Jomini NOT Sun Tzu for Civil War Tactics

[Norfolk nChance]

I’m just way too old to courses. I admire you all doing something like that.

 

One thing I had noticed missing from this section is “Game Theory” and the breaking down of tactics and strategies into their elements. My first book I read many years back was Thinking Strategically by Avinash Dixit that’s still popular today.

 

Maybe this is best started with another thread later…

Edited June 2, 2017 by Norfolk nChance

[Andre Bolkonsky]

36 minutes ago, Mr. Mercanto said:

I just recently decided to put my MA "on hold." I feel your pain, Andre ;P 

Yeah . .. you may want to reread my post again. 

[veji1]

Well there is a problem with the thread's title straightaway that sort of makes it lose much of any credibility : Sun Tzu and tactics in the same sentence... Sun Tzu isn't tactics, his are more philosophical principles and axioms applied to war, more akin to a book of proverbs and parables on war. It's completely different to what Jomini or others did which was more based on actual study of wars being carried out in their time.

[Keepbro]

Sun Tzu is a philosophy of war that is designed for autocratic societies (ie Dictators and Kings and how they should wage war) that is still relevant today but probably only if you are tinpot dictator in the arse end of nowhere. Modern militaries and their very complex supply needs are run philosophically almost exactly the opposite of Sun Tzu. 

Most Governments with big militaries these days are Democratic and how they wage war is entirely different. Democracies generally only fight only when they have to and prefer to have coalitions backing them. They also have professional volunteer armies that aren't used as police forces since a civilian police force is preferable. Dictatorships are more likely to invade other countries, usually use armies as police forces and in many cases forcibly conscript. Dictators also don't care about casualties.  Democracies are susceptible to casualties since democratic leaders will get voted out if too many casualties occur which is why democracies use highly trained volunteers (to keep morale high) and try to use the best equipment. If you take a rough look at Sun Tzu and compare it roughly to US doctrine (using the US since this is an ACW game site) they are almost completely different. Sun Tzu advocates quick decisive action taken on enemy soil with plunder being given to troops and no interference from civilians. The US military states that it should not to go to war unless its in the National interest, does so wholeheartedly with full supply, has clear objectives and exit plan and is backed by its Congress. The US does not usually wage war quickly. There's usually heavy buildup with lots of talking before any action is taken. So completely the opposite of Sun Tzu. 

Please note that my study of US military doctrine was done during the Powell era so it may have changed a bit. 

[Mr. Mercanto]

On 2017-6-2 at 2:34 AM, Andre Bolkonsky said:

Yeah . .. you may want to reread my post again. 

I did. Still can't figure out what was wrong with my response, do I just deleted it, since I really can't be bothered to figure out what the problem was.

[Andre Bolkonsky]

36 minutes ago, Mr. Mercanto said:

I did. Still can't figure out what was wrong with my response, do I just deleted it, since I really can't be bothered to figure out what the problem was.

Sooner or later, you'll get the joke. 

[Mr. Mercanto]

2 minutes ago, Andre Bolkonsky said:

Sooner or later, you'll get the joke. 

I now get the joke. 




I'll be adding it to the USB for future reference. I tip my Union Kepi to you, sir.

[thomas aagaard]

Jomini and Sun Tzu are about strategy and maybe about the operational level. They are not about tactics.

 

Two other things.
There was never a German doctrine called Blitzkrieg. What they did was nothing more than old style Prussian military thinking with new toys.

Tactics during the civil war had very very little to do with tactics of the Napoleonic wars. Had french infantry tactics from the start of the century been used on the 3rd of july 1863 Their infantry would have gone forward in columns covered by  a thick screen of skirmishers (something like 25% of the attacking force) and they would have been followed by horse artillery going forward to provide support.

During the civil war we rarely see 25-33% of a infantry force fighting deployed in front of the lines as skirmishers... something that was the norm when the french and british fought each other.
 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

19 hours ago, thomas aagaard said:

There was never a German doctrine called Blitzkrieg. 

Goebbels begs to disagree. 

I prefer the terms Kesselschlacht, or you can call it Keil und Kessel if you want. Granted, the term is as mis-used as Shock and Awe by people who think Tiger Tanks never broke down on the side of the road and that Panthers were built of the finest Krupps pre-war steel possible. But, yes, in the war of propoganda and in the modern mind, Blitzkrieg is a real thing. 

[thomas aagaard]

Suggest your read my post again.

There was never a german doctrine called blitzkrieg.

An army doctrine is something you will find in the army handbooks explaining how to fight. The army would have been training for that way of fighting for years. The army structure made to support that doctrine. Their plans made to support that way of fighting.

