David Fair

1st Tenn Reg. Watkins, Lee was cautious about putting criticism in writing. Jefferson Davis knew Lee well enough to know that when Lee was not highly supportive in his comments he was telling Davis to "read between the lines" because Lee did not support the idea. This could, and often did, result in confusion between Lee and Davis. Wikipedia has an incomplete account which states: On July 17, 1864, Jefferson Davis relieved Johnston. He considered replacing him with the more senior Hardee, but Bragg strongly recommended Hood. Bragg had not only been impressed by his interview with Hood, but he retained lingering resentments against Hardee from bitter disagreements in previous campaigns. Hood was promoted to the temporary rank of full general on July 18, and given command of the army just outside the gates of Atlanta. (Hood's temporary appointment as a full general was never confirmed by the Senate. His commission as a lieutenant general resumed on January 23, 1865.[12]) At 33, Hood was the youngest man on either side to be given command of an army. Robert E. Lee gave an ambiguous reply to Davis's request for his opinion about the promotion, calling Hood "a bold fighter, very industrious on the battlefield, careless off," but he could not say whether Hood possessed all of the qualities necessary to command an army in the field.[30] Lee also stated in the same letter to Jefferson Davis that he had a high opinion of Hood's gallantry, earnestness, and zeal.[31] The more complete text from Lee to Davis is in the "The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee": By Telegram July 12, 1864: Telegram of today received. I regret the fact stated. It is a bad time to release the commander of an army situated as that of Tennessee. We may lose Atlanta and the army too. Hood is a bold fighter. I am doubtful as to other qualities necessary. The full letter Lee sent to Davis: I am distressed at the intelligence conveyed in your telegram of today. It is a grievous thing to change commander of an army situated as is that of the Tennessee. Still if necessary it ought to be done. I know nothing of the necessity. I had hoped that Johnston was strong enough to deliver battle. We risk much to save Alabama, Mobile, and communication with the Trans Mississippi. It would be better to concentrate all the cavalry in Mississippi and Tennessee on Sherman’s communications. We had better therefore hazard that communication to retain the country. Hood is a good fighter, very industrious on the battlefield, careless off, and I have had no opportunity of judging his action, when the whole responsibility rested upon him. I have a high opinion of his gallantry, earnestness and zeal. General Hardee has more experience in managing an army. May God give you wisdom to decide in this momentous matter. In addition to these statements in writing, one of the officers on Lee's staff stated that Lee had said something like Hood is a bold fighter, but I fear he may be too bold and loose the army. I'll need to look for this second-hand statement a bit more. Hearsay is not fact; but, note that Lee may not have needed to say this directly to Davis. Saying it within earshot of a staff officer (who may have even delivered the letter) or discussed this with a member of the Confederate Senate may explain why Hood was never confirmed in his new rank as army commander. The politicians wanted offensive actions after the long defensive by Johnston - but did not want the responsibility of putting Hood in command. Also from Wikipedia: The change of command in the Army of Tennessee did not go unnoticed by Sherman. His subordinates, James B. McPherson and John M. Schofield, shared their knowledge of Hood from their time together at West Point. Upon learning of his new adversary's reckless and gambling tendencies, Sherman planned to use that to his advantage...[After Atlanta] Sherman felt this development [Hood's movement North] furthered his [sherman's] current objective by removing opposing forces in his path, noting "If he [Hood] will go to the Ohio River, I’ll give him rations. ...my business is down south.”

Mr. Mercanto, We have different definitions of "military genius". Sherman's Hard War doctrine had been practiced over the course of history by Ghengis Khan, Alexander of Russia - inflicted on his own people as a scorched earth program, etc... We agree that Grant's Vicksburg Campaign was "an incredible military achievement". But true military genius in my mind is the ability to gain and sustain military superiority from an initial starting point of military inferiority. Alexander, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon are examples. It is not the ability to win on one battlefield that sets the metric. It is the sustained effort to replicate military victory that in my mind defines military genius. The North held such tremendous resource advantages that the ACW looks like more of a war of attrition. It had moments of brilliance - but it was basically a blood fest. I'd credit Hood with the destruction of the Army of Tennessee. What a dufus - Lee warned Jeff Davis that Hood would destroy any army under Hood's command before Jeff Davis appointed Hood to command. I agree the South lost the war. Need to run for the weekend with the family. Cheers to all - its been a fun week with the debates. Again my apologies to 42ndMS.

kc87, Above you stated: "I'd say there is some weight to the "Southern battlefield superiority" in the Eastern theater. What they were doing to achieve that type of superiority or advantage is another subject for debate altogether, a more accurate result might come from Brigade ordinance and inspection/review reports." Now you're tapped into the issue we were discussing! "...the another subject for debate altogether..." The factor that continues to be missing from inclusion in the discussion is that firepower is usually determined by superior firearms. Not only do you need ordnance report but also armament reports. For example, the "new fangled gimracks" that General Ripley resisted proved to give the Northern cavalry a significant firepower advantage (Spencer & Henry repeaters). The firepower advantage was based on repeating rifles - not the superiority of the men wielding them. I agree with your point but we need to define "battlefield superiority" in this discussion - the term includes too many factors to isolate and credit individual man-for-man trigger pulling superiority. Was Chancellorsville a demonstration of "battlefield superiority?" In my mind it was a demonstration of "leadership superiority" - bordering on military genius. It took a great deal of testosculosity to divide the Southern army and march an half of it in column around the front of an army that was twice its size. In that battle the leadership advantage gave the South "battlefield superiority" during the early phase of the battle on the Union's right flank. As the day wore on the Union re-established their lines and manged to fight their way out of a very difficult situation. At the end of the day the difference in casualties was minimal - and Lee was in a worse position relative to his position at the start of the battle. So if the South ended in a relatively worse position after the Battle of Chancellorsville had the South gained or lost "battlefield superiority?" Lee's behavior suggests he was frustrated that not only had the South lost "battlefield superiority" over the course of the day but that the officers under his command did not understand the concept of "battlefield superiority". Lee wanted to gain and sustain battlefield superiority until the AoP ceased to exist. His officers were satisfied winning a battle. Lee had his chance at Chancellorsville. He also had his chance at Gettysburg - but after July 1 "battlefield superiority" had again slipped from his grasp. Gettysburg was the last opportunity for Southern "battlefield superiority" in the East. From that point forward until the end of the war Lee was on the defensive and the war devolved to grinding attrition. Did Lee gain battlefield superiority at the Wilderness? He inflicted more casualties but the North moved South, replaced their losses and ground on to the end of the war.

