David Fair

Below is the data for the Union and Confederate Artillery at Gettysburg. Analysis of Union Artillery Losses Summary: 1st Corps: Reynolds 28 guns 596 men ( 9 KIA; 11 MIA; 86 wounded) 18% casualties 2nd Corps: Hancock 28 guns 605 men (27 KIA; 3 MIA; 119 wounded) 25% casualties 3rd Corps: Sickles 30 guns 596 men ( 8 KIA; 17 MIA; 81 wounded) 18% casualties 5th Corps: Sykes 26 guns 432 men (10 KIA; 2 MIA; 7 wounded) 4% casualties 6th Corps: Sedgwick 46 guns 937 men ( 4 KIA; 0 MIA; 8 wounded) 1% casualties 11th Corps: Howard 26 guns 604 men ( 7 KIA; 9 MIA; 53 wounded) 11% casualties 12rd Corps: Slocum 20 guns 391 men ( 0 KIA; 0 MIA; 9 wounded) 2% casualties Cavalry Corps: Pleasonton 52 guns 925 men ( 4 KIA; 0 MIA; 19 wounded) 2% casualties Artillery Reserve: Tyler 110 guns 2,376 men (43 KIA; 12 MIA; 187 wounded) 10% casualties Artillery Grand Total = 356 guns 7,353 men (112 KIA; 54 MIA; 569 wounded) 10% casualties 21 Union guns were disabled during the battle (4 by counter battery fire; 11 by capture [likely spiking the guns]; 1 burst barrel; 1 gun struck on muzzle; 4 unserviceable due to casualties). Note – Minor discrepancy between “order of battle” and “stone sentinels”. My guess is that the upper echelon commanders were not aware of the actual strength of their commands on the “stone sentinels” and there may have been a number of men absent or alternatively local men who fought with units at Gettysburg who did not “muster in”. The artillery would be a logical place for untrained men to serve. Many of the tasks supporting guns require no training [grunt work]. Specifically, for example, the “runner” on a gun crew is one of the most tiring jobs [running ammunition from the caisson to the gun]. Untrained men could also manage the backbreaking logistics of the artillery brigade’s wagon to resupply caissons, holding horse teams, etc… For example the “stone sentinels” for 1st Corps individual batteries total 642 men. This is 42 men more than the total for the “stone sentinel” 1st Corps Artillery Battalion’s 596 men. I’d suspect the 642 is the closer to correct number. With this observation I’d suggest deferring to the numbers in the summary above. The summary ties to the Corps-level “stone sentinels” (immediately below) and the “order of battle” at http://www.bio.brandeis.edu/classes/hist150b/battleorder.html See: · AoP HQ Monument: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-AOP.php · 1st Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-1.php · 2nd Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-2.php · 3rd Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-3.php · 5th Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-5.php · 6th Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-6.php · 11th Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-11.php · 12th Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-12.php · Cavalry Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-Cav.php · Artillery Reserve: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes.php 1st Corps: Reynolds 1st Corps Artillery Brigade (28 guns 596 men) (9 KIA; 11 MIA; 86 wounded) 18% casualties See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-1-Art.php 2nd Maine B (Hall’s) Battery 127 men (18 wounded) 14% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles July 1 Chambersburg Pike & Seminary Ridge July 2 Cemetery Hill See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ME/2MeArt.php 5th Maine (Steven’s) Battery 136 men (3 KIA; 7 MIA; 13 wounded) 17% 6 Napoleons 979 rounds fired July 1 Seminary Ridge July 2 Cemetery Hill “…double canister [“poured”] into their ranks…” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ME/5MeArt.php 1st New York L (Reynold’s) Battery 141 men (1 KIA; 1 MIA; 15 wounded) 12% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles “1 gun captured in the fighting west of town” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatL.php 1st Pennsylvania B (Cooper’s) Battery 114 men (3 KIA; 9 wounded) 11% casualties 4 Ordnance Rifles 1050 rounds fired (4 guns) ~8 hours (1 round every 2 minutes/gun) July 1 from 1-4 pm Chambersburg Pike & Seminary Ridge 4 pm “heavy artillery contest with the enemy’s batteries on Benner’s Hill” July 3 “engaged…final attack and second repulse of the enemy” [Pickett’s Charge] See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/1PaArtBatB.php 4th U.S. B (Stewart’s) Battery 124 men (2 KIA; 3 MIA; 31 wounded) 29% casualties 6 Napoleons July 1 Seminary Ridge repositioned to Cemetery Hill “Two guns on the [baltimore] Pike and two in the field have been disabled” July 2 & 3 “Remained in this position” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartB.php 2nd Corps: Hancock 2nd Corps Artillery Brigade 28 guns 605 men (27 KIA; 3 MIA; 119 wounded) 25% casualties See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-2-Art.php 1st New York B (“Empire” or Rorty’s) Battery 114 men (10 KIA; 16 wounded) 23% casualties 4 10-Pound Parrotts July 2 “fought near the Wheatfield” July 3 “directly in the path of Pickett’s Charge” “Three of the battery’s cannon were disabled in the bombardment preceding the charge” “Rorty borrowed a score of men from the 19th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment to keep the gun firing” “Kemper’s Virginians briefly overran the battery in a flurry of hand to hand fighting” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatB.php 1st Rhode Island A (Arnold’s) Battery 139 men (4 KIA; 24 wounded) 20% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles July 2 Cemetery Ridge July 3 “Hancock overruled batteries under his immediate control, ordering them to return [counter battery] fire [prior to Pickett’s Charge] to give moral support to the infantry” 1 gun destroyed by counter battery fire. Long range ammunition exhausted “four of the serviceable guns pulled back. The final gun “was wheeled up to the stone wall for fire canister into the approaching Rebels. That gun fired the rest of the battery’s canister, the last double-shotted into Confederates who had almost reached the wall.” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/RI/1RIBatA.php 1st Rhode Island B (Brown’s) Battery 103 men (7 KIA; 2 MIA; 19 wounded) 27% casualties 6 Napoleons July 2 Overrun by Wright’s Georgia Brigade 2 pieces abandoned by Emmitsburg Road (spiked by CSA) & another abandoned by Cemetery Ridge. All three guns recovered by Union countercharges. “One gun…restored to service for the next day.” July 3 [Preceding Pickett’s Charge]“One gun was struck on the muzzle by a Confederate shell…distorted [the] muzzle.” Ammunition exhausted the 3 serviceable guns withdrawn by order of General Hunt. Uncalculated consequence: “Longstreet’s Artillery Chief, E. Porter Alexander, saw it leave. Union gunfire was also slackening following orders from Hunt and Meade. Alexander reported that the Union artillery on the [Cemetery] ridge – all of it – was pulling back. if Pickett were to charge, now was the time. And so it was that Battery B helped launch Pickett’s Charge.” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/RI/1RIBatB.php 1st U.S. I (Woodruff’s) Battery 112 men (1 KIA; 29 wounded) 27% casualties 6 Napoleons 2 & 3 July Cemetery Hill “assisted in repelling Longstreet’s Assault [Pickett’s Charge]” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/1USartI.php 4thU.S. AI (Cushing’s) Battery 126 men (6 KIA; 32 wounded) 30% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles July 2 “took part in the artillery engagements during the day July 3 “Engaged in the repulse of Longstreet’s Assault [Pickett’s Charge]” 5 guns disabled and all horses “but three” disabled [83 out of 90; 92% Horses KIA/disabled]. See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartA.php 3rd Corps: Sickles 3nd Corps Artillery Brigade 30 guns 596 men (8 KIA; 17 MIA; 81 wounded) 18% casualties See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-3-Art.php 1st New Jersey B (Clark’s) Battery (Judson commanding) 143 men (1 KIA; 3 MIA; 16 wounded) 14% casualties 6 10-Pound Parrotts July 2 in the Peach Orchard - 1,300 rounds fired in 5 hours withdrawn when ammunition was exhausted July 3 “in line with the Artillery Brigade…but not engaged” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NJ/1NJArtBatB.php 1st New York D (Winslow’s) Battery 116 men (8 MIA; 10 wounded) 16% 6 Napoleons See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatD.php 4th New York Independent (Smith’s) Battery 135 men (2 KIA; 10 wounded; 1 captured) 10% 6 10-Pound Parrotts 3 guns captured and used by CSA 240 rounds fired in 4 hours (11 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/4NYBatt.php 1st Rhode Island E (Bucklyn’s Battery) 116 men (3 KIA; 26 wounded) 25% casualties 6 Napoleons See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/RI/1RIBatE.php 4th U.S. Artillery K (Seely’s) Battery 134 men (2 KIA; 4 MIA; 19 wounded) 19% casualties 6 Napoleons July 2 engaged for 3 hours in the Peach Orchard & Wheat Field (28 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartK.php 5th Corps: Sykes 5th Corps Artillery Brigade 26 guns 432 men (10 KIA; 2 MIA; 7 wounded) 4% casualties See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-5-Art.php 3rd Massachusetts (Walcott’s) Battery 124 men (No casualties reported) 0% casualties 6 Napoleons July 3 “At 3 am moved to and occupied this position until the close of the battle” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MA/3MABatty.php 1st New York C (Barnes) Battery 88 men (“No losses”) 0% casualties 4 Ordnance Rifles July 3 “transferred to the left flank of Big Round Top” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatC.php 1st Ohio L (Gibbs’s) Battery 121 men (2 wounded) 2% casualties 6 Napoleons July 2 “went into position under a brisk skirmish fire on the extreme right of Wolf Hill” moved to Little Round Top July 3 Held same [Little Round Top] position” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/OH/1OHArtBatL.php 5th U.S. D (Hazlett’s) Battery 68 men (9 KIA; 5 wounded) 21% casualties 6 10-Pound Parrotts July 2 & 3 Little Round Top See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartD.php 5th U.S. I (Watson’s) Battery 71 men (1 KIA; 2 MIA; 19 wounded) 31% casualties 4 Ordnance Rifles 2 July 4:30 pm “moved to the front at the Peach Orchard.” “[battery] captured by the 21st Mississippi Infantry. It was almost immediately recaptured with the assistance of the 39th New York Infantry and being unserviceable was taken to the Artillery Brigade.” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartI.php 6th Corps: Sedgwick 6th Corps Artillery Brigade 46 guns 937 men (4 KIA; 8 wounded) 1% casualties See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-6-Art.php Note – Arrived on 2 July and placed under the command of General Hunt Chief of Artillery AoP 1st Massachusetts (McCartney’s) Battery 145 men (No casualties reported) 0% casualties 6 Napoleons 4 rounds fired See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MA/1MABattyA.php 1st New York Independent (Cowan’s) Battery 113 men (4 KIA; 8 wounded) 11% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 3 July “…Confederate lines [Pickett’s Charge] were over the defenses and within ten yards of our guns….” Note bas relief on monument “Double Canister at Ten Yards” (14 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYBatt.php 3rd New York Independent (Harn’s) Battery 119 men (“No losses”) 0% casualties 6 10-Pound Parrotts See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/3NYBatt.php 1st Rhode Island C (Waterman’s) Battery 116 men 6 Ordnance Rifles No Monument – This battery lost 27 men during the entire American Civil War so it is likely that if they had casualties at Gettysburg they were very light. 1st Rhode Island G (Adams’s) Battery 116 men 6 10-Pound Parrotts No Monument– This battery lost 30 men during the entire American Civil War so it is likely that if they had casualties at Gettysburg they were very light. 2nd U.S. D (Williston’s) Battery 126 men (“Not engaged”) 0% casualties 4 Napoleons See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartD.php 2nd U.S. G (Butler’s) Battery 113 men (“Suffered no casualties”) 0% casualties 6 Napoleons 3 July “on repulse of Longstreet’s Assault [Pickett’s Charge]” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartG.php 5th U.S. F (Martin’s) Battery 113 men (“Suffered no casualties”) 0% casualties 6 10-Pound Parrotts 3 July “on repulse of Longstreet’s Assault [Pickett’s Charge]” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartF.php 11th Corps: Howard 6th Corps Artillery Brigade 26 guns 604 men (7 KIA; 9 MIA; 53 wounded) 11% casualties See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-11-Art.php 1st New York I (Wiedrich’s) Battery 141 men (3 KIA; 10 wounded) 9% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 1-4 July “fought on Cemetery Hill” Battery was overrun on July 2 and retaken by the 73rd Pennsylvania Infantry. Bronze Table of the 73rd directly below. Weidrich’s Battery follows. (See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PhotoGallery/Bronze-Pennsylvania_73.php) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatI.php 13th New York Independent (Wheeler’s) Battery 118 men (3 MIA; 8 wounded) 9% casualties 4 Ordnance Rifles 1 July engaged north of Gettysburg 2 July Cemetery Hill 3 July “repulse of Pickett’s Charge” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/13NYArt.php 1st Ohio I (Dilger’s) Battery 127 men (13 wounded) 10% casualties 6 Napoleons 1 July engaged north of Gettysburg “silenced [2 CSA batteries] with a loss of five gun carriages” 2 July “extreme right…on Cemetery Hill” “One gun disabled” (28 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/OH/1OHArtBatI.php 1st Ohio K (Heckman’s) Battery 118 men (2 KIA; 2 MIA; 11 wounded) 13% casualties 4 Napoleons See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/OH/1OHArtBatK.php 4th U.S. G (Wilkinson’s) Battery 115 men (2 KIA; 4 MIA; 11 wounded) 15% casualties 6 Napoleons 1 July Barlow’s Knoll “Retired about 4 pm…About 5 pm took position on Cemetery Hill” 1,400 rounds fired in action for 8.5 hours (31 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartG.php 12rd Corps: Slocum 12th Corps Artillery Brigade 20 guns 391 men (0 KIA; 0 MIA; 9 wounded) 2% casualties See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-12-Art.php 1st New York M (Winegar’s) Battery 96 men (“suffered no losses”) 0% casualties 4 10-Pound Parrotts “[From Power’s Hill]…duel with Confederate pieces on Benner’s Hill” See http://www.civilwarintheeast.com/USA/NY/NY1artM.php and http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatM.php Pennsylvania Independent E (Knap’s) Battery (Atwell commanding) 135 men (3 wounded) 2% casualties 6 10-Pound Parrotts July 2 Culp’s Hill “”…5 pm when the three guns engaged the enemy’s batteries on Benner’s Hill” July 3 Power’s Hill See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/PaIndArtBatE.php 4th U.S. F (Rugg’s) Battery 89 men (1 wounded) 6 Napoleons 1 - 3 July Culp’s Hill area See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartF.php 5th U.S. K (Kinzie’s) Battery 77 men (5 wounded) 4 Napoleons 1 July Culp’s Hill 2 July Culp’s Hill “…assisted in silencing Confederate Batteries on Benner’s Hill. At 6 pm rejoined the battery at the foot of Power’s Hill” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartK.php Cavalry Corps: Pleasonton Cavalry Corps Artillery Brigade 52 guns 925 men (4 KIA; 0 MIA; 19 wounded) 2% casualties See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/AOPCavCorps.php 3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery H (Rank’s) Battery 52 men (1 MIA) 2% casualties 2 Ordnance Rifles “…attached themselves to McIntosh’s Cavalry Brigade” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/3PaHvArt.php 1st Horse Artillery Brigade 28 guns 490 men (2 KIA; 0 MIA; 6 wounded) 2% casualties See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-Cav-HA-1.php 9th Michigan (Daniels’s) Battery 119 men (1 KIA; 4 wounded) 4% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 322 rounds fired (23 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MI/9MiArt.php 6th New York Independent (Martin’s) Battery 130 men (1 wounded) 1% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles …in reserve for the battle…” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/6NYBatt.php 2nd U.S. B & L Consolidated (Heaton’s) Battery 99 men (No casualties) 0% casualties 2 July “In reserve…” 6 Ordnance Rifles 3 July “…for a time exposes to a severe fire. In the evening withdrawn…” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartBL.php 2nd U.S. M (Pennington’s) Battery 117 men (1 wounded) 1% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 3 July “Engaged in Brig. General Custer’s Brigade with Major General J.E.B. Stuart’s Confederate Cavalry on the right of the Union Army” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartM.php 4th U.S. E (Elder’s) Battery 60 men (1 KIA) 2% casualties 4 Ordnance Rifles 3 July “Arrived on the field and took position on a hill southwest of Round Top and engaged [serving] under Brig. General E.J. Farnsworth in the afternoon against the Confederate right” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartE.php 2nd Horse Artillery Brigade 22 guns 435 men (2 KIA; 0 MIA; 13 wounded) 3% casualties See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-Cav-HA-1.php 1st U.S. E & G Consolidated (Randol’s) Battery 84 men (“suffered no casualties”) 0% casualties 4 Ordnance Rifles 3 July “…hotly engaged in repelling the attack of Major General Stuart’s Confederate Cavalry Division…” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/1USartEG.php 1st U.S. K (Graham’s) Battery 114 men (No casualties) 0% 6 Ordnance Rifles 3 July “…engaged during the attack of Brig. General E. J. Farnsworth…” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/1USartK.php 2nd U.S. A (Calef’s) Battery 74 men (12 wounded) 16% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 1 July “Advanced with the Cavalry…” 2 July “2 am marched with First Brigade of Major General John Buford’s Division to Taneytown en route to Westminster [MD]” (13 Horses KIA) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartA.php 3rd U.S. C (Fuller’s) Battery ~120 6 Ordnance Rifles 4 July “Arrived at Emmitsburg Not engaged” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/3USartC.php Artillery Reserve: Tyler Artillery Reserve 110 guns 2,376 men (43 KIA; 12 MIA; 187 wounded) 10% casualties See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes.php First Regular Brigade 24 guns 445 men (13 KIA; 2 MIA; wounded 53) 15% casualties See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-1Reg.php 1st U.S. H (Eakin’s) Battery 129 men (1 KIA; 1 MIA; 8 wounded) 8% casualties 6 Napoleons 2 & 3 July Cemetery Ridge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/1USartH.php 3rd U.S. F & K Consolidated (Turnbull’s) Battery 145 men (9 KIA; 1 MIA; 14 wounded) 17% 6 Napoleons 2 July in the Wheat Field (on the right flank of III Corps) “…compelled to retire with the loss of 34 horses killed and 4 guns which were afterwards recaptured.” 3 July “…left of Cemetery Hill.” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/3USartFK.php 4th U.S. C (Thomas’s) Battery 95 men (1 KIA; 17 wounded) 19% casualties 6 Napoleons 2 & 3 July Cemetery Ridge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartBatC.php 5th U.S. C (Weir’s) Battery 104 men (2 KIA; 14 wounded) 15% casualties 6 Napoleons 2 July Cemetery Ridge “…The Confederates in front advanced to within a few yards no infantry opposing. Three of the guns were captured by the Confederates…but were recaptured by the 13th Vermont and another regiment.” 3 July “…[Pickett’s Charge] opened with canister at short range on the advancing Confederates… See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartC.php First Volunteer Brigade 22 guns 385 men (17 KIA; 5 MIA; 71 wounded) 24% casualties See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-1.php 5th Massachusetts E (Philips’s) Battery 104 men (7 KIA; 13 wounded) 19% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 700 rounds fired 2 July “Withdrew at 5 pm from the field near the Peach Orchard…” 3 July “…fired on the Confederate batteries but did little damage…assisted in repulsing the [Pickett’s] assault. A charge was made…by the Florida brigade…driving the cannoneers from their guns which they abandoned.” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MA/5MABatty.php 9th Massachusetts (Bigelow’s) Battery 110 men 9 (10 KIA; 20 wounded) 27% casualties 6 Napoleons 2 July “…Wheatfield Road…Enfiladed with canister Kershaw’s Brigade C.S.A…By ‘prolong firing’ [using the recoil from each shot fired to move the gun rearward] retired before Kershaw’s skirmishers…ordered to hold enemy in check [Trostle’s House] until line of artillery could be formed 560 yards in the rear. Was without support and hemmed in by stone wall. Enemy closed in on flanks. Man and horses were shot down when finally overcome at 6:30 pm…7:15 pm Willard’s Brigade 2nd Corps and later Lockwood’s Brigade 12th Corps came to support of artillery. 8:00 pm the enemy finally repulsed.” 3 & 4 July “Two guns…Only officer and guns effective after engagement on Trostle’s farm July 2nd, 1863” (80 Horses KIA/disabled) 91% casualties See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MA/9MABatty.php Note to “prolong” a gun is to manhandle the gun into position. A Rope is attached to the gun for men to pull it to a new location without a limber. See rope on cannon below and image at https://www.google.com/search?hl=en&site=imghp&tbm=isch&source=hp&biw=1162&bih=770&q=american+civil+war+prolong+a+gun&oq=american+civil+war+prolong+a+gun&gs_l=img.12...2854.13369.0.16458.34.13.1.20.21.0.62.641.13.13.0....0...1ac.1.32.img..12.22.689.gpXzaNudLzE#hl=en&q=american+civil+war+prolong+a+cannon&tbm=isch&facrc=_&imgdii=_&imgrc=CakUahXQbytmOM%3A%3B15YAz1wUF1edGM%3Bhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.nps.gov%252Fhistory%252Fhistory%252Fonline_books%252Fcivil_war_series%252F20%252Fimages%252Ffig44.jpg%3Bhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.nps.gov%252Fhistory%252Fhistory%252Fonline_books%252Fcivil_war_series%252F20%252Fsec5.htm%3B500%3B486 15th New York Independent (Hart’s) Battery 99 men (3 KIA; 13 wounded) 16% casualties 4 Napoleons 2 July “Engaged in the Peach Orchard…” 3 July “…open[ed] on the Confederate batteries with solid shot and shell. Upon the advance of the Confederate infantry, fired shell and shrapnel and canister when the line was within 500 yards. A second line advancing was met with double canister which dispersed it. The fire of the battery was then directed against the artillery on the Confederate right and several caissons and limbers were exploded by the shells.” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/15NYBatt.php Pennsylvania Independent C & F Consolidated (Thompson’s) battery 105 men (1KIA; 3 MIA; 10 wounded) 13% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 2 July Peach Orchard “…most of the horses being killed and the drivers wounded.” 3 July Cemetery Ridge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/PaArtBatCF.php Second Volunteer Brigade 12 guns 241 men (1 KIA; 2 MIA; 5 wounded) 3% casualties See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-2.php 1st Connecticut B (Brooker’s) Battery “Not engaged” 4 (four) 4 ½-inch Rifles; for performance characteristics see: http://www.civilwarartillery.com/tables.htm No Marker Note the total guns in the details = 106 and the total for the Artillery Reserve is 110. I suspect the missing guns are in these two Connecticut batteries. See Page 37 for the Gettysburg History, “That we were not in action at Gettysburg is much to be regretted, as was expressed by General Meade, commanding the army, and by General Hunt, Chief of Artillery. That guns of this range and caliber would have made terrible havoc in the enemy’s forming columns and lines non can doubt.” See: http://books.google.com/books?id=8RgvAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA90&lpg=PA90&dq=%221st+Connecticut+B+battery%22&source=bl&ots=yl-mbK1k_N&sig=QryOR11i9YYMFtYhL-CEPk-M3U4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=W_vjUtvZKvjMsQT864G4BQ&ved=0CFkQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=%221st%20Connecticut%20B%20battery%22&f=false 1st Connecticut M (Pratt’s) Battery “Not engaged” 4 (four) 4 ½-inch Rifles See image middle of page at: http://markerhunter.wordpress.com/2013/11/07/4-5-inch-rifle-at-kellys-ford/ No Marker 2nd Connecticut (Sterling’s) Battery 106 men (2 MIA; 3 wounded) 5% casualties 4 James Rifles and 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers (3 Horses KIA/disabled) 1 caisson destroyed 2 & 3 July “Engaged on Cemetery Hill” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/CT/2CTArt.php 5th New York Independent (Taft’s) Battery 146 men (1 KIA; 2 wounded) 2% casualties 6 20-Pound Parrotts 2 July Cemetery Hill “…Four guns…firing on a Confederate battery on Benner’s Hill…” 3 July 1 burst gun 1,114 rounds fired in 12 hours See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/5NYBatt.php Third Volunteer Brigade 22 guns 431 men (10 KIA; 3 MIA; 24 wounded) 9% casualties See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-3.php 1st New Hampshire (Edgell’s) Battery 111 men (3 wounded) 3% casualties 4 Ordnance Rifles 2 & 3 July Cemetery Hill 353 rounds fired See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NH/1NHBatA.php 1st Ohio H (Huntington’s) Battery (Norton Commanding) 123 men (3 KIA; 4 wounded) 6% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 2 & 3 July Cemetery Hill See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/OH/1OHArtBatH.php 1st Pennsylvania F & G Consolidated (Ricketts’s) Battery 144 men (6 KIA; 3 MIA; 14 wounded) 17% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 2 July Cemetery Hill “…engaged the Rebel batteries on Benner’s Hill. 8 pm A Rebel column charged the Battery and a desperate hand-to-hand conflict ensured which was repulsed after every round of canister had been fired.” 