[IMPORTANT] Artillery discussion

[JaM]

you know what amuses me? that there are so many contradicting studies being made, one downplays artillery effects, another musket lethality, bayonets, cavalry... but then if you take them all seriously, what exactly caused all those dead? they didnt died of the old age... Norm during Napoleonic times was around 2000-3000 musket rounds fired for a single casualty, yet average musket couldnt fire more than 40-50 rounds without malfunction, while average ammo load was around 25 rounds (60 for British)...

 

Statistics are made from innacurate numbers. We dont have real numbers, they are just extrapolated from incomplete info. like the assumption of 10-15% casualty rate for artillery during Napoleonic times because of data published by Frech hospitals, where about 10-15% of wounded were due to artillery - such assumption doesnt take into consideration that being hit by a solid shot would most likely kill you, while  even if you are "lucky" and it just takes your leg, you had pretty low chance surviving the following operation...

 

same is true for bayonets.. It its nature, bayonet was technically very dangerous weapon - soldiers didnt used armor, so were practically defenseless against it, while you actually didnt had to thrust it hard into enemy, as even thrusts with relatively low energy had high chance to get deep into human torso and cause lethal wounds. Yet, bayonet fights were extremely rare, (french in the same report, reported 3% wounded by bayonet). Why is that? it actually has more to do with the psychical aspect of close combat than anything else.. amount of psychical stress soldier was facing equipped with a weapon that can kill enemy but gives you no protection against enemy doing the same to you was just way too much for majority of men... instead of following thorugh with bayonets into close combat, one side (with lower morale) just withdrawn from the fight before contact.. majority of bayonet use was when one side chased down the retreating enemy, while soldiers could stab enemy in the back without fear of being stabbed by somebody..

 

but lets get back to artillery. As all weapons, its effectivity depends on many aspects, and in some cases, if something is not right, results will be flawed. Using direct fire artillery against broken terrain would greatly reduce its effects on target, smoke on the battlefield would eliminate any advantage guns could get from rifling, inexperienced officers unable to realize potential of their weapons... etc etc etc.. these are factors that could greatly impact the effectivity of artillery in particular battle and it was not that uncommon to get totally different results with some adjustments to employed tactics. Like with the Seramont battery at Friedland who refused to use its battery statically, and instead he "charged" the enemy with first example of overwatch fire tactics that is something used today with tank units (one unit is stationary and covers another unit moving with their fire). At Friedland he managed to literally wipe out several Russian regiments completely, causing incredible carnage, yet there are plenty of examples of poor use of artillery which fired hundreds of projectiles and achieved nothing...

[David Fair]

Agreed, but that is why you need to cross-index the data from multiple sources.  

 

There actually have not been many "studies" made of the primary data.  This takes work.  

 

There are lots of poorly research books on the black powder era and specifically on the ACW that draw conclusions based on little or no data.  After all the goal is to sell books - so print whatever sells.

 

In the age of the internet people also post misinformation without references to their "work".  When you check references you quickly discover that they are not accurate/fabricated completely.  I guess they hope you won't check their sources?

 

For example, the link you sent me was peppered with more than 14 major inaccuracies of statements regarding warfare in the black powder era.  In the interest of brevity I chose to highlight one - regarding deployment of cavalry "exclusively on the flanks".  I've studied most black powder conflicts and knew enough to know that the statement was a complete fabrication.  All it took was the images of the maps from these battles to show that the statement was false in 88% of the cases the author used to prove his point.

 

That site was riddled with rubbish - yet I've been pointed at that site as "authoritative" at least 3 times from different folks on this forum.  

 

There seem to be some very low standards of professionalism in research.  You just can't trust everything you read - especially on the internet.

 

One of the unique advantages of studying ACW artillery is that we have primary data including ordnance reports, hospital records, Sanitary Commission documents, and often many first hand accounts of events.  By cross-referencing these sources we can begin to filter fact from less 'factiness'.  We don't get it 100% right 100% of the time - but we can get it reasonably within the ballpark.

 

A major difference between the Napoleonic wars and the ACW was the diligence of data collection and the short duration of the war.  France was weary of Napoleon's propensity for war - even his Marshals were reluctant to go to war with Russia.  Bethier in particular didn't want to leave the comfort of the Loire for the steppes.  It is a serious problem when your chief of staff is in tears for the comforts of home while on campaign.  The French nation was weary of conflict - the wars and death seemed to go on without end.  Napoleon's temperament was another problem that influenced data collection.  Napoleonic tirades are legend. This caused distortions in data collection.  For example, during the 1812 Campaign in Russia it seems that Typhus was carried from the Iberian Peninsula with the troops originating on Spain/Portugal.  Rather than the medical staff reporting that they were facing a Typhus epidemic these deaths were passed off as 'starvation'.  This passed the buck from a medical problem to a logistics problem.  We know of the Typhus problem in Napoleon's army because we have enough of the the skeletons of the dead to track their progress as the army moved east.  

 

There are certainly flaws in many of these data sets as they were often collected under extreme duress.  But, by the same token, many of the reports were not compiled under stress and are fairly accurate.  For example, in helping families identify loved ones - we know for a fact that of the millions of entries made by the U.S. Sanitary Commission were able to respond accurately to over 70% of the inquiries they received from the data they had compiled.  This data was available and on hand with the specific intention of helping families understand how their loved ones were injured and died.  This painstaking work involved over 12,000 people for the duration of the war and many years after the conflict ended.

 

Throwing data out the window because it is less than 100% accurate is throwing the baby out with the bath water.  The goal is to understand the magnitude of the inaccuracies and work within reasonable tolerances of precision.

[David Fair]

Jam,

 

What is the basis for your cynicism regarding ACW battlefield statistics?

 

I'd suggest you take a look at, "This Republic of Suffering Death and the American Civil War" by Faust and the Adams book "Doctors in Blue: the Medical History of the Union Army in the Civil War".

 

To my knowledge no nation in the history of warfare had put in the scale of effort to eradicate the word "unknown" in the context of battle.  The folks who spearheaded this effort during the was were zealous in their desire to ensure that soldiers did not die nameless.  To ignore or discount this data in our understanding of the impact of the war would be foolish in the extreme.  While the data isn't perfect it was not compiled with malice/bias.