kc89, I re-read your post above on the casualty numbers. This seems like a good baseline. Captured muddies the water a bit; but roughly the wounded tie closely enough to the KIA numbers. After Gettysburg some sources cite Lee as intentionally and systematically reducing the number of casualties he reported. My recollection is that the CSA and Union had different methods of counting who was "wounded." For the CSA men who could be dressed in the field and returned to recover with their regiments were not counted as wounded. Additionally, Union numbers were tallied at the field/tent hospitals. CSA were tallied at permanent hospitals. Many in the South were encouraged to return to their homes to recover to keep bed space available in hospitals. In the North men were sent to military hospitals to recover. That way the hospital had control over when a soldier returned to duty or was discharged. Interestingly this difference may have only made about a 3% difference in the numbers. (I expected the calculated number to be larger). If we accept these numbers the question we initially were discussing was, "Southern musketry firepower superiority." Specifically, are these numbers representative of the battlefield situation or does this difference represent superiority of the South on a man-for-man basis? After thinking about the distinction a bit and looking at the numbers I've realized - I really don't care either way. Thanks for the data!

kc87, Thanks for dealing in the reality of actual numbers! Note the 10 X 10 target in the analysis. I'm not aware that many of the soldiers who fought the war were 10 feet tall. All of the numbers need to be cut by about 50%. Additionally, fighting from the prone position was very common which reduced the threat profile to about 2 square feet. There is a reason millions of rounds were fired to inflict thousands of casualties during ACW battles. Also note that the tests you've quoted are for volley fire. Which is exactly my point. It is difficult to argue superior CSA marksmanship when on battlefield results were cumulative. I'd be more convinced if the discussion was about superior sniping/skirmishing capabilities where individual marksmanship is more important. But again, few people had rifled muskets in their personal possession - so I'm questioning the logic of the CSA having superior firepower. It seems like Lincoln had this right when he observed that "we are all green alike" prior to First Manassas. Both armies learned the art and skill of war. They used the same weapons and tactics. There is no evidence that CSA held an innate advantage in superiority of musketry.

42ndMS, Your questions with my answers... Did you notice that both of the battles you use for examples were VERY early battles? Certainly, and I explained why I chose these early battles. If I chose incorrectly please course correct and present a case. Please note that firepower superiority is usually identifiable by superior firearms. I'm not clear on how you've claimed the CSA had prolonged firepower superiority when, by your own statements, the CSA had inferior firearms and experienced firepower inferiority. I actually expected you to say that the CSA in these early battles was at a disadvantage in armament and still managed to inflict equal casualties with inferior arms. Hopefully this argument helps you make your case. On the flip side with 12,000 men vs. 5,000 it begs the question: "is this really a metric establishing superior firepower?" In all theatres the Confederates at that stage were under-armed with Rifles especially the Trans and Western ones. If you check the ordnance for the Union regiments in the Trans West they were also armed with smoothbore muskets in these battles. My goal was to offer the best situation for the South I could think of. If I missed the mark I'm happy to look at other data. Why don't you take a whack at this? I'm happy to alter my perspective - but I need some convincing evidence that I've got the firepower analysis wrong. At both Wilson's Creek and Springfield the CSA picked up about 6,000 Union smoothbore muskets. At this point in the war almost all of the rifled muskets were issued in the East. Could you so dearly consider more future battles and show me the results when the Confederates were better armed? Actually, I think you might do a better job trying to prove your own point. I seemed to miss the mark on my previous post. It was not my intention to piss you off. A good start would be Gettysburg where the Confederates for the majority frontal assaulted every position at a terrain disadvantage complete with Union Arty. Hmmmm, I thought you said the South held firepower superiority from the start of the war. When the facts don't fit the evidence you want to jump to 1863? That's fine. I thought Ewell's Corps arrived on both the front and right flank of XI Corps. The XI Corps right flank collapsed on Barlow's Knoll rolling up the Union line on July 1. The Union I Corps fought Heth to a standstill. It was not until later in the day at about 4:00 when I Corps collapsed under the weight of the CSA reinforcements. I'm not clear on how this demonstrates Southern firepower superiority - which was where you started the conversation. It seems to me this demonstrate the advantage of reinforcements over fatigued troops more than firepower superiority. And you definitely don't want to mention "The Wilderness" where Union Arty. was neglible. Not sure what you mean by this. I'm open to any discussion you'd like to have. The Wilderness was chosen as a battlefield by Lee to obviate Union artillery. He was successful. But the lesson from the battle is not proof of musketry fire superiority - it is a clear demonstration of defensive terrain superiority in the ACW. Cherry picking a lopsided defensive battle and saying, "There! That proves CSA fire superiority!" isn't an intellectually honest way to demonstrate fire superiority. We'd need a longer period of study where we can normalize the effects to understand CSA fire superiority. Even battles on even terms with lopsided results would demonstrate fire superiority. Can we agree on a battle where this might be the case and look at the numbers? And there you go again with the blue-bellied cowards, you said that I didn't! My apologies that this offended you - I was just having fun. Still I have yet to see you present any compelling evidence of CSA fire superiority. Are you trying to convince someone with the IQ of a Turnip that I'm an ignorant moron?? Nope. But I have yet to see you present any compelling evidence of CSA fire superiority. ... is that your nature really? if you are then it is back-firing. I've already apologized - but I'm happy to apologize again if my response was too flippant. (Had I realized you would take this so poorly I wouldn't have been as sarcastic.) I'm very interested to see your evidence supporting CSA fire superiority. I noticed you kinda skipped over the question of where the South developed their superiority in firepower in my previous post. I'm actually honestly very interested in what you believe to be the basis of your statement regarding Southern firepower superiority. But one thing for sure that we agree on ... There was definitely strokes of brilliance on both sides with Generals, but none in the overall scheme was consistent enough to be called geniuses. But Lee came closer by far. Nathan Forrest on the more tactical side. Hmmm, I'd be more convinced if you had proposed Jackson. Chancellorsville likely was the closest demonstration of military genius during the war. Jackson envisioned the plan then executed the maneuver. Jackson's Valley Campaign also stands out as exceptional. Lee was more of a blocking and tackling general. Effective - but he certainly paid a heavy price for his decisions during the Seven Days and Gettysburg for his offensives on July 2 & 3. Not much genius in those plans. Forrest certainly was effective at leading smaller forces. But generally I think of "military genius" at army command level. We seem to have different definitions of the term.

