Edgy

1. Yes totally agree, it's still happening. I just started a new battle and had Paul's Brigade take the Cashtown Pike after routing through my men, Baxter routed through Pettigrew and then rallied right behind him...routing poor old Pettigrew again. 2. Yes agree again. Commanders run even if they're behind your lines, thus putting your Brigades out of command radius, who then of course rout. 3. Agreed, my artillery flee at the merest hint of an infantry attack.....even before the infantry come into canister range, not that this actually matters much as most of my batteries are worn out from firing three shots and are ready to route anyway. 4. Agreed, Artillery line of sight is appalling, most of the time it's either a house or your own men blocking. 5. Those Vedettes are all wearing medieval armor. On the plus side though my game never freezes or crashes, ever. At least it's stable.

I'm seeing the AI 'ball up' it's units a lot more (by this I mean his units are bunching together) which is turning a lot of scenario's into little more than ganking sessions. The cause of this seems to be the officers command radius, your AI does not care about lines or history, it only cares about winning, and to win it's keeping all it's units within the radius of it's commander. VP locations are still a problem, once again the AI only cares about winning points, and will do ridiculous things in order to plant a unit onto a VP location, a 'front line' means nothing to the AI at all. The command system, in my opinion, is flawed. You need division commanders at least. Example - A.P. Hill can barely command two Brigades as things stand, and 'wrapping' all the Division commanders up into Hills one unit in no way reflects how good/bad Hills Corps was, it just is not enough. A possible solution to the VP location problem could be to make them 'progressive'. So when VP locations fall behind the flow of battle they vanish, when the battle flows that way again they re-appear.

I think you need to make a clear decision here as to weather or not you are making a war game, or an RTS game. If Jeb Stuart had been available then Lee would have continued on to Winchester, and Gettysburg would never have happened.

They are quoting Cavalry vs Cavalry actions. The greater percentage of successful (note the use of the word successful here because a lot of Cavalry charges were abject failures) attacks on Infantry by Cavalry were late in the war when Confederate troops were under supplied and demoralized (such as Five Forks). Even successful Cavalry charges resulted in massive casualties for the attackers. I also think you have your genres mixed up. You are looking for an RTS game, not a war game. War games are not re-enactments, they allow the player the chance to win battles/wars that were lost, or to win battles/wars using different strategies or, in fact, to loose them. This is done by re-creating the circumstances that existed at the time, not by changing those circumstances. The Total War series are RTS games, not War games. You're argument does not hold water for one simple reason. A mounted charge by Bufords Cavalry on the morning of July the first would, without any question at all, have resulted in the decimation of his Brigades and the loss of the battle before any Union Infantry had shown up.....game over in the first thirty minutes. And before we go any further lets get something straight here. A lot of controversy surrounding this game is because of the Devs use of Bufords Cavalry on the first morning. The game makers have mixed RTS into this game with their use of those mounted Vedettes, they have also split Bufords command into three skirmish lines, instead of the two Brigades he actually had. Vedettes were nothing more than forward scouts, who's job it was to warn the main body of approaching enemies, they were totally incapable of attacking an Infantry Brigade. You are not seeing Cavalry being used as it was used at Gettysburg, you ARE seeing the Devs RTS version of it. As has been pointed out to you numerous times in this thread, the advent of rifled weapons had made the Cavalry charges of Napoleons times obsolete by 1861. Of course there are a few minor examples of Cavalry charges against Infantry but they were the exception, not the rule, and were always made in exceptional circumstances.

Civil War soldiers carried sixty rounds per man, not forty (forty rounds was what the typical cartridge box of the time was meant to hold), and the habit of carrying extra rounds in their pockets and haversacks stopped very early on. As correctly stated in this thread, to re-supply, units (infantry & artillery) were rotated 'off the line'. Artillery did this while in action, but I cannot recall and instance of reading of an infantry unit doing it while engaged. There are a few instances where Infantry had to fix bayonets due to shortage of ammunition, but not many. Confederate Artillery batteries had problems with ammunition supply, because their four gun batteries were usually a mixture of different guns, which was a logistics nightmare. I can't see the sense in making supply a problem in game, simply because it was not a real problem during the actual battle. Chamberlains men on Little Round Top were the exception, not the rule. It sounds great in theory, but anyone who has played Scourge of War Gettysburg will know what a total nightmare it turns into when you have to start taking your units out of action to re-supply them.

