David Fair

1st TN Reg. Watkins, Thanks for the post - I keep watching your battlefield statistics to see if artillery batteries are still as effective as infantry brigades. This report confirms that batteries continue to be as effective as infantry brigades. As long as this relationship exists it is difficult for me to get very excited about UGG. It is great to hear the cavalry finally received an adjustment. Hopefully the game will continue to trend toward the reality of the ACW.

Skaldwolf, West Point did not formally teach military 'doctrine' prior to the ACW. Since the country’s birth there had been a national debate about the place of a professional military in a democracy. George Washington, whose experience with milita units had not always been felicitous, originally favored the creation of a trained officer corps, as did Alexander Hamilton and Robert E. Lee’s father Light Horse Harry. There were equally strong voices on the other side – those who, like Jefferson, though defense a prerogative of the states…The compromise they reached was to create a very small regular army for peacetime. The cadets studied advanced calculus, trigonometry, and descriptive geometry to aid them in planning fortifications, and natural sciences such as biology and astronomy to help them assess terrain and master positioning. They also learned surveying and spent long hours perfecting the draftsmanship needed to plot maps and draw intricate structural diagrams. Always there were the endless drills, riding practice, and instruction in tactics and artillery. The curriculum stressed the construction of fortifications and operational expertise; it did not teach battlefield maneuvers to any great degree, and little time was spent on war games or other theoretical pursuits. Military analysis, to the extent that it existed, focused on informal discussions of the American Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, including the War of 1812…Antoine-Henri Jomini’s earliest catalog of tactics, also based on experience with Napoleon’s armies, was available to Lee in French and was also excerpted in a standard text on military science used at West Point…for the most part cadets were taught tactics with General Winfield Scott’s all-American General Regulations for the Army, which was largely bureaucratic in nature. Carl von Clausewitz’s meditations on the political and strategic consequences of military action, which again drew on Napoleonic principles, were also available in French, though it is not know whether Lee ever read his work [and was not required reading]. At the time Robert E. Lee entered West Point, army engineers were charting the Great Lakes, surveying canal routes, and contributing innovative technical and managerial skills to the earliest American railways. Before 1830 the Corps of Engineers could take credit for fourteen roads totaling some 1,900 miles, including the National Road. In 1831 the War Department was given primary authority for topographical work. This came to include the establishment of boundaries and observation of weather conditions and natural resources, as well as recommendations for likely military sites... In 1838 a distinct Topographical Corps was created…Lee exclaimed [to his friend Mackay]…’you are in the Topogs, which perhaps offers the most pleasant duty of any corps in the Service. It will introduce you to the community at large, give you an opportunity of visiting all parts of the Country, enable you to practice what you have learned, stimulate your farther efforts in science, &c…' The military contribution to developing the vast, uncharted American territory was so extensive that warrior [General, then President] Zachary Taylor would drily note: ‘The as, pick, saw and trowel, has become more the implement of the American soldier, than the cannon, musket or sword.' Check out google images for "Robert E. Lee drawings of St. Louis" for example and you can see the skills Lee honed at West Point. The arsenal of the United States was devoted to fixed fortifications with a couple thousand large-caliber guns. When the war began the CSA captured 1,198 heavy guns at the Gosport Naval Yard in Norfolk, VA. Included in this haul were 959 of the Model 1829 Seacoast Gun. This heavy artillery would be redeployed to various forts including Fort Donelson Tennessee, Port Hudson and Fort DeRussy in Louisiana and CSA city defenses including Charleston, Savannah, Memphis, Mobile, and Vicksburg among others. The Model 1829 would prove effective against wooden-hulled warships; however, ironclads were impervious to this obsolete ordnance. In the battle for Mobile Bay, for example, the CSS Tennessee was captured and a few days later repaired and rechristened the USS Tennessee. The Model 1829 scored numerous direct hits on USS Tennessee each making a dent about 2 mm deep (1/8 inch or about the thickness of a dime) but inflicting no critical damage (other than the loss of hearing for the crew). After the loss of Norfolk the remaining 3,000 seacoast guns in the U.S. arsenal saw little action – the Confederate