kc87, Hmmmm, I'm really confused. Are you saying nobody died of disease during the ACW? Typhoid was the leading “killer” and “diarrhea” was a universal ailment, its annual average being 73.8 per cent during the ACW. The data from the U.S. Army & CSA Medical Corps show that 2/3 of all deaths during the war were not combat-related. This number is typical of warfare prior to medical advances that included the discovery of bacteria. During the war surgeons treated 6 million sicknesses as opposed to 400,000 wounds. For an excellent reference on the casualties during the war see: Drew Gilpin Faust “This Republic of Suffering” The statistics I'm looking at are for the entire war, in all theaters, for battlefield casualties vs. death by disease. You can't include captures in casualty figures. ;-) Not all captures are casualties. There were 194,743 Union soldiers captured and 215,865 Confederates. Of these 30,218 northerners and 25,976 southerners died in captivity. Also the numbers you've included above are for the AoP and ANV vs. the ACW. We need to figure out what we are talking about to ensure we are talking apples to apples. `````````````````````` I didn't make any statements about the "performance" of the ANV vs. AoP. This was not the topic of discussion. I did say there is no statistical basis demonstrating superior Confederate firepower. There is a vast difference between these statements. The Confederates generally out-marched the Union, enjoyed superior morale, and had a clear edge in leadership; particularly early in the war. Logistically our discussion would require further refinement/clarification of definitions. I wouldn't call Southern logistics "superior" but they were certainly much "leaner". "Leaner" logistics can be both a boon and a curse. The "lost cause myth" is not up for redefinition. It is already defined. For example of a general summary see Wikipedia: The Lost Cause is a regional American cultural movement, based in the white South, seeking to reconcile the traditionalist white society of the antebellum South that they admire, to the defeat of the Confederate States of America in the American Civil War of 1861–1865.[1] It forms an important minority viewpoint among the ways to commemorate the war. The United Daughters of the Confederacy is a major organization that has propounded the Lost Cause for over a century. Supporters typically portray the Confederacy's cause as noble and most of its leaders as exemplars of old-fashioned chivalry, defeated by the Union armies through numerical and industrial force that overwhelmed the South's superior military skill and courage. Proponents of the Lost Cause movement also condemned the Reconstruction that followed the Civil War, claiming that it had been a deliberate attempt by Northern politicians and speculators to destroy the traditional Southern way of life. In recent decades Lost Cause themes have been widely promoted by the Neo-Confederate movement in books and op-eds and especially in one of the movement's magazines the Southern Partisan. Here is another link to the topic: http://civil-war-journeys.org/the_lost_cause.htm Note the similarity of the definitions.

42ndMS, Yep, Guilty. I was having fun pulling your leg on the Clauswitz topic based on the sentence structure rather than your intent. No malice intended. I'm not really certain the ACW produced any generals of genius. As a topic for books I'm quite certain it has produced few authors of genius. Military genius is a metric based on results. The ACW was a war of attrition and battlefield results were frighteningly predictable. There was only one general during the war that successfully eliminated 3 armies - all by surrender. But I don't consider the sieges of Vicksburg or Petersburg much to crow about in the annals of military brilliance. If it wasn't the best war we've had we'd celebrate it less. ;-)

Gents, I’ll take a stab at challenging notion of Southern musketry supremacy. Then you can course correct where my logic has gone astray. You’ll need to forgive my sarcasm in the post below – but taking the time to respond to the Southern Musketry Supremacy myth should have some kind of humor-based reward for the author IMHO. ;-) The Minie ball was invented in France in 1847. Rifled muskets were state of the art military technology and civilian access to manufactured arms was limited. Most civilians living in the United States prior to 1861 did not have the means or need to arm themselves with rifled muskets. The Enfield 1853 was not widely deployed on the ACW battlefield until April, 1862. From 1862 forward the Enfield saw action on every field of combat to the end of the war. Prior to 1861 civilians in the U.S. had access to three basic firearm alternatives: rifles, smoothbore muskets, and shotguns. Rifles were of the antiquated 1812 era. They were slow and difficult to load, heavy, long, and poorly balanced. They were also at the pinnacle of accuracy for marksmanship at long-range prior to 1861. Not many of these obsolete firearms made it to the ACW battlefield – by the 1850s the numbers of these weapons that remained serviceable in the field was so small that they are militarily irrelevant to the discussion. Smoothbore muskets were the preferred choice for local militias, and men with the means or need for dedicated large-game hunting/trapping. Accurate marksmanship was limited to about 50 meters. Beyond 50 meters the physics of the spherical shape of the projectile reduced marksmanship to a hit or miss proposition on a 4 foot diameter target. At 150 meters targets smaller than the side of a barn became challenging. These firearms were adequate for the battlefield - assuming Napoleonic linear tactics, which presented regimental targets massed at approximately the width of a barn and the height of a man. The basic rule for military marksmanship was at 50 meters fire at the knees, at 100 meters fire at the belly, and at 150 meters fire just over the head of the target. The goal was to achieve a gut-shot which was almost always lethal once infection set in. Shotguns of various calibers were the primary gun of the civilian population. They could fire bird-shot, buck-shot, buck-and-ball combinations, or one or more slugs (balls). The most common round fired by civilians was bird-shot which combined enjoyment, low –cost, ridding the farm of varmits, and meat for the table. Targets larger than rabbits and squirrels required heavier gauge shot. Transitioning to bigger game/warfare shot guns could be loaded with fewer more-lethal projectiles for ranges within about 75 meters. Given this suite of armament alternatives how was the South developing their superior long-range marksmanship skills? The average civilian had access to a gun – but most of the hunting experience would have been limited to ranges of less than 100 yards; most frequently at ranges of less than 50 yards. Given the Southern supremacy of firepower this should be most dramatically displayed statistically early in the war – before those blue bellied gun-shy cowards had time to get trained. The South clearly entered the war with a tremendous man-for-man advantage in skills with firearms. Southern men should be inflicting casualties at a 10 to 1 ratio according to the rhetoric of the day. At First Manassas each army numbered about 34,000 men. About 18,000 were engaged on each side. The first shots of the Union offensive were fired at about 5:15 a.m. and the Confederate counter-offensive started at about 4 p.m. The Union suffered 481 KIA. The South had 387 KIA. There were 1,124 wounded men in blue. Another 1,582 men in gray lay wounded on the fields. Given these numbers, if all other things are equal, the Southern musketry advantage was nonexistent at First Manassas. In total there were 1,605 Union vs. 1,969 CSA casualties. The Union was 23% more effective in their overall musketry. Obviously First Manassas was an anomaly to the argument for Southern firepower supremacy. Man-for-man the South was ten-times better. No I meant 20 times better. Forty days after First Manassas we can prove Southern musketry supremacy at the Battle of Wilson’s Creek. The Union attack by 5,430 men commenced at daylight. The noise disrupted the sleep of 12,120 Rebels. By 11:00 a.m. the CSA had again shattered a Union onslaught. The South had lost 277 KIA. The North suffered 258 KIA. Wounded Southerners numbered 1,232. Union casualties included 873 wounded. Given these numbers, if all other things are equal, the Southern musketry advantage was 1.07 to 1. Now that is a compelling demonstration of Southern firepower superiority! For every Fredericksburg there is a Malvern Hill. Casualty ratio for the winners of major victories over the loser is usually in the 2.1 to 1 ballpark for the ACW. The key to ACW battlefield deaths is defensive terrain – not the dye in the fabric. I used my 4 kids in an experiment and discovered it is possible to teach a quick course on ACW tactics and topography to see how well they can predict casualty ratios. All four performed very accurately when presented with actual battlefield situations from the ACW. As Shelby Foote says the ACW was, "more like reciprocal murder." Many people today, and many generals in the conflict believed, something like General Fremont stated, "I think it can be done gloriously." The ACW was a war of balance and attrition. Over the four years of war 110,000 Union and 96,000 Confederates died in combat. Another 450,000 died of diseases far from the battlefields. Both armies suffered about 35% casualties rates from disease. Disease, like bullets, and musketry supremacy was color blind during the ACW. The only statistical anomaly in the war was John Bell Hood’s ineptitude. He continued to attack long after rational generals would have learned their lesson. His men paid a high price for his learning curve as General in Chief. For example at the Battle of Franklin he came close to losing men at 3 to 1 ratio. Both sides managed to get their hands on rifled muskets at about the same time during the ACW. Both seem to have about the same results on the battlefield in similar conditions. If you have some compelling evidence that the CSA held an advantage in musketry I’d be very interested in the proof and the logic of the argument. Personally I'm not persuaded by race, creed, color, or geography supremacy arguments. Firepower supremacy is achieved by superior weaponry. During the ACW the armies used the same equipment, had the same training and manuals, and often were born from the same parents. The notion of blue or gray fire supremacy is baseless because it cannot be demonstrated in any battlefield results.