3 July East Cemetery Hill See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/1PaArtBatFG.php 1st West Virginia C (Pierpont’s) Battery 124 men (2 KIA; 2 wounded) 3% casualties 4 10-Pound Parrotts July 2 & 3 Cemetery Hill See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/WV/WVartBatC.php Fourth Volunteer Brigade 24 guns 499 men (2 KIA; 0 MIA; 34 wounded) 7% casualties See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-4.php 6th Maine F (Dow’s) Battery 103 men (13 wounded) 13% casualties 4 Napoleons 3 July Cemetery Ridge “…suffered 13 men wounded in the artillery duel that preceded Pickett’s Charge…” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ME/6MeArt.php 1st Maryland A (Rigby’s) Battery 106 men (“…no casualties…”) 0% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles July 2 & 3 Power’s Hill See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MD/MD1artBatA.php 1st New Jersey (Hexamer’s) Battery (Parsons commanding) 116 men (2 KIA; 7 wounded) 8% casualties 6 10-Pound Parrotts 3 July “…in reserve S.W. of Power’s Hill galloped into action at 3 pm…Fired 120 rounds shrapnel at Pickett’s column, and 80 shell at a battery in left front…” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NJ/1NJArtBatA.php 1st New York G (Ames’s) Battery 132 men (7 wounded) 6% casualties 6 Napoleons 2 July Peach Orchard 3 July Cemetery Ridge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatG.php 1st New York K (Fitzhugh’s) Battery 149 men (7 wounded) 6% casualties 6 Ordnance Rifles 3 July “…assisted in repulsing Pickett’s Charge…) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatK.php Analysis of CSA Artillery Losses Summary: First Corps: Longstreet 87 guns 2,118 men (46 KIA; 26 MIA; 211 wounded) 13% casualties Second Corps: Ewell 78 guns 1,679 men (21 KIA; 24 MIA; 82 wounded) 8% casualties Third Corps: A.P. Hill 84 guns 1,893 men (22 KIA; 29 MIA; 112 wounded) 9% casualties Cavalry Division: Stuart 17 guns 406 men (11 KIA; 0 MIA; 15 wounded) 6% casualties Artillery Grand Total = 275 guns 6,096 men (100 KIA; 79 MIA; 420 wounded) 10% casualties 8 guns were disabled during the battle (6 by counter battery fire; 1 by accident; 1 burst barrel). The most likely cause of a disabled gun was a broken wheel; which could be replaced in less than an hour with a crew of 6 men. The only gun (I can find) abandoned by the CSA at Gettysburg was the gun with the burst barrel. Horses KIA/disabled = 276 minimum (not all batteries reported losses in horseflesh) I’ve counted 65 CSA batteries at Gettysburg. You can double check my count: See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateBatteries.php 276 horses = 46 completed teams of 6 or 36% of all front line CSA artillery (gun/caisson) horses “After Gettysburg it was our habit,” wrote Stiles, “when a piece became engaged to send the horses to the rear, to some place of safety, preferring to run the risk of losing a gun occasionally rather than the team that pulled it”. Indeed, horses were so valuable that in the 1864 campaign Stiles reported that when artillery officers met, the first thing they asked each other was, “How many horses did you lose?” Philip Katcher, “The Army of Northern Virginia: Lee’s Army in the American Civil War 1861-1865” p. 52 See: · ANV HQ Monument: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV.php · 1st Army Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ANV1Corps.php · 2nd Army Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ANV2Corps.php · 3rd Army Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ANV3Corps.php · Cavalry Division: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ANVCav.php First Corps: Longstreet McLaws Division (16 guns 378 men) (12 KIA; 4 MIA; 31 wounded) 12% casualties (80 Horses KIA/disabled) Pulaski (GA) Battery 63 men (July 2: 6 KIA; 13 wounded) 30% casualties 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts 2 Ordnance Rifles Ammunition exhausted (30 minutes in Peach Orchard) in 7 hours (18 Horses KIA/disabled) July 3 operational See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Pulaski.php Carlton’s Battery (Troup County (GA) Light Battery) 94 men (1 KIA; 6 wounded) 7% casualties 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts Ammunition exhausted in 9.5 hours (in Peach Orchard) (17 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Troup.php 1st NC Artillery Battery A (Manly’s Battery) 131 men (3 KIA; 4 MIA; 4 wounded) 8% casualties 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers and 2 Ordnance Rifles 1146 rounds expended over 15 hours (in Peach Orchard) (20 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/NC1artBatA.php 1st Richmond (VA) Howitzer Battery (McCarthy’s Battery) 90 men (2 KIA; 8 wounded) 11% 2 Napoleons and 2 Ordnance Rifles 850 rounds expended in 9 hours (in Peach Orchard) (25 Horses KIA/disabled) 1 gun disabled See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Richmond1Howitzers.php Pickett’s Division (18 guns 419 men) (8 KIA; 17 wounded) 6% casualties (25 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-1-Pickett-Dearing.php Fauguier (VA) Battery 134 men (No losses reported) 4 Napoleons and 2 (two) 20-Pound Parrotts Ammunition exhausted in 2 hours See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Fauquier.php Lynchburg (VA) Battery (Blount’s) 96 men (No losses reported) 4 Napoleons Ammunition exhausted in 2 hours See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Blount.php Richmond (Fayette, VA) (Macon’s) Battery 90 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts Ammunition exhausted in 2 hours See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/RichmondFayette.php Richmond (Hampden, VA) (Caskie’s) Battery 90 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 1 Ordnance Rifle, and 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott Ammunition exhausted in 2 hours See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Hampden.php Hood’s Division (19 guns 403 men) (4 KIA; 23 wounded) 7% casualties 1500 rounds fired on July 2 & 3. See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-1-Hood-Henry.php 1st NC Artillery (Reilly’s) Battery D (The Rowan Artillery) 148 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles, and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts 1 burst rifle; replaced with captured Union pieces (Smith’s Battery) 3 hours firing & participated in repelling Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Rowan.php The Branch Artillery (NC) (Latham’s Battery) 112 men (No losses reported) 3 Napoleons, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer, and 1 (one) 6-Pound field gun Howitzer and gun disabled; replaced with 2 captured Union pieces (Smith’s Battery) 3 hours firing & participated in repelling Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Branch.php Charleston (SC) “German” Light (Bachman’s) Battery 71 men (No losses reported) 4 Napoleons 3 hours firing & participated in repelling Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/German.php Palmetto (SC) Light Garden’s) Battery (Garden commanding) 63 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts 3 hours firing & participated in repelling Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Palmetto.php First Corps Reserve Artillery (43 guns 918 men) (22 KIA; 22 MIA; 140 wounded) 20% casualties Alexander’s Battalion (24 guns 576 men) Losses not reported by individual battery (19 KIA; 6 MIA; 114 wounded) 20% casualties The sum total of the losses in my battalion during the period covered by this report are as follows: In the battle of Gettysburg, July 2 and 3, killed, 19; wounded, 114; missing, 6; total, 139 men. There were also 2 killed and 3 wounded of a detachment of 8 gallant Mississippians at Captain Moody's guns, who volunteered to help maneuver them on very difficult ground. Horses killed and disabled in action, 116. Many of my wounded sent to Cashtown fell into the hands of the enemy there. On the night march across the Potomac, 8 men missing. Deserted near Martinsburg, 3 men. Upset near the pontoon bridge and thrown into the river, by order to clear the passage to the bridge, one limber of 24-pounder howitzer caisson. Destroyed in action: one 12-pounder howitzer, two 12-pounder howitzer carriages, and six wheels. The howitzer, however, was brought off in a wagon. See http://www.civilwarhome.com/alexandergettysburgor.htm Madison (LA) Light Artillery (Moody’s) Battery 135 men (Losses heavy) 4 (four) 24-Pound Howitzers 5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Madison.php The Brooks (SC) Light Artillery (Rhett’s Battery) 71 men (Losses heavy) 4 (four) 12-Pound Howitzers 5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Brooks.php Ashland (VA) (Woolfork’s) Battery 103 men (Losses heavy) 2 Napoleons and 2 (two) 20-Pound Parrotts 5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Ashland.php Bath (VA) (Taylor’s) Battery 90 men (2 KIA; 10 wounded) 13% casualties 4 Napoleons 5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Taylor.php Bedford (VA) (Jordan’s) Battery 78 men (Losses heavy) 4 Ordnance Rifles 5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Bedford.php Richmond (VA) (Parker’s) Battery 90 men (Losses heavy) 3 Ordnance Rifles, and 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott 5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Parker.php Eshleman’s Washington (LA) Artillery Battalion 329 men (3 KIA; 16 MIA; 26 wounded) 14% casualties (37 Horses KIA/disabled) (3 guns disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-1-Eshleman.php Company A (Squires’s) Battery 77 men (No losses reported) 1 Napoleon 2 hours firing See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Squires.php Company B (Richardson’s) Battery 80 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer 2 hours firing; used captured 3” ordnance rifle See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Richardson.php Company C (Miller’s) Battery 92 men (Losses heavy) 3 Napoleons 2 hours firing; 3 Napoleons advanced 450 yards with Pickett’s Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Miller.php Company D (Norcom’s) Battery 80 men (2 guns disabled; losses not reported) 2 Napoleons, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer 2 hours firing; 2 Napoleons advanced 450 yards with Pickett’s Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Norcom.php Second Corps: Ewell Early’s Division (16 guns 290 men) (2 KIA; 6 wounded) 3% known casualties See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Early-Jones.php LA Guard (Green’s) Battery 60 men (2 KIA; 5 wounded) 12% casualties 2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts 161 rounds fired; 1 hour at Barlow’s Knoll + Day 2 withdrawn 1 mile from counter battery fire See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/LAGuard.php Charlottesville (VA) (Carrington’s) Battery (No casualties reported) 4 Napoleons Firing 1 hour at Barlow’s Knoll See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Charlottesville.php Richmond “Courtney” (VA) (Tanner’s) Battery (Tanner commanding) 90 men (No casualties reported) 4 Ordnance Rifles 595 round expended; firing 1 hour at Barlow’s Knoll + 10 hours on Day 2 See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Courtney.php Staunton (VA) (Garber’s) Battery 60 men (1 wounded) 2% casualties 4 Napoleons 106 rounds expended; firing 1 hour at Barlow’s Knoll See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Staunton.php Johnson’s Division (16 guns 356 men)(10 KIA; 40 wounded) 14% casualties (30 Horses KIA/disabled) Note – 48 reported wounded by battery command; I suspect 8 of these wounds minor and not reported by Johnson at the Division level. See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Early-Jones.php First Maryland (Dement’s) Battery 90 men (1 KIA; 4 wounded) 6% casualties 4 Napoleons (9 Horses KIA/disabled) (1 Caisson exploded; 1 disabled) 2 hours firing; withdrew from Union counter battery fire See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/MD1bat.php Fourth Maryland (Chesapeake) (Brown’s) Battery 76 men (4 KIA; 12 wounded) 21% 4 (four) 10-Pound Parrotts (9 Horses KIA/disabled) 2 hours counter battery fire; ammunition exhausted; one gun disabled See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Chesapeake.php Allegheny (VA) (Carpenter’s) Battery 91 men (5 KIA; 24 wounded) 43% casualties 2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles (9 Horses KIA/disabled) 2 hours counter battery fire; ammunition exhausted See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Allegheny.php Lynchburg “Lee” (VA) (Raine’s) Battery 90 men (8 wounded) 9% casualties 1 Ordnance Rifle, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott, and 2 (two) 20-Pound Parrott (3 Horses KIA/disabled) 2 hours counter battery fire + 2 hours on July 3 See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/LeeArt.php Rhode’s Division (16 guns 385 men) (6 KIA; 24 MIA; 35 wounded) 17% casualties 1898 rounds fired See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Rodes-Carter.php Jefferson Davis (AL) (Reese’s) Battery 79 men (no losses reported) 4 Ordnance Rifles 229 rounds expended; 2 hours firing at Barlow’s Knoll + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/JeffDavis.php King William (VA) (Carter’s) Battery 103 men (4 wounded) 4% casualties 2 Napoleons, and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts 572 rounds fired; 2 hours firing at Barlow’s Knoll + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/KingWilliam.php Morris (VA) (Page’s) Battery 114 men (4 KIA; 26 wounded) 26% casualties 4 Napoleons 215 rounds fired; 2 hours firing at Seminary Ridge (17 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Morris.php Richmond “Orange” (VA) (Fry’s) Battery 80 men (no losses reported) 2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts 882 rounds fired; 5 hours Day 1 + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Orange.php Second Corps Reserve Artillery (30 guns 648 men) (3 KIA; 1 wounded) 1% casualties Dance’s Battalion (20 guns 367 men) (3 KIA; 1 wounded) 1% casualties 1888 rounds fired See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Rodes-Carter.php Powhatan (VA) (Cunningham’s) Battery 78 men (No losses reported) 4 Ordnance Rifles 308 rounds fired; 3 hours on Day 2 + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Powhatan.php 2nd Richmond (VA) Howitzer (Watson’s) Battery 64 men (No losses reported) 4 (four) 10-Pound Parrotts 661 rounds fired; 3 hours on Day 2 + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/RIchmond2.php 3rd Richmond (VA) Howitzer (Smith’s) Battery 62 men (1 KIA) 2% casualties 4 Ordnance Rifles 314 rounds fired; 3 hours on Day 2 + 3 hours Pickett’s Charge See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Richmond3.php 1st Rockbridge (VA) (Graham’s) Battery 85 men (No losses reported) 4 (four) 20-Pound Parrotts 439 rounds fired; Day 2 “July 2 Remained in position on the left firing occasionally” 14 hours maximum firing See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Rockbridge1.php Salem (VA) “Flying” (Griffin’s) Battery 66 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles 154 rounds fired on July 3 See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Salem.php Nelson’s Battalion (10 guns 277 men) (No casualties reported) 48 rounds fired See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Rodes-Carter.php Georgia Regular (Milledge’s) Battery 73 men (No losses reported) 2 Ordnance Rifles, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott 48 rounds fired; half on July 2 and 20 to 25 on July 3. See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Milledge.php Amherst (VA) (Kirkpatrick’s) Battery 105 men (No losses reported; no ammunition expended) 3 Napoleons, 1 Ordnance Rifle See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Amherst.php Fluvanna (VA) “Consolidated” (Massie’s) Battery 90 men 3 Napoleons, 1 Ordnance Rifle (No losses reported; no ammunition expended) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Fluvanna.php Third Corps: A.P. Hill Heth’s Division (15 guns 396 men) (17 MIA; 5 wounded) 6% casualties (13 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-Heth-Garnett.php Donaldsville (LA) (Maurin’s) Battery 114 men (No losses reported) 2 Ordnance Rifles, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott 3.5 hours firing on July 1; 4 hours firing on July 2; “fired upon but no returning the fire” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Donaldsonville.php Norfolk “Huger’s” (VA) Artillery(Moore’s) Battery 77 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 1 Ordnance Rifles, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott 3.5 hours firing on July 1; 4 hours firing on July 2; “inactive all day though sometimes under fire” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Huger.php Norfolk ‘Light Artillery Blues” (VA) (Grandy’s) Battery (No losses reported) 2 ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers July 2 “Afternoon and evening in the artillery duel with Union batteries on Cemetery Hill” July 3 “Held all day in reserve without firing a shot though sometimes under fire” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/NorfolkBlues.php Pittsylvania (VA) (Lewis’s) Battery 90 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles July 2 “Artillery duel in the afternoon and evening with Union batteries on Cemetery Hill” July 3 “Not engaged at any time although from time to time under fire” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Lewis.php Pender’s Division (16 guns 377 men) (2 KIA; 6 MIA; 24 wounded) 8% casualties 657 rounds fired (17 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-Pender-Pogue.php 1st North Carolina “Charlotte” (Graham’s) Battery 125 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers July 3 at 7 am opened on Union position; ordered to cease firing as they drew concentrated fire of several batteries. Supported Pickett’s Charge. See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Charlotte.php Madison (MS) Light Artillery (Ward’s) Battery 91 men (No losses reported) 3 Napoleons, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer Supported Pickett’s Charge. See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/MadisonMS.php Albermarle “Everett” (VA) (Wyatt’s) Battery 94 men (No losses reported) 2 Ordnance Rifles, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott July 3 at 7 am opened on Union position; ordered to cease firing as they drew concentrated fire of several batteries. Supported Pickett’s Charge. See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Albemarle.php Warrenton (VA) (Brooke’s) Battery 58 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers Supported Pickett’s Charge. See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Brooke.php Anderson’s Division (17 guns 384 men) (3 KIA; 6 MIA; 21 wounded) 8% casualties 1082 rounds fired (36 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-Pender-Pogue.php Sumter Artillery (GA) Company A (Ross’s) Battery 130 men (1 KIA; 2 MIA; 7 wounded) 8% 1 Napoleon, 3 (three) 10-Pound Parrotts, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer, 1 Ordnance Rifle 506 rounds fired; July 2 “Under a heavy fire of artillery” North of the Peach Orchard July 3 supported Pickett’s Charge (9 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Ross.php Sumter Artillery (GA) Company B (Patterson’s) Battery 124 men (2 KIA; 2 MIA; 5 wounded) 7% 4 (four) 12-Pound Howitzers, 2 Napoleons 170 rounds fired; July 2 “Opened fire upon Union positions north of the Peach Orchard” (? Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Patterson.php Sumter Artillery (GA) Company C (Wingfield’s) Battery 121 men (2 MIA; 9 wounded) 9% 3 (three) 3” Navy Rifles, 2 (two) 10-Pound Howitzers) 406 rounds fired; July 2 “Actively engaged and exposed all the while to a heavy fire from the Union artillery” July 3 supported Pickett’s Charge (20 Horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Wingfield.php Third Corps Reserve Artillery (36 guns 736 men) (17 KIA; 62 wounded) McIntosh’s Battalion (16 guns 357 men) (7 KIA, 25 wounded (16 of the wounded captured)) 9% (38 horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-McIntosh.php Hardaway AL) (Hurt’s) Battery 71 men (No losses reported) 2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 Whitworth Rifles July 1 “Opened fire slowly and effectively” July 2 On Seminary Ridge “exposed to a heavy fire from the Union sharpshooters and artillery” July 3 On Seminary Ridge “Fired with great effect” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Hardaway.php Danville (VA) (Rice’s) Battery 114 men (No losses reported) 4 Napoleons July 1 “Firing when Union forces were visible” July 2 “Actively engaged under heavy fire of sharpshooters and artillery” July 3 “All the guns were actively engaged” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Danville.php Second Rockbridge (VA) (Wallace’s) Battery 67 men (No losses reported) (1 gun disabled) 2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles July 1 “actively engaged in the evening” July 2 “actively engaged. Had one gun disabled” July 3 “actively engaged” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Rockbridge2.php Johnson’s Richmond (VA) (Johnson’s) Battery 96 men (1 KIA) 4 Ordnance Rifles July 1 “Not engaged though under fire and losing one man killed” July 2 “actively engaged under a heavy fire of sharpshooters and artillery” July 3 “actively engaged” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Johnson.php Pegram’s Battalion (20 guns 375 men) (10 KIA; 37 wounded) 13% 3800 rounds fired; engaged all 3 days (38 horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-Pegram.php PeeDee (SC) (Zimmerman’s) Battery 65 men (1 gun disabled on July 1 returned to action July 2) (No losses reported) 4 Ordnance Rifles 1 July “engaged and did effective service” [gun] “disabled by accident…hastening into action” 2 July “engaged with Union batteries” 3 July “Took an active part in all the operations…including [Pickett’s Charge]” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/PeeDee.php Fredericksburg (VA) (Marye’s) Battery 71 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles 1 July “Fired the first cannon-shot of the battle…actively engaged until the close of the day’s conflict” 2 July “Opened at intervals upon the Union lines” 3 July “Participated actively in all operations…including [Pickett’s Charge]” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Fredericksburg.php Richmond “Crenshaw’s” (VA) Battery (Johnson commanding) 76 men (No losses reported) 2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers 1 July “took an active part in the battle” 2 July “actively engaged throughout the day…sometimes annoyed by sharpshooters” 3 July “Participated in all the operations of the artillery” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Crenshaw.php Richmond “Letcher” (VA) (Brander’s) Battery 76 men (No losses reported) 2 Napoleons, 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts 1 July “fired upon the Union infantry with much effect” 2 July “engaged at intervals in firing upon the Union lines and batteries” 3 July “Actively participated in all the operations…including [Pickett’s Charge]” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Letcher.php Richmond “Purcell” (VA) (McGraw’s) Battery 89 men (No losses reported 4 Napoleons 1 July “actively engaged” 2 July “Took part in the day’s conflict with Union batteries and…busy sharpshooters” 3 July “Actively participated in all the operations” See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Purcell.php Cavalry Division: J.E.B. Stuart See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-Cav.php 6,389 men and 17 guns (36 KIA, 64 MIA; 140 wounded) 4% casualties Division Horse Artillery (15 guns 406 men) (11 KIA; 15 wounded) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-Cav-Beckham.php Only two markers exist for the 6 Division Horse Artillery Batteries: Second Baltimore (MD) Light Artillery (Griffin’s) Battery 106 men (No marker) 4 Ordnance Rifles Ashby’s (VA) (Chew’s) Battery 99 men (No marker) 1 Ordnance Rifle, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer First Stuart (VA) Horse Artillery (Breathed’s) Battery 106 men (6 KIA; 8 wounded) 4 Ordnance Rifles (14 horses KIA/disabled) See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Stuart-Breathed.php Lynchburg (VA) Horse Artillery (Moorman’s) Battery (No marker) 1 Napoleon, 3 Ordnance Rifles Second Stuart (VA) Horse Artillery (McGregor’s) Battery 106 men (5 KIA; 7 wounded) (11 horses KIA/disabled) 2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/McGregor.php Washington (SC) (Hart’s) Battery 79 men (No marker) 3 Blakely Rifles Imboden’s Command – not part of ANV, but led retreat near the Potomac crossing (No marker) Staunton Horse Battery (McClanahan’s) Battery 64 men (?? losses) 1 Ordnance Rifle, 4 (four) 12-Pound Howitzers Charlottesville (VA) (Jackson’s) Horse Artillery Battery 75 men (No losses reported) 2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Jackson.php