States of America lacking naval strength to attack Federal fortifications by sea. Prior to the war, U.S. ordnance included only 165 field artillery pieces. These were widely distributed, often by two-gun section, at various posts. These were largely ornamental pieces fired at parades and reviews. The gun designs were too heavy, and the American Indian too elusive an enemy, for effective employment of field artillery. Artillery personnel were usually trained as infantry and used in this role rather than remaining with the guns which were usually left behind on campaign. Note that at no time in American history had the United States ever had a field army with 100 field guns prior to the ACW. America's largest collection of field artillery was attained during the Mexican American War which featured the capture of about 625 pieces of artillery - some of that number were field calibers - but due to the lack of teams to pull the guns they were largely left in the nearest garrison rather than brought forward during active campaigning. At the start of the civil war officers had no idea how to fight a war at scale. This includes everything from organizing and marching more than a regiment from place to place to on-battlefield grand tactics. Grant talks about the nation's learning curve in his memoirs at length. The general notion was to get men in lines and then get them moving forward. It took four years to determine military a 'doctrine' with the new technologies of the ACW - which primarily meant the increased distance (about 2X compared to the distance between the lines in Napoleonic battles) between the opposing forces at the start of a battle. Forces were organized by brigade with artillery and cavalry attached. The result was a mess. The corps system was implemented by McClellan in early 1862 and was formally adopted by the Union by an Act of Congress on July 17, 1862. The Confederates did not implement a corps organizational structure until after their army reoganization following Antietam. Longstreet and Jackson were made lieutenant-generals, and the whole army was definitely organized into corps. Corps were authorized after Lee's reorganization in November 1862. Even after the adoption of the corps system there was a raging debate on the organization and use of artillery. This debate was never resolved and the battery remained the largest formal artillery formation until the conflict of 1917. It is true that the Union army formed the Artillery Reserve under Hunt after the Chancellorsville debacle, and batteries were formed into brigades. But these brigades were actually a collection of batteries without any additional staff to deploy the brigade as a unit. Batteries were parceled out to various units as needed and the replaced batteries were sometimes refitted by the reserve. Tidball's book is an excellent resource on the topic of artillery as he was a battery commander, then brigade commander during the war and ultimately the commander of the U.S. artillery school at Fort Monroe. See: "The Artillery Service int he War of the Rebellion" edited by Lawrence M. Kaplan by Westholme Publishing 2011. Neither side figured out the role of staff officers and the staffs of both sides were too small and not trained in their art to function effectively. The ACW was a bit of a blundering war - which is often blamed on the technology outpacing the 'doctrine'; but, as the Franco-Prussian war was to demonstrate it was entirely possible to use the technologies at hand to rapidly out maneuver and defeat an enemy strategically in much less than a four-year struggle of attrition. Note that the ACW's fundamental contribution to the art of war was Longstreet's innovations regarding entrenchments. Previously a line of entrenchments was precisely that - a continuous line of trenches supported by the occasional redoubt. See for example the Lines of Torres Vedras. Longstreet designed mutually supporting works with refused flanks, defense in depth, communication ditches and protective works to facilitate the feeding and maintenance of men in these positions - Stonewall Jackson was so impressed with Longstreet's designs at Fredericksburg that he had his engineers redesign his own works more in line with Longstreet's innovations in trench warfare. The Petersburg Richmond lines were derivatives of the Longstreet concept at scale. These in turn were the formative steps to WWI trench warfare and warfare by attrition. Hopefully this information is what you are looking for... Cheers PS - here are a couple of great pictures from the war. The first is the Union front line, likely before the Battle of Nashville in 1864, The second image is one of the only pictures of the Army of Northern Virginia on the march. If you haven't seen it before I consider it to be one of the most educational images of the war. You can almost smell the sweat as the column pauses before moving on to fight at Antietam. These don't look much like tidy lines of tin box soldiers. The photo below is the property of the Historical Society of Frederick County, Maryland.