RebBlunt & 42ndMS, Pitch your suggestions/preferences to Nick and the gang. I suspect the question you need to be prepared to answer is how will the two sides be different after these adjustments? The design goal, as I understand it, is that commanding the two sides offers players a different command experience. It's a good question now that we know Antietam is over the horizon.

42ndMS, When the game was originally tested it was designed as a CSA charge-a-thon. Just keep the CSA charging and the Union never had a chance. The UGG team design goal was to make fighting the different sides have a different tactical feel. Artifacts of this design goal continue to impact the game design. Yep, I completely agree that balancing the firepower would be much more accurate historically. There is no historically-based argument, I can think of for, blue fire superiority - and minimal arguments for gray fire superiority (that I'm aware of). Many other changes to the game would also improve the historical accuracy. There is often a vast chasm between marketing spin claiming historical accuracy and a game's implementation. History-motivated changes would not necessarily improve the game experience. The goal of the building a game is not really historical accuracy - it's usually about feeding, clothing, and paying for college for your family. Southern musketry advantage is an interesting topic. There is a vast difference between hunting, a shooting range, and the battlefield. Translating individual superior marksmanship off the battlefield to firepower superiority on the battlefield is problematic. Noise, smoke, fear, confusion, uncertainty, danger, stress, and sleep and food all have a leveling effect on fine motor skills. Rate of fire in a fight tends to become more important than precision. Of the 37,000 guns collected at Gettysburg after the battle half were unloaded or had a single round. The other half had 2 or more rounds - in some cases men had loaded their guns until they couldn't jam anymore ammunition down the barrel. Fighting is a high-stress activity. It is possible that all of the serviceable guns picked up at Gettysburg were from southerners - and it was only those cowards from New York with their blue-bellied propaganda that failed to pull triggers and panicked - but I'm a bit skeptical. If the South had a unique advantage in musketry accuracy it is almost impossible to detect statistically from the various battlefield results. The Seven Days Battle goes a long way to demonstrating that the most important factor in casualty ratios was which side was defending. The results are statistically predictable - and in my analysis quite balanced. If this were not the case the overall battlefield casualties for the war should be more skewed. My comment on Sherman was specifically directed at your musketry observation. But I did a poor job conveying my thoughts into writing. Let me try again... Both sides had difficulty keeping men in the ranks. The Southern cavalry policy was on the cutting edge of the problem. Soldiers could sell their horse to a comrade and go on an unofficial furlough back home to find a remount. In some cavalry commands the practice verged of a formal rotation policy to give the men a break. Infantry had no such opportunity. For many men in the infantry the only option was a wound or desertion. Sherman discovered surprising numbers of men, who were very likely skilled trigger pullers, hiding out for the end of the war. We don't know what the numbers were over the course of the war. But we do know attrition resulted in the South growing increasingly desperate for manpower - and that they ultimately drew on young boys and old men to fill the ranks. We also know that as ammunition became more precious that musketry practice was relegated to on-battlefield live fire exercises - not an environment conducive to marksmanship accuracy/precision. It did become clear that Lee was losing more than 1,000 men per day to desertion after the loss of Richmond. ```````````````````````````````` I've learned something new - I didn't know Clauswitz authored "Northern propaganda". I've always thought him focused on the logistics, tactics, and lessons of the Napoleonic Wars - only some of which applied to the ACW. There is a tremendous amount of blue and gray propaganda around today. But man for man none of this bias usually stands up to analysis/scrutiny regardless of the hue of the perspective. My favorite response to this propaganda is the picture from the 50th Anniversary of Gettysburg. The old soldiers re-enacted Longstreet's Charge on July 3*. As they closed at the Angle they embraced. The propaganda, wounds, and vitriol that motivated the nation to war had dissipated and was buried in the past. IMHO that is where arguments of superiority should remain. Unfortunately, the "Lost Cause" rhetoric inspired a pro-northern reaction - and arguments on superiority abound. My observation is that myth often has a foundation in an inferiority complex. Reconstruction certainly gave the South a firm foundation and mass-appetite for myth and an alternative reality. As one former slave stated to his returned master after the war, "Bottom rail on top now." It is more difficult to pin northern myth on a historic event other than it is reactionary and likely rooted in the makeup of the individual. I'm not aware of a mass market for northern myth - but I'd be very interested in anything you can point me to to learn more. Perhaps I'm just not attracted to this genre and am blissfully unaware. Others have theories for the mass appeal of the Lost Cause. At the time of the war the U.S. was deeply religious. Both sides stated, and may have believed, god was on "their" side. Thus, the losing side, may have suffered losing the war because of the "sin" of owning another human. Turning the war into anything other than about the issue of slavery may have been therapeutic and consoling for those that god had turned against. See for example Shelby Foote and other authors... I'm not a psychiatrist or a psychologist so personally, I'd rather just move along... `````````````````````````````` *The name "Pickett's Charge" was coined after Pickett's wife went on the speaking circuit after Pickett had died. My hunch is Pickett continues to roll in his grave having his name associated with that debacle. But it has become common parlance in the myth/propaganda of the war. There is even a book that states that Pickett "planned" Pickett's Charge. Complete rubbish - but if it sells books then as Lincoln said, "You can fool all of the people some of the time. You can fool some people all of the time. But you cannot fool all of the people all of the time."