Immelman, Your question regarding artillery is neither difficult to answer nor much of a challenge to implement. The information is readily available. It is NOT COMPLICATED if you can understand an inverse relationship in a 4 column chart with 10 rows (4 ammunition types in column, 10 gun types in rows). I've repeatedly provided this information on this forum. Your question has been answered in detail in my other posts - at great length. In previous posts I've layed out the composition of every battery for both sides, and the performance characteristics of the ammunition types. Let me know if you want this information and I can post it again if you can't find it on this forum. The game portrays different batteries with different artillery characteristics. As SidChigger points out - select a battery and change the setting to "canister" for example. Different batteries have different ranges for each type of ammunition. Generally in UGG batteries with longer canister range will have longer shell and solid shot range. This is absolutely incorrect for the ACW. There is an inverse relationship between accuracy at range and effectiveness with canister. The game does not correctly assign these differences to the correct batteries nor does UGG assign the correct attributes to the guns that made up each battery historically. For example - check out Calef's battery (Only Union battery on the field at the start of the game). Calef's battery was armed with six 3" Ordnance Rifles. Historically this was the worst gun in the entire arsenal of both sides for delivering canister. Yet the canister pattern for that battery in UGG is among the largest in the game. The design team wanted to make a fight out of Buford's cavalry stand heroic; so Calef's canister pattern was increased to one of the most effective in the game. This helped stave off the onslaught from the CSA and balance the game. Historically Buford lost about 100 men. Calef's battery's major contribution was to mask the fact that Heth was facing a skirmish line of cavalry. Buford's cavalry along with Calef's battery were sent to Westminster, MD to refit and resupply after their diversion/skirmish on July 1. Smoothbores were the most effective tools for delivering canister: The most effective gun on the field at Gettysburg for canister was the 24 pounder howitzer. Its short barrel and wide bore made it a devastating weapon at short range. But these characteristics made the howitzer almost worthless for accuracy and range. (Not very complex). The 12 pounder howitzer was next - smaller bore with a short barrel. Next would be the 12 pounder Napoleon Model 1857 that was used extensively by both sides. This was the most versatile gun for canister, shot, and shell. McClellan recommended that the Union standardize on this piece exclusively to reduce the complexity of logistics and artillery ammunition resupply. Northern cannon manufactures prevented McClellan's proposal from adoption. The small bore of the 6 pounder smoothbore made this gun largely obsolete in the ACW. The small bore was inadequate for effective canister. The bore was roughly the size of the 3" Ordnance Rifle, but the 6 pounder lacked the benefit of a rifled barrel for range and accuracy of the 3" Rifle. About half the guns at Gettysburg were rifled: Rifled guns were not as effective at delivering canister. The rifling in the tube caused the canister to have a left-hand twist leaving the barrel of the gun and interferes with a uniform distribution of canister in the flight pattern. Generally the effectiveness of canister with rifled artillery is affected by the size of the bore. Thus: The 3" Ordnance Rifle (preferred by cavalry of both sides for "flying batteries") was the poorest at delivering canister during the ACW. Rifled guns with a larger bore were increasingly more effective. Because of the generally poorer quality at delivering canister, and the superior characteristics at delivering accurate fire at range, rifled guns were preferably deployed behind the line of battle where their accuracy could be used to pick of targets at longer range. Keep in mind that artillery contributed about 6% of battlefield casualties during the ACW. 93% were inflicted with small arms. It took on average about 35 shots for artillery to inflict a single casualty. At Gettysburg the CSA fired about 22,000 rounds (E.P. Alexander). The Union fired 32,781 rounds (Hunt). Casualties at Gettysburg were 50,000. According to the medical reports after the battle about 3,000 of these casualties were inflicted by artillery. 3,000 casualties divided by 55,000 rounds fired at Gettysburg = about 1 casualty per 20 rounds. Canister was the only effective round at consistently inflicting more than a single casualty per round. If you deduct the canister casualties from the 3,000 artillery casualties then you end up with about 1 round in 35 inflicting a single casualty at longer range. Note that at Gettysburg the Union picked up about 6,000 CSA wounded rebels - so we have reasonable information from both sides from the same medical source for this data. So the point is black powder artillery was a direct-fire weapon whose contribution on the battlefield was "more moral than physical" (See "The Artillerists Manual 1861 or 1864" by John Gibbon). Note that it was unusual for CSA batteries to be homogeneous. Generally at least two types of guns made up each CSA battery. Thus CSA batteries were generally fought by two-gun section. Smoothbores forward with rifles located in more advantageous positions to the rear. The primary target of long range rifles was artillery on the move; as this presented the largest target on the ACW battlefield. Infantry in line of battle presented two ranks with a threat surface per file of about 22 square feet (man = 5'5" height X 2' width X two ranks). By comparison a limbered gun includes 6 horses, 2 men, and a threat surface of over 350 square feet plus the surface of the gun and limber. Multiply this 350 square foot threat surface times 12 for a Union battery on the move (six guns, six ammunition caissons, plus 100 men). For the CSA the multiplication factor is 8 times (4 guns, for ammunition caissons, plus about 70 men). The result is a juicy target with a threat surface just south of 5,000 square feet. The CSA lost 35% of their front line artillery horses at Gettysburg - primarily to long range artillery rifle fire. Note that the artillery horse casualties were greater than the artillery and cavalry casualties; each ten percent, and the infantry casualties which were just under 30%. Regarding the Whitworths: There were two of these guns at Gettysburg. They were posted on Oak Ridge and fired at long-range during the battle. Recently a Whitworth bolt was dug up on Little Round Top - conclusive evidence that these guns had a range of 5 miles. These long slender barrels made the Whitworth more of a heavy-duty sniping rifle. These guns were so few in number, with such a small bore, and carried such a small payload they were militarily irrelevant. The screaming bolts from the Whitworths did rout a Pennsylvania militia regiment at Gettysburg; but these men were chided back into the line by the hoots and cat calls of the veteran units on hand to witness the scare. After Gettysburg the primary question CSA artillery battery commanders asked each other was, "how many horses did you lose today." The loss of these draft animals hindered the CSA war effort and left many Confederate guns in static positions in static defenses for the remainder of the war. Mules and cattle can move artillery. Hood used these animals extensively late in the war in the west. But mules can be contrary in combat and were not used on the battlefield for service in artillery batteries. Mules are smarter than horses and consider their own personal safety paramount. Not at all a "for glory, god, and nation" kind of self-sacrificing creature. Cattle used for draft purposes are really slow. They can move a gun to a position - but were not mobile enough to keep batteries safe in the event they needed to be moved. Let me know if you have other questions regarding ACW artillery.