Had it existed as a doctrine you would find references to is all over the German military handbooks of the period. And you don't.
It simply don't exist. 

How the journalists in the west (true lack of understanding of German military traditions) invented an name have no influence on German doctrine... and is irrelevant to my post.

 

The wiki page about this actually explain the issue rather well.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitzkrieg

[Andre Bolkonsky]

I agreed with you in part, I disagreed with you in part. You repeated your previous statement and want to make this about semantics. I have nothing more to add. 

[A. P. Hill]

4 hours ago, Andre Bolkonsky said:

I agreed with you in part, I disagreed with you in part. You repeated your previous statement and want to make this about semantics. I have nothing more to add. 

Ooooo.  Now you did it ... you worked up the ire of Mr. Aagaard.  Run!  Run for the hills!  

[Andre Bolkonsky]

No offense intended. I have nothing but respect for the many posts Thomas has made here. 

[Buford Protege]

The important point to remember is to look at the fact that nearly every war ever entered into the Armies were prepared for the previous war(s) and not the new one.  We dissect everything In the past beyond any sense of realism.  The blitz idea was formed long before the Germans or Prussians.  It essentially used the tank as heavy cavalry of old.  An concentrated attack at important strategic points and then followed up on by light cavalry that encircles the enemy that can not get away.  Then the infantry hammers away at the enemy.  Old ways of war adapted to modern wars is the explanation of basically any new breakthrough.  Sun Tzu can be applied today, as can Jomini and Clauswitz and many others.  What one has to do is analyze what they bring to the table and try to decipher how one can apply them with new tools.  The side that does it the quickest or most efficient is generally the one who wins the day.

 

I heard a great quote by Woodrow Wilson back during the First World War, before the United States entered.  He said that with the state of modern war no nation is left untouched.  When one remembers that we can see how the world has changed in the past hundred and fifty years.  It is remarkable when one thinks that no outside nation got directly involved by sending troops or intervening.  In the modern world when a Civil War breaks out everyone has to have a hand in the pot and push their ideologies.  Leaves one to wonder how things would have been different.

[Norfolk nChance]

https://www.amazon.com/Blood-Fury-Americas-Civil-Season/dp/B01MRXHLR8

 

the Naval Action Guy is back again sorry… another question… well two…

 

So, earlier in this thread I asked what one thing do you think led to the North’s victory. Great feedback and nothing surprising. The above link I wouldn’t think many of you hardcore Civil War guys would rate. More for mainstream audience obviously.

One thing, am starting to pick up on my initial studies is a recurring theme. Even then before and during the War, the North was expected to Win and win quite quickly because of its railways and industrial superiority over the South. And yet it didn’t, it took time…

Why I mention the tv series is because it actually conveys this really well. It did bring out the frustration and Lincoln having to hotfoot around changing the whole reason for the war. This actually leading to some even switching sides.

"The Civil War - with maps" M. David Detweiler  

The book I finished reading. Here left me thinking the Southern Land mass was enormous is size and scale. This was I think why it took so long for the North to win. Finally leads to my Question…

 

The Question.

Did General Lee effectively use the South’s Land mass?

My impression is he didn’t. I’m thinking along the lines of the “Russian” defense of drawing in over stretching with a shock counter offensive. Instead he adopted a quick offensive stance. Lee's thinking I understand was the South can only win if it’s a short engagement…

 

Last Question.

Is there any scenario in which Lee could have won the war?

 

 

 Thank you for a great thread,

 

Norfolk nChance.

 

[Buford Protege]

On 6/23/2017 at 8:49 PM, Norfolk nChance said:

https://www.amazon.com/Blood-Fury-Americas-Civil-Season/dp/B01MRXHLR8

 

the Naval Action Guy is back again sorry… another question… well two…

 

So, earlier in this thread I asked what one thing do you think led to the North’s victory. Great feedback and nothing surprising. The above link I wouldn’t think many of you hardcore Civil War guys would rate. More for mainstream audience obviously.

One thing, am starting to pick up on my initial studies is a recurring theme. Even then before and during the War, the North was expected to Win and win quite quickly because of its railways and industrial superiority over the South. And yet it didn’t, it took time…

Why I mention the tv series is because it actually conveys this really well. It did bring out the frustration and Lincoln having to hotfoot around changing the whole reason for the war. This actually leading to some even switching sides.

"The Civil War - with maps" M. David Detweiler  

The book I finished reading. Here left me thinking the Southern Land mass was enormous is size and scale. This was I think why it took so long for the North to win. Finally leads to my Question…

 

The Question.

Did General Lee effectively use the South’s Land mass?

