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I don't think subs would quite work out in custom battles, for the same reasons the "fleet submarine" concept didn't work out in reality. Too slow. If they're underwater, hard to communicate with them, and they're even slower. The US fleet submarines ended up operating as cruisers -- which they were well suited to, but still it wasn't the original plan in the 1920s. Aircraft carriers are a more interesting proposition. If we ever get aircraft in the game, how could we help but make dedicated aircraft carriers? Maybe a 1930 end date would help. Otherwise, yeah, specialty ships are a must.

I do not mean to imply the US, Germany, Italy, and Japan did not deploy fire-control computers. The Ford Rangekeeper Mark 8, in service from about 1932, could not deal well with maneuvering targets, per Friedman's Naval Firepower. I rather suspect the French and postwar Soviet systems were not very good for this purpose, either, despite being built with that in mind. Likewise Royal Navy systems before the AFCT Mk10, which deployed postwar. I don't think the US Computer Mark 1 could calculate maneuvers either. It was still the best naval AA computer in the world.

I have seen some debate on guns, and how they work. To my knowledge, the current gun/damage system works as follows. I put here a simple situation, where the shooting ship with one gun (hereafter, the "Shooter”) fires at a Target with an arbitrary quantity of armor on all surfaces. The Shooter acquires the Target. If it is in range, the Shooter locks on. The gun must turn to aim. This probably involves some calculations to give appropriate gun angle. The computer calculates the chance to hit, given all factors. At this point, the prospective shot contains most relevant information already: It will either hit or miss, based on probabilities. The game generates an approximate ballistic arc. The gun fires. A visual shell is created. It has no “substance,” as it has no hitbox and is only a visual representation. The visual shell is maneuvered midair to hit or miss the target, depending on the precalculated hit-or-miss. Trajectory corrections are made several times. The shell approaches for final impact on or near the Target. This is where things become uncertain. The following is my best guess. If the shell is destined to hit, the computer rolls to hit one of the compartments. A lookup table is consulted: Depending on the range, the shell will “probably” hit either belt or deck armor. The computer rolls to choose which. The visual shell is given its final impact trajectory. If the shell was destined to miss, it impacts the ocean and makes a splash. As the shell is purely visual, if it passes through another ship, it does not “hit.” If the shell was destined to hit, it collides with the Target’s selected compartment on the appropriate surface. The relevant armor value for that compartment is chosen. If the belt armor is impacted, the computer chooses either “extended” or “main” thickness based on the angle of the Target relative to the Shooter at the approximate moment of impact. The computer calculates armor penetration with a formula and lookup table. This depends on the range (giving a vertical impact angle) and armor modifiers, as well as a Target-to-Shooter angle for belt armor. The “main” and “extended” belts probably have set angles that are modified: The main belt is likely 90deg from the Target’s long axis, while the extended belt is likely about 45 degrees from the long axis. The conning tower and turret "belt" armor are possibly treated as always perpendicular to the Target-Shooter axis, with no Target-to-Shooter angle applied. A damage value is selected based on penetration: Overpen, partial pen, full pen, etc. This damage value is modified up or down by various factors, including damage previously taken by the compartment. Chance of critical is applied, given the compartment that is hit and the penetration type. The computer shows an explosion, depending on position, and a decal is created. Damage (or bounce) and criticals are displayed and applied. This is all theory, so I am curious to know if it is the reality. I'd like to know others' thoughts on this.

The earliest computers could not deal very well with any substantial maneuvers. This is why the Germans' zig-zagging in WWI was so effective: The Royal Navy's Dreyer tables could not keep up, although I don't know how much of a turn they could deal with. Of course, the Germans couldn't get on target either, with their much more primitive systems. Interwar, gunnery computers advanced enough to account for more own-maneuvers. A good example is the 1943 Battle of the Komandorski Islands. Both sides were able to shoot while freely maneuvering, but, crucially, they could not account for the other's maneuvers! After a point, the battle degenerated into the USS Pensacola chasing Japanese shots... then the Japanese kind of gave up and retreated. French computers apparently were designed to account for radical enemy maneuvers by 1937. They used inclinometers to help account for changes in enemy course, though I am suspicious of their functionality at longer ranges. British computers could not account well for enemy maneuvers until post WWII, with the Royal Navy's AFCT Mk10 on HMS Vanguard, their last battleship. The Soviet Union's TsAS-0 computer would have been able to account for enemy maneuvers, but the battleships it would equip were never completed. I think the TsAS-1M, on the postwar-completed Chapayev cruisers, may have had this capacity. I do not know which computer the Sverdlovs used. The US did not develop an equivalent system and moved on to guided weapons almost immediately after the war. The Japanese, Germans, and Italians did not either, to my knowledge.

