David Fair

Lee withdrew over the Potomac after the battle of Antietam at Boteler's Ford. The Shepherdstown Bridge had been destroyed. Note: If forced north he could also have used Shepherds Ford, located between the gap in Shephers Island in the Potomac River. The location of both of these fords and the destroyed bridge at Shepherdstown may be beyond the scope of your Antietam maps.

Nick, What about the fords at Antietam Creek and also on the Potomac River? On Antietam Creek there were: 1) two fords south of the Upper Bridge. 2) one ford above and one ford below the Burnside Bridge 3) and Snavely's Ford further south (also below the Burnside Bridge). On the Potomac Boteler's Ford and White's Ford.

Nick, Can you please clarify your statement above regarding Rivers, "except when they are near hilly terrain that must be climbed. There they become volley traps if you stand for long." Can you give a couple of examples of the hilly terrain on the map that will make the River a "volley trap?" How long is too long to stand by a "River?"

Koro, Your statement may not be correct. If the game adjusts the volley's incomming and/or outgoing effectiveness due to the time and proximity to a river, the effect is not necessarily reflected in the "cover percentage" as you've stated above. Thus this feature is just as undocumented as the off-board movement cheat. While you may see these differently they are both undocumented game features that impact play. You may find your distinction compelling - but I'm not convinced at all by your argument. An undocumented game cheat is what it is. Thank you for sharing your opinion. But... While I have the utmost respect for you as a player there is the potential that even an experienced player may unintentionally contort the design facts. I wouldn't be asking the question if Nick didn't make the same statement regarding the effect of "rivers" in two of his game videos. It is not clear if the effects of a river are reflected in the "cover percentage" as you've stated above; which is why I asked the design team to respond to the question in the first place. It could be there is an algorithm that increases the kill percentage independently of the cover percentage. Perhaps I'm mistaken Koro but I don't believe you are a member of the design team. Is this correct? I'm honestly interested in the design facts regarding these water features. The design team is the only credible source to respond to this question.

But if this is a game feature shouldn't players know that this advantage/disadvantage exists to understand how to master the game? The only reason I'm asking the question is there are at least two instances in Nick's videos where Nick specifically mentions the advantage/disadvantage of the effects of the "rivers" and the extreme disparity in casualties that can occur in particular situations when crossing these water features. This seems like a reasonable question and something that should be openly revealed to the community to ensure everyone has a common knowledge base. Koro, my recollection may be faulty but I think it may have been you that called REB Blunt a cheat when he flanked your army with an off-board move that Nick and his team did not know was possible. Note that this is precisely what players are complaining about - the fact that memorizing the terrain and its non-obvious effects unbalance the game play. Is mastering UGG Gettysburg really about memorizing the precise pixels where advantages lie hidden in the map? If so then this is about rote memory of terrain rather than strategy. It seems to me this is another one of these situations where an undocumented game feature gives players an advantage because they don't understand the effects of specific topography. IMHO a topography anomaly is as much of a "cheat" as off-board movement. But this is just my humble opinion...and your opinion may differ.

Thanks Nick & Koro, How long does a unit need to stand near a run to be in a "volley trap"? How far does a unit need to be away from a run to avoid being in a "volley trap"?

Can anyone on the design team explain the effect of the "Rivers" in UGG's Gettysburg? It seems "Rivers" have a profound effect on casualties. While "Rivers" played a role at other Civil War Battlefields most of the water features on the Gettysburg battlefield are not "Rivers" at all. They are "Runs." A "Run" is a small creek about 1 meter wide and about 10 centimeters deep. Images are available on Google for each of the "Runs" on the Gettysburg battlefield. During the battle of Gettysburg most of these "Runs" were dry. They afforded some cover; but in most cases because the elevation of a "Run" is at the lowest point in the topography's drainage they were not desirable for defensive positions. The point is that they did not impede advances and were a minor obstacle at Gettysburg. The single exception was Rock Creek which was fordable almost everywhere - and could be crossed in numerous places without getting your feet wet. While I understand the goal is to give some tactical advantages to the terrain the implementation seems to have way to much of an impact in the examples Nick is posting in his battles with Agrippa, etc.. At Antietam the Antietam Creek was wide and deep enough that it could only be forded at a few places; or crossed at one of the three bridges. If you want Gettysburg to be different from Antietam you might consider tweaking the significance of the "Rivers" in UGG's Gettysburg because they don't represent the battlefield reality credibly.