Much has been made of Longstreet’s recommendation to march around the flank of the Union army (particularly by Longstreet). Longstreet’s book, "From Manassas to Appomattox Memoirs of The Civil War in America" asserts that Lee himself, later in life was quoted as saying, “had I listened to Longstreet (avoiding July 2 and 3 at Gettysburg) the South would be an independent nation.” Note that this is in Longstreet’s book written in 1896, long after Lee’s death in 1870, and the comment is blatantly self-serving. Longstreet’s reputation in the South, and his social standing, had been hopelessly tarnished by his leading African-American militia against the anti-Reconstructionist White League in 1874, and his post-war politics that embraced the Republican Party. His book only further antagonized Southerners with his assertion that the infallible Lee's judgement might have been impaired from Gettysburg through the end of the war. Rather than rehabilitating his reputation he was concerned that he might be lynched. Longstreet's Proposed Flank Move: Longstreet stated that he advised Lee to conduct the campaign on the strategic offensive; but, tactically to fight exclusively on the defensive. He wanted to position the ANV where the Union army would be obliged to attack to protect Washington/Baltimore. Longstreet's point was to fight defensively with secure flanks where the Union would have to endure another Fredericksburg or Second Manassas. His goal was to ensure that casualties were extremely lopsided; with the Union suffering enough to undermine the support for the war. Chancellorsville-style victories could not end the war - simply extend the contest to a war of attrition. Longstreet was not proposing an attack on the Union left flank at Gettysburg (or anywhere else for that matter). His experience told him that the attack on the Union center would be a disaster. He knew that the only way to inflict massive casualties with the technology of the ACW was on the defensive. Lee's order to attack could only result in slaughter. Longstreet had learned from Chancellorsville that stunning offensive battle victories were hollow for the South. Casualties were likely to result in parity when the CSA was attacking - even if the battle was won. The only way to even the odds was to fight a series of defensive battles emulating the results at Fredericksburg. Just for grins let’s consider the move around the Union army to interpose the ANV between Gettysburg and Washington DC. Longstreet states in his book that this move would have forced the Union army to attack the ANV in prepared positions. First let’s all pull out our trusty “The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War” from the WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1891-1895. Under the heading of" Military Divisions and Departments" turn to PLATE 136 titled, “General Topographical Map Sheet 1.” Page 319. Note - All ACW armchair generals must have a copy of this volume in their personal library – it is an invaluable resource and essential to study the possibilities of this flank move and to follow this discussion. Background: We all know that the ANV marched from the west, north, and northeast to converge at Gettysburg. The Union army approached from the south and southeast. The Union army converged and deployed along the line of the Emmitsburg Road then north in the shape of the fishhook to Cemetery Hill. Situation on July 1 at 6:00 pm: During the evening of July 1 it would have been an invitation for disaster to march the ANV in road-column along the Emmitsburg Road; this would have exposed the flank of the marching column with supply wagons, wounded, etc... to the entire Union line of battle deployed along Cemetery Ridge/Emmitsburg Road line. Even if you factor in the possibility of a night march stealing 10 miles for the CSA it would not have been possible to march those ten miles at night along the Union army's front without being noticed. Further, in the morning the road column would have been strung out more than 18 miles presenting more than 8 miles of the rear of the Confederate forces to the entire Union army. Such an incompetent move in the face of a deployed enemy could only be considered a gift from the God Mars. Lee was no fool and would not consider such a move relying on the Emmitsburg Road. The only viable militarily prudent option for the CSA was to acquire the Emmitsburg Road, Taneytown Road, or the much more desirable macadamized Baltimore Pike for rapid marching on a solid road base. But these roads were all in possession of the Union army. To get around the Union left flank would require fighting Gettysburg - in precisely the same areas as the historical battle – and we already know the results of Longstreet’s attack with Pickett, Pettigrew and company. This leaves the CSA the “Longstreet Option 1” of the Hagerstown Road and the Chambersburg Pike (two of the primary roads west of Gettysburg used by the CSA to converge for the battle. It is 33 miles from Gettysburg to Hagerstown, MD in a west by southwest direction. This route puts the CSA 33 miles further from their destination of getting between the Union army and Washington. It will not be considered further because if fails to meet the goal of Longstreet’s flanking move. “Longstreet Option 2” is to march west on the Hagerstown Road then turn southeast to Emmitsburg then on to Taneytown. This is a distance of only 24 miles and puts the ANV between the Union Army at Gettysburg and Washington. But the distance for the Union army to march from Gettysburg to beat the Confederates to Taneytown is 13 miles – about half the distance over a better road. Additionally, while the CSA would be required to use a single road the Union could use both the Taneytown Road and the Baltimore Pike to Littlestown then to Taneytown a distance of 18 miles. This route provides the best road in the theater of operations and is 25% shorter than the best Confederate road alternative. Additionally the Union railhead and supply base for Gettysburg was at Westminster, MD. In the march to Gettysburg Meade had ordered his ambulances and artillery ammunition to halt at Westminster. The Union army arrived at Gettysburg with two ambulance trains – all of the rest of the Corps ambulances were parked at Westminster. Further,in order to expedite the movement of combat troops to Gettysburg, two Corps had sent their artillery trains with a supply of 40,000 additional rounds of artillery ammunition ready for action to Westminster. These were positioned in the event of a loss at Gettysburg with the intent to put the famous Pipe Creek Circular into effect to stop the Confederates before they could reach Baltimore or Washington. I’m not saying Longstreet’s flank march couldn’t happen – but I am asserting that the Union’s position at Gettysburg was carefully selected to prevent Longstreet’s viable options to get between Washington, D.C. and the Federal Army. If the CSA was going to move around the Union flank the Confederates would either need to build a new road network in Pennsylvania to facilitate the move; or, Longstreet’s move would have involved moving into Maryland to threaten these strategic Union cities. The notion that Longstreet’s move on the Union flank, given Lee’s position at Gettysburg, was militarily viable is pure unadulterated myth. The positions of the armies, the reality of the road network, and the condition of those roads, and the supply situation all conspired to obviate the possibility of a move that could get around the Union left flank. The CSA was going to have to face the Union army somewhere if they intended to win the war. The Union had the luxury of the option to fight a defensive or an offensive battle. Every step the Confederates took in the direction of Washington or Baltimore decreased the miles to the wealth of supplies that were increasing daily by rail at Westminster. Comparatively, the ANV would need to continue to rely on foraging for their supplies. They had already “requisitioned” much of the edibles along their line of march and would need to rely on fresh routes for continued sustenance for the duration of a campaign on northern soil. Absent the belief in spherical chickens to feed the ANV during the flank march, on an imaginary road network, with fodder falling like manna from heaven to feed the horses, I don’t see that Lee had many options other than to fight or retreat at Gettysburg. Lee’s viable options did not include a flank march around the left of the Union army given the exigencies of the situation of these two armies without a move into Maryland – which would basically have been the start of a new campaign as he would have needed to replenish his food, forage, and ammunition to continue the fight in the north. Note that it would have been possible to take the ANV north to Harrisburg, PA around the right flank of the Union army. But…this would have placed the ANV dangerously far from their supply base, would have abandoned the mountain range of the Shenandoah that had protected Lee’s march north, just as these mountains protected the flanks on the march south after Gettysburg, and would have put the Union army in the position to defend Harrisburg from behind the Susquehanna River (Harrisburg is located on the north bank of the Susquehanna River located along a primary northern rail artery. Northern supplies supporting the defense of the capital of Pennsylvania would have been inexhaustible).