The determinism approach is especially inappropriate given that we know that gyro setters were present on US surface ships, and that all US submarines post-1925 had gyro setters. By 1941 continuous setters were installed. The manual for the Mark 14 surface-ship launcher (ie the one used on like 300 destroyers) explicitly shows both the setter and a dedicated crewman to enter gyro settings. Also I'm not sure any general history would mention gyro setting except in the context of failures.... Edit: The 1947 torpedo fire control equipment (destroyers) manual describes gyro control pretty well. It does not describe any outstanding postwar issues with angling. Apparently there was even a specific setting to deal with latitude of the Earth. Links to both: https://maritime.org/doc/destroyer/ddtubes/index.htm https://maritime.org/doc/destroyer/ddfc/index.htm

If the enemy has been forced to retreat, you can: Launch an invasion. Raid a base. Sink transports and shipping. Bombard ground troops. Or keep the enemy from doing the same to you.

I have noticed torpedoes often fail to launch when the attacker is second or third (or so on) in the division, and the division is on converging-parallel course with the target. Generally this corrects if the division begins to pull away from the target track. I think this may be a product of some (maybe primitive) friendly-fire avoidance logic. I suspect the ship will not launch if a friendly ship (in the same division?) will cross the torpedo track within some timespan, regardless if the chance to hit is negligible. On the other hand, I have seen a ship sink itself with torpedoes. The torpedoes launched, then the vessel immediately turned into two of them and blew up. It took perhaps one second from launch to destruction, if that.

Seems this is your lucky day, haha. The Imperial Japanese Navy, so famously competitive with the Imperial Army, did not want to stay out of land warfare. The Special Naval Landing Forces were organized as an adjunct. These forces generally operated as light infantry, and were organized into battalions. Tank and paratrooper units were also used. The troops were sailors, led by naval officers. It was the SNLF that defended Tarawa: Rear Admiral Shibasaki Keiji was in command. There were a very large number of other actions where they were used, including in China, the Aleutians, and Okinawa.

90 tons is 90 tons; the point is where. On the main deck? It is fine. Although I wholeheartedly agree with criticism of the German capital ships. On top of the casemates, as this post suggests? Not so great, I expect. I think the game would give a pretty stiff penalty to roll characteristics for this. Mind, if a ship has too much stability, it will have a sharp, jerking roll -- very unpleasant -- so some topweight can be built in purposely, as on the Royal Navy's Revenge class. Remember the issues the Americans had with WWII radars and AA guns -- they didn't weigh particularly much, but a few tons very high in the ship has cascading effects. Likewise the Japanese Myoko class. One pair of main deck quadruple launchers was removed to save weight during the war. This is somewhat separate from the wisdom of torpedo tubes on a battleship, tactical or otherwise, but that is itself a valid question.

The Japanese cruisers Tenryu and Tatsuta each carried two triple Type 6 21in (53.3cm) launchers. The weight of each Type 6 launcher was 11.95 tonnes, totaling 23.9 tonnes. The weight of each Type 6 torpedo was 1432kg. There were six torpedoes embarked, totaling to 8.592 tonnes. Each launcher with three torpedoes weighed 16.246 tonnes. So, 32.492 tonnes grand total. Not a huge amount. A single Type 3 14cm/50 (5.5in) shielded gun weighed 21 tonnes. Unfortunately it seems a lot of auxiliary equipment was needed for the torpedoes. A cursory look at the other Japanese cruisers indicates that this was usually the case -- lots of extra stuff needed. The total outfit weighed 88.8 tonnes on Tatsuta at 2/3 displacement. Assuming that the 2/3 displacement did not include two torpedoes, the full load weight was ~91.7 tonnes. Probably a minor amount for a big battleship like Scharnhorst or Tirpitz, but for the "bug" we're discussing, the weights would be very high (given the launchers were on top of the casemates), which is quite bad for stability, and the old pre-dreadnought hull would weigh much less proportionally.