The quote, "who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" was originally attributed to Joe Hooker - though the quote became common during the war. He was specifically complaining about the Union cavalry's inability to match the chivalry's cavalry in recon, daring, and rear area destruction. The basic problem was that the Union attached cavalry (and artillery) in the early part of the war to infantry commands; often at the brigade-level sometimes as supports for individual infantry regiments. It took the first couple of years of the war for the Union to sort out how to use cavalry. Once the Union got their cavalry organization remedied they performed on par with the rebels. The reorganization of the Union cavalry (and artillery) into a cavalry corps (and brigades of artillery) established parity between the Union and Rebel cavalry as shown at Brandy Station. Note that parity was achieved BEFORE the Union cavalry had been armed with repeating rifles such as the Spencer. PS - statistically the cavalry suffered as many casualties as the infantry during the war. But most of these casualties were inflicted on recon patrols, scouting, screening, and vidette duty - seldom on the battlefield. Buford's cavalry was not attacked by formed Confederate infantry brigades at Gettysburg. Heth was under orders not to start a general engagement - he sent his men forward in triple lines in skirmish formation. Buford's total casualties at Gettysburg were about 100 men. The delay in the Confederate advance was not due to Buford's "heroism" but Heth's restrictive orders and Buford's "bluffing". Courageous gamble by Buford to risk his command - but more of a bold ruse than a Thermopylae. Without CSA cavalry Heth lacked the recon ability to determine the composition of the force he was facing. By the time the CSA figured out they were facing a line of Union cavalry elements of 1st Corps had arrived and the CSA was no longer facing a line of cavalry. Had Heth plowed ahead with formed divisions at first contact Buford and his cavalry would have been steamrolled. Buford's men had been deployed in the prone position and firing so furiously they made it appear they were more numerous. They were not under "cover" other than the wheat that concealed these men while they were prone on the ground. By the end of the first day Buford's men exhausted their ammunition supply and were withdrawn to the supply base in Maryland on the morning of July 2.

So I've looked up this "white pride" rhetoric... It seems it was started by Don Black, formerly a Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, as a rebranded white supremacist slogan to draw in a broader spectrum of the white population in the white separatist, white nationalist, neo-Naxi, and white supremacist movements. The demarcation line of this group seems to be that they advocate non-violence; but widely embrace racial intimidation. White Pride is often coupled with the Nazi flag and the CSA battle flag - so the symbolism of hatred seems unchanged. Also when you google the images of white pride many of the images don't align with your statement that 'white pride' is: "No better or worse than anybody else ... Just proud to be white !" So if this is true what's with the parades and the flare toting skin-head whites intimidating the black folks on their way to worship in their churches? What about statements like, "Beauty IS skin deep!" The agenda of racial hatred is so pervasive in this rebranded "white pride" that it is blatantly clear that "White Pride" has little to do with equanimity among the races - as you've stated above. I'll choose to live my life with racially tolerant tunnel vision rather than succumb to living with hate over the color of people's skin. Life's too short for this racial hatred nonsense.

I appreciate your answer and the fact that you aren't skulking behind nameless masses regarding your 'white pride.' An honest response was all I was asking for. However, you've still not made the any connection between the Confederate Battle Flag and the media. Can you shed some light on the connection? Note that: The Confederate States of America was hardly an un-oppressive government or a symbol of non-oppression. It's foundation was based on slavery and the oppression of one-third of the Southern population. See for example Alexander Stephens "Cornerstone Speech" which states this proposition directly and precisely. The compulsory draft for all males was implemented by the CSA - oppression of the white male population that led to more than 100,000 white Southerners abandoning the ranks, the cause of the South, and their flag during the course of the war. See Sam Watkins in his chapter on "Corinth" for example regarding the 20 negro exemption from the compulsory draft that brought the first wave of desertion from the armies of the Confederacy. Southerners stated "I'll fight for the South" but not for the right of the rich to keep their slaves. Rich man's war - poor man's fight. Robert E. Lee requested permission to shoot any deserters - which was too big of a step in the direction of oppression even for the South. When Lee posted sharpshooters behind his battle lines they also refused to shoot deserters. In the end the South's white population was under one of the most oppressive governments in history. First in its founding by subjecting its black population. Then oppressing the white population as popular support for the war waned after Antietam. So the argument that the CSA battle flag represents a government that was somehow benign, unobtrusive, and not oppressive is silly. I'm not sure you can honestly characterize the fact of slavery in America and its legacy of Jim Crow as "a few blacks who may have there feelings hurt." But here we reach the chasm between our perspectives. This discussion has not been about "tunnel vision" but as Lincoln said regarding the oppression of America's black population, "there is the rub." And so racial tension continues to simmer in America. I remain ignorantly yours, Mr. Fair