 

Napoleon himself distorted fact.  "To Lie like a Bulletin" became a common statement because Napoleon used every battle for his propaganda.  Statistics during the Napoleonic Wars were highly suspect because they were compiled with an agenda.

 

The foundations for America's effort was religion/spiritual and often the people staffing this effort had abolitionist sympathies.  To them the war was about the religion of freedom for all races.  Identifying the wounds and the wounded was their life's mission.

 

Today this American Civil War legacy continues and the U.S. spends over $200 million each year to identify the dead/mission from the WWII, Korea, and Vietnam.

[David Fair]

It is important to keep wars properly separated - because the weapons, tactics, and methods of data collection used were not the same.  The Napoleonic Wars artillery projectiles were dominated by solid shot and canister.  Canister did most of the killing - as you point out above.  For an excellent article on use of Napoleonic Artillery at Friedland see: http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/c_senarmont.html

 

However, artillery during the ACW could not be deployed as it was during the Napoleonic Wars.  Specifically the effective range of the smooth bore musket was about 150 yards and the effective range of canister about 300 yards.  Artillery could safely wheel just outside musket range, unlimber, and blaze away at squares or lines of infantry.  During the Napoleonic Wars it was considered cowardice to dodge, duck, or - god forbid - lay on the ground when under artillery barrage.

 

By the time of the ACW the tactical use of the infantry square was obsolete.  Rifled muskets precluded cavalry charges or shattered them prior to contact. The range of the rifled musket at 300 to 400 yards wiped out cavalry and artillery horses at an alarming rate.  Batteries could not deploy safely within canister range.  When they tired to charge with artillery batteries lost their mobility from loss of horses.  Additionally, Americans figured out that it is safer to fight from the prone/supine position.  Infantry under artillery fire could reduce their threat surface from 9 square feet to 1.5 square feet by getting down on the ground.  Tactically, survival trumped machismo in the ACW. Finally, canister range had not changed - roughly 300 yards for effective range.  

 

ACW artillery was tactically in a very different situation than had existed during the Napoleonic Wars.

 

The data from the AoP medical records show that the "artillery kills" but "infantry wounded" more men is a complete red herring.  In warfare, prior to the discovery of bacteria, wounds to the head or torso were most often a death sentence - particularly if the wound penetrated the large or small intestine.  It didn't matter if the wound was caused by bayonet, minie ball, or round shot - infection set in, it was not possible to amputate in the middle of the torso - and the patient died.  The argument that artillery was more effectively killing during the ACW is medically pretty lame.

 

Additionally, during the ACW most of the projectiles fired were not solid shot.  Multi-projectile rounds, such as case shot or canister, were very much in favor and inflicted far more casualties than solid shot.  The size of these projectiles was not substantially different from the size of the infantry ammunition from a medical perspective.  A 1/2 hole is just as fatal as a 1.5 inch hole - in pre-antiseptic warfare.

 

Bottom line - overlaying  Napoleonic Wars artillery tactics as representative of the ACW is not a accurate or valid.  

 

Regarding ACW Statistics - With data sets in the small thousands of records tremendously accurate predictions are possible with less than 3% error.  Statistical predictions are the basis for today's big data analytics that are the backbone of modern business, and statistics have dozens of military applications including casualty analytics.  Statistics have proven to be outstanding predictors - denial of statistical analysis is a bit like arguing the world is flat.  

 

While the medical data for the Napoleonic Wars is very sketchy - this is not so for the ACW.  In the 1840's and 50's there was a surge of interest in statistics and statistical analysis that did not previously exist.  Part of the reason that the statistics for the ACW are so complete is that Americans were obsessed with tracking and counting everything.  

 

Additionally, there was no comparable private medical support infrastructure similar to the ACW Sanitary Commission or the other relief organizations during the Napoleonic Wars.

 

It is not a surprise that we know that the Union fired 32,781 artillery rounds at Gettysburg, nor that 37,574 rifles were collected from the battlefield.  http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/Gettysburg_Facts/Gettysburg_Facts.php  In addition to counting ammunition expended and the arms recovered the statistics of the wounded men were also painstakingly collected.

 

It is true that the names of individual soldiers were often not connected with the statistics on the individual soldier.  Dog tags had yet to be invented.  But the fact that there was not a name corresponding with the wound - does not invalidate the wound data collected by the medical personnel.

 

Historical fun fact - the medical records of ACW wounds were compiled on 3 X 5 cards.  After the war the volume of these cards had grown to such an extent that many were moved to Ford's Theater (where Lincoln was shot) which had been closed.  On June 9th, 1893 the weight of these cards resulted in the second floor of Ford's Theater collapsing - killing twenty two clerks and injuring over 100 more.  I guess you could say these were the final casualties of the ACW.  The killed and injured were compiling the statistics for the ACW to resolve pension claims.

 

The ACW was an amateurs war fought over a very short four year duration.  Many lessons of warfare were not obvious to ACW military minds when compared with the long tradition of warfare at scale of European armies.  

 

Where the U.S. did set the World Standard was in the Medical Corps and more specifically the Ambulance Corps.  By 1864 battlefield medicine in the ACW had advanced beyond anything previously known in history of battlefield relief.  The Letterman field hospitals were subsequently adopted by the British, French, and Prussians.

 

Rejecting primary ACW data as inaccurate is certainly justified in the Napoleonic Era.  In the ACW it is much more difficult to discard the data as "inherently invalid".  The scientific methods employed in collecting the data, the number of sources for collecting data, and the processes were reasonably rigorous.  Not perfect - but statistically if there was a 3% error in a data set of this magnitude it would be surprising.

 

 

Historical fun fact - the medical records of ACW wounds were compiled on 3 X 5 cards.  After the war the volume of these cards had grown to such an extent that many were moved to Ford's Theater (where Lincoln was shot) which had been closed.  On June 9th, 1893 the weight of these cards resulted in the second floor of Ford's Theater collapsing - killing twenty two clerks and injuring over 100 more.  I guess you could say these were the final casualties of the ACW.  The killed and injured were compiling the statistics for the ACW to resolve pension claims.

