  

Their "redeployment to the rear" was less than organized - but they were armed and prepared for action at the end of July 1.

 

Clearly the 17,000 unarmed Union men milling around the rear areas of the AoP on July 4 had "routed".

But these weren't formed units - they were individual men who had left the ranks, weren't armed, and had no intention of returning to the fight.

 

There is a vast distinction between a routed army and one that is falling back.  

Heth's Division, Longstreet's attack (Pickett's Charge) and the Union I & XI Corps are examples of the shades of gray in the distinction.

 

 

My apologies to you and the memory of the 26th N.C. - for using the word "rout" regarding Pettigrew's Division July 1.  

The term "rout" really doesn't apply to Gettysburg.

 

My incorrect recollection was that Pettigrew had gone in earlier than 2:00 pm on July 1 in support of Heth.

 

Thanks for keeping me honest!

 

Note on the Major Jones report on July 3:

"With our thinned ranks and in such a position, it would have been folly to stand, and against such odds. We therefore fell back to our original position in rear of the batteries."

 

It is great to meet another enthusiast with an eye for detail.

[Gen Grenadier]

26th NC also took the highest number of casualties out of every regiment that saw action at the battle. 1st Min took a higher proportion (85% I think) though.

[Doge]

Anyways... This issue is resolved. I was playing the CS today and Pettigrew was my best brigade out there, though Davis was the single brigade that took the most losses/killed the most.

 

So, yeah. Pettigrew's in perfect balance right now. It doesn't take 3 brigades to break him or just a skirmisher and arty.

[Mr. Mercanto]

26th NC also took the highest number of casualties out of every regiment that saw action at the battle. 1st Min took a higher proportion (85% I think) though.

 

Yes, 1st Minnesota lost 82% of its effective fighting force saving the Union Center on the Second Day, reducing its number from 262 to 47. The 1st was ordered by Hancock to charge against Wilcox advancing Rebel brigade which had cleared a path through the center of the Ridge. The regiment was annihilated providing Hancock with the time he needed to save the Union center and the Grand Army of the Potomac.  Just to clarify.