The Forum is a place for interesting discourse regarding the Civil War and its relevance to current events. I am honestly interested to see a well-reasoned response on the connection between the CSA battle flag and a rebellion against the media. It doesn't matter if you response is from the perspective of racism, avian, or avant garde. Lump yourself into whatever bunch appeals to you. You seem to have entirely missed the question or simply dodged - again. Is it possible for you focus on an issue and answer a direct question? It's OK if you can't respond intelligently to this question. I know it's a tough issue. I'm genuinely interested in understanding the connection of the Confederate Battle Flag to a revolution against the media. Joseph Goebels did not fly the Confederate Battle Flag in his propaganda campaign. How is your Goebels quote relevant? Goebels was talking about state policy methods of manipulating the media - not inciting a popular revolution against the media; which you stated was your reason for adopting the Confederate flag. Your Goebels quote is simply a Red Herring. Not sure why your feelings are hurt...perhaps it's a side effect from the dye in the Red Herring?

Can anyone enlighten me on the connection between the CSA battle flag and a rebellion against the media? During the entire Civil War the Confederate Government never censored so much a single glyph in the media. Robert Rhett's, Charleston Mercury Newspaper, railed against the Federal Government for more than a decade prior to the Civil War. Once the Confederacy was formed he railed against the Confederate Government, Jeff Davis, a long list of incompetent Southern generals (including, in Rhett's rhetoric, the King of Spades - Robert E. Lee). It wasn't until a regiment from the Army of Northern Virginia was assigned to duty in Charleston that Rhett's printing presses were silenced...smashed by the soldiers who had had enough of Rhett's blathering against the cause for which so many Southerners gave their last full measure of devotion. Conversely, the Union suppressed the media routinely during the war. So if follows that if you are looking for a symbol that represents the repression or suppression of the media that you would identify an appropriate banner with a historical factual connection between the symbol and the act of media suppression. Seems like a logical argument. If the theme of rebellion is important then the "Don't Tread on Me" flag or the American Flag in the "Betsy Ross" 13 stars, might fit your desired rebellion symbolism without the implication of white supremacy. Alternatively, flying the 35-Star Union Flag of the Civil War, possibly even upside down, might convey your desire to suppress and rebel against the media. The Union routinely censored the media. It's generals including Meade and Sherman silenced individual reporters and the media generally by physically tossing them out of camp or breaking up their printing presses. So it follows that these flags have more of a historical connection and a nexus between your issue and the historical significance of the banner. So why not choose one of these flags? Need a more contemporary flag? No problem! How about the Alaska state flag for the Palin'ites out there. The Confederate Battle Flag is not related to or relevant historically vis a vis suppression of the media or a popular rebellion against the media today. So, I can only suspect that the reason to defend the Confederate Battle Flag in a 'revolution against the media' context is because THAT flag means something broader than the simple list of issue you've outlined above. One of the most fascinating conversations I've ever had was with a man who stated he was a confirmed member of the KKK. He quoted scripture that the natural condition of the races was ordained by god. Interestingly, though he could quote scripture, he couldn't find where exactly in the Bible this proposition was actually stated. We looked for over an hour. Many of this other arguments seemed equally flimsy to me. Did he use a computer? Yep! Was he using and Intel microprocessor? Yep! Why was he embracing technology from a company run by an immigrant Hungarian Jew for his racial tirades? Silence... What I admired about this man was that he had the intellectual integrity to admit he was a racist. Secondly, he had the courage to stand up and state his beliefs. He did not cower behind illusory "masses that disagree with you." He proudly stood up and stated, "I'm a racist and this is how, "I SEE THE WORLD!" It made no difference to him that Catholics, Jews, and people of all races contributed to the technology base that he lacked the creativity to invent himself; but used freely to spew his vitriol. At the end of our conversation he acknowledged that few of his arguments were illogical or had no basis in fact - but he was still proud to be a confirmed racist. To this day I'm puzzled by his basis for believing in his natural superiority. Part of ending the divisiveness of the Confederate legacy is to have the intellectual integrity, honesty, and moral fortitude not to skulk behind some ethereal "there are masses who see the world differently" obfuscation. It is high time for America to "man-up" for a debate on the use of the Confederate flag in government. I admired the KKK for standing up to endorse flying the Confederate Battle Flag on government buildings in South Carolina. No action by any other group could more clearly and effectively frame the issue on the use of that flag. By taking their racial hated to the street it left little room for debate on the symbolism of the flag. The agenda of