It would be interesting to see how the Game Labs team would address cavalry on the WWI battlefield. Currently in UGG the cavalry is more like armored knights or Napoleonic Heavy cavalry than ACW cavalry. WWI was even more of an infantry affair than the ACW. The tactics of that war don't really line up very well with the current implementation of brigade-level linear tactics. To get a game even approximating WWI would be an interesting game design challenge. You'd need to address off-screen artillery which contributed about 75% of all casualties during the conflict. Interestingly about 35 years ago the U.S. Army had a team that was playing war games against local clubs. They were on a recruiting tour looking for officer candidates. The winners were awarded a trip to Ft. Leavenworth to play a game on their static set up - staggeringly impressive. The feedback regarding all of the amateur wargamers from the U.S. Army team was that we really didn't have a clue how to use artillery in modern warfare. You'd need to get some serious guidance to even get a WWI game in the ballpark...or just strap on a blindfold and throw some darts at an implementation that has little to do with the actual combat arms. WWI fire and control mechanics for artillery are not for faint hearted game designers - and they are likely the most critical element of a WWI game.

P.S. More than 100,000 southern soldiers were AWOL by late 1864. Jefferson Davis desperately tried to get these "shirkers" back into the ranks - with little effect. These men were not waiting for a "last hurrah" they had "given up the ghost" on the dream of the Confederacy long before the curtain fell on the final act. P.S.S. Jefferson Davis wrote his appeal to the state governors prior to 1960.

Isn't the right of a white man to own a black man by definition "white supremacy?" Most southerners did not own slaves; but they did have the right to own slaves. Those who did owned two or fewer, and most slave holders worked beside their slaves in the fields. Plantation owners with more than 100 slaves were the upper crust of society. Less than 5% of slave holders owned more than 100 slaves. I'm not certain how knowing slavery statistics is "demonizing" the 1%? These men of property tended to lead politically as well as economically. Not sure what documents you are talking about that were written after 1960? All of the documents I cited above, including the 1840 and 1850 Census and the 1861 Texas Ordnance of Succession were written before 1960. Not clear what pre-1960's data you are citing for the death of slavery or pre-1960's information supporting your theory of a "last hurrah". The invention of the cotton gin catapulted the importance of slave labor back into the most important property resource of the south. The south didn't produce "goods" they produced cotton as a raw material for textiles goods from England, France, and the Yankee North (e.g., Lowell, Massachusetts). The KKK was founded by N.B. Forrest after the ACW. Where the KKK found membership is a completely different issue than a "last hurrah" of the southern war effort. Great to hear you don't have doubts in your mind about your theory of the "last hurrah." I was simply hoping you could enlighten the rest of us with a more coherent presentation for your theory.

Hmmmm... a last hurrah theory of American Civil War History? I thought many of the "blunders" at Gettysburg were caused by the loss of key Confederate leaders, such as Jackson. This led to the promotion of lesser men like Ewell who were leading Corps-level commands at Gettysburg. Attrition led to the promotion of less experienced division, brigade, and regimental commanders - all of which deteriorated the quality of command and control in the ANV throughout the course of the war. Every Civil War battle was replete with blunders and Gettysburg is no exception. The ANV was no less determined in 1863 (or 1865 through 1965) than in 1861. The South continued to fight, and fight to the last extremity, until their resources were exhausted completely. In short, I respect your right to express your opinion; but, I don't buy your personal opinion that the South continued fighting for a "final hurrah with which to bow out of the conflict." Both sides were fatigued. Both sides were determined. Both sides fought until the South was utterly broken militarily. After the war the cause of white southern supremacy went sub rosa with organizations like the KKK to continue the fight. The fight for white southern supremacy continued through Jim Crow laws, the Civil Rights movement, and continued today over the display of the Confederate flag on State and Federal property. This was not then, nor is this today, a last hurrah. Policies of southern white supremacy is a legacy of the antebellum south as seen in the "lost cause" myth" and the fights today over the display of the Confederate battle flag. The United States census of 1840 and 1850 documented the loss of the political dominance of the South. From that point forward the South wanted to be and independent southern confederacy. If the leaders of the South could not lead the United States (by Southern candidates winning the Presidential election) then the South wanted to form its own country where Southern leaders would continue to play the dominant role. The election of Lincoln was the catalyst for the war because it was a clear representation of the loss of the political clout of southern aristocrats. John Brown and the abolitionist movement proved that it was only a matter of time before the political spectrum would shift to limit or eliminate the spread of slavery. The slave population was worth more than all of the land-property value of the southern states. Loss of the right of slavery was de facto loss of the economic wealth of the 1% in the antebellum south. For example the Texas Ordinance of Secession from 1861 states, in part: In all the non-slave-holding States, in violation of that good faith and comity which should exist between entirely distinct nations, the people have formed themselves into a great sectional party, now strong enough in numbers to control the affairs of each of those States, based upon the unnatural feeling of hostility to these Southern States and their beneficent and patriarchal system of African slavery, proclaiming the debasing doctrine of the equality of all men, irrespective of race or color--a doctrine at war with nature, in opposition to the experience of mankind, and in violation of the plainest revelations of the Divine Law. They demand the abolition of negro slavery throughout the confederacy, the recognition of political equality between the white and the negro races, and avow their determination to press on their crusade against us, so long as a negro slave remains in these States. See: http://www.lsjunction.com/docs/secesson.htm The south was fighting for political control, economic control, and the independence to continue to exploit human bondage as a constitutionally protected fundamental property right on which southern aristocratic leisure society was based. Southern leaders weren't going to let the good life go without fighting the the last ounce of their energy. I guess I'm not a fan of the "last hurrah" interpretation of the American Civil War.