January through April of 1863 were lean times for the ANV. Longstreet’s Corps had been dispatched to Suffolk, Virginia to gather supplies near Union-held Norfolk. Stuart’s cavalry had been sent west to find fodder and ease the burden of transporting fodder to the critical artillery horses which could not be relocated without losing complete mobility of the artillery arm. Hooker’s move in May, 1863 for Chancellorsville caught Longstreet with his supply train out foraging. When Lee urgently called for Longstreet to join him near Chancellorsville Lee and Longstreet had a painful choice. Longstreet could abandon his irreplaceable supply train and hope that it could rejoin the army undisturbed. Alternatively, Longstreet could collect his irreplaceable supply train then march rapidly to join Lee. Lee deferred to Longstreet who collected his supply-laden wagons and missed the battle of Chancellorsville. Had Lee given Longstreet more advanced notice for the recall, or Hooker delayed his movement by two weeks, Hooker would possibly have faced an even more devastating Confederate victory. Chancellorsville was Lee’s greatest victory – yet it did not alleviate the supply conundrum. Northern Virginia had been picked clean and the Confederates would have a difficult time feeding the horses and men for a defensive campaign in Virginia with the supplies and railroad transport available. Logistics demanded a northern campaign for the summer of 1863. Stuart’s cavalry were sent east on the Gettysburg campaign march north partly to ensure the Shenandoah supply route back to Virginia would not be disturbed by the Union army. In Coddington’s, “The Gettysburg Campaign A Study in Command” he states that during the Gettysburg campaign a herdsman in Gordon’s brigade estimated that 26,000 head of cattle and 22,000 head of sheep taken in Maryland and Pennsylvania were going south. One foreign observer accompanying the army noted that beyond Williamsport the road was crowded with wagons, horses, and droves of cattle and sheep going south from Pennsylvania. He was amazed by the wagons and referred to them as of the “most extraordinary size, drawn by six or eight horses.” Another foreign observer noted in his diary on June 27 that Ewell had already sent back “great quantities of horses, mules, wagons, beefs, and other necessaries…” In addition to rations on the hoof of cattle and sheep droves of hogs estimated by some sources at 50,000 head were driven south. Additionally, ham bacon and other supplies that required salt were highly valued and sent south – enough food for the Army of Northern Virginia to feed it for 6 months. Additionally, the Gettysburg campaign allowed southerners to harvest the 1863 crops of the Shenandoah Valley to fill the CSA larder. Without these supplies garnered during the Gettysburg campaign it is unlikely the South could have sustained their army in the field for a defensive campaign in northern Virginia in 1863 and beyond. The logistical reality greatly determined Lee’s decision to fight at Gettysburg. The South was running out of men, horses, and supplies. The land mass controlled by the South had decreased every year of the war and 1863 would be as strong the CSA could ever be. Lee could choose to fight at the pinnacle of Southern strength or avoid a fight and watch the South dwindle and atrophy as the war ground on. The Seven Days, Second Bull Run, Chancellorsville, and July 1 at Gettysburg confirmed in Lee’s mind that the AoP could not stand up to sustained severe blows. If he only exercised his will and pushed hard and long enough he could win a great victory that might bring peace or foreign intervention. Regardless of his casualties. Lee had lost about 20,000 men during the Seven Days to the Union's 15,000 and yet Northern forces were withdrawn when they were 7 miles from Richmond. In Lee's mind breaking the Northern will to fight was essential to end the war. Gettysburg was Lee’s last chance and he knew it. Gettysburg is considered Lee’s great blunder by armchair generals with the benefit of hindsight. Had Lee not fought at Gettysburg the results for the South would likely have been the same. Vicksburg was lost. Lincoln had found Grant. Grant had found Sherman, McPherson, Ord and competent officers that would fight to the end of the war. Given the momentum that the North was sustaining and the increasing pressure at all points west of Virginia the Confederacy was in for a bleak future. War is not so much about tactics and battles as logistics. Logistics were driving Southern strategy. As Napoleon observed, “an army marches on its stomach.” Lee’s understanding of Napoleon’s maxim led him to the only choice he had to win the war. And that choice was Gettysburg. Lee preferred to gather his forces to strike a concerted blow. But events on July 1 preempted his will as Hill’s III Corps and Ewell’s II Corps mugged the Union I and XI Corps taking 6,000 prisoners and decapitating Union forces with the loss of their senior commander on the field, John Reynolds. July 1, 1863 was certainly not aligned with Lee’s intentions; nor were the results a blunder. The morning of July 2 left Lee with a new problem. Logistics. Lee’s army had picked much of the area around Gettysburg clean. There was no longer enough supplies in the area to sit tight and wait for a Union attack. His animals were rapidly exhausting the forage and Lee didn’t have the ability to transport large quantities of forage necessary by train. His nearest rail supply base was Winchester, Virginia. Both armies at Gettysburg fought on short rations – some Union troops not having a meal for 2 days. As armchair generals it is easy to sit back and marvel at the blunders of generals. But the challenges of leading an army during the horse and musket era were vastly more complex than the battlefield tactics. Even with the additional transport capacity of the external combustion engine logistics were a critical factor that influenced every battle of the ACW. Given the logistics dimension of the South’s situation Lee’s decision to continue the fight at Gettysburg on July 2, and July 3 looks more like a calculated risk at long odds rather than a blunder. The South was being ground into pulp. Time was not in Lee's favor. He could place a bet in July 1863 or lose the war defensively by attrition.

Hmmm, You may need to be more specific regarding equations - I'm not sure what equations you are talking about. My equation above is 10 KIA + 34 wounded = 44 casualties. 356 men were present in Latimer's Battalion. 44 casualties out of 356 = 12%. The data for the ACW Union casualties is among the most complete in the history of warfare up to that point in time. The Union spent millions of dollars after the war to find and identify all of the remains of every soldier for fought for the Union. The result wasn't perfect but it was a very very good effort that produced unprecedented results in identifying many of the remains. The South was left to do the best they could to honor their dead - without Federal assistance. There was a religious/moral motivation for the effort; but also money at stake for the surviving family members who were entitled to government benefits. In fact the Ford Theater in Washington D. C. served as an archive for these records. in 1893 three floors collapsed under the weight of these records killing 22 employees and injuring over 100 - you might call these the final casualties of the ACW. See: http://boothiebarn.com/2012/06/09/the-collapse-of-fords-theatre/ There are various statistics of the cause of casualties for WWI and WWII. You can check out various sources on the internet.

Taggart, My comments regarding artillery have been cited for over 2 years on this forum. Nick has had all of this information for 700 days - footnoted and cited. Artillery in UGG is not about facts. It is about selling the game. Gamers want to see blasts of canister wiping out infantry. So UGG has artillery playing a false role historically. History is irrelevant to the discussion. From a marketing perspective UGG has tapped into the gaming market about as deep as it will penetrate. The interesting question is what to do next to stimulate more sales. Spinning another iteration of the game isn't going to attract more gamers. The only available market for the game is to increase the game base. The only community that would likely be interested in the game is ACW history enthusiasts. There is a large and vibrant community of ACW enthusiasts that won't take a look at this game given the historical deviations. Perhaps if Nick and his team are interested in the ACW community they will focus the game to be more inline with ACW reality. Simply put - there are too many people who know too much about the ACW to be interested in this game given it's current state. It isn't possible to fool all of the ACW enthusiasts all of the time. Until this game embraces history sales are going to be limited to gamers and history buffs that don't have much historical depth of understanding or simply believe that the game is "good enough as is." After all the game is for entertainment. Personally, I'm interested in ACW history and don't find UGG a satisfying use of my entertainment time.