the symbolism was exposed in the light of day and the flag came down. Bravo for Apple for making a stand for their beliefs as well. Note - From a marketing perspective the KKK needs a serious reexamination of their public message. The best thing they could have done to preserve their beloved symbol on government buildings is to remain silent. Unfortunately for their cause they seem to lack the political savvy to know when silence is their best policy. It is funny how much the debate on the flag is reminiscent of the Civil War. 150 years ago slavery was a Constitutionally protected fact. The only way to abolish slavery was by Constitutional amendment; requiring 2/3 Congressional approval. By firing on Fort Sumter and continuing to fight long after the cause was lost the South may have done the "honorable" thing - but they lost all that they valued for their continued obstinance. As the butcher's bill mounted so did the North's determination to crush the fact of slavery, the Southern slave culture, and the economic basis for slavery. For those of you interested Robert E. Lee's letters are very interesting reading - particularly his writing after the Civil War. His family's slaves just didn't seem to understand how much better off they were under the slave system; and this honestly seems to have confounded the general. Lee struggled after the war with his notions of evangelical Christian beliefs. God rewards those following his word; and punishes those who fail. The South was about as thoroughly punished as was possible at the end with Union armies marching unopposed anywhere they wanted to go. Lee devoted a significant amount of ink and paper to reconciling his religion with the defeat of the South. This reading really makes you feel sorry for the man. After the war General Johnston was on a riverboat where he heard a number of young men boasting about how they would whip the Union in a rematch. The men were all of military age for the conflict and Johnston inquired where they had served during the war. Each of the men boasting had been exempted from serving on account of their families owning more than 20 slaves. Johnston was quick to criticize men who were absent in war but indefatigable in defeat. He informed the men who he was and stated the only reason they had not been whipped is that they hadn't served. He stated that as a general he and his men had been thoroughly whipped - as badly as a man could be whipped and survive. Johnston relates that he was glad to see the banner furled and wanted no further part of revolution. I've worked with a company founded by a Croatian and staffed with many native Croatians - anyone with first-hand knowledge of revolution is very cautious regarding the appeal of revolution and revolutionary symbolism. There are more effective (and logical) methods to respond to the media than the Confederate Battle Flag. Cheers...

Soreloser, nice dodge of the issue. First of all nobody is forcing anything on anyone. We are simply have a dialog in a civil war forum. An ostrich sees the world differently than me as well, but I don't think that's a logical argument for suggesting I don't understand that others see the world differently than me. Let's hold that truth to be self-evident. Your post is a bit curious - suggesting that a government building should fly a flag that represents rebellion against media, government, and folks like myself seems a bit counter-intuitive. Are you suggesting that the government should rebel against the government, media, and folks like me? Hmmm, I thought we had a representative democratic government that is inclusive. I get it - quite a few people don't approve of an inclusive government that accepts racial diversity. While I don't agree with all that democracy implies maintaining civil relations seems like a reasonable goal to respectfully disagree on issues. I applaud the multiple uses of the flag and the diversity in the meaning it has for various folks. I defend absolutely your right to see in the flag what you want to see. It is healthy to have a dialog and rebel against media, government, and folks like myself who tolerate multiple perspectives on the use of symbolism. But the issue is not what you or I see in the flag or even the multiple interpretations of the flag. It is about flying the flag on government buildings; where, for a large minority segment of the population, that flag represents oppression, slavery, white supremacy, etc... Why do they see it that way? Because 13% of America's citizens were at one time slaves. Because the KKK flew that flag in Selma Alabama on Bloody Sunday March 7, 1965. Because folks like Dillon Roof photographed himself with the flag then murdered 9 people in Charleston. Because there are hundreds of terrorist acts carried out on a racial basis against American citizens under that banner. Because as a nation, we subscribed to the notion, that "all men are created equal." In high school I kept a Confederate flag in my room - but I've taken it down - there is just too much baggage associated with that symbol for my taste. I guess I'm guilty of growing up and having a view of the world that acknowledges there are people who don't see the world the way I do. I strive to give others respect for their perspectives as well. I respect your right to continue to fly the flag regardless of what you see in the flag. It doesn't matter to me if you are a white supremacist, an ostrich, or a civil war enthusiast - good on 'ya mate. Good day to you as well and have a wonderful Thanksgiving. God bless America and the folks of all races who serve in uniform to protect this nation.