Koro, three of my daughters are named: Laissez, County, and Un - so we are immune to fair-puns. If flanking in the game was as effective as it was on the ACW battlefield I'd maybe agree with your characterization of this move as exploitative. However, getting on an enemy's flank has minimal impact in UGG. (See Koro's video above as a prime example) In UGG troops simply turn to face the threat. When units rout they rout by brigade and each brigade fights on until it's condition is destroyed. Thus, you never see a Corps collapse as I and XI Corps both did at Gettysburg resulting in 6,000 Union POWs. Bottom line in the UGG design Chancellorsville would be difficult to replicate. The game designers might want to consider the impact that friendly units routing should have on other friendly units in the proximity of the rout. This would make the game more about battlefield tactics/planning/coordination/reserves rather than getting every unit on the firing line and plugging holes as they occur.

There is a certain amount of comedy in this fair/cheating thread. By taking half of his army off the map the CSA defense was crushed - losing all of the VPs on the map and suffering more than two to one casualties. Dividing the CSA forces reduced their defensive firepower by 50%. Bad idea in a timed scenario. When the remaining half of the CSA army returned to the map it was crushed. While the tactic caused consternation it was militarily foolish. Not only did the CSA fail to hold any key positions - their army was decisively beaten and suffered more than two to one casualties. Can't do much worse than that in this game. If I was in Koro's shoes I'd be cheering for any opponent that performed such a silly maneuver in this situation. As Napoleon said: Never interrupt the enemy when he is making a mistake. Thanks for sharing the video.

Keep in mind at Gettysburg Meade's best intelligence was the the ANV was 90,000 strong - roughly equal or slightly superior in numbers to the AoP. Yet, in UGG, no player is under the same intelligence misconception. Reb Blunt's observation that 100% knowledge of the OOB makes the game stale is valid and should be considered to ensure the game retains elements of excitement/variability. Everyone has learned a lesson and placing blame on the fairness/unfairness is a toxic subject. Accept the lesson and move on. Everyone is entitled to their own perspective, and there is not an obvious right answer or moral high ground. The primary problem with the move is that many players (and the devs) didn't know this was even possible. It is one thing to move around an open flank. It is something quite different to know a game mechanic/design flaw that can be exploited in a Tournament that people are competing to win (and seem to care about the result). A sound game manual would be vastly helpful and resolve the conflict. In my book this is why we agreed to test the game in the first place - to understand what is possible. Fussing about the results of a particular Tournament seems premature - as the game is still in flux. The thing I really like about the move is players can't put "it all on the line" with troops running from map edge to map edge. Reserves once again enter the equation and force players to address tactical mobile reserves at Gettysburg. UGG is not intended to be a game of WWI trench warfare with the flanks anchored on the sea and the Alps. The map edge "anchored flanks" turn Gettysburg into something it was not - the siege of Petersburg. In fact it is interesting that in all of the "next game" choices players would like to see Petersburg is not on the list anywhere. And yet, by allowing the map size to troop concentration ratio to enable troops to be deployed from map edge to map edge that is precisely the situation that devolves UGG Gettysburg into UGG Petersburg. Perhaps the design team might think about scenarios of smaller scale with more of the map on the open flanks represented to allow "fair" flanking maneuvers while precluding off-map flank moves when there are real flanks that are not open. PS - Chancellorsville was an exception in the Civil War. Most battles were fought with the armies attempting to discover open flanks only to run into mobile reserves that protected open flanks (e.g., Gettysburg). Battles more frequently resulted in head-on collisions because the armies were either evenly enough matched, or poorly commanded, so that flanks were not often exploited (e.g., Antietam).

It looks more like a game design flaw than a question of fairness/cheating by players. I'm not a fan of "false flanks" created by the map edges. Players should not be allowed to anchor on the edge of the map in the first place. The game design should allow the map to scroll to allow players to play the battle on the battlefield map of Gettysburg. Sigh - I know - it is impossible with the current game design. The problem I see with this strategy is that a "real flank" can be obviated by a move than can't be countered by on-map units. With this move it would be possible to take a cavalry force as the most central unit then circle an infantry corps in addition to the cavalry unit. Move the cavalry unit so it stays on the map - thus allowing an entire corps to move around a flank off-screen that might be protected by units that are outside the scope of the particular scenario. Thus you can move freely on a flank that might be protected by troops deployed on that same flank in another scenario. For example, the CSA could flank Cemetery Hill by moving off-map around the Culp's Hill area - even though Culp's Hill is currently occupied by Union troops that aren't in the current scenario. Hopefully that statement is not as clear as mud. Another example may help - Custer plus the Union VI Corps moves off-map to the east, then north of Gettysburg to land on the Confederate flank/rear. Custer stays on the map and moves quickly to the desired location; then he can evade the CSA counter-moves and wait for the VI Corps to arrive. There is no way for the CSA to counter this move until the Union VI Corps arrives back on the map later in the scenario. I really like the idea of keeping on-map units in a position where they can be added to the next scenario. It actually makes the game have more of a campaign feel rather than a disjointed series of vignettes focused on VP's. Suggested game mechanics modification: Perhaps the game needs to have a map-edge "flank status" that would prevent this type of move if the flank is secured by off-map units while allowing the move if the flank is not secured by off-map units.