It could be done, eventually, because aircraft torpedoes could be dropped from significant heights. For a long time, though, torpedoes could not deal with high water-entry angles, or they weren't strong enough to drop from that high, so the above-water torpedo tubes were usually much closer to the water. On the Japanese cruisers Furutaka and Myoko, for example, a drop of about 20 feet was considered too much until the entry-angle issue was fixed -- when it was, the launchers were moved a deck upward. These technical limitations made high tubes ill-advised until after battleships largely disposed of torpedoes. That, and a very high torpedo launcher produces a lot of topweight. Whether it should be done, I do not know.

Attacks on ports is definitely a must. Lots of famous battles to be had. I think forts, mines, and motor torpedo boats would be great additions.

External belt armor is fairly easy to change. It's bolted to the ship's structure, and contributes no girder strength of its own -- it just hangs off. British heavy cruisers received extensive upgrades later in their lives. Structurally integral belts (like on IJN heavy cruisers) or internal belts would be much harder to repair or replace. Per the Washington Naval Treaty, cruisers had to stay within 10000 long tons, or at least within the 10300 ton "gentlemen's agreement" refit limit, so refits couldn't add much more armor. The Americans certainly could have upgraded the armor of the Pensacolas and Northamptons, given their gross underweight, but it seems there was little interest in such refits -- probably it made more sense just to build new ships with better armor. The Washington Naval Treaty banned alterations to capital ship belt armor, except for France, Italy, and on HMS Renown.

I don't know, I think it would be very annoying. Who likes to have weapons that just don't work? It would be historical, yes, but it seems to just add in more elements of chance. Imagine how awful it would be to launch a torpedo shoal and have them just break up instead of exploding. I perceive this as worse than simply missing. I would rather abstract this. What if there were damage modifiers on shells and torpedoes? Using completely arbitrary values, perhaps poor quality control would give 30% less damage, moderate quality control would give 10% less damage, and high quality control would have the full damage.

Submarines could and did, for example a mix of electric and wet-heater types. For surface ships, it was certainly more rare. Most would carry all of one type/version, especially as rotating topside mounts would come with few reloads. 8 and 10 tube US destroyers generally had 4 reload torpedoes, for example, up to the Fletcher class. Homogeneity is useful in a broadside. Considering US predreadnoughts, flywheel and compressed-air torpedoes were mounted on separate ships due to different launching equipment. This is one of the barriers to "mixed" batteries -- may need extra parts. Off the top of my head, I believe there was some German WWI interest in mixing wet-heater and compressed air "cold" torpedoes, as the latter would require no warmup time. I will have to check if this was done. Edit: It was a British idea, not German. As akd points out, this was actually Royal Navy practice on some WWI destroyers. Apparently the idea was dropped by 1921 and the tubes disembarked. Generally (except for ASW), electric torpedoes were not used by surface ships, because they had inferior performance to conventional wet-heaters. Their stealthiness was far more useful to submarines.

I do not know how the game treats things, but in "real life" HE shell can ricochet off armor if its fuze does not activate. This can happen at extreme impact angles. If the shell has a sufficiently sensitive filler, like picric acid (called "Lyddite," "Melinite," "Shimose," etc.), it might blow up even if the fuze has not activated. Sometimes that's nice... other times, not so much. Unlike the Americans, the Royal Navy was very concerned about the effect of powerful battleship HE shells. This is largely why they preferred distributed armor schemes in WWI, even while the US was developing the all-or-nothing idea. British light cruisers used Common Pointed Ballistic Cap (CPBC) shells, later redesignated Semi-Armour Piercing Ballistic Cap (SAPBC). I believe Common Pointed Cap (CPC, very little armor penetrating ability) and HE were also used fairly often. British heavy cruisers had no "true" AP issued. They used mostly Semi-Armour Piercing Capped (SAPC), though some HE shells were carried too, probably for bombardment use or maybe against merchant ships.