One of the privileges of being an American is the right of free speech. Confusing that right as license to kill black folks under the guise of "free speech" is ludicrous. Individual rights of free speech are different from the responsibilities of state government to be inclusive and open to all. Unfortunately the rebel battle flag has become a symbol of hatred and racial divisiveness - thus it fails to meet the standards as an appropriate symbol of government inclusiveness and openness. soreloser, nobody expects people to change what they d-mb well believe. Part of being American is accepting that there are people that lack the capacity to understand the nuances of the free speech dialog. But it is reasonable to expect that people will exercise rights in a way that does not inflict injury or death on Americans that see the world differently. !!!!!!

1st Tenn. Watkins, I made a comment above regarding horses in Vancouver that might possibly be incorrectly interpreted. In no way was it my intention to suggest that you have not worked with horses in your past or that your post was in anyway a misrepresentation. My first sentence states clearly my intent - simply that we share a common background growing up in farm country. You have my sincere apologies if this was not construed correctly. David PS - I don't recall seeing many horses in the Boston area either; but that doesn't mean I didn't grow up elsewhere.

No but you certainly did a number on the Union infantry - almost 2:1 casualties is an accomplishment.

Yep, I also grew up in a farming community working with draft horses and milking cows - 1st through 3rd grade in a one-room schoolhouse where the reward for work well-done was helping Mrs. Eikner shovel coal into the furnace (At the time I thought she was hot - but for a 6 to 8 year-old kid that likely meant she was kind and patient.) We were the last graduating class from Pleasant Plains Elementary which was subsequently a museum. I was asked to the opening ceremony to talk about what it was like to attend school in the single classroom setting - but it was difficult to admit I was now officially a museum artifact (at the time only age 35). Vancouver, B.C. has some great Chinese Food (Peaceful Restaurant - if I recollect correctly they pull the shrimp out and let you see them wildly thrashing about to show how fresh they are).

It would be interesting to get a shot of the artillery performance form this battle given the heavily wooded nature of the scenario.

