ObiQuiet

Quit my IRL job.

LOL, I was thinking the opposite -- that a captain would know this information... the UI is just a way to convey it without annoying, repetitive spoken recordings of a fake crew and to compensate for the limits of flat-screen perception.

I happened to be reading Theodore Roosevelt's book on the naval war of 1812. (His book is mainly a recounting of the logs, letters and reports of American ships, he did a lot of reading of original records.) He writes, He doesn't provide any support for the assertion, though the book mentions four or five cases where US guns failed.

Yesterday's rounding of Cape Horn (helicopter footage of sailboats off Cape Horn is at least rare, if not unique)

I'm not arguing this, but am interested in the rating criteria you have in mind. Number of tactical innovations? Amount of enemy tonnage sunk? Fewest missed opportunities? Lowest opportunity cost? Loyalty? Inspirational impact on subsequent commanders? A weighted function of many such evaluations? You see, I think it's hard to make sweeping generalizations on a topic like this...

As a follow-up to this idea I posted, here is a summary of the first chapter... (I'm not sure where or how to go with this, or what the interest level is -- feedback welcome. For this first episode I've attempted to extract the most interesting passages so you don't have to read the whole thing.) Chapter I, in which Corbett analyzes the large-scale aims of England and Russia during 1804... Napoleon's "virtual annexation of Holland was what made a renewal of the war inevitable" after the Peace of Amiens. Having a hostile power in control of the Dutch coast was unacceptable to England. Therefore, England did not leave Malta as the Treaty of Amiens called for, and also decided... ... to strike at the Dutch colonies. It was a blow that could be dealt rapidly and was well calculated to teach any man but Napoleon the lesson he could never learn. It told him plainly that if France could find no room for England in the councils of Europe there would be no room for a French empire beyond the seas. An aside about Addington's economic rationale for attacking the West Indies: The captured islands were a hotbed of privateering and privateering was always the chief danger to our sea borne commerce Long experience had shown that it could not be dealt with effectually by pelagic operations alone. Addington's policy therefore has at least the justification not only of having dealt a direct blow at French commerce and therefore at her finance but also of having adopted the most effectual method of protecting our own. And be it remembered it was the retention of our financial position that eventually enabled us to beat Napoleon down; it was our sole hope of securing allies and furthermore our only possible means of offence for the moment was against French sea borne commerce. It was a form of attack particularly embarrassing to a ruler like Napoleon whose chief aim in consenting to a peace had been to restore his finances and his fleet. It is therefore perhaps too narrow a judgment to condemn the West Indian operations out of hand merely because they seem to sin against the principle of concentration and were a form of war which of itself could never decide the issue. When Pitt came to power, he had the intention of changing England's defensive strategy (i.e. preventing invasion) into an offensive strategy -- which required allies. Corbett feels strongly that making the assumption that defense was Pitt's goal has meant that... ...the real teaching has been almost entirely buried in a mass of erroneous strategical deduction. Alliance with Russia The reasons why Czar Alexander approached Pitt, and why the two countries could co-operate: Corbett makes a point that these alliances are the key to understanding the events leading to the battle: Specifically, this lead to Nelson's emphasis on Sicily and Sardinia: Elsewhere * In the Channel, the task was still to prevent French troops from crossing. This was done with a "swarm of sloops and gun-vessels" meaning that the French would need battleships to get their troops across: With his (never-quite-ready) invasion plan thwarted and with the threat of Austria joining Russia and Britain, Napoleon induced Spain to become a French ally in order to distract English attention. Pitt responded by ordering the seizure, if possible, of Spain's treasure ships from South America. When this occurred in November 1804, Spain declared active war. This allowed France to have a fleet nearly the strength of the British -- counting Dutch, Spanish and French ships of the line together. At this point the diplomatic alliance between Pitt and the Czar was hung up on the issue of the British leaving Malta, while Napoleon expected to use Spanish ships to distract the British Navy from continental coasts with a naval presence and attacks in the Indies. Conclusion to Chapter I Questions I had in reading this chapter (apologies for sounding like a high-school teacher -- that's just the way they came out.) * What is the French point of view? Why care about England at all? Were Napoleon's actions really driven by economic and import issues? * Did Napoleon really plan to invade, or is the only conclusion we can draw from the fact that he didn't manage it -- that he never meant to? That it was a grand diversion? * What are the "erroneous strategical deductions" that Corbett complains about? (These are discussed in later chapters.) * Is the question of Malta important? Pitt felt it was, Nelson didn't -- though he likely wouldn't give it up either without a better option available.

It's much harder today, we have to use both mouse and keyboard. All they had were rats.