In the Imperial Japanese Navy, two-seat spotters had endurances of about five to seven hours. Three-seat recon/scout seaplanes had endurances of seven to fifteen hours. The two-seat Type 95 E8N and the three-seat Type 0 E13A1, the ubiquitous battleship/cruiser seaplanes at the start of WWII, had endurances of 7.0 and 14.96 hours, respectively. I don't know the endurances for the US SOC Seagull and OS2U Kingfisher, the major US WWII spotter planes, but from ranges I estimate five and six hours, respectively. Evasive maneuvers and such would decrease available fuel. I want to see spotters and recon aircraft and airships. But it might have to be an artificial balance. From the early days there were considerations for cruiser/battleship fighters. Though torpedo planes took slightly longer to mature than fighters, they famously sank several ships during WWI. By the 1920s, US forces were asking for both fighters and torpedo bombers for use aboard battleships. That spotters and scouts were mounted instead seems less a lack of interest and more a division of labor, with dedicated carriers being introduced. Even spotters and scouts could carry bombs, anyway, especially for anti-submarine patrols. I imagine it would be hard to implement planes other than spotters/scouts.... Balancing carriers could be impossible.

There were a few more same-caliber gun upgrades in our timeframe. On the US battleships New York, Nevada, and Pennsylvania, the 14in/45 went through a few iterations, ending up with a bigger chamber and greater muzzle velocity. There was a great amount of fiddling with the US 14in/50, but I would call this troubleshooting more than anything. The French Bretagne battleships upgraded from the 340mm Mle.1912 to the Mle.1912M. Unfortunately I do not know what really changed. There were various guns, like the Japanese 14cm Type 3, which changed from wire-wound to built up or monobloc construction during their production runs. These guns were often functionally identical, though, and accounts tend not distinguish between the variants; often there was no particular "upgrade program." That's it for main batteries on cruisers, battleships, battlecruisers, and carriers, to my knowledge. It was much more common to change shells, propellants, or turret arrangements, rather than the gun itself: this could make great changes to gun performance. There might be more examples from the big shift from black powder to smokeless powder, but I must profess ignorance there. If you change your criteria to allow secondary batteries and different calibers, then examples abound.