Jeremiah O'Brien, The deaths of 9 black people shot to death while they worship in church is a "petty problem"? Clearly you've confirmed your "Location at Sea" - possibly on a sea in a galaxy far, far away. The flag you're defending as benign is steeped in 150 years of overt acts of terrorism, violence, and white supremacy propaganda. The South chose the bullet over the ballot box in 1864. After the South lost a war, then it subverted the ballot box with 150 years of policy of racial injustice. Unfortunately the symbol adopted by this movement was the Confederate Battle Flag. Dylann Roof chose THIS flag because it represents his beliefs as it has also represented the beliefs of hate organization such as the KKK. This has everything to do with history, and the history of the Confederate Battle Flag in particular. This problem of racial violence is neither "new" nor "petty". Anyone driving past the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church displaying the Confederate Battle Flag and honking their horn is making a clear and undeniable statement in support of Dylann's attack. Black churches are regularly threatened/attacked with burning crosses, Confederate Battle Flags, overt and obfuscated racism. Attempting to deny or mitigate the powerful symbolism of the flag is a shoddy argument given the history. Particularly in the context of recent events. The flag has its proper context in history of the American Civil War. This is the only ground that that flag can be defended upon is the historical context of the 3 years while it was carried on the battlefield.

Dylann Roof chose the Confederate Battle Flag as his symbol - not Apple Corporation. I'm not an Apple fan - but it seems to me that condemning a corporation for "trying to do something right" in response to a National tragedy is curios and disturbing. Did Apple over reach in their response? Clearly. But I applaud Apple's attempt to show they could DO something. For far too long the U.S. has looked at every lynching, shooting, and racial hate crime and simply sighed as if there is nothing that can be done. In many respects Apple got it right. Apple took a stand - and then rapidly course corrected to a more rational response. This cycle has helped the U.S. openly discuss the use/misuse of the Confederate Battle Flag. Game Labs also took a stand and helped to define the demarcation line between rational and proper context for usages of the Confederate Battle Flag. It took less than a week of inconvenience to the game community for the demarcation line to be discussed, identified, and implemented. This seems like a very small price to pay - particularly when you consider the advertising cache Game Labs received from the discussion. This was a very necessary and positive cycle and I applaud Apple, Game Labs, and some of the more rational responses on this forum. White supremacy is not about liberalism or conservatism. It is about overt acts of violence against american citizens and equal protection under the laws. The fact that social issues interfered with the game community is simply and indication of how pervasive and institutionalized racial tensions have been ingrained in our society. The Confederacy used the Battle Flag for about 3 years to reduce confusion on the battlefield. White supremacists have usurped the Confederate Battle Flag for the past 150 years for an organized campaign of racial and religious hatred. It is stunning that the flag flies over any government property given the Flag's post American Civil War history. 98.5% of the Confederate Battle Flag's time in existence has been as a symbol for institutionalized racial oppression and hatred. What I've learned on this forum is that it some people get absorbed in games to the extent that it detaches them from life's realities.

Anyone have anything Civil War-related interesting to contribute?

How does a Scourge of War site answer william1993's question regarding UGG?

LM, I wasn't thinking so much about cities as VP's - but more for their impact on the political situation and ability to draw recruits. Rather than VP's I think of this in the context of momentum. Taking an individual city might have a minimal impact if the casualties to achieve the result were too costly. Taking and holding Harrisburg & Baltimore early in the war, while threatening Philadelphia would definitely swing the momentum in favor of the CSA for example. Thus rather than VP's I'm thinking more of a "momentum algorithm" that factors in events including casualties, areas under control, and the ability to take and hold cities. The algorithm doesn't need to be complex - but it should be comprehensible so that players can predict the results of their actions. On the logistics side the farming areas were critical for supply. The ANV was able to scratch out enough food to sustain the army as long as they held the Shenandoah Valley. When this vital resource area was picked clean Lee was forced to go North, starve in Virginia, or retreat South with some or all of his army to balance food supply with demand. To a large extent the Gettysburg Campaign was a massive raid that ended in a battle. The meat ration in the ANV required butchering 300 head of cattle per day. During the course of the Campaign the ANV appropriated more than 26,000 head of cattle, 22,000 sheep, and about 30,000 hogs. These rations on the hoof were herded back to Virginia during the Campaign. CSA commissary estimates stated this was enough meat to feed the ANV and CSA troops in the Richmond area for at least six months - sustaining northern Virginia through the end of 1863. In the aftermath of Gettysburg John Sedwick caught up with one of the Northern herds headed South on July 26: "We captured twelve thousand head of cattle and eight thousand head of sheep that the enemy had driven from Pennsylvania." During the Campaign horses seemed to be classified as "contraband of war" and were taken by the thousands. Jenkins cavalry brigade was particularly active in this role as his irregular cavalry brigade was of little combat utility and questionable reconnaissance/screening value as their ability to accurately estimate enemy forces they had encountered was so inaccurate as to be taken with a grain of salt. I'd suspect that the mechanics would not be very difficult to define given the vast amount of detailed information we have on the quality of the road network, distances between locations, predictable distances covered, etc...