My impression is he didn’t. I’m thinking along the lines of the “Russian” defense of drawing in over stretching with a shock counter offensive. Instead he adopted a quick offensive stance. Lee's thinking I understand was the South can only win if it’s a short engagement…

 

Last Question.

Is there any scenario in which Lee could have won the war?

 

 

 Thank you for a great thread,

 

Norfolk nChance.

 

When you look at it the largest mistake in my opinion that the Confederacy made was changing their capital to Richmond.  It essentially forced Lee to fight the quick response defense that he used.  Had the capital stayed in Alabama it would have made a much larger buffer zone and thus become more of a difficult location to capture and would have allowed more freedom of movement for Lee and other Confederate commanders in general.

Essentially, I for one believe that by the time Lee took command of the Confederate forces the chance to win a victory was gone.  The best chance was lost by Beauregard after 1st Bull Run when the federal army was in disarray and the fortifications were not complete around Washington and no garrison to speak of.  Had the Confederacy followed up their victory it would have likely been their best chance.  When fighting an industrial behemoth the best thing is for quick victories to keep their strength from overwhelming you.  Look at Japan vs USA during WWII, 6 months of Japanese victories ultimately overwhelmed by American industrialization.  Unfortunately, or fortunately depending on your view, the Southern arms were split in leadership at the time and the forces under questionable leadership in many areas.  Much of the ANV's right flank never engaged and could have followed up the Union retreat.  Would have been a sight to see with an energetic Longstreet leading the charge (this was before his family succumbed to Scarlet Fever in the winter of 61-62 that took much of his zeal and brought on the moodiness).  The Federal army was a mess, Tyler, Heintzelman, and Hunter's divisions were a mess.  Runyon's was a motley assortment of militia and Dixon Miles was drunk.  What few regulars there were on hand (300 cavalry, 300 marines, 400 infantry) would not have been able to stem the tide.

I believe that even had Lee won Gettysburg it is likely he never would have been able to take Washington or subdue the Federal government as the ability of the Federals to reinforce Washington from New York, PA, Ohio etc was something that could suddenly bring about 15,000+ fresh troops in weeks notice and with the fortifications that Washington already had by 1863 he would have had to set up a fruitless siege.

When you think of what Lee was faced with and the logistical and political problems he faced it is remarkable what he was able to do.  I recommend reading Douglass Southall Freeman's work called "Lee's Lieutenants" to get a good feel for the command problems he faced.

The South had a great chance as the 16,000 US regulars were spread across the country, far from the zones of early combat and the industrialization wasn't ready yet.  Had they struck decisively and quickly they would have stood a puncher's chance.

[Andre Bolkonsky]

On 6/23/2017 at 8:49 PM, Norfolk nChance said:

 

The Question.

Did General Lee effectively use the South’s Land mass?

My impression is he didn’t. I’m thinking along the lines of the “Russian” defense of drawing in over stretching with a shock counter offensive. Instead he adopted a quick offensive stance. Lee's thinking I understand was the South can only win if it’s a short engagement…

 

Last Question.

Is there any scenario in which Lee could have won the war?

 

First question: 

The biggest mistake the Confederacy made, but a necessary political concession, was establishing Richmond, Virginia as their capital. Initially in Mongomery, AL, there was a long term plan to build a new capital near Atlanta. But, the interim capital would be Richmond.

Lee had one mission and one mission only: defend Richmond. Period. That's the whole of it. His use of the defensive terrain was masterful, but the amount of land he had to work with was very, very small. 

Richmond and Washington are separated by a gap of a little less than 110 miles. At that moment, any concept of Defense in Depth and Space for Time are totally thrown out the window. That is why these battles happen on the same pieces of dirt over and over again. 

At first, the South refused major offensive operations in the North to prove they were not the aggressor in this conflict, but the Yankee mass of men and material was never ending and just too great and the South was forced to attack. When his offensive capability was shattered, Lee's defense of Richmond was legendary. 

Going into your second question: 

Could Lee have won the war? - This should read 'Could Jefferson Davis have won the war'. Lee worked for Davis, and for all his flaws, Davis did an impressive job given the constraints placed upon him by time and space. 

The popular answer is the fantasy scenario whereby Stonewall Jackson is not shot -- accidently by his own troops in an Act of God -- and killed at Chancellorsville. At Gettysburg, the OOB of the Army of Northern Virginia remains simple and effective as two corps under Longstreet and Jackson; the OOB is not scrambled to form three corps under Longstreet, Anderson and Ewell. Longstreet presses, Jackson maneuvers and rolls their flank yet again, the South wins Gettysburg, and Europe recognizes the Confederacy. Victory. 

Yet, God called; and Stonewall crossed the river and rested under the stade of the trees on the other side. And Vicksburg fell while the smoke still hung over the Gettysburg battlefield.