Euriska22, In my experience there are three factors to preserving artillery. First, as Husserl points out set the ammunition to canister so they don't rout themselves. Second, is to get them on a reverse slope where they are protected from enemy fire. Third, keep them stationary. You don't need to put them on hold - just don't move them. I watch my artillery condition and moral closely and rotate batteries out of the line to recover. I also try to put my recovering batteries in heavy cover. That way if your artillery is surprised while they are recovering they are loaded with canister on superior defensive ground. Once you lose a battery it is gone for good - so it is much better to keep the guns out of action over multiple phases if necessary to recover their condition and morale. Note: I'm not a fan of the artillery implementation in UGG. I'm not aware of any batteries north or south during the entire war that could fire continuously and rout themselves. Generally, a battery held its fire until ordered on a specific fire mission. This helped preserve ammunition that was bulky and difficult to transport by horse and wagon. A battery limber carried a single ammunition chest. A caisson carried an additional two chests. Ammunition chests were of a standard uniform size. Each chest carried between 30 and 50 rounds; depending on the caliber of the ammunition. The small bore of the 3" ordnance rifle and 10" Parrott allowed more ammunition to be carried in each chest. Ammunition chests for the Napoleons were limited to just over 30 rounds due to the larger size of each projectile (over 4" in diameter). In action when a battery exhausted its ammunition supply it would be pulled out of the firing line to return to the supply train and replenish its ammunition. Batteries in reserve with fresh ammunition supplies were rotated into the line. Once batteries had been resupplied they were sent to reserve position. As batteries on the firing line also exhausted their ammunition supply they were then available to be rotated back into the firing line. It was unusual for artillery to suffer more than about 10% overall casualties in a battle. Generally artillery was the combat arm that was in the best shape to protect the army in the event of disaster. For example at Gettysburg the artillery was in tact on July 4 after the battle and in position in front of both armies. The UGG artillery mechanics, and thus the tactics, substantially deviate from the ACW. Perhaps the Antietam implementation of artillery will include some course corrections.

Lincolns Mullett, Great to hear you are enjoying the game. As I've said repeatedly to Nick and his team - forge ahead and release the product. As a Biz Dev executive there are many times I've had to sing "Don't Worry be Crappy" at product release. I'm all for revenue optimization because it is the only path to new and better games in the future; and I'm a believer in the "golden ticket" for game design. The ACW enthusiast community in the U.S. is very large - but to an unfortunate extent they've been driven out of the game market due to poor game design. The balance between game and history remains somewhat elusive. But customer feedback helps guide product evolution. Please note that my posts are focused on history - not Nick's game. If the community would like to see more precision in games then they should speak up. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Some of us have been on the focused testing team for more than 18 months. There have been a long list of items that have been discussed over those 18 months. Many of the problems have been addressed. Some have not. Some of these issues have driven testers originally in the testing community in other directions. Bottom line - you can't make everyone happy all of the time. Rather than have me reiterate what is in writing on this forum and summarize what we've been discussed over those months why don't you do your own research? There is a long list of items that are known problems including melee, routing issues, surrender, artillery sighting, etc... Nick has asked for time to address those issues and we have respected his request. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ My goal is regarding artillery is simply ACW education. When topics are presented as "historically accurate" I'm having fun verifying that these statements align with fact. If they can add to the game experience that is icing on the cake. Abstractions are great - but introducing light sabers, armored cavalry, or other "fantasy" factors should be identified and kept to a minimum when the game is represented as a "historically accurate" presentation. When critical factors are out of line by half an order of magnitude it is reasonable to present and discuss the details. To put this in perspective if you had a WWII air combat game you might include the spitfire. The spitfire had an top speed of about 250 miles per hour. Now let's multiply that number times 5. We now have an propeller driven aircraft flying at 1,250 MPH (roughly mach 2). Kinda messes with game balance don't you think? I'm more of let's examine things and get them within a reasonable ballpark. I'm not really interested in futzing around to derive "perfect" numbers. Play should impact results - and the numbers will vary. But you shouldn't be getting an ACW artillery battery with the firepower of an ACW brigade. There seems to be a educational void regarding black powder artillery. In game terms this cascades into the balance of the other combat arms. Let's take your Total War example. The artillery implementation was so flawed in those games that my recollection was that artillery was banned from competitive matches. PS - I take exception to your stating that for me "fun is the exacting historical details." Exacting historical details would make a horrific game. You've completely missed the point of this entire topic - which began as a historical discussion of artillery. History is a reasonable guide for what should/should not be in a historical game. The details I've provided are primarily submitted as additional information for Nick and his team. The UGG team presents itself (and its product) as committed to history - so I've offered to help sift history from mythology. Nick can choose to do whatever he likes with the historical record in his games. My theory is that better educated historical game designers make better historical games. But from your wealth of experience you may have a different perspective.

42ndMS, My family fought on both side of the war with participants in Virginia, Alabama, Ohio, and Pennsylvania regiments. Lieutenant Rittenhouse commanding the battery on Little Round Top after Hazlett was KIA (5th U.S. Battery D). Robin Leech KIA at Cold Harbor, etc... It not that I'm anti-southern just pro-history. Much of the pro-southern rhetoric doesn't follow the historical record. Particularly the "lost cause" stuff. My point was simply that Barksdale's Brigade is one example where some tuning might be in order. Adjustments should be blue and gray 'color blind'. One of the most interesting things about Sherman's march was the vast resources he was able to extract from the South. We learn in the history books that by this point in the war the South was on the verge of collapse - yet Sherman's forces discovered significant untapped resources in Georgia and South Carolina that had managed to dodge the repeated calls for horseflesh, food, etc...and requisitioning efforts by the South. Additionally, it is interesting how frequently men of military age were hiding out waiting for the war to end. As in most economies there is a flourishing underground economy that seems to exist despite official efforts to toe the line. I've always thought an examination of the resources and manpower remaining in the South at the start of Sherman's march would make an interesting doctoral thesis. I'm certain many men were delighted to get away from the war and get back to life afterwards.

Hister my friend - thanks for the compliment - but the entire community has the ability to test the artillery and post results. Community feedback will be much more effective than my individual testing/response. I've simply outlined the ACW historical record. Nick and the team are highly competent at examining the game results. They understand where the artillery stacks up in the combined arms results. Bottom line - this is not really about the historical record or my participation in testing. Tuning artillery in the game is simply a design preference and game balancing issue. The most effective way to get the artillery tuned more in the direction of the historical record is for the community to post their preferences. If players want UGG to be an ACW infantry-dominated game the UGG team is highly responsive to community input. Note that many players complain that artillery is "useless" when it is not anachronistically too lethal. But the morale/condition effects could be implemented a bit differently to make the artillery both "useful" and more historically accurate. Note that Gibbon's "Artillerist Manual 1861" states, "the effects of artillery are more moral than physical" and the ordnance reports and medical records confirm this truth. My recollection is that the design team's Husserl stated something like the design team didn't want the artillery to "crash the morale of the infantry". Yet historically, artillery's most critical role during the ACW was to be the final line of defense where a shattered army could find refuge knowing that artillery could "crash the morale" of a victorious enemy. This is precisely the pattern during the ACW and is demonstrated at Malvern Hill, Shiloh, Second Mananssas, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, etc... where shattered armies deployed behind a line of guns and lived to fight another day. I've devoted the last 18 months to the historical record to influence game balance. There is not much more to contribute on the historical front. The game is completed. If the community wants the artillery to be tuned in the direction of the historical record then stand up and say so. Please note: It will be interesting to see how the UGG team deals with artillery at Antietam. The Union had a vast artillery advantage at that battle - the Antietam artillery will need to be tuned differently than UGG artillery - or the Union infantry is really going to suck. History has a way of inserting itself into game design. My hunch is that the design team is going to question why their artillery implementation in an Antietam game needs to be substantially different from UGG. But, I could be wrong.