Skirmishers in a war game are problematical. Buford deployed his troopers to delay the Confederate advance, not stop them. In real terms this meant making Heth deploy his men into line of battle, in other words making them get off the road, and out of column. Playing as the Union I've tried testing Bufords ability to hold up the Confederate advance without those Vedettes, it's not easy, but it can be done. Buford held the line until approx' 10:30am which in this game is not that difficult to do. In my testing the real problems start after Buford has done his job, because once the Yankee infantry have appeared Bufords units then seem to go into 'free roam' mode. This typically leads to two problems, either they run around your flanks and rout your artillery, or they head straight for that three thousand VP location on the Chambersburg Pike.....sometimes even both! In my opinion, to sort out the morning problems on July the First two things could be done. First of all, if you are sold on keeping those videttes in game then they & the skirmishers need to loose their ability to capture VP locations, OR remove that three thousand VP location from Chambersburg Pike.

At no point, either on the first or the third of July (Pettigrew's Brigade took part in Pickets charge) did Petigrew's brigade rout....... No. 550.--Report of Maj J. Jones, Twenty-sixth North Carolina Infantry, commanding Pettigrew's brigade. AUGUST 9, 1863. SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Pettigrew's brigade in the engagements beyond the Potomac: On the night of June 30, ultimo, the brigade was on picket on the turnpike road leading from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, about half way between Cashtown and the latter place. Early on the morning of July 1, we moved down the pike toward Gettysburg. When within about 2½ miles of the town, we deployed to the left of the pike, but soon crossed over to the right, other regiments of the division having been engaged for some time. We took up our position in rear of our batteries after we moved to the right. After remaining in this position about half an hour, exposed to a random fire from the enemy's guns, losing probably a dozen men killed and wounded, we received orders to advance. We moved forward about half a mile, and halted in a skirt of woods. The following is the position of the regiments in the brigade: On the right, the Fifty-second North Carolina, next the Forty-seventh North Carolina, then the Eleventh North Carolina, and on the left the Twenty-sixth. In our front was a wheat-field about a fourth of a mile wide; then came a branch, with thick underbrush and briars skirting the banks. Beyond this was again an open field, with the exception of a wooded hill directly in front of the Twenty-sixth Regiment, about covering its front. Skirmishers being thrown out, we remained in line of battle until 2 p.m., when orders to advance were received. The brigade moved forward in beautiful style, at quick time, just with the brigade on our left, commanded by Colonel Brockenbrough. When nearing the branch referred to, the enemy poured a galling fire into the left of the brigade from the opposite bank, where they had massed in heavy force while we were in line of battle in the woods. The Forty-seventh and Fifty-second, although exposed to a hot fire from artillery and infantry, lost but few in comparison with the Eleventh and Twenty-sixth. On went the command across the branch and up the opposite slope, driving the enemy at the point of the bayonet back upon their second line. This second line was encountered by our left (the Twenty-sixth), while the other regiments were exposed to a heavy shelling. The enemy's single line in the field was engaged principally with the right of the Eleventh and Forty-seventh. The enemy did not perceive the Fifty-second, which flanked their left, until they discovered themselves by a raking and destructive fire into their ranks, by which they were broken. On this second line, the fighting was terrible--our men advancing, the enemy stubbornly resisting, until the two lines were pouring volleys into each other at a distance not greater than 20 paces. At last the enemy were compelled to give way. They again made a stand in the woods, and the third time they were driven from their position, losing a stand of colors, which was taken by the Twenty-sixth; but, owing to some carelessness, they were left behind, and were picked up by some one else. While the Twenty-sixth was thus engaged, the rest of the line, having cleared the field and being exposed to a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, were ordered to fall back, which they