Richmond fell, not because the Army of the Potomac beat the Army of Northern Virginia in the field. It fell because after fighting at Vicksburg, the Army of Tennessee under Bill Sherman burned Atlanta, marched to the sea, then hit Richmond from behind. Not a damn thing Robert E. Lee could do about that, he had his hands full with Grant trying to kick in the front door. 

 

Long story short: without Europe, the Confederacy could not endure. The Europeans would not condone slavery. At the end, when their strength was almost spent, the Confederacy put emancipation on the block as a bargaining chip, they were told 'it's simply too late'. 

The North won. The South was raped by Carpetbaggers, creating enough animosity to fuel the Klan for two hundred years. An amendment that supposedly freed the slaves was actually a ploy to make Corporations the equal of human beings. And under Grant's Administtraion; Bill Sherman and Phil Sheridan killed everything between the Mississippi and the Pacific in the name of the All Mighty Railroads. 

Amen. 

 

 

 

[guidon101]

@philknox

I find it funny how the OP finds Sun Tzu's "Art of War" from 500 B.C. China, a time when most of Europe had no writing system except for those in the Mediterranean area, does not apply well to 19th century or modern warfare unlike more contemporary works written in those eras (19th-21st centuries) for their specific time period...

Just like in warfare, where you have to know what each weapon is useful for (and you can be creative on how to use them), in literature you have to know what each book, each concept, each sentence is useful for in all those texts you mentioned. If a person doesn't recognize what a 2500-year-old "art of war" text is good for and what it is not good for, I have to question how much they will get out of reading any other military-science texts.

If the words "oriental mysticism" and "fantasy" are used to describe the non-scientific, flowery/poetic type of language used by the earliest civilizations with writing systems, especially for the ancient Chinese who often wrote in metaphors or parables (i.e. meant to be taken figuratively, not literally) as one of the defining characteristics of their early writing system, which have been translated poorly-at-best to modern times in a different language and in a different cultural, technological, and historiological context, then I have to seriously question the legitimacy of the person's understanding about the subject piece of text, and the credibility of speaking about it.

 

Sun Tzu's Art of War is obviously not for ACW "tactics", but as @Col_Kelly pointed out, if you actually read and understood the text, there are applications both explicit and creative that applies to ACW as a general, and specifically to the player in this game. Many concepts we now consider "common sense" in modern times, and some statements that stand well to the test of time and changes in technology, yet some concepts may not apply as well; I think the same could be said of Clauswitz, as his works will stand the test of time.

My analogy is that the "Art of War" is basic "Cliff's Notes" as a crash course before going to war or playing a RTS/wargame from the point of view of a national leader or a strategic general, and then reading up on contemporary military manuals, and also history, to get more fully briefed and prepared to use the relevant conventional/unconventional arms available to the specific war/game in question.

At the end of the day, I think it also depends on your goals, who you are, and what you're trying to do. I would place my bets on the leader who understands the value of military texts but more importantly also understands the value of what the texts don't say (e.g. think out of the box) as opposed to the leader who is "by the book"... because it is the former type of leaders who will write the next book of warfare that will make your books as "irrelevant" as you find Sun Tzu's "Art of War"...

 

So I guess I don't know what the goal of this thread was, if it was to discredit one text and promote others in the context of ACW, or if it's meant as advice for players, or just tips for juicy reading material... either way, "All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved"...

 

[LAVA]

On 10/27/2017 at 7:45 PM, guidon101 said:

So I guess I don't know what the goal of this thread was....

My interpretation is that OP was actually trying to provide folks with some good reading material concerning Civil War tactics.

His lead-in, however, was a bit confusing.

Jomini is historically credited as the most influential tactical/strategic "philosopher" during the period of the American Civil War. Personally, I find Jomini's work to be uninspiring though I'm sure at the time having someone actually put pen to paper and explain basic concepts on war was actually quite enlightening. Having said that, Jomini's approach to warfare calling for empirically based immutable laws is IMO badly flawed.

In regards to discussion concerning Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Liddel Hart, I believe that their importance lies in their attempts to instruct us on the conceptual environment we call war. Their writings are more psychologically based than empirically based. For example, it is quite easy to say one should concentrate one's forces on the critical point of the battlefield (Jomini), it is quite another to actually do it. I believe that where folks go wrong with these writers is that they are searching for empirical "immutable laws" that can be summarized in a single sentence or phrase. These folks are actually dealing with complex concepts which pervade the battlefield in which war is actually fought. Therefore, ALL of them contribute to not only understanding military theory, but practice and execution.

As such, we should heed folks like Sun Tzu who remind us that... "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."

For those so inclined I would recommend  Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War by Barton Whaley