Lincolns Mullet, Absolutely agree that the game should be fun. But shouldn't a game on Napoleonic warfare be different from the ACW? We really aren't talking about the numbers to tune the game to the numbers. We consider numbers to make the game play differently in the ACW than other time periods. The numbers simply establish boundary conditions to consider. Perhaps artillery that is 5X too powerful does not cross the boundary conditions in your perspective. But, in my mind this result transcends the demarcation line between the sublime and the ridiculous. But that's just my opinion. Bottom line - we are trying to educate ourselves to understand the nuances of history so that we don't end up with homogenized wargames that are too generic to represent the difference in warfare over the ages. Knights are great. So are cannons. But the ACW was an infantry war. Styling an ACW game with dominant artillery and cavalry that performs not at all like the ACW may be fun - but not really representative of the ACW. In my mind the real goal is balancing history and game to derive the fun. It's great that you enjoy UGG as is. Personally if I'm going to invest my time in an ACW game I'd prefer to see it look a bit more like the ACW. Currently, IMO the game is styled as more fitting to the wars of Frederick the Great - powerful cavalry and slow artillery. In Frederick's time the idea of skirmishing had not really evolved to the extent it was employed during the ACW. These are fundamental differences that impacted the tactics. If the UGG team changed the battlefield map to Lobositz and dressed the guys in tricorne hats we'd be good to go. We simply have different tolerances for where to draw the line on the history and call it fun. When I play an ACW game I expect that my knowledge of the ACW should be somewhat applicable to playing the game well. For me this is the definition of a "fun" history-based game. I'm not looking for a numbers game or numerical precision - but when 8 of the top 12 units in KIA are artillery batteries - the game has strayed too far from the historical record to use knowledge of the ACW in the tactics of the game. When the game deviations from history are so large that the game doesn't fit the historical record then the game is "less fun" because it is more fantasy than reality. But we all have different definitions and thresholds for "fun".

42ndMS, There are a number of issues with the quality designations in UGG for various brigades. Gottfried's "Brigades of Gettysburg" is a reasonable resource for examining/comparing brigade quality. While some brigades proved to be superior over the course of the war, at the time of Gettysburg, they were unproven. For example, Heth was so concerned about some of his North Carolina regiments, which had not seen action for more than a year, that he requisitioned regiments from other commands with more experience to steady these unproven brigades on July 1. There is no evidence supporting some of the "Lost Cause" myths you've repeated above. While it is true that the CSA had more riles as a total percentage for their army it is not true that the CSA had more rifles at Gettysburg. Over the course of the war the Union actually bought more Enfield’s from England than the CSA. However, because the Union army was larger they had a few regiments at armed with smoothbores...but they also had 20,000 more rifles at Gettysburg. A couple of smoothbores in the mix did not change the overall military situation. It is true that the recently recruited, and poorly fitted out, Pennsylvania Militia units were of much lower battlefield quality than more seasoned units. Over the course of the war the Union lost 110,000 men KIA in combat and the CSA about 96,000 men. A more balanced KIA result after four years of war would be difficult to achieve. Additionally, if you look at battlefield casualties statistically there is no indication that the CSA had the advantage in quality of men. When the Union was attacking at Fredericksburg the casualty result was 2.1 to 1 in favor of the CSA. When the CSA was attacking at Malvern Hill the casualty result was 2.1 to 1 in favor of the Union. Bottom line – casualty figures had more to do with terrain advantages and the side on the defensive than the color of the man’s clothing who was defending. Lee’s Seven Days around Richmond demonstrate that offensive action resulted in higher casualties for the attacker. Additionally, artillery only contributed 6% of all battlefield casualties during the ACW. About 2/3 of the guns used by the ANV were captured guns – so if there was much of an advantage in guns it was minimal. The fuze technology, North and South, was notoriously bad during the war. While the CSA had difficulty manufacturing ammunition at the same volume of the North all of the rounds of ammunition had to be transported by wagon – which tended to give the Union about 250 rounds per gun at battles vs. the CSA 150 rounds of ammunition per gun. At Gettysburg specifically the AoP artillery supply was 93,000 rounds which the CSA supply was in the ballpark of 40,000. As the war progressed the impact of artillery on offensive operations was so poor that Grant cut the number of guns in a field battery from 6 down to 4. The basic message was that artillery required too much road surface for the offensive fire power – and the logistical difficulty of feeding the additional horses was more trouble than it was worth. Civil War artillery was successful on the defensive and its most important contribution during the war was that it precluded the complete destruction of armies. Union armies were saved at Shiloh, and at Chancellorsville, and the CSA artillery positions at Antietam and Gettysburg were a deterrent to potential Union attacks at the end of these battles. Finally, the idea that the South held individual fire superiority through marksmanship over the course of the war makes no sense. After Gettysburg the CSA was desperate for men. Old men and young boys were fed into the ranks. Convalescents were rushed back to the fight. The quality of the southern armies deteriorated as the South lost 20% of the military aged men over the course of the conflict. Unique to the American Civil War is that the arms, men, and results were so balanced. But this should not be a surprise when you consider the two sides shared a common history, language, military tradition, and military training. Statistically the argument of southern superiority at the man vs. man level on the battlefield is simply myth. Where the South did have a significant advantage was in leadership and mobility – Jackson specifically and in particular. The CSA never had the luxury of more than 20 wagons per 1,000 men. Southern men had to get by with much less – and the fact that they could persevere for four years is a testament to their internal fortitude, resourcefulness, and commitment to their cause. But determination and perseverance doesn't translate into more accurate trigger pullers. Live fire practice goes a long way in marksmanship - and while the South may have started with an initial advantage in experience it did not prove to be a sustainable advantage once the Union had trained their armies.

Thanks for the notice Nick - but once again Steam has terminated my account and access to the game. Last time I dealt with this "lost account" issue with Steam it took 3 months to resolve and a big chunk of my time. While I'm happy to take a look as a tester I can't afford the time it takes to deal with Steam. Kind Regards, DF