did in perfect order. The Twenty-sixth, not receiving the order, were now engaged in collecting ammunition from the enemy's dead, being entirely out themselves. Just as they were ready to advance again, General Pender's division passed over them. They followed on, and assisted in driving the enemy from the heights on the edge of the town. They then halted. That night the brigade bivouacked in the woods they had occupied previous to making the charge. While the whole brigade behaved most admirably, especial credit is due the Eleventh and Twenty-sixth. The Twenty-sixth lost more than half its men killed and wounded, among them Col. H. K. Burgwyn, jr., killed, Lieut. Col. J. R. Lane seriously wounded, both with the colors, with many other most valuable officers. Col. C. Leventhorpe, of the Eleventh, and Major [E. A. J Ross were lost--the former wounded severely, the latter killed--with many officers and men. We remained in this position until the evening of the 2d, when we moved about a mile to our right, and took position in rear of our batteries, facing the works of the enemy on Cemetery Hill. We remained here until about 12 o'clock on the 3d, when our batteries opened upon the enemy's position. About 2 o'clock we were ordered to advance. It was an open field in front, about three-quarters of a mile in width. In moving off, there was some confusion in the line, owing to the fact that it had been ordered to close in on the right on Pickett's division, while that command gave way to the left. This was soon corrected, and the advance was made in perfect order. When about half across the intervening space, the enemy opened on us a most destructive fire of grape and canister. When within about 250 or 300 yards of the stone wall behind which the enemy was posted, we were met with a perfect hail-storm of lead from their small-arms. The brigade dashed on, and many had reached the wall, when we received a deadly volley from the left. The whole line on the left had given way, and we were being rapidly flanked. With our thinned ranks and in such a position, it would have been folly to stand, and against such odds. We therefore fell back to our original position in rear of the batteries. After this day's fight, but one field officer was left in the brigade. Regiments that went in with colonels came out commanded by lieutenants. We remained in this position until the night of the 4th, when we took up line of march for Hagerstown, Md. We remained there and in the vicinage until the night of the 13th, for some days in line of battle. On that night, we took up line of march for the Potomac. After traveling all night in mud and rain, about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 14th we took position in a wheat-field as a portion of the rear guard, while the rest of the troops crossed the river at the pontoon bridge (about 1½ miles) at Falling Waters. The men stacked arms, and most of them were asleep, feeling perfectly secure, as our cavalry were out in front. We had been here probably two hours when the enemy's cavalry dashed in upon us, causing some confusion, as the men were just aroused from sleep. Soon as they saw what was the matter, they seized their guns, and soon made way with the cavalry; all but 3 of them were killed or wounded. General Pettigrew was here mortally wounded. He had received a severe contusion on the hand on the 3d, but would not report off duty. I was informed of his condition, and that I was senior officer of the brigade, subject to the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel [s. G.] Shepard, commanding General Archer's brigade. Soon after this, I received orders to fall back gradually to the river. I did so, fighting the enemy, who had now brought up an infantry force, all the way. In this I lost a few men killed and several taken prisoners, most of whom gave out from exhaustion. I could have saved most of those lost by a more hasty retreat along the road, but in that event would have left a brigade on my left completely in the hands of the enemy. We crossed the pontoon about 12 m., just as the bridge was being cut loose. The brigade was marched next day to Bunker Hill, where it remained until I was relieved from command by the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel [W. J.] Martin, of the Eleventh. The brigade deserves the highest praise, not more from its conduct on the battle-field than its soldierly bearing on the march. Where every one did his duty, it would be invidious to mention names. For list of casualties, see reports before sent in. I am, major, respectfully, your obedient servant, J. JONES, Major Twenty-sixth Regiment North Carolina Troops.