You might prefer Corbett's non-fiction details and analysis of what was planned, what actually happened, and what was innovative. (An appendix includes Nelson's own description of his plan, distributed ahead of time.) The innovation wasn't breaking the line -- the Wikipedia article you linked to on "Nelson's Touch" says: There is a tendency amongst some historians to attribute these tactics to Nelson alone. There was nothing new in his ideas however: Breaking the enemy line had previously been achieved by, amongst others, Admiral George Rodney at the Battle of the Saintes (1782);[7] Admiral Adam Duncan had divided his fleet atCamperdown (1797).[8] Concentration on one part of the enemy fleet was a very old tactic and had already been used by Nelson at the Nile in 1798.[9][10] Nelson was innovative in one respect at least: rather than direct the battle as it was occurring, through the use of signals, he would gather his captains together prior to action and tell them his plan but would allow them great leeway in how they carried out their individual orders.[11][12]

In all of human history, it's impossible to find any individual whose success isn't based partly on the work of associates, colleagues, and those who came before -- we all build on what we have around us. I don't think the premise you're attacking ("X was the greatest Y") is ever an interesting premise, so I can see why it annoys you. To have an interesting discussion, we have to take aspects in more detail, viz: * Grant that much of their 'greatest' stature comes from being folk heros that common people could rally around. Interesting sociologically, but not militarily. * Informed commentators recognize that each man's tactics were based principles developer earlier -- they were both students of their profession. Instead, what is interesting (to me) is to try to understand questions like these: 1. How did these men inspire confidence in those they led? What personality traits? What leadership style? 2. How did these men make the decisions that put them in the right places at the right times? 3. What was based on intuition, what was based on educated guesses, and what was based on careful preparation? Where was there luck? We also have to admire anyone who exhibits a tireless devotion to a cause greater than himself...

A suggestion for the armor/hull and gun damage indicator: Single0Decker with some hull damage: Triple-Decker with hull and gun damage: Essentials: 1. Armor damage is shown as thinning and/or breaks in the ship outline. 2. Gun damage is shown by removing the gun's square. Yes, it is a lot of squares (27 x 3 decks x 2 sides in this example), but it does show which guns are damaged. I like that the overall damage state is evident in the density of dots and lines remaining. I thought about showing reloading progress too, perhaps by coloring or filling up the dots, but that seems too much information for a display like this. The count down clock we have now works well.

Another small, relaxed step today. I like to save money until I know exactly what I want. In this case, a $15 non-USB footswitch + old USB mouse = TeamSpeak pedal solution (or firing, or gun view, or...?) StealthSwitch FS-2 Momentary Contact Foot Switch Pedal with 3.5mm (1/8 Inch) Mono Audio Plug - Slave Switch for StealthSwitch3 Link: http://amzn.com/B00QJCAZ1M If only I had a surplus wireless mouse lying around (I looked.... maybe one will come my way.)

The gunnery is a tough one. I don't envy you having to design for this. I like the "1-1-3" type sequences better than the pop-ups idea. Instead, you could have a hybrid display section at the bottom, as shown here. * Gun loading commands should affect reloading AFTER the next shot is fired. Captains have to give a separate, subsequent command to fire the guns and cause a reload. * Choosing both sides should be one key, so it takes no more time than choosing one side. * Choosing all decks should be one key, so it takes no more time than choosing one deck. In this concept, the "R" key brings up the reload display, then the sequences are 2-3, etc. * The menus show all options until you choose one, then the menu shrinks down to one line, and the next set of options appears * This 'breadcrumb" trail would stay visible for a short time as confirmation. "Reload > Doubles > Port > Deck 3" * A gun load order is cancelled if not completed; e.g. abandoning an order after the first key or second key cancels it after a short delay with no further action * If a ship or fore/aft has only one deck, the last menu isn't shown * Sequence of commands is shown here is opposite order of what we have now (shot type first, then which guns to load) This is just my preference; it could be either way.

Yes. With the limited capabilities of on-line interaction, it takes careful design of software and process to avoid extremists of any polarity from taking the fun out of it for the rest of the player base. My observation is that the debate on these forums has been about whether that's even possible and how to find that balance.

Definitely. The ornamental look is good for lobbies and menus, but not for the information displays. Sparse lines, sans serif fonts, bold colors are much better. Especially with older eyes... like this: Other things I would like (don't forget adjustments for colorblind mode) 1. Yellow to indicate "Manual Trim", white for "Auto Trim", or auto-skipper 2. Distinct color for enemy ships in mini-map (a real captain would have a good situational awareness without having to turn around to look, so I don't think this adds unrealistic data. If the ship is unknown, leave it white). Leave my ship as an outline. 3. Larger heading indicator 4. Larger rudder indicator 5. Yellow for above-water leaks, red for below waterline. 6. Maybe move the clock.