 

http://boothiebarn.com/2012/06/09/the-collapse-of-fords-theatre/

 

Historical fun fact - Edwin Booth, brother of John Wilkes Booth died on June 7th and was being interred in Mt. Auburn cemetery in Boston on the day of the Ford's Theatre collapse.

[David Fair]

Even if you chuck the Medical History of the Army of the Potomac as garbage - Halleck & Hunt both stated that the firepower of a battery of 12 pound Napoleons was equal to a 200 man regiment.

 

A Union brigade of 1,000 men would have about 5 regiments - so the "kills" in UGG should be scaled to the Halleck & Hunt metric to be in the ballpark of ACW artillery.  In UGG artillery batteries typically inflict as many casualties as an entire brigade.  

 

While General Gibbon stated the effect of artillery is "more moral than physical" in UGG history has been turned on its head and artillery has a dramatic physical effect.   

 

Hopefully the modders version will be out in the near future which will allow a history tuned version of UGG.

 

Tormidal - you still interested in modding UGG?

[David Fair]

Next artillery post below

[David Fair]

Just for fun let's chuck out the Civil War Medical Data. Let's also throw out the first hand knowledge of Hunt, Tidball, Alexander and the other men who fought the guns in the ACW. Those guys didn't know anything anyway and as resources they are worthless.

Now lets compare the guns.

The United States arsenal included 163 Field Guns at the start of the American Civil War. The guns were scattered across the nation - usually by 2 gun section in various posts. Frequently the men trained to man the artillery served as infantry as the guns were too cumbersome for field service chasing American Indians or Mexican Bandits. Most of these guns were model 1841 6-pounders, some mule carried mountain guns, and about forty 12-pounders of various model years from 1841 forward. These 12-pounders were of a heavy design and could not be pulled in the field with teams of less than 8 horses. In the field these guns often had teams of 10 horses.

Bottom line at the start of the war both sides had to build their field artillery arm from the ground up. But the Union had an immediate advantage - 90% of the industrial might of the nation was in the North.

After the battle of Bull Run, AoP artillery consisted of nine imperfectly equipped batteries of 39 guns, 650 men, and about 400 horses. By the following March these numbers had swelled to 92 batteries of 520 guns, 12,500 men and 11,000 horses, fully equipped and in readiness for active field service. Of this force 30 batteries were regulars and 62 volunteers.

During the Peninsular Campaign the Union held a tremendous advantage of guns in both quantity and quality. Yet the Southern forces drove the cowardly blue devils away from Richmond.

At Second Manassas the CSA captured more than 30 state of the art Union guns which vastly improved the state of the CSA ordnance.

At Antietam the Union continued to hold a significant edge in artillery both in terms of numbers of guns but also in gun caliber and quality.

Gun Type Union CSA

6 pound Model 1841 0 41

6 pound Newer Models 28? 0

12 pound Napoleon 108 27

10 pound Parrott 42

20 pound Parrott 30 4

The Union logistics train at Antietam included over 4,000 wagons whereas Lee had about 100 rounds per gun at Antietam. Additionally, Union ammunition production was much more reliable and more plentiful than Southern ammunition.

Battery A. 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery under Captain Tompkins fired 83 rounds of canister, 68 solids, 427 shell, and 454 case – a total of 1,050 rounds in four hours. Other Union batteries reported similar expenditures of ammunition – McClellan might be out-general’ed but he would never be out-logistic’ed.

Almost all of the 20 pound Parrott ammunition was also expended during the battle. Tidball stated after the battle, “the quantity of ammunition expended by the Federal guns greatly exceeded the return.”

The Union advantage in Colonel Lee speaking to Colonel E. Porter Alexander said, “Pray that you may never see another Sharpsburg. Sharpsburg was artillery hell.”

The term associated with Antietam as “Artillery Hell” is most often used out of context today. At the time Colonel Lee was specifically stating that it was not safe for any CSA battery to attempt to duel with the Union batteries because the Union could direct 6 batteries to fire on any CSA battery that had the audacity to fire from an open position.

“Artillery Hell” highlighted the disparity in numbers and quality of guns the CSA could field.

That Union guns did sweep the field at Antietam is incredible. Despite the Union advantage in guns the CSA suffered 10,316 casualties and the Union suffered 12,401 casualties.

If artillery was inflicting more than 6% of casualties then why didn’t the Union guns wipe the ANV off the map? Clearly the Union did not have a shortage of ammunition. They fired as many rounds in a single day as they would at Gettysburg.

We’ve cast out Medical Data, the opinions of the experts who actually fought the ACW, and tomorrow we can discard AAR’s, then knowledge, and the day after logic. Then the artillery casualties in UGG start to look like the history of the American Civil War.

[Nick Thomadis]

David, about artillery, I have replied in a steam forum post that artillery casualty records are based on total statistics and not on specific battle moments. In game we have multiple battle moments in which canister and shell shots are fired and player expects to see a realistic result. We cannot balance this result by a historical strict filter which will cut damage to an average 6% of all casualties inflicted unless we somehow force game armies to always wait hours in large distance between them, avoid being shot from canister rounds multiple times etc. However there is room for improvement always and feedback is always considered for future patches so we will check how we could tone down the effect of artillery without destroying its unquestionable significance in the battles of 19th century.

[XCLBR]

if you make the artillery more vulnerable to attack...which they were...this would make player alot more leary to bring up the guns as close fire support...which rarely happened...setting a brig in some trees with 4 or 5 arty pieces directly behind at this moment is almost impossible to break and is completely illogical to think that artillery can shoot through friendly units...perhaps make friendly fire possible...this would change the whole arty situation for the best in my opinion and produce more realistic results without nerfing the power of the guns....ty..ty very much...ill be here all week...lol

[David Fair]

Nick,

In my opinion you are vastly overstating your case. I've never proposed a "historical strict filter..." I've never suggested anything this rigid.

I'm not arguing for balancing artillery casualties to 6% in all situations - clearly the statistics were aggregated and individual battery performance varied significantly based on the situation.

It would be nice to have a Civil War Game that was in the ballpark of the history of the Civil War. Specifically, infantry was the dominant combat arm on the battlefield.