Hi Sterner, Now that we've taken a look at optimum casualty situations we should also consider "less than optimal" artillery effectiveness. ACW tactics frequently allowed infantry to get close to batteries with minimal casualties, and in good condition with morale in tact. These infantry tactics were effective enough that artillery inflicted only about 6% to 10% of all ACW casualties. For example, at Gettysburg, the 21st Mississippi took on a series of 3 Union batteries, all firing canister, in succession and lost only about 27 men by artillery fire. The combination of terrain, using rock walls for cover, fighting from the ground, and rapid advances mitigated Confederate casualties. The 21st eventually penetrated the perimeter of the battery to such an extent that they were standing on the Union limbers and shooting the horses to prevent the guns from escaping. Minimal artillery casualties were the more frequent norm for the ACW. While it would be possible to build the effects of terrain into the UGG model my hunch is it would be far more efficient just to tune the artillery algorithms to reflect "historic" results rather than deal with optimal vs. sub-optimal battery positions. In my mind it would seem to be a nightmare trying to identify all of the "optimal" battery locations, then identify all of the "standard" battery locations, finally all of the sub-optimal areas for battery fields of fire. Optimal fields of fire for artillery were typically flat plains (where the gun and the target were on the same elevation) with no cover - not a situation that occurs very often on the North American continental topography until you get to Kansas/Nebraska/Eastern Colorado. Given that the ACW was fought mostly east of the Mississippi River the artillery was often fighting on hilly terrain, frequently covered by trees. Both Grant and Sherman late in the war dramatically reduced the number of guns in their armies. After Gettysburg the number of guns in Union batteries was reduced from 6 to 4 guns to reduce the number of horses that needed to be fed. The Army of the Potomac eliminated more than 100 guns to assist in managing the logistics for the war. Gettysburg was the last time the two great armies in the East would mass against each other with hundreds of guns in line on open ground. In the Wilderness Campaign, the artillery fought in small groups of batteries/single gun actions. At Petersburg, field cannon were replaced by siege artillery (mortars and guns of position in fixed fortifications, with chests removed from limbers and caissons, and all vehicles and horses sent to the rear.) See Grape & Canister p. 474 [The Wilderness] "...the Union artillery had only negligible losses; eleven men in the II Corps brigade, all in Dow's and Rickett's units; another eleven in V Corps, eight from Winslow's battery; and none at all in the VI or IX Corps or the Artillery Reserve." IBID p. 484 "On the Union side the main problem was that the artillery had been of little use in the fight so far. Grant was fully aware of this situation; for on the morning of May 10th he wired Halleck in Washington, "We want no more wagons nor artillery."" Bottom line - you want a game that reasonably reflects the reality of warfare in each unique period where you plan to author games. In order to manage this for the ACW building normalized casualty results will be much simpler than trying to figure out which battery positions offered optimal fields of fire.

You also need to keep in mind that batteries were frequently "sniped out of existence" during the ACW. Rather than a regiment blindly charging a battery with horrific casualties it was standard tactical procedure to send out skirmishers to inflict casualties in the gun crews and horses to reduce the lethal effectiveness of the battery and eliminate the battery's mobility. Perhaps the missing tactical ingredient from UGG is skirmishing - which would reduce the lethal effectiveness of artillery. Also, reducing the effectiveness of artillery firing canister firing at less than ideal targets (such as infantry on lower elevations attacking artillery on hill tops). Finally, ACW infantry dramatically reduced casualties by fighting in the prone position. Infantry firing from the ground is very difficult to artillery to eliminate. There are many examples of infantry advancing on a battery immediately after the battery fires. When infantry closed to within 100 yards - if the artillery fired it couldn't reload or limber to the rear fast enough to escape a quick charge.

Hi Sterner, The best place to start with artillery’s ability to inflict casualties is: Lt. Col. Ormond M. Lissak’s “Ordnance and Gunnary. A Text Book”. from 1915. Ordnance and Gunnery. A Text-Book. New York: John Wiley, 1915. Page 446 A projectile energy of 58 foot-pounds force (US Army calculation) to 60 foot-pounds force (81 J) (British calculation) was required to disable an enemy soldier. This applies for soldiers across the ages - including Gettysburg. When a canister projectile hit a target is was possible that it could have the energy to inflict 2 casualties if the lines of the target infantry were close enough that the projectiles still had the energy to inflict casualties. Canister - 300 Yards and Less When the 27 projectiles in a canister round exited the cannon tube their velocity of 1,485 per second in a cone-shaped pattern. The projectiles can be divided into thirds: - 9 projectiles would hit the ground in the first 50 feet. If the ground was solid they would continue in flight for about another 100 feet. If the ground was soft the flight of these projectiles often stopped in the first 75 feet. - 9 projectiles would fly at the elevation of the gun tube – and carry out to about 300 feet. - 9 projectiles would fly at over 2 meters for the first 150 feet then descend to lethal height out to about 400 feet. Thus, for a single round of canister on level and solid ground at most distances 18 casualties per canister round would be possible for a 12 pounder gun – but projectiles often hit the same target more than once and a more accurate number would be in the 14 to 16 casualties per gun per round of canister. Double Canister – 150 Yards and Less Double canister could inflict 22 to 26 casualties per round per gun within the 150 meters of the gun. Effects of Battery Canister Fire For a battery of six guns double canister could inflict between 132 and 156 casualties. For a battery of six guns canister could inflict between 84 and 96. Two rounds of canister could be fired per minute – but most often guns that had infantry support would withdraw all equipment and men about 200 yards – leaving a single gunner to pull the lanyard on a final round of double canister. This ensured that even if the gun was captured it could not be turned against the former owners. If the gun was not overrun the crew would return to the gun and continue the fight. Canister had a significant impact on the target unit’s organization (condition) as well as morale. Units that had been shaken rarely had the gumption to take a battery. Fresh troops are known to have overrun as many as three batteries in succession before their condition and morale dropped enough to preclude further action until they had rested. >300 Yards Out to 600 Yards Civil War Artillery had a variety of ammunition options. The most effective anti-personnel round at this distance was case shot (shrapnel). Each round carried a one-ounce charge that detonated the projectile about 75 yards in front of the target infantry and 15 feet above the target. The likelihood of an optimal shot is about 1 in 33 or about 3% per gun or 18% for a six-gun battery. An optimal shot with case could inflict about 12 to 16 casualties. The likelihood of an entire battery with optimal shots (inflicting 96 casualties from a single battery salvo) might have happened once at the combined battles of Gettysburg, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. For a 6-gun 12-pounder battery the casualties of 14 to 22 per salvo would be a generous number of casualties. Note that shell was often fired at this distance. When shell’s detonated they broke into 4 to 8 pieces with unpredictable flight trajectories (due to the non-uniform shape of the fragments). While it was unusual for these rounds to be lethal on the field the sound of these projectiles did have an impact on both unit organization (condition) and morale. Batteries often fired with both case and shell in a single salvo (2 or 3 guns loaded with shell) for optimal lethal and morale impact at this distance. >600 Yards Out to 1,000 Yards Judging correct distances at this range was very difficult and the effectiveness of case and shell dropped significantly in the smoke-filled confusion of battle. The most frequent round used beyond 600 yards was solid shot. (These numbers are from tests carried out in England in 1835 using 12-pounders.) At 600 yards a 12-pounder had an 87% chance of hitting a regimental size target. At 950 yards this dropped to 40% chance of hitting a regimental size target. At 1,300 yards this dropped to a 17% chance of hitting a regimental size target. Casualties for solid shot should be calculated based on the depth of the target. For each rank encountered these percentages are applicable. Thus it would be possible for a 6-gun battery to inflict something like 10 casualties per salvo at 600 yards, 5 per salvo at 950 yards, and 2 per salvo over 1,000 yards. Rifled guns might have a slightly higher chance of having the precision to hit a target at greater distance – but keep in mind that rifled rounds tended to bury themselves in the dirt prior to detonation – which absorbed the impact and mitigated the lethal impact at long-range. Keep in mind these are optimal numbers. As soon as you place artillery on a hill you decrease the impact of canister - because the guns were limited in how far the tube of the gun can be depressed. As a result - cannons firing canister from hills/ridges at infantry targets on lower elevations tended to shoot over the heads of the attacking infantry - often dramatically reducing the lethal effects. Additionally, cover, soft ground, and obscured sight ensured that artillery was operating under less than ideal battlefield conditions. For historical reference - Napoleon's attack at Waterloo was delayed until the afternoon to ensure the ground had time to dry to ensure the impact of his artillery projectiles might be closer to optimized numbers.