Just for fun here is a more complete excerpt from Peyton's AAR. Note the line highlighted and underlined. What is fascinating about this line is that the battery on LRT (Hazlett's) was commanded by Rittenhouse. Rittenhouse states in his report that only 2 of his guns could target the Confederate advance - there simply was not room on the top of LRT to deploy his entire battery in the direction of the attack. The other 4 guns were firing - but in the direction of Devil's Den. “But one official report from Pickett’s division has been published, that of Garnett’s brigade, by Maj. C. S. Peyton, 19 Va., who was the only field officer of the division not killed or wounded. [Peyton reported] ‘…we lay during the most terrific cannonading, which opened at 1:30 P. M., and was kept up without intermission for one hour. During the shelling we lost about 20 killed and wounded…the order to advance was given…[the enemy’s skirmishers were first met, and immediately driven in. Moving on, we soon met the advanced line of the enemy, lying concealed in the grass on the slope about 100 yards in front of his second line, which consisted of a stone wall, about breast high…about 30 paces from the crest of the hill which was lined with their artillery…Up to this time we had suffered but little from the enemy’s batteries…with the exception of one posted on the mountain [Little Round Top]…which enfiladed nearly our entire line with fearful effect, sometimes as many as 10 men being killed and wounded by the bursting of a single shell…We were now within about 75 paces of the wall, unsupported on the right and left…Gen Kemper’s line was discovered to be lapping on ours…a staff officer rode back to the general to request him to incline to the right…but in consequence of the eagerness of the men in pressing forward, it was impossible to have the order carried out…within about 20 paces of the wall…a terrific fire that poured into our ranks both from their batteries and from their sheltered infantry…Gen. Armistead…rushed forward with unyielding determination to plant the Southern banner on the walls of the enemy…the fighting over the wall became hand to hand and of the most desperate character…those who were not killed or wounded were captured, with the exception of about 300 who came off slowly, but greatly scattered, the identity of every regiment being entirely lost…The brigade went into action with 1287 men and about 140 officers…casualties will show, of 941 killed, wounded, and missing.’” Note also that these shells that killed 10 men with a single shell were noted by other first-had witnesses and there were only a few of these extraordinarily high casualty rate single rounds fired during the entire battle Bottom line - either you believe in the data from the hospitals - or you don't. If you don't believe in the data from the hospitals then it would be great if anyone can point out sources for other data. Fox's Regimental Losses is based heavily on the hospital records so it is not clear that any other sources actually exist.

Let's compare your UGG results with an AAR from Gettysburg... “But one official report from Pickett’s division has been published, that of Garnett’s brigade, by Maj. C. S. Peyton, 19 Va., who was the only field officer of the division not killed or wounded. [Peyton reported] ‘…we lay during the most terrific cannonading, which opened at 1:30 P. M., and was kept up without intermission for one hour. During the shelling we lost about 20 killed and wounded… The distance from the Union line firing on Garnett's brigade is roughly equal to the distance to your screen shots. At Gettysburg a cannonade twice as long with more than double the number of Federal guns (60 to 80) inflicted "about 20 killed and wounded" on Garnett's brigade. If we double the numbers for Garnett's brigade to get us up to a division in UGG it suggests about 40 killed and wounded in an hour at long-range. By comparison in UGG your losses in half that time by, what looks to be about 3 or 4 batteries (18 to 24 guns), is 5X more effective than the historical reports. Every time we compare historical data with UGG the artillery is consistently about 5X too lethal. Sigh...

Ahhh - like Pickett's Charge, Fredericksburg, Malvern Hill, and the Battle of the Wilderness. We all know how successful going straight at 'em worked. The math for this approach is 2.5 to 1 losses.

These observations are applicable to Antietam as well - where the Federal army held a much greater artillery advantage in the caliber and quantity of the guns. My concern is the cascade effect of moving from Gettysburg to Antietam where the artillery, if left "as is', will further impact the game balance which will require increasingly superior CSA infantry to overcome the overly effective artillery that dominates the UGG Gettysburg implementation. Personally, I'd like to see something in KIA statistics more like the ACW where each side claimed substantially more kills than had actually occurred. That way players have a 'sense' of the effectiveness of units rather than a precise data point - kind of makes the game more like war which embraces the 'fog of war'. Thus, people who like artillery and believe it inflicted more than 6% of battlefield casualties can choose to believe the numbers they see reported in the game, while tuning the algorithms to more correctly align with the historical record. Final battle statistics could be accurately reported, but the individual phases would be 'estimates'. I don't expect Nick and his team to implement my thoughts - but it does seem reasonable to share it with them.