But...when you play a game with anemic Union infantry and ponder how a battery inflicts as many casualties as a division - there is something fundamentally flawed with the game mechanics. For example, in the stats Reb Blunt posted from your match with him 8 of the top 12 units were artillery. This is not an unusual result in UGG. But it is pure fiction in regard to the ACW.

Note that when you pulled the artillery effectiveness back under 20% I cheered the effort. UGG only stayed this way for a single test release cycle then jumped back up to pre-WWI levels - your design team simply likes artillery that is more effective than ACW artillery. But thanks for giving history a try.

It is OK to have a fantasy game of the ACW. You need to get your product out. I realize this and respect your decision.

However...

I'm cautious about ignoring posts that present sillyness about ACW history. Inflicting hundreds of casualties per battery in a single canister salvo etc...When posts ignore/rewrite history then it makes sense to point this out and put some reality into the forum content regarding the history of the ACW.

Given the state of the game in the release cycle just plow ahead.

I'm trying to restrict my comments and target history specific topics. My posts are targeted at responding to historical misconceptions/misstatements in postings. I'm not always successful in staying silent about the game - but I am trying to be supportive of your effort and silent in my criticism.

The easiest way to tone done the artillery is with the game's artillery algorithms.

Alternatively, you might want to leave the algorithms alone and consolidate the artillery batteries into artillery brigades. This would cut back on the number of batteries on the field (thus micromanagement of things like artillery ammunition selection) and help the game manageability. Additionally, folks who want to see the impact of their artillery will still see the results - it just won't mess with the historical relationship between the combat arms as much. Thus, artillery brigades would obviate the objection that "artillery is useless".

The point is there are a number of ways to skin the history cat to get the game into more of an alignment with historical reality.

I don't think at this point you want to get into revamping the tactical engine.

For example, ACW infantry objected to friendly artillery firing over their heads. When artillery did fire over the heads of friendly infantry the ammunition used was restricted to solid shot - because it could not detonate prematurely like case or shell tended to do during the war (both sides experienced tremendously faulty ammunition)See Frederiscksburg and the laying of the pontoon bridges as an example - Naisawald's "Grape and Canister provides and excellent description.

Artillery batteries that chose to ignore the infantry's objection could be threatened with a friendly bayonet charge - particularly when the infantry suffered a "friendly fire" casualty. This usually silenced the guns or had them return to solid shot.

Alternatively, artillery selecting other than solid shot could find itself without infantry support as the regiments in front of the battery tended to break and move or rout to the rear quickly.

If you need suggestions I'm happy to assist.

[David Fair]

UGG is not about the 19th century. It is about Gettysburg - 3 days out of the 100 years that made up the 19th century. Over the period of the 19th century the technologies, tactics, and philosophy of artillery changed dramatically.

Artillery's "unquestionable significance in the battles of the 19th century" is fundamentally the story of artillery through the ages - in mass artillery is effective. Napoleon understood this and massed his guns.

But the 19th century is not really what we are discussing.

America really never got the artillery memo; it had never fought a battle with 100 guns prior to 1862 - and certainly did not gain a deep understanding of the artillery arm during the ACW. Note that artillery field officers never existed in the Union Army through the entire conflict. Thus, it was always scrambling for men who could identify reasonable places to put guns during a battle. The senior gun commander was responsible for this role - but how could he leave the battery he commanded to position the batteries in the division or corps that he did not command? This question was never resolved during the ACW.

The ACW was unique, in part, because of the technology, philosophy, and tactics. You've chosen to make a game about Gettysburg - so some people might expect that the armies might perform a bit like they did at Gettysburg.

But, the universal lesson of the 19th century was that when artillery is not massed - it is not very effective. During the ACW neither side was very effective at massing artillery. The Confederates were quicker to get the artillery mass memo and organized their artillery into brigades as early as Second Manassas.

It was not until after Chancellorsville that the Union BEGAN to understand that massing batteries made an "unquestionable significance in the battles of the 19th century".

The United States Army was dominated by infantry officers who exercised command over artillery - often with poor results. Note that in the U.S. Army the largest tactical artillery organization through WWI was the artillery battery. The Artillery Reserve of the Army of the Potomac was really a bunch of batteries that were held in reserve and allocated to front line units who needed to have additional batteries, or fresh batteries for those that had been used up along the line.

What was Hunt, Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac, doing at Chancellorsville? Nothing. Hooker had stripped his authority and was using him as an errand boy. After the debacle Hunt was called in to try to unscrew the situation - which he did and protected the army from destruction - with an ad hoc line of guns.

During the entire ACW the concept of a "Grand Battery" was never used in battle. The closest the American armies came was the line of guns preceding Pickett's Charge. Note that there was no unity of command, unity of fire control, unity of targeting - simply a line of guns that blasted away by battery - wasting ammunition and "filling the valley with smoke" according to Warren who observed the barrage from Little Round Top.

Wadsworth at Gettysburg is a great example of an infantry officer who had no clue how to post batteries. When he ordered one of Wainwright's to support his right wing Wainwright refused to place a battery in such an absurd position. Wadsworth then turned to Calef and ordered him into the same position - Calef also refused - for two reasons: 1) Calef was not in Wadsworth's chain of command and 2) the position that Wadsworth identified for the battery was suicide.

Wadsworth placed Calef under arrest for insubordination and had him escorted under guard to the rear. Buford intervened and resolved the issue.

But the lack of understanding of artillery ran to much higher echelons than division commanders. Hancock, Corps commander, and wing commander had no clue how to manage artillery. Hancock's performance with artillery at Frederiscksburg, Antietam, and Gettysburg were all examples of what not to do with artillery. Note that at Fredericksburg the Union attached 17 batteries to the Corps that crossed into the town. There was only room for 7 batteries to deploy. The other 10 simply became a roadblock that interfered with the subsequent retreat.

The Union army's understanding of the artillery combat arm was amateurish and continued to be a problem through the war. One of the reasons for this was that after artillery batteries became seasoned the were often discharged, consolidated, or decommissioned. New rookie batteries were raised to take their place and the entire learning process would start over again.