Naisawald's "Grape and Canister" was written by a WWII artillery officer. He gives an excellent technical overview of the guns, ammunition, tactics, and organization of the artillery. Like all artillery professionals he attributes casualties inflicted by artillery at "only some 10 per cent" with 89 per cent caused by the rifle and musket.

Hi Sterner, If you want artillery performance that is both historically correct and "satisfactory"/"relevant" for gameplay in UGG then you might consider using a higher organization than the battery. Six or eight guns was not a large enough number of guns to have a major tactical impact on battles - particularly when you are focused at the brigade scale for the infantry. If effectiveness is measured in lethal scale a battery was roughly equal to a 200 man regiment. IMO you have a tactical mismatch between infantry brigades and artillery batteries. If you are going to play at the infantry brigade level then you need to increase the number of guns in tactical units above the scale of the battery. Currently you have artillery tactically at the regimental scale while the infantry is at the brigade scale. The problem with this is that the ACW was not an artillery fest. Phillips of the 5th Massachusetts Battery called the Confederate artillery barrage on July 3 "a humbug" with no militarily relevant impact. Warren, Hunt, and Meade ordered the Union artillery to stop firing at long range because it was "filling the valley with smoke but doing little damage." Two "half-brigades" per Corps would allow artillery support between the three divisions in a Corps. You could think about organizing artillery in a 2 battery divisional support groups(about 1/3 of an artillery brigade) which would provide each division artillery support. If you wanted my input I'd suggest the artillery organization of "half brigades" to ensure players consider putting Corps into the historically correct 2 divisions on the front line with the 3rd division as a reserve. You might want to think about artillery brigades, half brigades, or 1/3 brigades - about 18 guns to make the artillery have an impact without turning the ACW into something it was not - an artillery fest. This should balance the scale of the infantry brigades with an appropriate artillery support structure. This was a strange exchange. Clearly a fixed rate of 20% is not desirable. Gameplay should impact the results. It seems you can either tune the algorithm to keep all the individual batteries in the game (which would be annoying as the impact of each battery will be less - and players will correctly complain artillery is "worthless") or increase the size of the tactical units to something more than individual batteries (artillery brigades or sections of artillery brigades). But, an artillery battery with as many "kills" as an infantry brigade is absurd. If you tune the algorithm down and test it to put artillery casualties in the 18% to 25% (dependent upon gameplay) you don't really need specific numbers of kills at range X,Y, or Z. If you want me to give you historical data for the ranges I've outlined above these should hold true for artillery from about 1750 through 1865 by individual gun type. After 1865 the introduction on new fuzes had a significant impact the artillery performance. I can define the assumptions for the numbers. Note that numbers for individual guns would still need to be tuned for the number of guns in the battery/brigade.

Hi Sterner, If the guidance I've requested is too complex we can talk about tuning the algorithm. In the past the artillery "kills" algorithm was dialed down then compared with battlefield test results. When the battlefield tests yielded about 20% of the casualties by artillery this was a good starting point. Does this approach make sense? Alternatively, let me know if you want to go forward with to your approach above of casualties at each distance as the starting point. Thanks

Hi Sterner, We need a bit more precision in the question you're asking to ensure I'm answering the question you are asking. Also, I'd like to ensure my responses are practical for the game engine so in some cases I have some questions. Is this an algorithm tuning question or a broader question? Specifically: First of all what is the assumed target unit? The impact of artillery was largely determined by the size and density of the target. The impact on cavalry is different than infantry or artillery. The impact of artillery on infantry columns or in enfilade is different. Also artillery in battery was less of a target than limbered artillery. If you can help me understand the game mechanics I'll tune my responses to ensure I'm not responding with answers that are impossible to implement. We need a bit broader discussion - first of all guns had both a moral and physical impact on infantry that increased as infantry moved closer to the guns. I don't think you can move artillery into the ballpark of historical realism without considering both the physical and moral impact. If you can help me understand how artillery impacts morale it would help me compare UGG with the historical record. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Please let me know which scale to discuss in responding to your question. Is this a question about an individual gun by gun type? If this a question about a battery? If a battery do you need battery type? If this is about battery types I'd need to understand a bit more about how you calculated the impact of CSA batteries in UGG to compare how this aligned with history. Note that historically CSA batteries were of different gun types, but, at Gettysburg they were organized into brigades (CSA called these artillery "battalions") and the brigades fought more by gun type than by battery type. For example, the July 3 artillery barrage included the rifled pieces and 12 pound Napoleons. Longstreet's Charge on July 3 received close fire support mostly from the 12 pound and 24 howitzers from multiple batteries - the only guns which had not participated in the barrage preceding the attack because they didn't have the range to reach the Union guns on Cemetery Hill. Is this a question about an artillery brigade - where abstractions become more important as we move from individual guns/types of guns, to homogeneous batteries, to heterogeneous artillery brigades. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Are you looking for historical numbers for statistical averages or a single static number? Alternatively, do you want numbers that I think would work well and help better balance the game? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The distances you've provided don't make any sense in the context of the ammunition of the ACW. If we take a look at ACW artillery projectiles from ACW Range Tables (Barry, "Instructions for Field Artillery", Gibbon, "Artillerist Maual", Benton's West Point Textbook "Ordnance and Gunnary" we get a general picture of how the various types of ammunition used for the 12 pound Napoleon were: Canister (27 projectiles/round) was fired at ranges less than 400 yards. Canister became more effective under 300 yards. At 150 yards crews often switched to double canister if ammunition was abundant. Case shot (72 projectiles/round) was fired at ranges greater than 400 yards out to about 600 or 700 yards. Shell (4 to 7 projectiles/round) was fired at ranges over 400 yards and primarily had a morale impact. Solid shot was fired at all ranges (depending on the target) and was effective out to about 1,000 yards. Napoleons could fire out to 1,600 yards and rifles out to 2,400 yards but the lethal effects were minimal at this distance. For UGG then I'd suggest we consider looking at the distances of 150 yards and less, 150 to 300 yards, >300 yards, and >600 yards out to 1,000 yards. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The last topic to consider is ACW tactics. In UGG it is impossible to deploy skirmishers. Yet, this was the primary method of eradicating annoying batteries - particularly isolated batteries that did not have infantry support. If we are going to include an abstraction for skirmishers then we should adjust our assumptions to include this abstraction. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Let me know if/where my questions may be too complex for UGG and we can iterate on questions/answers that fit your requirements for UGG. Thanks for considering bringing artillery more into alignment with the historical record!