Taggart, General Norman Schwartzkopf during the First Gulf War was sent to see the crater left by a SCUD missile. He looked at the 15 foot deep by 30 foot wide impact crater, scratched his head, and stated, "Wow, I never understood how militarily irrelevant these things are." This is an accurate starting point for any starting point in understanding ACW artillery. Today our concept of artillery is tainted with artillery that can fire indirectly at targets miles away utilizing high explosive charges. These advancements resulted in 80% of WWI and 85% of WWII casualties inflicted by artillery. The result is most people can't imagine artillery that was "militarily irrelevant." I ran the calculations based on the metrics General Halleck negotiated with General Hunt for the basis of determining proper rank of battery commanders during the ACW (1 battery roughly equaled the firepower of a 200 man regiment). By running these numbers the artillery, representing about 10% of a typical ACW field army provided a force multiplier of 1.05%. When you take into consideration the additional logistics to support a battery vs. 200 men it becomes evident that reducing artillery to the minimum would directly impact the mobility of an army without decreasing its firepower substantially. Note that both Sherman reduced his guns to 60 for his March to the Sea (1 gun per 1,000 infantry) and Grant sent word during the Wilderness Campaign that, "We don't need anymore guns. We have all that we can use." Specifically, guns in abundance we more of a headache than their firepower contributed. Thus Grant had "Heavy Artillery" converted into infantry brigades in 1864. During the ACW small arms contributed about 94% of all battlefield casualties. Artillery contributed the remaining 6%. The statistics from hospitals on both sides confirm this fact. First-hand personal correspondence of hospital personnel confirm this fact. Analysis from the Aberdeen Proving Ground confirm this fact. A wealth of information from Fort Sill and their museum confirm this fact. The Gettysburg National Park information confirms this fact. Gibbon's "Artillerist Manual 1861" confirm this fact. Tidball confirms this fact. And data from the ACW battles all align with this information. ACW artillery was incapable of penetrating defensive works - which is why Petersburg, Vicksburg, etc... could hold out for months under an artillery barrage. Culp's Hill by Day 2 was impervious to CSA artillery both because of the quality of the defensive works, and the fact that there was no ground that would allow the CSA guns to reach the top of Culp's Hill. The best ground they had was on Benner's Hill; but the footprint of the topography limited the number of guns that could be deployed to four batteries. Here is a first-hand account of the artillery duel on Benner's Hill. The casualties can be confirmed on the Gettysburg Stone Sentinels. Below the account I've listed the OOB for Latimer's Artillery Battalion which included 16 guns and 356 men and suffered 12% casualties in the most intense artillery duel at Gettysburg (IMHO). You begin to get a picture of artillery combat during the ACW. This narrative is from W. F. Hatton, Dement's 1st Maryland artillery, CSA. "At 4 o'clock p.m. our battery advanced to the line of battle and rolled our guns in position on a hill... east of Gettysburg. Our whole artillery battalion opened fire as fast as the guns could be gotten into position, and a storm of shell greeted us the moment our first gun fired. It seemed the enemy had gotten the range of the hill even before we fired, and we're expecting us to occupy the position and were watching for us. Solid shots were whistling by us, striking among the few scattered bunches of trees along the hill side and tearing up the ground in several places; and the shells were bursting over us, around us, and among us, keeping the air in a continuous vibration like a severe storm raging. Horses were killed in harness while others were plunging from fright and wounds. Men were struck, wounded and killed, while their comrades continued at their duties regardless of the cry's of agony and moans of the dieing. Our guns were served as fast as could be with shot and shell. After a while both sides ceased firing as though both combatants were exhausted. During the lull we cleared away the fragments of shattered carriages and tangled up horses and the dead and made ready to renew the carnage. A short distance to my left Corp. Thompson (Sam) was engaged during the firing in detailing out ammunition from the caisson. He was rather careless as to close the lid of the box immediately after extracting a round. He was warned it by comrade that he was running a great risk. His reply was, "Oh nothing going to hurt Sam! Sam's going to Baltimore! " A few seconds after he uttered these words with a light and joyful heart, a shell exploded in close proximity to his caisson, scattering sparks in every direction, some of which fell into the open limber box, causing it to explode in a sheet of flame, a terrific report, and all was over in a flash of lightning. As the smoke drifted away, the caisson was revealed in a wrecked condition- spindles of the axel twisted, wheels shattered and warped, ammunition boxes reduced to splinters and whirled out of sight, a few black and burn fragments scattered around, and the horses frantic, some wounded and tangled in the harness. A few yards away from the scene of destruction was a form lying prone upon the ground, clothes scorched, smoking and burnt, head divested of a cap and exposing a bald surface where used to be full suit of hair, whiskers singed off to the skin, eyebrows and eyelids denuded of their fringes and the eyes set with a popped gaze. Was he breathing? No! It was the body of Sam Thompson, the jovial soul. A few minutes of preparation and rest had placed our artillery in readiness to renew the fight. The wreckage was cleared away; ammunition arranged; the guns loaded, and the word was given "fire!" And all the guns of the battalion were discharged at the same time; and the ground upon which we stood trembled from the jar. So promptly did the enemy reply that it seemed as though they caused our own shells to rebound against us, after the manner of a boomerang, after leaving the muzzles of our guns but a step or so. Doubtless, they had occupied the few minutes of respite, like ourselves, in a vigorous preparation for the renewal of the contest. Doubtless, they were watching our demonstrations, and fired at seeing the flash of our guns before our balls reach them. The enemy fired more furiously than before, having contrived to obtain a cross range of our position as though they plan to annihilate us. While the fight was raging in its fury, the sun was suspended a few minutes above the western horizon, Maj. Latimer commanding our battalion of artillery, was riding along the crest of the hill, directing and encouraging the men, when a shell burst close to him, killing his horse and wounding him severely. Both rider and horse fell, the later party upon the former so as to pin him to the ground. My brother Joseph seeing the accident ran to his assistance and helped to extricate the major from the perilous position. The major was wounded in the arm and did not long survive [Latimer's arm was amputated & he die from the wound a month after the battle]. About this time, we ceased firing; but the enemy continued a while longer. I took this as a bad omen. Had we gotten the better of them, they would have been the first to desist. I felt the day was decided against us. About sundown, we had orders to retire from the field. We fixed up our shattered condition and slowly dragged ourselves to the rear. So shattered, indeed, was the battery to our right, that we had to lend them men to get their guns from the position." Losses in Andrew's Battalion= 10 killed, 34 wounded, 30 horses killed, 1 gun damaged, 1 caisson exploded & 1 damaged. Latimer mortally wounded. Division Artillery Battalion, 16 guns, 356 men, Lt. Col. R. Snowden Andrews (w), Maj. J.W. Latimer (mw), Capt. Charles I. Raine 1st MD Battery (4 12-pound Napoleons), 90, Capt. William F. Dement 4th MD (Chesapeake) Battery (4 10-pound Parrotts), 76, Capt. William D. Brown (k), Lt. Charles S. Contee (w) Allegheny (VA) Battery (2 12-pound Napoleons, 2 3-inch rifles), 91, Capt. John C. Carpenter, Lt. William T. Lambie, Capt. John C. Carpenter Lynchburg "Lee" (VA) Battery (1 3-inch rifle, 1 10-pound Parrott, 2 20-pound Parrotts), 90, Capt. Charles I. Raine, Lt. William W. Hardwicke

Taggart, Yep, the condition of artillery batteries became chopped up in artillery duels. Detailed descriptions of the Benner's Hill artillery duel provide an excellent sample reading. While the moral of the men remained jubilant traces were shot to pieces, limbers destroyed, horses killed, and yes a few casualties were suffered. Artillery batteries are a sparce target with a small threat surface; thus they suffered about 10% casualties at most ACW battlefields. The moral of infantry suffered from artillery barrages; but keep in mind a long artillery barrage was 90 minutes before the ammunition ran out. Additionally, because artillery was a direct fire weapon firing had to stop while friendly infantry went forward. During these brief interludes between the end of an artillery barrage and facing an enemy's infantry it was fairly typical that the moral of the defending troops would recover and the troops were prepared to dispute charges enthusiastically. At no point in the war at any ACW battle was the artillery effective in driving defenders from even moderate defensive positions. The stone wall at Gettysburg is an excellent example. Tidball's Book on ACW artillery is the finest publication in existence regarding ACW artillery. The book was edited by "Kaplan" and can be found at Amazon: "The Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865." E.P. Alexander's book is also a very useful resource and the best from the CSA point of view on artillery. The best book on the details of the action at Gettysburg are from the former director of the Gettysburg National Park Service, See Pfanz - "Gettysburg - The First Day" and his predictably titled, "Gettysburg - The Second Day." There are a number of other sources that are excellent as well but I'm fond of Pfanz because he had unlimited and unfettered access to both the battlefield and the archives for the years at Gettysburg. The Official Records are the best primary sources for information. But caution must be exercised when using this because these are often report directly after action written in the aftermath of smoke, confusion, and death. The reports were written from memory and it is not unusual to have conflicting reports from actors on the same side in the same action. AAR's have a tendency to focus attention on the role the actors and his men played in an event. Both hyperbole and exaggeration run rampant in the OR's. For example, a salvo from a battery "wiping out" entire companies. I've discovered over 27 references to artillery battery commanders making this specific claim - yet when I've found information on the company that they executed the returns after the battle don't come close to matching up with the claim. Basically it is really difficult in battlefield conditions to know how many men are killed, injured, or just lying prone on the ground waiting for a chance to escape. It is also dangerous to go forward of the line and confirm this data. As a result the OR can be wildly verbose, inaccurate, and downright intentionally misleading. I usually try to cross reference all of the OR data with information from other sources. For example, Hunt's report of the artillery ammunition expended at Gettysburg can be cross-referenced with the Ordnance Reports from both the Corps and the Ordnance Department itself authorizing the ammunition to be sent. If you have more specific questions I can direct you to precise citations and resources.

Nick, I'm not certain where you are getting your facts regarding the 100 Union guns that were not fought at Gettysburg. The Union had the luxury of rotating batteries during the battle. Almost every battery in the Union army participated to some extent in the battle. It is true that about 1/3 of the Union batteries had very light casualties (less than 5%) - but that is not an indication that they weren't in the fight. It merely demonstrates that the Union artillery was fighting at long range and fired 50% more ammunition than the CSA. Casualties for the artillery combat arm of both armies during the battle were about 10%. Counter battery effectiveness during the ACW was dismal which is why the casualties were so low. Artillery duels tended to last about 30 minutes to 90 minutes then the guns were usually withdrawn to resupply with ammunition. Further, when the artillery did suffer casualties it was not unusual to seek volunteers from infantry commands to ensure batteries had their full complement of personnel. These volunteer artillerists would take the least technical roles at the guns often running ammunition from the caissons forward to the battery while the trained men continued to operate the guns. Longstreet comments in his book that members of his staff volunteered to serve in a battery during the battle of Antietam. I've found one cross-reference that Longstreet himself served the gun - but if this occurred I haven't been able to confirm this with a second first-hand source. While it was not unusual to lose a gun wheel, or an ammunition caisson or two, during an artillery duel; the batteries were usually ready to take the line again after a night's rest. All but one of the batteries in the ANV reported for duty of July 4 with a full complement of guns and full supply chests. The deviant battery had a gun that burst. Its barrel was left on the field after the battle as the sole artillery trophy captured by the Union at Gettysburg. For the specific number of shots fired from each Union battery you can see the Stone Sentinels at Gettysburg. Unfortunately the best reference we have for the CSA ammunition expenditure is E. P. Alexander. His post-war recollection was 22,000 rounds of artillery ammunition fired out of the 43,000 brought on the Gettysburg Campaign. There was a battery of 4.5" Ordnance Rifles at Gettysburg that did not fire a single shot at Gettysburg. In most of the Gettysburg Orders of Battle this battery is not even listed. But in the OR the battery commander's report provides a discussion between Meade and himself pondering how these heavy rifle batteries firing a 35 pound projectile would have behaved as field artillery.

Nick, We've been all around the block regarding the artillery in ACW. In the latest release I've still got batteries firing "shell" that have as many kills as the most successful infantry brigades over the course of the campaign. I'll finish my latest campaign and send the results of the artillery. Historically this is absurd. This did not happen and could not have happened with the artillery technology of the ACW. Once the artillery is tuned to something more in the ballpark of historical reality then the mechanics of the other combat arms would need to be tuned for game balance. I'd understand if this was "canister" but I was slaughtering the Union with "shell". Regarding Flank Movements: Armies of all times have focused on getting on the flanks and rear of the enemy. Napoleon made a 25 year career of sending Davout on flanking movements to keep him on the throne of France. Lee's greatest victory - Chancellorsville - was the only great flanking movement of the entire ACW. This flanking movement shattered XI Corps. At Gettysburg XI Corps was also flanked and shattered on Day 1. The result was 6,000 POW's. XI Corps retreated from the threat to their flanks. In UGG moral is unaffected by flank movements until the brigade is shot to pieces. The moral of units with an enemy within firing range of their flanks or rear should immediately lose a significant amount (i.e., majority) of their moral. This would give the game a more fluid, Civil War feel to the ebb and flow of battle as units strive for maneuver as they did during the war. Note that Pickett's charge was shattered on the left flank by a single Union regiment of about 200 men. Three CSA brigades routed once their left flank was compromised. In UGG getting on the flanks and rear of the CSA can be a waste of time and energy. Each CSA brigade needs to be ground to a pulp before a retreats from flanking movements. Thus tactical maneuvering for the Union is almost irrelevant as the Union flanking troops are ground to a pulp. Specific example - CSA's Fitz Hugh's Cavalry Brigade with 534 men at Benner's Hill holds against Union Lockwood's Brigade with 1350 men in front, Another 1,000 man Union brigade on the flank, and a 600 man Union brigade firing into their rear. Lockwood was routed first, then Fits turned to destroy the flanking brigade, and finished with the smallest. First of all this was a CSA cavalry brigade vs. three Union infantry brigades. I'd appreciate a single reference during the entire war for a surrounded cavalry brigade fighting at 5:1 odds against infantry.