It is not that artillery per se was ineffective - but the use of the arm was vastly underutilized by the Union during the ACW. For a great summary of the ineptitude or artillery use please see Hunt's writings or the recent book published on Tidball's writings.

There are wonderful stories of the heroics of individual batteries during the ACW - but no examples of artillery used effectively on the offensive. Additionally, when batteries were massed it was usually after the organizational structure had been shattered. Once the batteries (that were usually attached to brigades, or divisions) became independent of these commands they tended to find superior ground for artillery and accumulate in groups to these positions of superior fields of fire. Then the shattered Union armies would form behind these ad hoc lines of guns - saving the various armies from destruction. This pattern occurred at Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, Malvern Hill, Gettysburg, Shiloh, Stones River, etc...

Black powder artillery was most effectively used during the Napoleonic Wars. Prior to the Napoleonic Wars the guns were so heavy that they were largely static. After the Napoleonic Wars the effect of the rifled musket relegated artillery to a defensive role - particularly during the Crimean War and ACW. It was not until the invention of the effective percussion fuzes, breech loading guns, and high explosives in particular that guns would make another "unquestionable" contribution to the battlefield equation.

During the ACW the artillery was a less than 10% contribution to the lethal services of warfare. The "unquestionable significance" of artillery during the ACW was the line of ad hoc guns that prevented the ultimate destruction of shattered armies that could rest and recuperate to fight another day.

Note that on July 4, 1863 both armies at Gettysburg rested behind their lines of guns hoping the other would attack. The Union expended 32,781 rounds of artillery ammunition over the 3 previous days of fighting. The Union Army still had more than 30,000 rounds of ammunition on hand and another 30,000 rounds within 25 miles.

If artillery could have been used offensively the Union had ammunition to finish off the Rebels at both Antietam and Gettysburg. But, because artillery could not be used offensively, and Meade understood that he would pay a high price for charging the Confederate guns on Seminary Ridge - he chose not to attack.

Such was warfare during the ACW and the role of the artillery in that war.

General statements like, artillery's "unquestionable significance in the battles of the 19th century" simply highlight the need for a bit more rigorous research on the role of the artillery during the conflict.

[David Fair]

Nick,

When designing a game at the brigade level it is clear that tactical abstractions are required. Specifically, infantry tactics for attacking artillery were to attack the battery in skirmish formation.

While UGG can't form skirmishers there should be some reasonable abstraction for the tactical effects of skirmishing.

Battery commanders required infantry support to ensure that friendly skirmishers protected the battery from unfriendly skirmishers. Battery commanders who were not protected complained that fighting skirmishers with cannons was like, "trying to kill mosquitoes with a rifle."

During the Napoleonic Wars infantry sometimes marched in formation into a line of guns; but we Americans had figured out that skirmishing, staying under cover, and staying low to the ground was the best way to attack an isolated battery. Bigelow's should be the poster child for UGG - the battery lost ALL of its horses to skirmishers, then all its guns. 25% of the men were casualties when the battery was overrun. The battery inflicted almost no casualties on the attacking CSA skirmishers - they never provided enough of a target. The formed infantry stayed out of range while the battery was overrun.

Murdering formed infantry with canister was common in Napoleonic Warfare; but, a rare occurrence during the ACW. Yet in UGG the design of the game fails to capture ACW tactics. Thus, artillery "kills" are vastly overstated for the conflict.

I'd suggest you tune the algorithms to represent the abstracted tactics. It is fine that you can't break units into skirmishers - but less fine that you can't find a reasonable representation of the ACW battlefield with creative abstractions that can get closer to the battlefield reality.

[David Fair]

Nick,

I'm writing on artillery because I also, "expect to see a realistic result."

The difference is that I'm comparing the number of projectiles in an artillery round with the casualties inflicted - and the results in UGG are pure fiction. Then I looked at the metrics from the officers who fought in the war, and the medical records from the men who patched the wounded. And the data tells a very consistent and tightly correlated picture of "realism".

I'm not sure how you can talk about "realistic results" then compare the results in UGG to the historical record of Gettysburg. Your game does not align with the historical record of the ACW - primarily because the artillery is anachronistically lethal.

I've run the tests and sent you the numbers to show you how far off these are. Reb Blunt has posted your battles and single batteries are more powerful than brigades - 8 of the top 12 lethal brigades were artillery batteries. In UGG battle after UGG battle the end results of a campaign are that the cumulative effects of artillery are way too lethal for the ACW.

You need to hang your arguments on something other than "realism" because the results of UGG are currently "fantasy-ism" that are off by almost an order of magnitude.

The net result is that the Union infantry have been nerfed to anemic cowards to balance the absurd artillery power.

Seriously you need to pick up on some of the metrics by Hunt, Halleck, Tidball and others or take a look at some of the primary sources of information. The casualties inflicted follow the projectiles fired. You need to include both the infantry and artillery ordnance expenditure data in your consideration. Millions of rounds of small arms ammunition was usually expended compared to thousands of artillery rounds. When you calculate the ratio of lead in the air it magically aligns with the Hunt/Halleck metric that a battery firing canister was roughly as effective as a 200 man regiment and if you calculate the number of batteries in the Army of the Potomac as a ratio to the infantry then the casualty data also neatly aligns with the medical data.

The fact that all of the data aligns at the same points suggests that the data is in the ballpark of "realism"; and that UGG is not even close to representing "realism" regarding the ACW.

[sterner]

Hi, David, what is your expected number of casualties from artillery? Please provide your numbers of casualties for distances: 50, 100, 250, 500, 1000 yards.

[David Fair]

Hi Sterner,

We need a bit more precision in the question you're asking to ensure I'm answering the question you are asking. Also, I'd like to ensure my responses are practical for the game engine so in some cases I have some questions.

Is this an algorithm tuning question or a broader question? Specifically:

First of all what is the assumed target unit?

The impact of artillery was largely determined by the size and density of the target. The impact on cavalry is different than infantry or artillery. The impact of artillery on infantry columns or in enfilade is different. Also artillery in battery was less of a target than limbered artillery. If you can help me understand the game mechanics I'll tune my responses to ensure I'm not responding with answers that are impossible to implement.