The whole of the Army of the Potomac suffered due to the loss at Chancellorsville. In the period leading up to Gettysburg, morale in the Union army was at an all time low, some soldiers were even writing home to loved ones saying how ashamed they were to be a part of it. The XI Corps were in a worse state than the rest, because the rest blamed them for the defeat, and because they had lost so many men as prisoners. Although George Meade had been a somewhat aggressive Division commander, he was never cunning, nor aggressive, as commander of the Army of the Potomac, being one of the first officers (along with James Longstreet) to fully realize the futility of frontal assaults against an entrenched enemy. At Gettysburg he had been in command for only a couple of days, and wisely left most of the fighting to men like Hancock. Even the decision to fight at Gettysburg was not his, but Gen' Reynolds. The defensive 'fish hook' was due to Buford wanting to hold the high ground, the direction Confederate assaults, and Gen's Howard & Hancock, not Meade. Gen' Slocum made the decision to fortify Culps Hill, not Meade, in fact Gen' Meade (possibly as early as the morning of the second of July) wanted to retreat from Gettysburg to Pipe Creek. The only thing Meade did with any 'skill' at Gettysburg was to not attack on the fourth of July. To say that Meade was 'cautious' at Gettysburg was, if anything, a mild understatement on my part. The Army of Northern Virginia that began to arrive at Gettysburg on the first of July, was not the same army that had won at Chancellorsville. Jackson was dead, and Lee's army now had three Corps, not two. Two of Lee's Corps commanders (A.P.Hill & Ewell) were untried in that position. While both men had proven themselves to be very capable commanders below Corps level, with hindsight we now know that neither was suited to Corps level command, or to Lee's way of conducting operations. Lee was an unusual commanding General, in that he gave his officers 'discretionary' rather than direct, orders. While this worked extremely well with Longstreet & Jackson at the head of his Corps, it's frailties were fully exposed when A.P. Hill & Ewell had taken over. Moreover, Lee & the Army of Northern Virginia won the large majority of their battles on the defensive, not the offensive. Last year, a study conducted by the Smithsonian on the topography of Gettysburg in 1863, has also shown that many of the critical decisions taken during the battle, would have been taken 'blindly', especially the decision to assault Cemetery Hill. Longstreet was a defensive minded officer, A.P. Hill & Ewell were used to being given direct orders under Jackson's strict command, I think that a new AI should be added for the Confederates....'confused'.

Lets start at the beginning. Buford knew he had no chance of actually beating what was coming down the road at him, his hope was to delay the Confederate advance in order to save the high ground for the Union....that is a set in stone fact. In order to simulate this, you made some bad balancing decisions, to the point where Buford is actually routing Davis & Archer. Buford did have advantages, his troopers had a greater rate of fire than the Rebel Infantry, they were also fighting from cover, but they were never going to beat Heth's men! This has a knock on effect too, once Archer and Davis are routed, they fare poorly when the Union Infantry arrives. Under most AI choices the Confederates are really easily beaten, under others the Confederate AI will just charge and smash the cavalry...but ruin their own Brigades in the process. It's all well and good for a Civil War game that's NOT based on the Battle of Gettysburg, but you named this game Ultimate General Gettysburg, not us. If you cannot simulate the real events of July the First, then how can you ever hope to create variations of it?

At this point I think it would have been a much better idea to make a generic civil war game, not based on any real battle.

I'm sorry but I have to disagree with you. Heth's mistakes were corrected, as were Rodes, & Ewell's failure to attack Culps Hill affected the second days fighting, not the first. Union uncorrected mistakes on the first day led to the rout through the town, such as the XI Corps poor choice of defensive positions. Also, given that this battle has been re-created, many many times, as a viable war game, more or less proves you wrong. You have already said ''This is intended as we have to give some generic but distinguished and functional advantages to each side'' in relation to the charge/fire variations between the sides, and obviously this is something that's now set in stone. Personally I think it is one of your products biggest flaws and a major factor in the issue's of July the First.

Gamble's vedettes were responsible for making the brigades of Archer & Davis form into battle line prematurely, but this was more to do with ANV officers not knowing what or who they faced, than anything those vedettes actually did. It's clear to me that neither vedettes nor skirmishers should be going toe to toe with Infantry brigades, let alone having them capturing VP locations, it really is ridiculous from an historical point of view. Having them there to slow the enemy down however, makes perfect sense, because that was their exact role on July the first.