Odd, it did when I first tested it. Anyway, I added direct link that works better. Thank you! While I'm at it, this shows what happens when a massive number of on-line players tries to sail around the world:

Very nice helicopter shot of the modern-built barquentine (square-rigged foremast only) Spirit of New Zealand. This link should take you straight to the scene at 45:53 if the embedded doesn't

About 15 years ago I got a paperback copy of this book. I cut the pages out to scan them (for personal wallpaper use) -- then I got a second copy to keep intact. Some of the paintings are full page in the book -- about 9x6 inches. The Tall Ship in Art: Roy Cross, Derek Gardner, John Groves, Geoff Hunt, Mark Myers Link: http://amzn.com/0713726946

I'm sorry, I should have been more clear. The URL I posted causes Google to generate a small HTML page with a piece of the book included in an img tag. That makes it possible to ""quote"" a book: But that results in an error when clicking : "You are not allowed to use that image extension on this community.

After you click on the cover to open the book, there's a gear icon at the top right for downloading:

Would anyone be interested in reading and discussing Corbett’s The Campaign of Trafalgar together in this forum? It’s a well researched “Staff-level” study of just about every topic from the continental political situation, the land-based military strategies, naval strategy, fleet tactics, to individual cruiser ship movements. Corbett discusses who knew what, and when, at all levels of the command chain from Pitt, Napoleon, and the Czar all the way down to individual captains. Details include the signal logs from the battle, charts of individual ship movements in the months and weeks leading up to the battle, and information collected from the best French and Spanish sources to give them a fair hand too. (Of course, he may have got things wrong in some instances.) The book covers a wide range of topics in 400 pages and 26 chapters, so I thought maybe a two-weeks-per-chapter schedule would work. It would take about a year. Kind of like a book club – clarifying, discussing, criticizing, speculating, learning… I know there are a few who are similarly twisted. If this intrigues you, take a look at the Preface and the Table of Contents and let me know what you think and how we might approach it. I’d also be open to choosing a different book. Your obt. servant, etc. ------------------------------------ P.S. For those interested, there are two editions of the book that I know of: · The one I have is the 1910 edition · A later two-volume edition Despite Google’s claims to “carefully” scan their books, they don’t scan the fold-out plates. And, many library copies have had plates cut out and stolen. Of course, the plates won’t show up in a print-on-demand version either. About a year ago, I acquired a real copy and I can scan the dozen or so maps that are not visible in the ebook. Here’s one of them for Calder's retreat, a 16MB PDF. It takes some careful reading with the text to sort it out, but it gives you a good idea of the depth of research in this book. (Animations would help a lot – hmm, an idea(!))

Thank you for the link to Commodore Morris... I will take a look.

Yes, an argument based on casualty data might show a bias in targeting, as long as it's corrected for some factors. Lavery is sometimes pretty good -- maybe he's citing a research paper or war college study we could find. I'll add that book to my list; it may be in a library here somewhere. Or when you make it back home and can look it up, that would be great.

Point well-taken. I'm also frustrated when a poor reading of a source is used to support specious assertions, eg the pirates thread. That's why I'm interested if there better evidence than "I heard" and "people say".

Since they don't end in .jpg or .png, the forum disallows links copied from Google ebooks: https://books.google.com/books?id=Sv6gAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA25&img=1&zoom=3&hl=en&sig=ACfU3U25RSuQXv91Sd22EZrWe1-Y39jfPQ&ci=88%2C899%2C768%2C204&edge=0 I understand why these are filtered out, but was wondering if an exception can be made for the books.google.com domain to make it easier to cite historical references. They do show up in edit mode, but cause a "you don't have rights to post images of this type" error when posting. Yours respectfully, etc.

(The following discussion, if any, should have no bearing on the in-game mechanics being discussed wrt "high-lee kiting".) Since the first time I heard of it, I thought the idea that the French aimed for sails and the Brits aimed for hulls must be an over-generalization. There seem to be too many obvious factors that would matter much more than nationality: * Where the ships were relative to the wind * Which captain(s) desired to sink, capture or evade their enemies * The relative strengths of the ships broadside, and who wants or doesn't want a close enagement. * Whether it is a single ship or fleet engagement etc. So I looked at one of the earliest sources for tactics: John Clerk of Eldin's Essay on Naval Tactics (~1782) While Clerk of Eldin isn't a primary source himself, his book a useful source for at least two reasons: 1. He documented the knowledge of a neighbor of his, who had been a serving RN officer 2. His tactics were read and studied by many, including Nelson, who used them at Trafalgar. However, even this book cites the French-Up, Brits-Down idea as conventional wisdom: I guess this is the main written source of today's conventional wisdom. I'm trying to get to the origins behind "It having been often said..." Thoughts from those more knowledgeable than I am? I should also look into the various Fighting Instructions to see if they dictated where to aim. Thank you,