We need a bit broader discussion - first of all guns had both a moral and physical impact on infantry that increased as infantry moved closer to the guns. I don't think you can move artillery into the ballpark of historical realism without considering both the physical and moral impact. If you can help me understand how artillery impacts morale it would help me compare UGG with the historical record.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Please let me know which scale to discuss in responding to your question.

Is this a question about an individual gun by gun type?

If this a question about a battery?

If a battery do you need battery type?

If this is about battery types I'd need to understand a bit more about how you calculated the impact of CSA batteries in UGG to compare how this aligned with history. Note that historically CSA batteries were of different gun types, but, at Gettysburg they were organized into brigades (CSA called these artillery "battalions") and the brigades fought more by gun type than by battery type. For example, the July 3 artillery barrage included the rifled pieces and 12 pound Napoleons. Longstreet's Charge on July 3 received close fire support mostly from the 12 pound and 24 howitzers from multiple batteries - the only guns which had not participated in the barrage preceding the attack because they didn't have the range to reach the Union guns on Cemetery Hill.

Is this a question about an artillery brigade - where abstractions become more important as we move from individual guns/types of guns, to homogeneous batteries, to heterogeneous artillery brigades.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Are you looking for historical numbers for statistical averages or a single static number?

Alternatively, do you want numbers that I think would work well and help better balance the game?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The distances you've provided don't make any sense in the context of the ammunition of the ACW.

If we take a look at ACW artillery projectiles from ACW Range Tables (Barry, "Instructions for Field Artillery", Gibbon, "Artillerist Maual", Benton's West Point Textbook "Ordnance and Gunnary" we get a general picture of how the various types of ammunition used for the 12 pound Napoleon were:

Canister (27 projectiles/round) was fired at ranges less than 400 yards. Canister became more effective under 300 yards. At 150 yards crews often switched to double canister if ammunition was abundant.

Case shot (72 projectiles/round) was fired at ranges greater than 400 yards out to about 600 or 700 yards.

Shell (4 to 7 projectiles/round) was fired at ranges over 400 yards and primarily had a morale impact.

Solid shot was fired at all ranges (depending on the target) and was effective out to about 1,000 yards. Napoleons could fire out to 1,600 yards and rifles out to 2,400 yards but the lethal effects were minimal at this distance.

For UGG then I'd suggest we consider looking at the distances of 150 yards and less, 150 to 300 yards, >300 yards, and >600 yards out to 1,000 yards.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The last topic to consider is ACW tactics. In UGG it is impossible to deploy skirmishers. Yet, this was the primary method of eradicating annoying batteries - particularly isolated batteries that did not have infantry support.

If we are going to include an abstraction for skirmishers then we should adjust our assumptions to include this abstraction.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Let me know if/where my questions may be too complex for UGG and we can iterate on questions/answers that fit your requirements for UGG.

Thanks for considering bringing artillery more into alignment with the historical record!

[David Fair]

Hi Sterner,

If the guidance I've requested is too complex we can talk about tuning the algorithm.

In the past the artillery "kills" algorithm was dialed down then compared with battlefield test results. When the battlefield tests yielded about 20% of the casualties by artillery this was a good starting point.

Does this approach make sense?

Alternatively, let me know if you want to go forward with to your approach above of casualties at each distance as the starting point.

Thanks

[sterner]

Hi David,

Guidance isn't complex, but keeping 20% casualties from artillery is not possible and it depends on gameplay. But I agree that effect from artillery could be different as you mentioned in previous post. We will consider that in next game.

Thanks

[David Fair]

Hi Sterner,

If you want artillery performance that is both historically correct and "satisfactory"/"relevant" for gameplay in UGG then you might consider using a higher organization than the battery. Six or eight guns was not a large enough number of guns to have a major tactical impact on battles - particularly when you are focused at the brigade scale for the infantry.

If effectiveness is measured in lethal scale a battery was roughly equal to a 200 man regiment.

IMO you have a tactical mismatch between infantry brigades and artillery batteries. If you are going to play at the infantry brigade level then you need to increase the number of guns in tactical units above the scale of the battery. Currently you have artillery tactically at the regimental scale while the infantry is at the brigade scale.

The problem with this is that the ACW was not an artillery fest. Phillips of the 5th Massachusetts Battery called the Confederate artillery barrage on July 3 "a humbug" with no militarily relevant impact. Warren, Hunt, and Meade ordered the Union artillery to stop firing at long range because it was "filling the valley with smoke but doing little damage."

Two "half-brigades" per Corps would allow artillery support between the three divisions in a Corps. You could think about organizing artillery in a 2 battery divisional support groups(about 1/3 of an artillery brigade) which would provide each division artillery support.

If you wanted my input I'd suggest the artillery organization of "half brigades" to ensure players consider putting Corps into the historically correct 2 divisions on the front line with the 3rd division as a reserve.

You might want to think about artillery brigades, half brigades, or 1/3 brigades - about 18 guns to make the artillery have an impact without turning the ACW into something it was not - an artillery fest.

This should balance the scale of the infantry brigades with an appropriate artillery support structure.

This was a strange exchange. Clearly a fixed rate of 20% is not desirable. Gameplay should impact the results.

It seems you can either tune the algorithm to keep all the individual batteries in the game (which would be annoying as the impact of each battery will be less - and players will correctly complain artillery is "worthless") or increase the size of the tactical units to something more than individual batteries (artillery brigades or sections of artillery brigades).

But, an artillery battery with as many "kills" as an infantry brigade is absurd.

If you tune the algorithm down and test it to put artillery casualties in the 18% to 25% (dependent upon gameplay) you don't really need specific numbers of kills at range X,Y, or Z.

If you want me to give you historical data for the ranges I've outlined above these should hold true for artillery from about 1750 through 1865 by individual gun type. After 1865 the introduction on new fuzes had a significant impact the artillery performance.

I can define the assumptions for the numbers.

Note that numbers for individual guns would still need to be tuned for the number of guns in the battery/brigade.

[David Fair]

Hi Sterner,

The best place to start with artillery’s ability to inflict casualties is: Lt. Col. Ormond M. Lissak’s “Ordnance and Gunnary. A Text Book”. from 1915.