Nick, While IVth Corps was not committed en masse all of the Third Division elements of VI Corps were committed at Gettysburg. On July 2, Brig. Gen. Alexander Shaler’s First Brigade was sent to support the XII Corps on Culp’s Hill. Col. Henry Eustis and his Second Brigade plus Brig. Gen. Wheaton’s Third Brigade stabilized the left flank near the Round Tops. Each of these brigades were supported with artillery batteries from VI Corps Third Division Artillery Brigade. The fact that the First and Second Divisions were not committed does not ipso facto mean that military exigencies would never have required these forces to be committed to battle. Additionally, VI Corps could have been used on July 4 for a Union offensive. A Union offensive was not started because the CSA had dug in during the night of July 3 on Seminary Ridge and the CSA artillery was largely intact with their entire complement of canister unused in the CSA offensives of July 1 through 3. My test campaign played out as follows: I played as CSA with Union AI on ‘Determined’. In the first phase all VP’s taken in an epic victory. Union AI sent almost all of the Union infantry north to hold Oak Ridge leaving Seminary Ridge defended exclusively with artillery. Four CSA Brigades smashed the entire Union artillery while the CSA artillery supported by a couple of infantry brigades concentrated on the Union infantry. Most of the destruction was inflicted at long range with CSA artillery firing “shell” into the Union infantry. When the Union infantry was shaken it was easy to rout them with the CSA infantry. The Union took such heavy casualties in the first phase that the later phases just fed additional Union troops piecemeal to slaughter. Every VP in every phase was taken by the CSA. Given that the results seemed curious historically it would seem that when the CSA is successfully steamrolling the Union that the Union reserves would be called upon to prevent the piecemeal destruction of the AoP. Avoiding such a result is precisely why Meade held two divisions of VI Corps in reserve. Right? Holding UGG generals to part of the historic script without the flexibility to use resources that historically would have been committed if the battle had gone badly seems more than a bit curious. Finally, if UGG generals are the G in C then shouldn’t they have the option to commit reserves?

Nick, I've repurchased the game and set up a new Steam account to test the latest version of the game given your representations that much changed in the final release. It is great to see the improvement in artillery mobility and the reduced cavalry performance. However, many of the historical deviations that have been highlighted over the past years of development remain in the game. Is there any possibility that a more historically tuned version of the game could be considered for the Grognards audience? Even if such a release was limited to a single player release vs. the AI it might satisfy a segment of the market that you currently aren't reaching with UGG. This is one of the best AI implementations in history - but it would certainly be great if a version of the game was tuned to be in line with the historical record. Finally would it be possible to add a scenario utilizing all of the troops in the OOB? Corps appear in some scenarios then disappear in the next. At the end of the battle it is not unusual for all of the scenarios to be roughly evenly matched in numbers. Historically the Union outnumbered the CSA by 20,000 men and 100 guns. But this is never reflected in the game scenarios or the campaign results. I realize the game is designed for even matches - but with this bias for even scenarios the game strays significantly from the battle of Gettysburg. Let me know if this is a possibility and we can get a small team of players together to agree on a finite specification for your team to consider. Alternatively, will the code ever be available for modification?

Mr Mercanto, This an example of an inappropriate use of the CSA flag that is not in line with it's historical context. What's to prevent someone selecting Dylann Roof with the CSA flag for a profile pic? That would be controversial as well. To Northerners this combination is an insult to the historical truth. To many Southerners this combination is also perceived as an insult to the South. The idea that a Grant, who only ever owned one slave, would have the pedigree to rise to upper echelons of command in the South is inconceivable. In a historical context, Grant was foolish enough to set that slave free almost immediately - didn't he understand the responsibility and necessity of owning human beings to gain access to polite Southern society? The Butcher Grant going South with his wife's family and plantation in Missouri is inconceivable if you've read Grant's perspectives on the Union. It's another misuse of the Confederate flag intended to incite controversy. Basically its an insensitive insult to everyone North and South and a misuse of a potent symbol of hatred. It really doesn't matter if it was intended as a political statement or not - it would be responsible for the site moderator to issue a warning regarding this profile pic. This is not original, I've seen this combination before... it's just another example of a bold move in an information and sensitivity vacuum. So you really don't need to get behind it one iota. Take it for what it is... inane and irrelevant. Taggart - you aren't hated - but neither are you winning friends.

Avtomatik, Your actually suggesting that it is possible that the Union might have won the battle of Gettysburg? Yet another funny example of the oxymoronic content on this forum. Gettysburg, and the ACW generally was an extraordinarily balance affair as the Union had to defend large swaths of Southern territory which ensured relative battlefield parity.

It is bold to confess that you don't know the basic facts yet argue the correctness of your logic. Good on ya mate! First hand accounts of enemy casualties are always highly suspect and the ACW is no exception. See for example every war in history. Briefly... The ancient Egyptians carved their victories in stone but when you compare their reports to the reports of their 'defeated' enemies the political results of the battles don't align with the propaganda chiseled into the wall of Karnak. Often both sides reported a stunning victory yet the political outcome is a fairly balanced treaty so it is more likely than not that both sides misrepresented the magnitude of their victories. The Napoleonic Wars is a classic example where reading first hand accounts of battles leads to intentionally misrepresented accounts. Perhaps it is just the nature of men and war. A more current example: during the Battle of Britain RAF pilots reported more than twice as many kills as the entire Luftwaffe had airplanes. Note that many of the Luftwaffe aircraft were deployed in other theaters of operation (i.e., Africa). The problem of estimating enemy strength became so acute that cameras became standard equipment to confirm first hand intelligence. With this in mind... You might consider doing some basic math before you draw your conclusions from first hand accounts. While canister was the most effective anti-personnel round a 12 pounder Napoleon canister round held 28 projectiles. Double canister would double this to 56 but the effective range of canister drops precipitously as these projectiles compete to exit the tube. Authorized strength for a company was between 83 and 101 men. Thus it would be mathematically possible that a battery of 6 guns firing 168 projectiles could "wipe out" an entire company. It is twice as likely if you consider double canister with 336 projectiles. But if you understand basic statistics the mathematical likelihood of such of event is absurd. At one point I ran the calculation and the possibility of a battery wiping out an entire company. If I remember correctly the odds were less than 1 in over 100,000 given the frontage of a company and the dispersion pattern of canister and less likely with double canister beyond 100 yards. Now if we consider the ordnance reports for artillery ammunition this means that such an event, if it ever occurred once during the war, would have required all of the artillery ammunition fired by both sides during the 6 largest ACW battles for such an event to statistically happen once. There certainly were cases where canister was effective. Dilger's use of his Napoleons at Chancellorsville earned his the Medal of Honor and stalled the Confederate advance long enough for the Union to assemble enough guns to prevent the ANV from further destruction of the AoP. So... Basically I'm saying you are drawing false conclusions from fictional data. If you match the AAR reports in the OR against the casualty returns for regiments it is not unusual for a battery to report 450 enemy casualties (Gettysburg Day 2 Longstreet's Offensive) yet the regimental return for the unit (in this specific case CSA) list only 45 casualties for the entire three-day battle. Both sides made ridiculous first hand claims in their AARs. It is great that you enjoy the game and are satisfied with its historical accuracy. We have had different experiences with the game and each have our own conclusions. Bottom line the game is for entertainment. Agreement and/or disagreement on our perspectives of the game is irrelevant.

Hmmm...we certainly agree that rifled muskets were a game changer during the ACW and that Napoleonic tactics became obsolete as a result. But... Artillery did not see a "climb in effectiveness." ACW artillery performance actually dropped off compared to the Napoleonic Wars. During the Napoleonic Wars artillery could be prolonged forward because musket range and accuracy were abysmal. Canister range at 400 yards was superior to musket range thus it was safe for artillery to move up and blast squares of infantry out of existence. Not so with the ACW because infantry could pick off gunners before they could deploy forward. Thus artillery was moved from the front ranks to more protected positions during the ACW. The net result was that artillery-inflicted casualties were a mere 6% of battlefield casualties during the ACW. At Gettysburg there were roughly 22,000 rounds of artillery ammunition fired by the CSA and another 32,781 fired by the Union. Given that there were about 50,000 casualties then each round of artillery inflicted less than one casualty per round - assuming that every casualty was inflicted by artillery - which it was not. If we accept the primary data and the research done at the U.S. Artillery School at Fort Sill then roughly 3,000 of the Gettysburg casualties were from artillery. In other words the artillery inflicted a single casualty for about every 20 rounds of artillery ammunition fired. Note that this includes casualties by canister - which was the only really effective round at inflicting multiple casualties per round. The problem with artillery is that it was going through and experimental phase with new types of ammunition transitioning from solid shot and canister to shells and canister. Additionally, the army was transitioning from smoothbores to rifled guns which dramatically reduced the number of casualties a round could inflict. The intent of shell was to inflict more casualties - however they relied on fuses that were woefully inadequate to match time over target with detonation. Additionally, the projectiles transitioned from spherical to conical with the adoption of rifled artillery - thus rather than spheres bounding along the ground the pointed rounds buried themselves in the ground - which absorbed the impact if the shell ultimately detonated. So the data from the ACW demonstrates that while the rifled muskets inflicted 93% of the casualties the artillery was not "bombarding" either army to pieces - hence the statement from Gibbon that the effects of artillery was "more moral than physical." Robert E. Lee provides another reference point from the siege of Petersburg when he stated to CSA Senators who asked if the artillery was particularly active. He stated indeed it was but it was the rifled musket that actually killed men. Note that the CSA bombardment prior to Longstreet's Charge on July 3 was noted as one of the greatest humbugs of the war. Bottom line artillery fire routed a single Pennsylvania militia regiment at Gettysburg. These green troops were under fire from Oak Hill by 2 Whitworths. Though these guns hadn't inflicted casualties the sound of the screaming projectiles unnerved the men (which were different from the thud of a 12 pounder smoothbore). Veteran units laughed and mocked the Pennsylvania militia back into the line. You might want to double check your facts regarding artillery because you don't have 'em correct or even in the ballpark for the ACW. Enough about artillery... How about cavalry? The cavalry during the ACW was also of limited utility on the battlefield. In UGG I'd trade every unit in either army to have them deployed as cavalry skirmishers. The fact is Buford lost about 100 men - and Heth's orders prevented him from steamrolling Buford and bringing on a battle. In UGG the opening phase is one of the most egregious historical inaccuracies of the game and the cavalry generally outperforms the historical reality of the ACW.

Taggert - the lack of historical realism in this game is why UGG has alienated the core of historical game enthusiasts. Right now the game focuses on Union artillery vs. Confederate infantry which is to miss the mark completely on historical realism for the ACW. The UGG Team built a game they think is cool - which is great. It's great they've attracted players who enjoy the game. Personally I'd prefer to see a historically tuned version of UGG - even if it was only a single player game. Such a game might have the support of the historical gaming community and the potential to attract more serious history enthusiasts. Sadly the "weaknesses of each side in history" are not represented which IMHO is dismal for a ACW game - and why many ACW enthusiasts have been driven from this game. UGG has little left to recommend the game regarding "historical realism." It is just a game about guys masquerading in blue and gray in a galaxy far far away...

Blast from the past… Stealthy is not usually a term associated with civil war battlefields. But the noise produced by high explosives on modern battlefields are dramatically louder than the relatively tame sound waves produced in the ACW. Bullets fired from modern rifles make small sonic booms when flying through the air, which make a loud, distinct “crack!” The .30-06 round for example travels at more than twice the speed of sound (150 grain Nostler Ballistic Tip travels 2,910 ft/s. (speed of sound is 1,125 ft/s.)). Black powder is a low explosive propellant (black powder discharges travel at less than the speed of sound). Projectiles propelled by black powder are by definition subsonic. Subsonic bullets and fairly large-caliber war rifles don't mix very well. Subsonic bullets experience significant accuracy problems due to excessive deviations in velocity. Even with rifling the problem of accuracy is dramatically increased with the size of the projectile (e.g., artillery). The gunpowder (or propellant charge) for a subsonic bullet has to be used in small quantities and the bullet itself has to be heavier. During the ACW the roughly 50-70 caliber plus bullet size was far and away less accurate than modern small arms. Additionally the heavy bullets didn't go nearly as far. Typically a civil war battle resulted in the discharge of a few millions of rounds of small arms ammunition to inflict tens-of-thousands of casualties. The low muzzle velocity creates lower pressures which makes it hard to get a clean burn of the propellant causing rapid fouling of the weapon. In technical jargon, the failure of a clean "burn" and the resulting lowered accuracy and range is called a failure of "obturation." Normally, a bullet expands -- or obturates -- to the size of its barrel after being fired, keeping the bullet on target and preventing the gases that propel it from escaping in front of the bullet and melting the round inside the barrel of the gun. The melted leading can be a pain to remove, and can permanently damage the weapon unless it's cleaned. Likewise, a bullet can't be too light or too heavy, because too much in either direction can prevent the bullet from obturating. Using subsonic bullets also causes a greater risk of jamming, which in a firefight could mean the difference between life and death. Today, the Pentagon is investigating technologies to build a better subsonic bullet for its special forces. Stealth and silence are essential ingredients for special ops. One solution might be using "polymer cased ammunition" as opposed to brass or steel. The idea is that polymer-cased bullets "produce a reliable and consistent powder burn." More specifically, polymer obturates at lower pressures, which means it may be possible to shoot a heavy bullet with less propellant while theoretically not trading for accuracy and range. It is a bit comical to think of today’s special ops forces toting a .50 cal musket with a polymer cased bullet to make the modern battlefield more “stealthy” - like the ACW battlefield.

Mr. Mercanto, Just for clarification are you looking for the multiplayer, single player, or both to be revised to a more historically representative game?

Thanks to Nick and his Game Labs Team for the great tactical game. It has been a pleasure to test this game and participate in its development over the past year. Best wishes to the community and I look forward to your next product release.

Collector's Showcase, If you want additional balanced phases to play why don't you politely offer some suggestions on ideas you have to generate a few more phases? Nick and his team have been very willing to add phases as players have made suggestions. In my opinion this is not a fair criticism of Nick and his team. It may even be possible to have a scenario editor where players could select parts of the battlefield and Corps-level elements from the order of battle to play against each other (not sure if you could do this at a lower-level of granularity without a bunch of new code). Then players could pick and choose their preferences for customized battles. ``````````````` Here's why the Ewell map is important in my opinion... The Campaign Game offers a variety of challenges in various to players. Some balanced, some not. The experience gained in these less-balanced phases provides players with a full-spectrum of challenges from steamrolling an enemy to doing your best against overwhelming odds. This historical reality of the battle is one of the aspects that brought me to the game - inclusive of the Ewell map. It doesn't seem fair to criticize a single phase out of a series of phases in a campaign game when the goal of the campaign game and its various phases is to achieve victory over the course of the multi-day battle of Gettysburg. While I agree that playing a single unbalanced phase (i.e., the Ewell map) may not be rewarding as a stand-alone phase; without these historical phases the campaign game would lose its current state of continuity and the historical challenges faced by the Union by their decision to fight at Gettysburg. The fact is the Rebs got to Gettysburg with more men earlier in the fight then lost their numerical advantage as more of the Union army arrived. If you completely strip the historical timeline away from the game you don't really have anything left of the historical battle of Gettysburg. The game, in essence, will just be a series of blue and gray chess pieces played out on a map of the Gettysburg battlefield. IMHO such a design vision for a historical game could only be fathomed by "a good short order cook." I'd prefer take my games at breakfast with a heapin' helpin' of sloosh with half a sweet potato on the side!