One of the universal problems with command and control during the Civil War the the habit of grabbing piecemeal units to send them to a critical point, or simply throwing whatever was at hand together as a new command to fight a battle. At Gettysburg on July 2 & 3 Meade was pulling regiments out of the various corps and divisions as a stop gap measure to hold his line. While this kind of higgledy piggledy works on holding a static defensive line it utterly destroys the command and control of an army for offensive movement. Chickamauga for example: “The army was now divided into two wings, the right under Polk, and the left under Longstreet. To Polk’s wing was assigned Cheatham’s division of his corps, and the corps of Hill and Walker, with the cavalry under Forrest on the right. To Longstreet, Bragg gave the divisions of Hindman of Polk’s corps, Johnson’s division, Buckner’s corps, and the five brigades of Hood’s and McLaws’s divisions, with the cavalry under Wheeler on the left. This organization was adopted, because the troops were already approximately in the positions assigned, but it involved further subdivision of the command without any increase of staff.” It is not difficult to image how easy it much have been for a unit to be 'forgotten' in the woods and hills of Georgia when orders were issued in the absence of a formal command structure. Wing commanders had to issue direct orders at the corps, division, brigade, and sometimes regimental level to coordinate the moves of their commands. Longstreet's command for Pickett's Charge included troops from Longstreet's First Corps and A. P. Hill's Third Corps. Pettigrew commanded brigades from Heth's divsion, under Col. James K. Marshall (Pettigrew's Brigade) Davis, and Brockenbrough. Trimble commanded Pender's division including Col. Lowrance (Scales Brigade), and Lane. Anderson's Division (Hill's Corps) was posted on the right flank with Wilcox and Col. Lang (Perry's Brigade). Note all of the substitutions. This had an immediate effect on command and control with a 400 yard gap opening as soon as the charge commenced. The net result was a fragmented and uncoordinated disaster for the South. Longstreet simply did not address, or secure a staff officer, from each of the portions of his command. The concept of the role of staff officers and their essential role in command and control appears to have been a complete mystery during the ACW. Both Gettysburg and Chickamauga were fought in the third year of the war - yet somehow nobody on either side has the vision to address the command and control issues. Just as a side note - in the First Gulf War in 1990 - 1991 DARPA was called in to address the command and control of the fragmented military coalition to ensure the Coalition Forces from 15 countries were coordinated. Command and control 'doctrine' was absent from the military lessons of the war - which is part of why battles were such a bungling mess. This also highlight why ACW armies were inept at pursuit and following up success. After a battle had been fought the commands were too scrambled to effectively operate offensively. Lee was furious with his commanders after Chancellorsville for not understanding that the goal was the complete destruction of the AoP. A battlefield victory would never be enough to secure Southern independence. At the heart of the issue was that Lee, Grant, Sherman, were not innovators. The staff necessary for command and control in the Horse and Musket era would remain elusive both North and South for the duration of the war. Hunt would complain not only of the lack of staff for the artillery, but that his batteries were often commanded by lieutenants - an argument he lost with the War Department. Even when the artillery reserve was created it was fought as a collection of individual batteries and never acted as a Napoleonic Grand Battery. It is as though the lessons of the Napoleonic Wars were studied, but not applied, to the ACW. Artillery in the mind of most American commanders remained a support arm of the infantry. Compare for example the formal command structure and staff organization of Napoleon's Army of the Prussian Army of the Franco-Prussian conflict. Each of these armies attained victories by maneuver on a scale that was never achieved during the ACW. Sieges were the only approach that resulted in the destruction of ACW armies until the final curtain came down at Appomattox for the remaining 25,000 men of the ANV. From a command and control perspective the ACW was a step backward almost 100 years to the siege warfare of Vauban.

One of the fundamental problems with artillery in UGG is if you make artillery too effective then the CSA infantry needs to be beefed up to unrealistically to compensate for the preponderance of Federal artillery batteries. The net effect is the Union infantry is too wimpy vs. the CSA infantry. Overly powerful artillery destroys the game balance and the relationships that existed during the ACW. The goal of the game is to make it possible for either side to win in the various scenarios. Some scenarios may be more or less difficult to win; but it should not be impossible to win or why play? Thoughts regarding artillery: On the battlefield there were two classes of artillery. The first was artillery that was supported by infantry or dismounted cavalry. The second was artillery without support. The former class was difficult to dislodge and had a significant impact on the moral of enemy ordered to attack a line of combined arms on the defensive. The latter class was a target that could be overrun with minimal casualties. Artillery batteries simply could not stand alone and unsupported. Even a line of guns could be taken unless the attackers moral was close to being shattered at the time they encountered an unsupported line of artillery. See: Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga for example. Gettysburg is also a prime example. Seven individual batteries deployed as isolated batteries were overrun with minimal casualties to the attackers. Tactically these guns were taken by men in skirmish order; the standard method for dealing with an unsupported battery. Skirmish order kept attacking targets minimized for artillery rapidly destroyed the mobility of a battery. While UGG can't deploy skirmishers it should be able to abstract this key distinction with modified based on the operational radius of the battery. Here are some practical observations... Bigelow, Smith, and 5 other batteries operating in isolation were overrun. Longstreet's charge on July 2 was stopped by a line of guns deployed effectively as a 'Grand Battery' of multiple batteries brought together in a line and holding a final position until infantry support could arrive. Longstreet's charge on July 3 (aka Pickett's Charge) was broken by a combined arms line. From an implementation standpoint it is almost like the artillery should have a support radius similar to the Corps commanders at 'canister range'. When friendly infantry/cavalry are close the batteries are more effective and lethal against the enemy. When batteries are not supported, meaning no friendly units are within the battery's operational radius, the guns are much more vulnerable to enemy fire and inflict fewer casualties. Mutually supporting batteries (batteries within each other's operational radius) might gain some benefit, but less than a line properly supported with infantry/cavalry. I haven't tested for a while now, so perhaps my comment are out of step with the current state of the game. Hopefully this comment is useful.