Lincolns M, Personally I hate to see another static VP-based point campaign game. In my mind you want players to be actively campaigning with maneuver/play - rather than sit in static positions. Static games are REALLY boring - and don't attract an audience for very long. Given that the war was about gaining/preventing international recognition/intervention, negotiating an end to the war politically, and keeping the armies fed I'd prefer the game to focus on both the political metrics and resources preservation/accumulation. This would force the CSA to have the motivation to move & stay North while protecting their rail lines to the South. Need to run - but I'll add some thoughts later.

ACW Campaign game of the Eastern Theater. The map would only need to be 150 miles X 80 miles. At this scale it would be possible to include the road & rail network and topographical features. Movement over the map would be based on the road/railroad network & Union sea-transport. The smallest unit of movement would be the brigade. The largest unit of movement would be the Army. The current system of UGG circle-drag-and-drop or player-defined combined units (e.g., Corps) would be used to move troops. The UGG team develops the Campaign Map and a tactical battlefield map editor. Tactical battles would only be possible at points where battlefield maps existed (e.g., Gettysburg and Antietam initially). The Community would use the tactical battlefield map editor to produce additional battlefield maps and submit these to the UGG team for approval. Once approved the maps would be included in the Campaign Game library of battlefield maps. Each tactical map would add an additional tactical point-of-battle to the campaign map. The UGG engine could be used to resolve the tactical battles. This way the design team could leverage the community proactively by distributing some of the work outlined by Lincolns Mullet to the community. As the number and quality of the tactical battlefield maps improves over time the UGG team can pull higher quality maps into their Campaign Map points-of-conflict library. The community will naturally focus on the major battlefields - providing a point-to-point campaign game initially (as described by Lincolns Mullet above). Over time the community could "fill in" the areas of the map where battles could have occurred - but didn't. Specifically areas like the "Pipe Creek Circular" etc... The end result would be a high-level campaign map with point-to-point battlefields that would be increasingly more robust over time. The key is the software architecture and vision at the start of the campaign game design. Abstracting the movement on the Campaign Map would be drag-and-click (similar to the current tactical method in UGG). `````````````````````````````` Campaign Map Implementation Thoughts: The commands on the Campaign Map would be based on the types of troops the player selected to move (cavalry, infantry, artillery, supply/support) and their mission (raid, screen, recon, or battle formation for cavalry; road column, movement battle formation, or forage for infantry; artillery would be attached to either cavalry or infantry. Artillery formations moving as an independent force would move in road column. The goal for the South would be destroying the Northern army or winning public opinion as stated above by Koro. Public opinion is influenced by battlefield results and control of key cities. To keep the game dynamic don't assign/disclose hard VP numbers to cities. You need to take a place to understand the impact on public opinion (e.g., Baltimore captured early in the war, when casualties are still low, results in Maryland joining the South). The key to game balance would be the requirement for the Union to protect critical Northern cities/territories (e.g., Harrisburg, Baltimore, D.C., Harper's Ferry and the Valley). The goal for the North would be subduing the South by capturing key cities (e.g., Frederiscksburg, Norfolk and Richmond) or destroying the Southern army. Both sides would be subject to fog-of-war that would make actual troop strengths difficult to determine. Fog-of-war would be decreased for armies operating in friendly territory. Additionally, inside their own territory each side could influence where they allocate their fog-of-war capabilities (ala Magruder in the Peninsular Campaign). The CSA would have the ability to deploy slaves to construct earthworks and prepare defenses. Abstractions would include straggling, civilian guides, spies, scouts, and traitors. These factors would influence the accuracy/flow of information to penetrate the fog-of-war and bring the war to a successful conclusion. The game would be a combination of strategy, bluffing, and a few factors beyond control. Playing each side would have unique challenges, and each game would be different.