It is important to say that the 155mm turrets on Mogami did not have the same dimensions as the previous 203mm turrets. In fact, they were bigger. They had a larger turret ring and a slightly greater overall weight. Neither, from my study, was there much in common in shell handling beyond the basics. When the decision came down to rearm, special turrets were needed to fit the bigger barrettes, a version of the "E" style usually called the "Mogami" or "E2 modified" type. The Tone class was also originally to have carried 155mm turrets. Midway through construction, it was decided to use 203mm guns. Rather than use bigger turrets, the barbettes were necked down to form a curious conical shape. Their E3 turrets retained the smaller dimensions of the E and E2 turrets on the Takaos and Furutakas. The Ibuki class, basically a variant on Mogami, was always intended to have 203 turrets and so had smaller cylindrical barbettes. They retained the oddly close positioning of turrets No.1 and No.2, but this may have been for expediency. The jury is still out on whether the 155-203 change on Mogami and Tone was strictly intended from the start. Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War is fairly equivocal. The Mogami class was designed well before the decision to abandon the Treaty system. One suspects the fairly similar dimensions of the 155 and 203 turrets stems more from a desire to maintain gunpower despite a decrease in gun caliber, rather than a plot to eventually subvert the London Naval Treaty. That tactical homogeneity could be bettered with the 203 refit was probably a happy side effect. There are persistent claims in general histories that the gun change was always the idea, but I have seen little positive evidence for this idea. Then again, the Mogami class was a twisted monstrosity from the start, so it is hard to say what fever dreams of the Fleet Faction were at play even then. The main problem with broad characterizations of refits is the Treaty system. So much of what we did and did not see was a consequence of the Washington Naval Treaty, wjich instituted the "battleship holiday." In earlier years, a navy could just build a new, better battleship, and keep the old unchanged. But the Treaty stopped this, so old ships would have to stay in the frontline. Thus refits were needed. But the Treaty prohibited changing the main battery on capital ships -- to the extent that the British became very angry when the Americans wanted to increase the elevation limits on their older battleships. Likewise, the refit displacement limit was 3000 tons, so there could not be huge changes. Still we saw radical reconstructions, though within the Treaty's boundaries. Who can forget the Lexingtons, or the Akagi and Kaga? Had the Treaty allowed, any number of older capital ships may have been transformed to arbitrarily improved designs: but, like the big carriers, it would take a very long time and come at ruinous cost. The Italians took this idea and ran with the Cavour and Andrea Doria, as has been said. The ships were lengthened, the machinery replaced, the amidship turret removed, the guns bored out, the secondaries replaced, the armor strengthened, and the towers rebuilt. It cost a ton of money, but so it went. Installed barbettes can limit the size of new guns, but if the expense was accepted, they could be replaced... in theory. Bigger guns add a lot of topweight, so any refit design needs either fewer guns or new bulges, or both. Smaller vessels could undergo extreme battery changes over their lives. The Royal Navy's C and D antiaircraft cruisers are a nice example, as are Japan's Isuzu, Maya, Kitakami, and Furutaka. Yes. The Japanese Furutaka, Aoba, and Myoko classes all upgraded from the 20cm Type 3 No.1 to the 20.32cm Type 3 No.2. Many US cruisers upgraded from the 8in/55 Mk9 to the Mk12, 14, or 15.

For our time period, the modifiable torpedo characteristics are broadly the following: Torpedo diameter Torpedo length (combined with diameter, this helps produce total weight) Warhead weight (correlated with torpedo size) Warhead explosive type Engine type Fuel type Torpedo speed (modifiable, but upper bound is dependent on the engine type) Torpedo range (modifiable, but strongly correlated with torpedo size and fuel type) Gyro ability Depth adjustment Of these things: Torpedo diameter is already implemented. Torpedo length would be alright to add. Essentially it would let us trade off range for weight. Not sure it's worthwhile, but it might be nice. Warhead weight might be subsumed into tech upgrades. The higher up the tech tree, the greater the damage. Conceivably we could trade this off versus fuel weight, so it could be a selectable value. Warhead explosive could be subsumed into tech upgrades. I'm open to making it a selectable option, like shell filler, but I don't know if it makes a lot of sense. I'm not sure there were clear real tradeoffs when it came to explosive tech -- there is not quite the same issue of impact sensitivity as there is for shells. Why would one want guncotton as compared to Torpex, essentially. Engine type is partially implemented, as we can choose electric torpedoes. Though there are other engine types -- radial, two-cylinder, turbine -- I don't think they have clear advantages over each other. Might be abstracted into tech tree upgrades. Fuel type is also partially implemented. We can pick electric, "normal," and oxygen. Many more fuels could be added, including compressed air, dry heaters, wet heaters, semi-Diesel, and even flywheels. I think this would be a great area to expand on. I think "electric" should remain a fuel type, and that more fuels should be added. Torpedo speed can be selected now, sort of. We can pick "fast" as an option. This should be separated from the "fuel" type, because most torpedoes, regardless of fuels, could be adjusted to swim at various speeds. I think this should become its own selectable category. "Normal" would be the default. "Fast" would have a higher speed but a reduced range. "Slow" would have a slower speed but a longer range. Range would be selected alongside speed. Gyro ability would be interesting. Gyro stabilization was introduced in 1896; the vast majority of torpedoes since then have had gyros. Aside from markedly improving accuracy, a gyro can give the ability to fire at more extreme angles and let torpedoes run patterns. Not sure about adding this. Depth keeping might be cool to add. A deeper-running torpedo may do more damage, but it may miss ships with shallow draft. Duds would be infuriating. We don't have dud shells right now, either, and I would not like to see them.