Ordnance and Gunnery. A Text-Book. New York: John Wiley, 1915. Page 446

A projectile energy of 58 foot-pounds force (US Army calculation) to 60 foot-pounds force (81 J) (British calculation) was required to disable an enemy soldier. This applies for soldiers across the ages - including Gettysburg. When a canister projectile hit a target is was possible that it could have the energy to inflict 2 casualties if the lines of the target infantry were close enough that the projectiles still had the energy to inflict casualties.

Canister - 300 Yards and Less

When the 27 projectiles in a canister round exited the cannon tube their velocity of 1,485 per second in a cone-shaped pattern. The projectiles can be divided into thirds:

- 9 projectiles would hit the ground in the first 50 feet. If the ground was solid they would continue in flight for about another 100 feet. If the ground was soft the flight of these projectiles often stopped in the first 75 feet.

- 9 projectiles would fly at the elevation of the gun tube – and carry out to about 300 feet.

- 9 projectiles would fly at over 2 meters for the first 150 feet then descend to lethal height out to about 400 feet.

Thus, for a single round of canister on level and solid ground at most distances 18 casualties per canister round would be possible for a 12 pounder gun – but projectiles often hit the same target more than once and a more accurate number would be in the 14 to 16 casualties per gun per round of canister.

Double Canister – 150 Yards and Less

Double canister could inflict 22 to 26 casualties per round per gun within the 150 meters of the gun.

Effects of Battery Canister Fire

For a battery of six guns double canister could inflict between 132 and 156 casualties.

For a battery of six guns canister could inflict between 84 and 96.

Two rounds of canister could be fired per minute – but most often guns that had infantry support would withdraw all equipment and men about 200 yards – leaving a single gunner to pull the lanyard on a final round of double canister. This ensured that even if the gun was captured it could not be turned against the former owners. If the gun was not overrun the crew would return to the gun and continue the fight.

Canister had a significant impact on the target unit’s organization (condition) as well as morale. Units that had been shaken rarely had the gumption to take a battery. Fresh troops are known to have overrun as many as three batteries in succession before their condition and morale dropped enough to preclude further action until they had rested.

>300 Yards Out to 600 Yards

Civil War Artillery had a variety of ammunition options. The most effective anti-personnel round at this distance was case shot (shrapnel). Each round carried a one-ounce charge that detonated the projectile about 75 yards in front of the target infantry and 15 feet above the target. The likelihood of an optimal shot is about 1 in 33 or about 3% per gun or 18% for a six-gun battery. An optimal shot with case could inflict about 12 to 16 casualties. The likelihood of an entire battery with optimal shots (inflicting 96 casualties from a single battery salvo) might have happened once at the combined battles of Gettysburg, Antietam, and Fredericksburg.

For a 6-gun 12-pounder battery the casualties of 14 to 22 per salvo would be a generous number of casualties.

Note that shell was often fired at this distance. When shell’s detonated they broke into 4 to 8 pieces with unpredictable flight trajectories (due to the non-uniform shape of the fragments). While it was unusual for these rounds to be lethal on the field the sound of these projectiles did have an impact on both unit organization (condition) and morale.

Batteries often fired with both case and shell in a single salvo (2 or 3 guns loaded with shell) for optimal lethal and morale impact at this distance.

>600 Yards Out to 1,000 Yards

Judging correct distances at this range was very difficult and the effectiveness of case and shell dropped significantly in the smoke-filled confusion of battle. The most frequent round used beyond 600 yards was solid shot. (These numbers are from tests carried out in England in 1835 using 12-pounders.)

At 600 yards a 12-pounder had an 87% chance of hitting a regimental size target.

At 950 yards this dropped to 40% chance of hitting a regimental size target.

At 1,300 yards this dropped to a 17% chance of hitting a regimental size target.

Casualties for solid shot should be calculated based on the depth of the target. For each rank encountered these percentages are applicable. Thus it would be possible for a 6-gun battery to inflict something like 10 casualties per salvo at 600 yards, 5 per salvo at 950 yards, and 2 per salvo over 1,000 yards.

Rifled guns might have a slightly higher chance of having the precision to hit a target at greater distance – but keep in mind that rifled rounds tended to bury themselves in the dirt prior to detonation – which absorbed the impact and mitigated the lethal impact at long-range.

Keep in mind these are optimal numbers.

As soon as you place artillery on a hill you decrease the impact of canister - because the guns were limited in how far the tube of the gun can be depressed. As a result - cannons firing canister from hills/ridges at infantry targets on lower elevations tended to shoot over the heads of the attacking infantry - often dramatically reducing the lethal effects.

Additionally, cover, soft ground, and obscured sight ensured that artillery was operating under less than ideal battlefield conditions. For historical reference - Napoleon's attack at Waterloo was delayed until the afternoon to ensure the ground had time to dry to ensure the impact of his artillery projectiles might be closer to optimized numbers.

[David Fair]

You also need to keep in mind that batteries were frequently "sniped out of existence" during the ACW.

Rather than a regiment blindly charging a battery with horrific casualties it was standard tactical procedure to send out skirmishers to inflict casualties in the gun crews and horses to reduce the lethal effectiveness of the battery and eliminate the battery's mobility.

Perhaps the missing tactical ingredient from UGG is skirmishing - which would reduce the lethal effectiveness of artillery.

Also, reducing the effectiveness of artillery firing canister firing at less than ideal targets (such as infantry on lower elevations attacking artillery on hill tops).

Finally, ACW infantry dramatically reduced casualties by fighting in the prone position. Infantry firing from the ground is very difficult to artillery to eliminate. There are many examples of infantry advancing on a battery immediately after the battery fires. When infantry closed to within 100 yards - if the artillery fired it couldn't reload or limber to the rear fast enough to escape a quick charge.

[David Fair]

Hi Sterner,

Now that we've taken a look at optimum casualty situations we should also consider "less than optimal" artillery effectiveness. ACW tactics frequently allowed infantry to get close to batteries with minimal casualties, and in good condition with morale in tact. These infantry tactics were effective enough that artillery inflicted only about 6% to 10% of all ACW casualties.