Hi Grognard_GC, My recollection is that Napoleon was trying to hold his empire together. Propaganda/misrepresentation was essential to try to maintain the status quo. Napoleon knew that many of his allies were "fair weather friends" at best; subjugated enemies waiting for revenge much more likely. During the Russian Campaign he knew that even the appearance of his stumbling could result in the loss of, or worse changing sides of, the Prussians, Austrians, Bavarians, etc... While Napoleon's manpower reserves within his empire and allies were vast his ability to hold his empire and allies together was very fragile. The only men he could rely on through thick and thin were French (exclusive of the royalist element and counter-revolutionaries), Polish, and possibly the Saxons. There was substantial rancor within France for his overthrow. IMHO Napoleon's propaganda was targeted to ensure he prevented being at a manpower disadvantage when his "allies" switched sides/abandoned him. Every soldier in a Prussian, Austrian, Bavarian, etc... uniform was both a blessing and a curse. Napoleon knew or suspected by 1812 that his allies and empire was a paper tiger - if not he learned this by the attempted coup and subsequent events.

Grognard_JC, I think you're selling man's military legacy for counting way too short. There is some very interesting research with infants. Even before infants can talk they understand the concept of numbers. This is demonstrated by putting pictures of dots in front of infants and teaching them to touch which picture includes more dots. They are stunningly capable of identifying which image has more dots - even into the thousands. Infants have also demonstrate mathematical aptitude for multiplication/division. But for now let's focus on counting. Human brain stems seem to be hardwired with an inherent understanding of numbers. We know from clay tablets that people have been counting for a long, long time. While we have clay tablets with the things they were counting; but, we don't know what the numbers represent. I'd suspect that armies have been tabulating troop strengths for a long time as well. I can't prove this is true, but human nature is to tally things and to understand that if I have more than someone else I may have an advantage. It is likely that wax tablets were used in this capacity at some point in the past. Human nature is risk adverse; particularly when it comes to mortal decisions. I'd be astounded to discover proof that ancient armies did not track their strength and casualties. Absence of proof is not proof that commanders were not counting their men or casualties. Brain stem knowledge is deeply embedded by thousands of years of critical concept requirements. There is a tendency to sell the ancients short on their innovations. Yet we have proof of the Antikythera Mechanism, the Roman Mile marker technology, etc... Otzi the Iceman pushed back our knowledge of the weapons and textile technologies available to early man. Troy tested the boundary of myth and history. The numbers of ships tested the envelope regarding the strength of the armies in the Iliad. Even if the numbers aren't correct in the Iliad - it demonstrates that commanders were counting/recording military numbers. In my mind there is compelling evidence that men have been aware of, and using numbers throughout military history. When I refer to "The 300" you know what I'm talking about. How do we know that there were 300? Why do we know that Xerxes had 10,000 Immortals? Somebody was counting both the living and the casualties to bring the 10,000 back to full strength. Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, and many other ancient authors provide both troop strengths and casualty figures. Additionally, we don't really need to specifically count casualties. The number can be derived from tracking troop strengths over time. `````````````````````````` I agree free press is a modern concept. But freedom of expression has a long history as well. In Egypt there is graffiti showing a giraffe coupled with Queen Hatshepsut's in a most unflattering position. Freedom of thought is not freedom of the press. But clearly a persons right to make a statement is not necessarily exclusively tied to the printing press. People did communicate, and communicate broadly, without the press. In the ACW the slaves knew a substantial amount about the progress of the Union forces - even though Southerners tried to keep both reading and newspapers beyond their access. ``````````````````````` Amateurism, incompetence, lost documentation, deaths in officers, differences in methods of counting and sometimes intentional misrepresentation are all factors in the Civil War casualty figures. But these same factors were also true in estimating enemy troop strengths. McClellan is famous for overestimating CSA forces - sometimes because he believed them and sometimes because inflated numbers served his personal or political goals. Intentionally minimizing the number of casualties reported is simply the flip side of the equation again with personal or political goals.

kc87, Great article on the Confederate Press during the Civil War: http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Newspapers_in_Virginia_During_the_Civil_War_Confederate#start_entry While the press was technically "free" it was increasingly "biased" and prone to propaganda. For example in Virginia prior to the War there were 120 papers. By 1863 only 17 papers were still publishing. By 1864 the number was reduced to about 5.