I do not mind the hotfix. I think it might have gone a little too far, but that's ok. I personally have not had trouble with overwhelming secondaries, but maybe I just haven't played the right missions again. There are some other things to consider before balancing accuracy across the board. Though I think the separation into focus groups or processes is valid and a great approach, we have some gestalt stuff too. Armor is wacky. It is not hard to build an invincible armored brick, so that guns that can't penetrate are worthless. Some battleships indeed had armor all over, but this tended to come at a cost, and such armor tended to be thin. A modern all-or-nothing battleship would have large unarmored areas. We cannot choose values for transverse bulkheads, turret sides, upper casemate belts, underwater protective decks, etc. So naturally the AP vs. HE dilemma is hard to solve. A good step may be some display of armor in port or in a viewer. We have no crew. Although a small gun may not be able to damage the ship itself very much, it could kill crewmen. It may also cause morale effect through its great rain of fire. We do not have crew training, intraship communications, decrewing of exposed guns, or crew shock from impacts. Crew is not diverted from shooting, operating machinery, etc. to go put out fires or stop flooding. Spaces are not rendered uninhabitable by smoke or water. Small guns have no bonus to accuracy against fast targets. A big gun with a forty second reload may find it difficult to find a continuing firing solution on a radically maneuvering target. A handy, rapid-firing gun can fire quick corrected shots and cope with quick changes. Though this advantage lessened with advanced fire-control, handy guns became very important against aircraft. I guess aircraft are kinda the elephant in the room with 1930s+ designs.... Small ships have no bonus for mounting small guns. A very lively ship like a destroyer may have problems keeping guns on target in a seaway. A light or short gun can make this easier on crew or machinery. Without automated loading, a heavy shell can be hard to handle and load in rough seas. There is no apparent substructure for guns. A bigger gun needs heavier supports and heavier facilities for ammunition stowage and transport. Though this can more or less be subsumed in "gun weight" in the designer, I have never seen it discussed and thought it prudent to mention here. It may also be said that a smaller gun can be less vulnerable to a "system" failure. A big-gun turret has a lot of parts. If one part is deranged, the whole turret might be disabled. A small gun can be more self-contained: it might need only an aimer, a loader, and a box of ready ammunition. On the other hand, larger guns might be built with greater system redundancy, so that any one issue can be bypassed or fixed. The discussions in this thread have been thought-provoking.

I think this would be a nice idea, I'd like to see it. Especially because it is hard to fire "browning shots" at big groups of enemies right now. It might be intensive micro-managing, though, which I think (?) some players don't want so much. I think improved AI would go a long way to bridging the gap. If we can tell the AI to make a torpedo attack on a specific target (apart from just "hold fire" or "aggressive fire"), that might be fun. Imagine a smarter opponent, too, which can make its own coordinated attacks. Collision avoidance would definitely need to be improved for that, though. The AI is... pretty stupid right now.