And yet, historically, the Army of the Potomac did survive the first of July at Gettysburg, over those three days this was, arguably, the Unions biggest achievement at Gettysburg. On the second and third days there were undoubted critical moments, supreme acts of valour on both sides, but all made possible by Union troops putting up such dogged resistance on the first of July. There are, of course, certain circumstances that would have lead to the Union falling back from Gettysburg, it is highly unlikely that Meade would have fought there, for example, if they had not held the high ground on July the first. But they did hold it, and thus it should be possible in the game. If this is not possible, then there is something wrong with the balancing in the game that shortening the time obviously does not fix.....because I've noticed it. Gettysburg was a three day battle. I believe that it is your 'victory' conditions that are wrong on the first day. Once Lee decided to fight there, only a disaster was going to force a retreat (as happened on the third of July) & in a similar vein the same is true for Meade. Once the fighting re-commenced on the afternoon of the first of July, the die was cast, Gettysburg had become the concentration point for both armies, making a retreat (especially for Lee without his Cavalry) in the face of the enemy an extremely risky undertaking indeed. I do not believe that either side should be able to loose the entire battle on the first of July, unless in the event of a complete disaster. If, as you say, the Union cannot defend hard and survive to fight on the second of July, then something is wrong with the game. The fighting was not cut short at any time on that first day, the Army of Northern Virginia continued fighting until darkness forced a halt. I keep returning to the first of July in testing because (as you say yourself) that is where the problems lie. Get that first day wrong, and obviously it throws day two and three out as well. In UGG it feels like the brigades are taking casualties too fast and too easily, thus the Confederates with more troops can seem to be 'overpowered'. I also believe that a mistake was made in making the southern troops better at charging, and northern troops better at small arms combat, because that simply was not the case. Confederate troops can now take positions simply by using 'charge' that otherwise they would struggle to over run, again making it seem like they are overpowered (southern AI uses this a lot). If either side had an advantage then it was in Artillery. Union Artillery was superior to Confederate for a number of reasons, their batteries would focus fire on one target at a time (especially when dueling southern batteries) Union batteries, as much as possible, kept to one type of cannon in their six gun batteries thus making supply much easier. Southern batteries were typically only four guns, and because the South were unable to manufacture cannon, these four guns were often a mismatch, making ammunition supply a nightmare. Southern Artillery at Gettysburg performed very badly indeed, while Northern batteries, on a number of occasions, were very often the difference between winning and loosing due to their outstanding performance.

What I am saying is that I know the ebb and flow of the battle of Gettysburg like the back of my hand. The afternoon of July 1st, in game, is a good as example as any of what I am talking about. I tried to use an echelon attack earlier today, starting from the Confederate right, all the way to the left at Culps Hill I sent my brigades in to assault the Union Brigades that I had pounded in the morning. By the time some of my second corps brigades reached the jump of point for the attack, the scenario was virtually over. Pender's Division as well as many brigades from the Second Corps barely get into action before the scenario ends, even if you rush them straight into an attack. I believe that the timing, or if you like the pace, of UGG is wrong, that it is too fast. And by too fast I do not mean from a ''I cant manage this'' point of view I mean that some scenario's are nowhere near long enough &, it's because of these time constraints that some units seem weak while others are appearing to be over powered. The first day of Gettysburg is, or should be, very very tough on the Union player in a war game. I'm not really seeing that in UGG. All he should reasonably be able to accomplish with the XI Corps is a holding action, the XI Corps were still suffering from the debacle at Chancellorsville ( if memory serves they had less than 9000 men) & were really in no condition to mount an offensive. The flow/timing, or whatever you want to call it, especially on the first day, seems to be skewed in order to give the Union more of a chance to be offensive. So far I have been testing things as the Confederate player, putting the Union AI on cautious, because I believe this more faithfully represents the 'historical' mindset of Meade at Gettysburg. By doing this I know, more or less, what to expect from the Union AI, and am able to judge the game better as a result. On that first day I notice, time and again, two units in particular seem to stand out. First of all Pettigrew's Brigade almost always under achieves, breaking quite easily over and over. Obviously I was expecting the Iron Brigade to be a problem on the Union side but it's actually the Bucktail Brigade who pose the biggest problem, seeming to roam the battlefield oblivious to withering fire from Infantry and Artillery alike.

I've been testing it quite a lot with the Union on cautious, because that's more or less what Meade was during the actual battle. Lee was very good at getting inside the opposing commanders head, so I believe cautious is a good test of the games AI. So far it has validated the AI, because on cautious the Union (with a few exceptions) behave as they did at Gettysburg.