Grognard_JC, When I mirror your post to "correct you if you are wrong" you call my response "peremptory". Not sure what you want/expect in the way of a response given that opening. When I note a correlation between manpower shortages and under-reporting casualty reports you've twisted my observation into a "general logical rule". I'm not really certain what you're trying to achieve with your nuanced semantics arguments. I'm happy to discuss anything you'd like to but I'm not really interested in semantics games. For example above, casualty figures are "facts" - so I'm having difficulty understanding your point. The first example of "numbers" used in propaganda, after the introduction of the printing press, that I've seen is following the battle of Culloden in 1746. The battlefield archaeology does not line up with the British press releases or battle description. British casualties were minimized while Scottish casualties appear to have been inflated. It is clear that the British were early in adapting the printing press for wartime propaganda. I'd strongly suspect there are examples during the 30 Years War - but I haven't looked into this question closely. Propaganda predates the 19th Century by thousands of years. Not sure why you are focused on when "numbers" were used in the propaganda. In some sense the Bayeux Tapestry represents "numbers". Numbers were just less formalized as images given the audience for the message of the Tapestry. The Egyptian description of the Battle of Kadesh in 1274 BC may be the earliest written example of propaganda. It is clear from other sources the battle was a draw yet that's not what's carved into the Egyptian or Hittite Temples for public consumption. Both sides claim victory yet the post-battle result was a treaty along the territory lines that predated the battle. Clearly battlefield casualties in times of war are almost always flawed. This is not necessarily an indication of propaganda - in the Civil War it was usually just bad process.

Grognard_JC, As requested - you've been corrected. "To lie like a bulletin" distorted fact frequently including the reported casualty figures on both sides. This cliche predates the Russian invasion. Examples are numerous and include the casualty figures from Eylau in 1807 and Napoleon's Spanish Ulcer. In addition to major battles events such as the Tyrolean uprising/revolt were masked from the French public. Dupont's surrender of 17,600 men at Bailen in 1808 was misrepresented in the French press. These bulletins often closed with a note that the Emperor's health has never been better; regardless of the previous content/distortion. kc87, Military personnel are representatives of the government and take an oath to that effect. Officers sending these reports were acting in their official government capacity. Scoops often came directly from army officers; which were often "tempered" for public consumption. There is a vast difference between reporting casualty lists by town/county and rolling up all of the casualty figures and reporting these to the press in aggregate. Friendly reporters had greater access to information/misinformation that they published which was then copied and propagated. For example: Shiloh was represented in the Richmond press as a CSA victory. Davis did not retract or correct the exultant message he sent to Congress after the first day of the battle. Subsequent articles covered the death of A.S. Johnston and the public on both sides were shocked by the casualty lists at the local level.

1st TN Reg. Watson, PS - I'm registered as a "student" on numerous educational sites. They often have very interesting information and low barriers of entry to the site. "Student" is loosely defined if you go through the registration process. It often requires the willingness to pay a small "student" fee.

kc87, Above you stated: "Personally I don't believe there was any reason for Lee to under report casualties to the Confederate government given the dire situation on hand in Virginia after Gettysburg." I didn't intend to suggest Lee was failing to accurately report his casualties to the Confederate government. My incomplete thought was that the CSA government was intentionally under-reporting casualties to the press and the public. Many of the casualty returns were destroyed later in the war. CSA casualty reports are often estimated from sketchy/incomplete sources. Governments running short of manpower often under-report their casualties in the press. As Napoleon faced increasing longer odds his casualty reports released to the press were so obviously flawed that, "To lie like a bulletin" became so common as to become a cliche in everyday business dealings in France during those wars. I'd posit that after the invention of the printing press it has been far more common than not to mislead the press regarding casualty returns. Even today many countries are less than diligent and/or don't have the press scrutiny that we have in the U.S.

1st TN Reg. Watkins, Thanks for the excellent reference on the CSA logistics. Great stuff! I don't recall reading this article previously; but, I've used the Southern Historical Society Papers on other topics. My apologies that I can't always put my fingers on sources immediately. Mostly I write from recollection. When pressed I need to hunt and peck my way through stuff that is decades old. It's been 30 years since I've read Shelby Foote's "Civil War" trilogy. My memory of the book was getting rusty so I re-read it this Memorial Day Weekend - enjoyed it thoroughly! My guess is that some folks from the South may feel it is not pro-Southern enough for their tastes. But I thought is was a reasonably balanced summary of the war. I'd forgotten the impact that the loss of Kentucky and Missouri had on CSA recruiting. It seems thousands of men simply returned home to sit out the war once their home states had been overrun by Grant after Ft. Donelson/Nashville and Curtis at Pea Ridge. This reserve of manpower certainly contributed to the guerrilla war in both states and the difficulty of keeping the Union supply lines open.