For example, at Gettysburg, the 21st Mississippi took on a series of 3 Union batteries, all firing canister, in succession and lost only about 27 men by artillery fire. The combination of terrain, using rock walls for cover, fighting from the ground, and rapid advances mitigated Confederate casualties. The 21st eventually penetrated the perimeter of the battery to such an extent that they were standing on the Union limbers and shooting the horses to prevent the guns from escaping.

Minimal artillery casualties were the more frequent norm for the ACW.

While it would be possible to build the effects of terrain into the UGG model my hunch is it would be far more efficient just to tune the artillery algorithms to reflect "historic" results rather than deal with optimal vs. sub-optimal battery positions. In my mind it would seem to be a nightmare trying to identify all of the "optimal" battery locations, then identify all of the "standard" battery locations, finally all of the sub-optimal areas for battery fields of fire.

Optimal fields of fire for artillery were typically flat plains (where the gun and the target were on the same elevation) with no cover - not a situation that occurs very often on the North American continental topography until you get to Kansas/Nebraska/Eastern Colorado. Given that the ACW was fought mostly east of the Mississippi River the artillery was often fighting on hilly terrain, frequently covered by trees.

Both Grant and Sherman late in the war dramatically reduced the number of guns in their armies. After Gettysburg the number of guns in Union batteries was reduced from 6 to 4 guns to reduce the number of horses that needed to be fed. The Army of the Potomac eliminated more than 100 guns to assist in managing the logistics for the war. Gettysburg was the last time the two great armies in the East would mass against each other with hundreds of guns in line on open ground. In the Wilderness Campaign, the artillery fought in small groups of batteries/single gun actions. At Petersburg, field cannon were replaced by siege artillery (mortars and guns of position in fixed fortifications, with chests removed from limbers and caissons, and all vehicles and horses sent to the rear.)

See Grape & Canister p. 474 [The Wilderness] "...the Union artillery had only negligible losses; eleven men in the II Corps brigade, all in Dow's and Rickett's units; another eleven in V Corps, eight from Winslow's battery; and none at all in the VI or IX Corps or the Artillery Reserve."

IBID p. 484 "On the Union side the main problem was that the artillery had been of little use in the fight so far. Grant was fully aware of this situation; for on the morning of May 10th he wired Halleck in Washington, "We want no more wagons nor artillery.""

Bottom line - you want a game that reasonably reflects the reality of warfare in each unique period where you plan to author games. In order to manage this for the ACW building normalized casualty results will be much simpler than trying to figure out which battery positions offered optimal fields of fire.

[Lincolns Mullet]

Wow.  Some fantastic detail/history here.  I'm a game designer at heart/old trade, so as I read these posts I can't help but come back to the question, "Yea, but is it fun?"

 

It seems there's too much focus on the numbers.  Game kills vs. historical kills by artillery.  Forget history for a moment.  What really matters here is the overall balance and effect artillery has on actual gameplay.  You want to make everything realistic?  Then you no longer have a game.

 

If the game is balanced and fun, then I don't care if artillery numbers are too high.  If it works, it works.  Not historical?  That's ok.  Its a bonus, but not necessary for me to have fun.  I've won as the CSA and the Union...artillery sucks on the receiving end, but you have artillery too.  Use it, brah.  And as someone else said, any historical game can go down a very long and hellish slippery slope of "realism" that would tie the devs up for years on this one game.  They have a business to run and, apparently, Antietam to work on next.

 

Bring it on, because I'm already going to put more $$ on it!

[CSA Watkins]

Wow.  Some fantastic detail/history here......snip 

 

......And as someone else said, any historical game can go down a very long and hellish slippery slope of "realism" that would tie the devs up for years on this one game.

 They have a business to run and, apparently, Antietam to work on next.....snip

 

 

Agree....^^ Realism outside weapons(Ballistics/Cofficient(ranges/fall off) is a difficult thing to achieve... Lets face it,,With realistic weapon behavior ingame, the numbers will be askewed.

 

Some Players have a lack of knowledge with period tactics(me included). Cannonade/Batteries/charging of positions(Batteries/front lines) in game.

This result's is a slaughter with a high unrealistic number being killed. With Cannonade particularly which in turn does reflect unrealistic numbers killed with the weapon's/war.

I have found that the proper use as far as 1 can utilize in game will reflect a more realistic outcome in Numbers/situation killed.

 

With David's Posts, he does his home work n is well read/learnt/educated on the subject, which promps me to

do my own research/reading(Hobby) for my own satisfication/curiosity.

 

One point that I never knew, or read about until David mentioned it. Which is largely ignored in historical writings.

Front line troops would adopt the prone position, when in a fire fight in certain battles/situations(Open Field/Area)...

Perryville comes to mind, here is a copy n paste

---

For four years – from Shiloh to the last battle – these four Tennessee regiments of Maney’s Brigade,

Cheatham’s Division, were comrades in arms, each assured of the support of the other in critical emergencies.

Captain Malone’s account of the Perryville battle is as follows:....

 

.......and in the field I saw the 41st Georgia and the 6th and 9th Tennessee Regiments lying on the ground,

engaged in a bitter fight with the line of the enemy on the edge of the hill in their front,

which was supported by Parsons’s Battery of eight, '12-pound Napoleon guns.

It seemed to me that our men could not have maintained our position at all but for the fact that old Turner – the best artilleryman, but the poorest drilled man in the army

https://busenbarkcivilwar.wordpress.com/2011/09/03/ningan-steele-lindsey27th-tennessee-infantry/

---

Hell of a charge there,, that took balls to run into those Cannons/Supporting Infantry.

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With that said there is problems with artillery/Melee/ ranges, but is a wip.

But these things are relative minor...imo/ but none the less at times quite irritating.....but is being looked into/fix/patch...if I read correctly.....

 

I believe the next project(Sharpsburg) will be a lot better as the Dev. has posted, with engine improvements,,etc...

[Nick Thomadis]

David, there is a new beta awaiting you to check it if you have time. Artillery should be balanced much more close to what you would like.

[David Fair]

Thanks for the notice Nick - but once again Steam has terminated my account and access to the game.

Last time I dealt with this "lost account" issue with Steam it took 3 months to resolve and a big chunk of my time.

While I'm happy to take a look as a tester I can't afford the time it takes to deal with Steam.

Kind Regards,

DF