There is a vast difference between men trained in the drill of arms and their ability to perform in combat vs. command and control of an army on the battlefield. Remise is spot on with his perspectives of company, regimental, and brigade drill. But even with all of the drill soldier's performance on the field at Gettysburg shows that training alone was not enough to make men perform reliably under battlefield conditions. There were about 36,000 musket reclaimed by the Federals after Gettysburg, the high water mark for training for both armies during the war. Half of the musket were empty, the other half were about evenly divided between muskets that had one round rammed home. The 9,000 (1/4 of the muskets) had two to eight rounds jammed into the barrel. In other words, despite the rigorous drill 1/4 of all of the muskets recovered at Gettysburg were effectively unserviceable in combat because the drill could not be automatically followed under combat-stress conditions. The conclusion is that combat is stressful and rapidly erodes the fighting capabilities - even of highly trained soldiers. This is not a reflection on the courage of the men - just the reality of the noise, smoke, confusion, and terror of the battlefield. The second factor is that the staff of both armies was woefully inadequate for the duration of the war. Here is a first-hand quote from E. P. Alexander's Book, “Much has been said in the accounts of prior battles of the insufficient and unskilled staff service in the Army of Northern Virginia, even after many active campaigns. The Western armies generally had had far less opportunities to learn from experience, and fewer resigned ex-army officers from the old U.S. Army among them, to organize and train their raw material. Several of Bragg’s divisions had been recently brought together and were strangers to each other. Nearly all were unfamiliar with the country in which they found themselves, which was unusually wooded and hilly. Bragg, himself, was lacking in quick appreciation of features of topography.” The armies of the ACW were not unique in this regard. The soldiers of Prussia were some of the most ruthlessly trained in Europe at the start of the Napoleonic Wars. Yet, in the 1806 campaign their staff work collapsed and the army was thrashed, despite the drills and numerical superiority (Auerstedt for example). All the drill in Prussia could not overcome the poor leadership and staff work that had eroded Frederick the Great's military machine. Again from E. P. Alexander, "Bragg’s daily experience in the handling of his army should have warned him that it was not a military machine which could be relied upon to execute orders strictly, or to be alert to seize passing opportunities, and it is safe to say that its power for offence was scarcely 50 per cent of what the same force would have developed upon the defensive.” The Union army's performance at Chickamauga is a prime example. Rosecrans ordered a division to shift out of the line - to close a hole in his line that did not exist. Longstreet pounced on the opportunity and shattered the Federal line. One of the continuing problems with command and control during ACW battles is that even when trained staff was available it was rapidly decapitated because officers played such a key role in leadership. Their casualties were so fearful that in some cases all of the officers of an entire division could be hors de combat 20 minutes after the start of a charge. It's no wonder that confusion reigned during ACW battles. If you compare how many corps commanders lost over the 25 year-long Napoleonic Wars vs the same level of casualties during the ACW it demonstrates that it was far more dangerous to be a corps commander during the ACW than men of similar rank in Napoleon's legions. The casualties data for field grade officers during the ACW is gruesomely increased over the Napoleonic Wars as well. Decapitating the leadership of ACW armies was key to degrading the efficiency over the course of the 4-year conflict. Never before in warfare was opportunity so rich and the benefit of advancement so lethal.