I've not seen any over powered Confederate units, but it 'seems' like I am seeing some seriously underpowered units on both sides. In all honesty I am struggling to fathom this game, & I've come to the conclusion that it's because of it's time ratio. The speed at which time passes is confusing me quite a lot. Some reinforcements, for example, barely appear on the map before it's all over. I am invited to carefully place my artillery, but not really given the time to see if it's being effective. I see units rout in the blink of an eye, some units of the Confederate second corps barely show their faces before they're running like rabbits. Lets be clear here too, I have fought this battle many many times, from Avlon Hill's Gettysburg, to table top, to PC versions. The passage of time (not the game speed) seems very very quick to me in UG....and I think it's this that's contributing towards units seeming to be over/under powered.

I'm a firm believer in freedom of speech, I really am, and in all honesty I didn't read anything after your 'Hitler was a great general' rubbish when obviously I should have done. Hitler was not a revisionist and neither are you, what you obviously are is a part of that insidious internet breed, Holocaust Deniers. Napoleon was never seen as an 'evil devil' by historians, he was portrayed as 'The Monster' by the Allies at the time, so get your facts right.....historical facts, not your interpretation of such. Secondly, not only Jews gave eyewitness accounts, many Nazi's did too, as did many ordinary Germans, Britains, Americans, Poles, Russians etc etc. The Jpeg you've posted claiming to be ''well documented door for Auswhitz gas chambers'' is in actual fact a door in one of the cottages at the same camp that was used before the implementation of the four much larger facilities, & held as little as forty people at a time. But of course you would know that if you had done this thing called 'research' and checked your sources. I 'heard' about war crimes that took place during World War Two from my grandparents, my grandmother was a land girl during the war, and she heard the stories originally from German PoW's working on farms in Britain, my grandfather was an air frame tech' in the R.A.F responsible for Spitfires and Hurricanes, his knowledge came from his best friend who was a 'guest' of the Japanese for two years. But I did not take their word for it, I went to see for myself and have visited Auschwitz & Birkenau, and Majdanek too. Later I did my own research, reading and listening to hundreds of eye witness accounts. These subjects led me to other childhood interests like 'confederates & Yankee's' and in later years I became a student of Bruce Catton, and visited all the eastern theatre battlefields of the American Civil War. I am also a student of the Victorian era....in short I am an historian of sorts. But one who checks his facts against sources, which you obviously only talk about. I apologize to everyone else for derailing this thread, but I felt this mans ramblings needed a reply before he started to zieg heil his way through his own skewed version of history.

I'm sorry but I have to take you to task here (and lets be clear, I am British) because you have listed Adolf Hitler as a good military leader....seriously? Obviously your view of history is a little skewed my friend. Apart from the obvious, you even miss the fact that from D-Day onwards the commander of all allied forces in Europe was an American (Eisenhower). Excuse me if I am wrong here but I'm sure George Washington was overall commander of the forces that won the War of Independence, beating these much vaunted European (in this case British) generals you seem fond of touting. Some names in your list were responsible for over seeing some of the biggest disasters in military history. Civil War commanders were men schooled in the Napoleonic style of warfare, at a time when rifled weapons had, in fact, made that type of warfare obsolete. Civil War soldiers (especially the men of the Army of the Potomac) were the ones who had to pay the price for this at places like Malvern Hill, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg. Times when the stubbornness of the man in command would refuse to accept that the days of the frontal assault were over. Considering the advances of weaponry over tactics, it is testament to the large majority of Civil War commanders that casualty lists were not a LOT higher than they were. Even at the start of World War One, many European commanders had still not learned the lessons that the American Civil War had taught. Lee earned his place in history, not so much for his victories, but simply because he kept the Army of Northern Virginia fighting, against overwhelming odds, for so long. It is highly unlikely that any other commander of his time could have done the same. There is much more to a commander than winning battles.