There were more or less seven major engagements between 1867 and 1914. The first was Yalu River, in the 1894-1895 First Sino-Japanese War. It was a large fleet engagement, 12v14, and ended with decisive Japanese victory. It spanned about five hours, from ~1230 to 1730. The second was Weihaiwei, in the same war. I have never seen a good account of the engagement. The combined land-sea battle lasted about two weeks. To my knowledge there were several short naval actions over a couple days, including two nighttime torpedo boat attacks, against the largely immobile Chinese fleet. It ended the Sino-Japanese War in Japan's favor. The third was the Battle of Manila Bay. Though a relatively small battle, it was a decisive American victory. Spanish shore batteries fired intermittent shots overnight, but the engagement began in earnest at 0515 when fortress guns and the Spanish fleet opened fire. The American fleet returned fire at 0541. At 0745 the Americans withdrew; they reengaged at 1040. With the Spanish fleet soon in ruins, the Americans fought shore guns until Spanish surrender at 1240. Total battle time was 7 hours, about 4 hours shooting. Fourth was the Battle of Santiago, in the Spanish-American War. It was an overwhelming American victory. The main engagement lasted from 0930 to about 1115 with the grounding of Vizcaya. Cristobal Colon attempted to get away, but was chased down and finally scuttled and surrendered around 1330. Thus a duration of an hour and forty-five minutes, with another two hours tacked on for Cristobal Colon. Fifth was Port Arthur, which kicked off the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. It began with a Japanese destroyer surprise night attack on Port Arthur, from ~0030 to ~0200, an hour and a half. The Japanese had overestimated the damage to the Russian fleet, so they dueled the port's fortress guns starting vaguely around 1110. The Russian fleet emerged near noon, and a daylight engagement then occurred between the two full fleets.The Japanese realized they had erred and quickly left. No ships were sunk, and the fleet engagement lasted perhaps a half hour, from ~1200 to 1230. Sixth was the Yellow Sea, of the same war. It was a large fleet engagement and ended indecisively. It started at 1300, with fire engaged until 1520. The Japanese then broke off. Some skirmishing occurred at extreme range at 1540. They re-engaged at 1735 and fought until at least 1900-2000 (to my knowledge, possibly some time longer). The daylight battle lasted at least five or six hours, of which perhaps three or four were spent shooting. Japanese destroyers gave chase and made attacks during the night. Seventh was Tsushima, the definitive fight of the Russo-Japanese War. It was an annihilatory battle and lasted more than a day. The main engagement began at 1355, with the first shots at 1405. The battlefleets fought five and a half hours, until 1930, when Borodino blew up and the Japanese battleships drew back. Japanese destroyers and cruisers made many attacks overnight and into the next day. The Japanese battlefleet reengaged Russian survivors at 1000 the next morning, ending at 1030 with Russian surrender. The battle completely ended a few hours later, when Japanese cruisers fought the coast-defense battleship Ushakov from 1500 until ~1530. So, very hard to say how long a battle "should" last. If you average these out, you get 3.7 hours shooting time. Standard deviation for that would be pretty high though. Take my estimate with a huge grain of salt. Edit: If we consider only battleship-battleship encounters, Yalu River, Weihaiwei, Manila Bay, and Santiago de Cuba do not count. Port Arthur would count only as the 30min skirmish, Yellow Sea for three or four hours shooting, and Tsushima for six hours shooting. Very small sample size. I must profess too much ignorance to say how long the night actions took. I will have to read over more accounts to say.

It is usually simple to tell between very different calibers, like 8in from 5in. But I would need to see sources for telling apart 11in from 12in in the heat of battle. The shell may kill most people close enough to see the damage it inflicts. Neither, during a battle, will the crew say: "hmm, according to the damage here, it must have been 12in in size! 11in is clearly insufficient to have caused this." How would most of the crew know this? Could one tell apart a 12in from an 11in hit without exactly measuring the impact hole or the shell (whatever of it remains)? That can be done, but it requires survivors in the area and for them go to tell the captain. Think of USS Vincennes, where the crew was unsure if they'd been struck by a torpedo or an 8in shell. Or USS Gambier Bay, which apparently could not tell 8in hits from 18in hits. It is much easier to tell after the battle, especially if the ship survived. But then that is not the issue of this bug report. I agree that a range (say, 10in to 12in) would be appropriate. Perhaps after a minute, the crew could tell you the exact caliber. Second issue with this bug is that you can tell shell size without being hit. That is, to my knowledge, would be basically impossible without prior information. Same with torpedoes. The US certainly could not differentiate between 21in and 24in torpedo hits. I do not think the 40km maximum range of Type 93s was known until postwar, either.

The changes are interesting. I agree that small guns have probably swung too far in accuracy, from playing the unescorted convoy mission. I think further testing is in order though. I think small guns instead should have bonuses against fast, small ships at short range. That is, they would have less of a penalty compared to bigger guns. This would better reflect their handiness and ability to make quick corrected shots. Then they would be good to take down attacking torpedo boats and destroyers, but not have super-high accuracy in general. I think crews would have to be implemented in a meaningful way before small guns can be perfectly balanced. Bigger torpedoes are much more impactful. A 21in torpedo is powerful enough to sink a merchant ship unaided. This seems tentatively appropriate. I have not tested them against warships, so I am curious how they do.