Nick, Given that you know perfectly what I like and do not like why would you need me to review the latest release? Yes I fixed my Steam account three times. It takes multiple emails and about 4 to 10 working days to get the account reinstated. Each time my account is fixed Steam cancels my account within 48 hours of getting the account fixed. I’ve grown weary of dealing with the dreadful account support from Steam and their absurd cancellation cycle. You have had dozens of posts from hundreds of hours of my testing with detailed feedback and numerous suggestions on UGG. Not that much has changed. You’ve stated that the game is finalized and the team has moved on to other projects. Rather than continue to invest my time in testing cycles for a game that’s been completed I’ve been learning a tremendous amount by watching the posted battles and learning the tips and techniques of other players (Koro, Nick, etc…). This allows me to evaluate the state of the game without investing more of my time with Steam or another iteration of “more of the same UGG.” Besides Nick, Mr. Mercanto and others have highlighted the same problems I documented 12 months ago. Hearing this again from me obviously has less impact than hearing it from your active community members playing on the current release. Perhaps, when enough of your community speak up in favor of player input on the fundamentals of the algorithms, your game design may evolve to include a couple of sorely needed player-tuned input options. This could be as simple as: Infantry Modifier: Union -50% -25% Standard Setting +25% +50% CSA -50% -25% Standard Setting +25% +50% Artillery Modifier: Union -50% -25% Standard Setting +25% +50% CSA -50% -25% Standard Setting +25% +50% This way I can tune my games to align with the ACW history while others can tune their games for the result they favor. I’ve managed many software development projects over a 30 year career and know that if the design is structured to accommodate user input then the implementation effort is minimal to accommodate users. The key is getting the design team to embrace the breadth of their customer base. America’s Civil War is not a “one size fits all” proposition. Alternatively, open up UGG to modding.

Hister, AGEOD's Civil War is a strategic campaign game - tactics are absent from game design entirely. So the focus is different from UGG. It would be great to have an AGEOD's-like campaign game where it would be possible to use the UGG engine to fight the battles. The AGEOD's design has some very strong points as well as many historical accuracy issues. AGEOD's is a game that offers the player the freedom to make strategic decisions and try different approaches to winning the war. It retains the continuity and flow of the players decisions over the course of the game. There is very little freedom (and sometimes less continuity) in the UGG design as the battle jumps from canned phase to canned next-phase. I'm not a fan of the 'wild cards' system in the newer AGEOD's design. IMHO the older version of AGEOD's was much better historically than the newer game. As the ACW progressed both sides evolved from a regiment/brigade-centric mixed combat arms organization in the direction of the Corps system with the combat arms mutually supporting each other. The net effect was that all of the combat arms were more effective as a result. I believe AGEOD's misses this evolution of trial by fire. Units gain more experience but the composition of the Divisions/Brigades remains static through the war and a real pain in the neck with lots of clicks to alter division composition. Artillery for example was initially tied to mixed combat arms brigades and evolved in the direction of quasi-independent and more concentrated artillery brigades. The 20 pounder Parrott rifle decreased in numbers in the field armies as the war progressed. These heavier guns were moved out of the field as too unwieldy and rough on horses to be effectively maintained on campaign. The weight of a 20 pounder Parrott shell was 35 pounds but the impact of these rounds vs. the 12 pounder Napoleon ammunition was so militarily irrelevant that these batteries were increasingly relegated to garrison duty as the war progressed. Then Grant figured out that heavy artillery batteries were all but useless and converted these formations to infantry during the final year of the war. Thus at Antietam the Union had many 20 pounder Parrott batteries which made the disparity of artillery caliber at Antietam "artillery hell" for the Confederates - but the military contributions of these guns was so small that they were subsequently all but abandoned in the field by the Union. Heavy caliber guns were brought forward for the siege of Richmond/Petersburg but were left in position during the Appomattox campaign. Sherman sent about 500 guns north out of Atlanta before the March to the Sea retaining only about 60 guns for the campaign and the remainder of the war. AEGOD's misses completely the evolution and mix of guns in the armies of the ACW. The timing of evolutionary events in AGEOD's relies heavily on parity. The Union grasped the Corps structure about a year before the CSA for example. The CSA, and Longstreet in particular, evolved trench warfare concepts much more rapidly and employed these innovations much earlier than the Union. Longstreet's innovations in mutually supporting trench systems was the single most enduring contribution to the art of warfare during the entire ACW conflict. In AGEOD's both sides can form Corps and upgrade trenches at exactly the same moment in time. Similarly the treatment of cavalry in AGEOD's is relatively static. The Union was much slower to adopt cavalry brigades - yet in AGEOD's the Union has complete freedom to form cavalry brigades without the evolution and learning that was required in reality to bring parity between Union and Rebel cavalry. Hopefully this summary satisfies your question - there is a great deal more that could be said...and a limited number of hours in the day. C'est la guerre.

Hister, Please see Mr. Mercanto's 28 November post above. He's usually an accurate tester and has offered a wealth of sound advice on multiple topics so I tend to value and trust his perspective. It doesn't seem like the feedback in this thread aligns with your statement that the sides are evenly matched now. I'm not certain what you mean by the statement the sides are "evenly matched." I think it means you are happy with the game as is...which is fantastic. If you mean that the game is now properly balanced so that each side in each scenario is "evenly matched" this is something completely different than the point of my post above. I'll try to be a bit more clear: The relationships of the combat arms are fundamental to the ACW and therefore game design for the ACW. The point is that the Union had 100 more guns at Gettysburg. If the artillery of both sides are now "evenly matched" then this is a flaw in the game - because the sides shouldn't be "evenly matched." A 12 pounder Napoleon should behave the same regardless of the color of the uniform firing the gun. And the Union had 100 more of 'em at Gettysburg. The disparity in guns at Gettysburg was not decisive because the impact of the artillery on the battlefield during the ACW was not the decisive combat arm. When you artificially crank up the casualties artillery can inflict in the game then the relationship of the combat arms impacts the historical balance and the relationship of the combat arms that existed in the battle. Fudging artillery performance introduces game imbalance in favor of the Union...which means to achieve game balance you need to offset this artificial error by creating something else false with an offsetting imbalance...like the rebel yell or charging as the decisive weapon of the ACW. The net result is a cascade of fiction resulting in the ongoing effort for Ultimately Unachievable Game balance by manipulating these fictional variables. Which is why Myes! on 28 November makes his comment above: Myes! - If I copy your quote the design team may ban me again so I'll not be pasting your quote into this post...but I echo your sentiments. The game design concept is great. I'm a huge fan. But the implementation needs a bit more flexibility to attract a wider range of players and offer what a broader spectrum of players are seeking in an ACW game. I'd like to see the combat arms in their proper historical relationships. Visually I'd love to be able to turn off the unit icons. IMHO they clutter up the visual appeal of the game (aka destroy the game visually). Ditto the VP locations. I understand the AI runs off of the VP locations...but visually it really sucks having them hover over the battlefield IMHO. It would be great to have an option so that VPs would not be displayed on the player's screen. That way the game code can still use the VP locations for the AI without the player(s) having to see them. Personally I don't care if the designer assigns 400 points or 4,000 points to a VP location. The only metrics that interest me are the historical metrics: casualties, POW's, guns, colors, supplies captured. The game wasn't designed to deal with the historical metrics of winning an ACW battle. I'm not motivated by arbitrary contrivance of VP allocations. I can live without the metrics ACW commanders considered important - but I don't want to be shackled to arbitrary design decisions that define "victory." The tally of historically relevant metrics at the end of the battle is what matters to me and why I'm interested in the game.. The only historically relevant metric included in the game is casualties so it's what I'm interested in using to define "victory." Just imagine for a moment that Robert E. Lee writes to Jefferson Davis claiming a resounding victory at Gettysburg because he captured Oak Ridge, Cemetery Hill, and Big Round Top at a cost of 10,000 more men than he inflicted on the AoP. Davis scratches his head and wonders where is Oak Ridge, Cemetery Hill, and Big Round Top and why the loss of 10,000 more Rebels will help defeat the Federals or win independence for the South... Perhaps you can get excited about a game with this result...I can't. The loss of 10,000 more men by the ANV would have been catastrophic regardless of the topographical features captured during the battle. None of the topography in the vicinity of Gettysburg was "strategic" or could help bring an end to the war. Gettysburg was simply about one army destroying the other completely and ending the war - at least that is what Lee claimed. Imagine Abraham Lincoln getting word that Union forces had inflicted 10,000 more casualties on the ANV but; gasp, the Rebels were on Culp's Hill near Gettysburg... He drops his head in his hands and mutters, "My God! We've lost Culps Hill! Our only option now is end the war and acknowledge Southern independence." Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.

One of the aspects of the ACW that makes it unique in the annals of military history is that both sides were trained and armed almost identically. Captured guns and ammunition could be almost immediately provisioned to units with appropriate caliber requirements. Over the course of the four-year conflict these similarities resulted in staggering similarity in battlefield-related casualties. UGG Gettysburg disregards these historical similarities in favor of artificial contrivances to make the two sides different. Then attempts to balance the fictional imbalances with superior Union artillery vs. CSA charging capabilities. History is full of examples of differences in armament that gave each side unique characteristics...but the ACW is uniquely not one of these conflicts. Why build a game of the ACW and not capture this fundamental truth of the war? The game would be much better if a 12 pounder Napoleon was a 12 pounder Napoleon, canister was canister, and an Enfield was an Enfield. Game balance should be achieved by CSA leadership advantages, unit elan, and VP allocation rather than nerfing armament or ammunition characteristics. Note that during the war the Aberdeen Proving Ground analyzed CSA powder because Union generals and their troops concluded that in action the Rebels had a "power advantage" due to superior black powder. The evidence from these tests demonstrated that Union and CSA powder were precisely the same. But Union generals who did not want to admit that they were being out-generaled insisted that the CSA had a firepower advantage based on the inferiority of Northern ammunition. Over the course of the war the Union claim of superior Southern powder was scientifically and irrefutably proven to be false. Lincoln realized the only way to snuff out the myth of CSA armament superiority was by decapitating the leadership of his army until he could find generals who could and would fight based on the reality of parity in armaments and superiority of numbers on the Union side. The artillery ammunition of both sides was universally crappy. REALLY CRAPPY. About 50% of the artillery ammunition fired actually detonated. The Boremann fuse was the pinnacle of timed detonation devices for both sides and performed equally miserably for the Blue and Gray. At Gettysburg there were about 60,000 rounds of artillery ammunition fired. Which demonstrates conclusively that each round on average killed less than 1 man (60,000 rounds fired vs. 50,000 casualties). The statistics get much worse if you consider that in addition to artillery ammunition about 5 million rounds of small arms ammunition also inflicted some of the casualties. If the analysis of the military professionals at the U.S. Artillery School at Fort Sill can be trusted then about 6% of the casualties during the ACW were inflicted by artillery. If we use the baseline of 6% of the 50,000 Gettysburg casualties then somewhere in the ballpark of 3,000 casualties at Gettysburg were inflicted by artillery. The math suggests that 1 round in every 20 inflicted a single casualty at Gettysburg. While it was mathematically possible to inflict as many as 16 casualties per round with other than canister the actual occurrence of this phenomenon was so rare that instances of such a devastating round were noted by Corps Commanders (Longstreet at Gettysburg noted a single round that inflicted 14 casualties). If you factor in these rounds that inflicted more than a single casualty (primarily canister; but also the occasional shell) then the average round per casualty inflicted jumps to about 1 round in every 33 inflicted a single casualty at range beyond about 400 yards. There is a good reason that E.P. Alexander, Gibbon and other artillery experts state that the effects of artillery were, "more moral than physical." Effectively the only round that could inflict multiple casualties reliably was canister. The metrics that Halleck, Hunt, and battery commanders such as Tidball align on is that an artillery battery of six guns firing canister at less than 400 yards roughly equaled the firepower of a 200 man regiment (roughly 1/5 the firepower of an UGG brigade). There are many reasons for the poor artillery performance during the war including non-standard manufacturing of munitions and fuses, ammunition alternatives, gun calibers and design limitations, and primarily the fact that black powder is a low-explosive propellant which is too impotent to inflict massive numbers of casualties. Bottom line - the ACW was primarily an infantry conflict. At the end of the battle of Gettysburg the artillery of both sides was the only combat arm still capable of continuing the contest. The artillery arm of both armies had suffered about 10% casualties. All of the batteries that entered the fray on July 1 were available on July 5 though some had been more severely punished than others. When the armies moved from Gettysburg virtually all of the guns from both armies (modulo one gun with a burst barrel abandoned by the CSA on the field) were present for duty. The fact that the artillery arms of both sides were intact was a key factor contributing to the war of attrition and parity of casualties. In UGG the reality of the relationship between the combat arms in the ACW has been lost in the never-ending quest for the Ultimately Unachievable Game-balance (UUG). See above the statement from Myes! that the CSA is overpowered vs. GrandGeneralRevShand's comment that the CSA is now "utter crap." The only way to resolve these balance complaints is to give players the ability to edit VP values as well as the weapon characteristics and charging balance algorithms and then let players adjust to their preferences/abilities. Perhaps a Pro-South, Pro-North, and a balanced option (historically most accurate) would be a wonderful addition that might attract players like myself to return to this game. I've grown weary of the game design attempts to please everyone all of the time. You can't. But you can provide a few options that would embrace more of the community.