Well actually only Davis's Brigade fell back to Herr's Ridge after they were flanked in the railroad cut (at which time many Confederates surrendered) But my point on commenting was that it's a game breaking bug, a solution to which could be, surrender. I totally appreciate that the game is under constant imporovement but, as it stands, I see the pathfinding of retreating/routed units as it's biggest problem. As to the balance of the early morning fight I think that the ability to take VP's needs to be removed from all but infantry brigades. While Cavalry & Skirmishers, quite rightly, should be able to slow down an infantry advance and prevent them taking VP's, they should not be able to capture them. What Buford did on the morning of July 1st was exceptional, but had he sent back to Wadsworth for orders it is highly unlikely that he would have been ordered into action against the flood of Confederates that were coming down those roads, not without full infantry support.

Sorry, but in it's current state your game is pretty much unplayable. Retreating & routed units reforming behind your lines and then walking over to Vp's and winning the battle are killing this game. Once again I have just replayed the morning of the first day, Baxter and Paul along with Devins Skirmishers had all routed and retreated through Confederate lines, only to rally and stroll casually over to take Herr Ridge. So even though I acheived my objectives and took all the other VP's, routing most of the Union forces in the process, I am left with a 'draw' and forced to begin the next stage with my troops all backed up against the west edge of the map, with all the ground I had previously taken in Union hands. Clearly this is unaceptable. At the very least routed/retreating units should be moving back towards their point of entry & away from the enemy, if their path of retreat is blocked then they should, without question, be surrendering.

I have to chip in here as well. The pathing for routing/retreating units definately needs fixing because I too am seeing things which should not be happening. Too often are enemy units routing through my lines, only to rally behind my lines and then casually walk over and sit on VP locations. For a game claiming excellent AI, this really is very poor. Couple this with those ridiculous skirmishers and vedettes roaming willy nilly and this is, more often than not, all adding up to be very very frustrating indeed. Added to this I have to also agree with the OP about my own units. I keep seeing my units retreat towards the enemy they are supposed to be running away from.

Hmmmm, maybe, maybe not. You could possibly add back a percentage of casualties taken to represent soldiers that were displaced during the fighting and who are now returning to their regiments.

As stated elsewhere, when you order a unit to fire at a specific target, to then have your firing unit move off in pursuit is very annoying, especially if the firing unit is artillery. Also, I know the Union XI Corps were not exactly the Army of the Potomacs best troops, and that they ran like hares at both Chancellorsville & Gettysburg, but having them turn tail and run after one volley is a little extreme game wise. 'Cavalry are your best scouts. You want them for that. Also, I believe thery were used quite a bit for flanking attacks during battle. It's not suicide if you hit an engaged unit from the rear. That's full on homicide, amigo' After first Bull Run it was quickly realised that the days of 'glorious' Cavalry charges were over (rifled weapons). Of course there were exceptions during the course of the Civil War, but they were very very few and far between. Scouting was indeed their main role, and when they did fight is was usually on foot. Playing as the Union I'm seeing Confederate units charge way way too soon (sometimes they're not even bothering to fire), and too often. I understand that it's a mechanic of the differences between the two sides, and that early in the war a Rebel charge was a powerful weapon, but I still think it's overdone.

Well I bought the game a few hours ago and I've now had a few scraps so...here goes. 'Skirmishers' need to be removed I think, the days of units running around the field, totally out of sync with everything else that is going on, should be long gone by now. We used to see this quite a lot in early PC strategy/war games, it was a pain in the backside then, and it's a pain now. I could understand skirmishers being detatched from parent units, but as stand alone units they simply do not work & detract from the overall feel of the game. Speed: Personally I think it is too fast, and the reason for this is morale. Morale is falling/rising so quickly that a lot of the time you get little or no chance to plan ahead, so even pausing is really no help. Once you get a significant number of troops on the field most of your time seems to be taken up with managing routing units as opposed to actually fighting the battle. 'Tactics' rapidly disolve into little more than plugging gaps. I'm pretty suprised to see this problem crop up here as the same thing was one of the major failings with Rome 2 Total War. Cavalry: Have to admit that I am a little unhappy with the amount of mounted charges going on, especially early in the engagement. As most of you know, by this period, cavalry charging against infantry was little more than suicide, even cavaly/cavalry charges were rare. Balance: So far it seems pretty good, up to now I've only really noticed one 'super unit' and that was the Bucktail Brigade who seemed to waltz around the field with impunity. So far, overall, it's a job well done but of course there are flaws. Back to the fight and we'll see if anything else crops up.