LOST ORDERS

[Gael]

Lost Orders

For your consideration:

Description of an observed incident during the time of the Battle of Malvern Hill, the several days after the Yanks left the field:

“One very singular incident at this point was the finding of General Lee's order detailing the entire movement for the attack on McClellan. At this time the organization of the army was in divisions, and the order set forth the instructions to each Division commander, from the crossing at Mechanicsville and on. This particular order found at the McGhee house was addressed to Gen. D. H. Hill. How it came there in the enemy's line, Heaven only knows, but it is a fact that one of our men found it, carried it to Colonel (Bradley) Johnson (of Maryland) and he permitted me to read it that night. I remember distinctly that in reading the order I was impressed with the fidelity with which, to that time, the instructions had been carried out, and recalled the celebrated order of General Scott for one of his battles in the Valley of Mexico, which has been so frequently quoted as an evidence of his far-seeing ability and of faithfulness on the part of his subordinates in execution. The circumstance of this lost order has not been made public to any extent, but not very long since General Johnson asked me if I remembered the incident, the facts concerning which, I believe, were known but to him and myself. It is a singular coincidence that Lee's campaign in Maryland in the following September, was exposed to McClellan by means of a similar lost general order, which set for the operations of the army and its dispersion in the movement against Harpers Ferry. This lost order was also addressed to Gen. D. H. Hill, and was handed to McClellan as he approached Frederick, and at once gave him confidence to press forward and carry the mountain passes at South Mountain and Crampton's Gap, knowing how feebly they were held and that Lee's army was scattered from Harper's Ferry to Hagerstown. It has been pretty clearly shown, however, that this last-named order, although intended for General Hill, was never in his possession, having either been lost by the courier, or, as has been claimed, the courier was wounded and the order taken from him. The misfortune, however it occurred, is responsible for the weakened and and illy-prepared condition in which the Army of Northern Virginia received McClellan's attack at Sharpsburg. It is more than probable that but for the order getting into the enemy's hands he would have moved so slowly as to have permitted Lee to concentrate and fight elsewhere.” pages 47-48

The above is from reprint “A Maryland Boy in Lee's Army”, Personal Reminiscences of a Maryland Soldier in the War Between the States, 1861-1865, by George Wilson Booth (1844-1914), Bison Books Edition, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, first printing 2000

Originally published: Baltimore: Privately published 1894

 

The above ties in with the said lost order leading to the battles of South Mountain and then the Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam.

I had read in another book (I forget which one) that during the retreat from the Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam that one small unit had passed by a tree in an out-of-the-way-location, seeing the curious sight of a Confederate courier having been hung.

By “connecting the dots”, I would conclude that Lee's HQ (COL Walter Taylor et al) discovered its courier system in delivering orders to Gen Hill had a traitor in its midst, set a trap to determine which courier was guilty, and this was sprung by the second lost order discovered at Frederick, MD. These dots would be:

     dot #1: lost order to Gen Hill discovered after Battle of Malvern Hill

     dot #2: lost order to Gen Hill discovered prior to Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam

     dot #3: Confederate courier hung

To maintain army esprit de corps and to not add to long-term demoralization of the ANV troops, I would venture that the rumor of a courier being wounded and the orders taken from him was planted intentionally by HQ ANV.

                       --Gael

[Mr. Mercanto]

Interesting, however I cannot say I agree. Stephen W. Sears spends a great deal of time in consideration of the Lost Order in "Antietam: A Landscape Turned Red." In the narrative, Sears explains that Lee only became aware of the Federals having any intelligence concerning the disposition of the ANV when a "Maryland Gentleman" present when McClellan received the intelligence, informed him. In truth, Lee did not know the exact nature of the intelligence leak, only that it had excited McClellan greatly, and the Young Napoleon now intended to attack. Given the disparity in numbers, this alone was enough for Lee to concentrate his forces in and around the town of Sharpsburg, Maryland. 

In "The Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War" by James M. McPherson, McPherson dedicates an essay to Lee's decision to invade Pennsylvania in 1863. According to McPherson, Lee only became aware of the intelligence leak in 1863 when, in a hearing before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Major-General McClellan disclosed of the intelligence leak in his deposition concerning the Maryland campaign. This information actually contributed greatly to Lee's movement into Pennsylvania, as he became convinced his defeat in 1862 was merely a case of hard luck. 

So, we can conclude that Lee had no idea that any orders were lost by the close of the Maryland campaign. 

As a final note, Lee would not have intentionally risked the leaking of his Orders 191 to simply catch a traitor. The loss of these orders was the most tremendous military leak in American history. Had a more effective man commanded the Army of the Potomac, the capture of these documents by the United States might have ended the war in two weeks. Lee would be history's greatest fool to risk so much to gain so little. The loss of those orders were not worth the killing of ten thousand spies. 

All that having been said, I do love the "Turn: McClellan's Spies" vibe . 

[Gael]

Mr. Mercanto,

I read what you suggest.

There would be two couriers sent to each of the primary commanders, to make certain that at least one set of the orders reached the commander.  This works the way it should on a field of battle, in case one of the couriers or his horse becomes a casualty.  But, between battles would be the opportunity for mischief if one is so inclined - in this case before the Battle of Malvern Hill, and once again before the Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam.

When making up sets of orders during the summer of 1862, it would not have been difficult to make an extra mark on each of the two sets of orders to distinguish which courier was carrying the one that would end up in DH Hill's hands if the other came up "missing", which the good Maryland Doctor in Frederick duly reported to the ANV (he was in McClellan's HQ tent and heard and saw everything when the "lost order" showed).  There have been a number of books stating the doctor informed the ANV in time that GEN Lee knew of the "lost" order in time to send Longstreet's troops up to defend at the South Mountain gaps and give Jackson the opportunity to capture the Corps' worth of Yanks in Harpers Ferry.  Even McLaws was notified by courier(s) that Burnside would be coming up his back-side (I couldn't resist this phrase ) and to make every precaution to move fast across the Potomac to join Jackson once Harpers Ferry had capitulated.

There was no leaking an order to simply catch a traitor.  They simply took the precaution that if it happened a second time that summer or whenever, they would know exactly who it was and would deal with him.

As written in James Kegel's book "North With Lee and Jackson", on page 173, last paragraph:

"Even more alarming was Stuart's next dispatch.  A copy of Special Orders No. 191 had been found  by a Union soldier in Frederick and turned over to McClellan.  A Marylander who had been at McClellan's headquarters at the time told Stuart that after reading the contents, McClellan raised his hands and exclaimed, 'Now I know what to do!'"

Lee knew of the lost order immediately, and when planning the Gettysburg campaign with Jackson and everyone, he had issued instructions to all his commanders that they were to read, memorize, and destroy any orders that were written.  As written in James Kegel's "North With Lee and Jackson", on page 246, 1st paragraph:

"This time around there were no written instructions on specific unit movements, so there was no risk of another lost order, as there had been in 1862.  Many orders in 1863 were given orally.  Some written, and in a few cases, Lee ordered his officers to destroy letters after they had been memorized."

                              --Gael

[Andre Bolkonsky]

You missed my favorite part. 

A kid examining an abandoned campground finds an envelope with Special Order 191 and three cigars. The quality of the cigars was reputed to be the primary reason why the orders were transmitted up the chain of command so quickly. No one would have given up cigars of that quality willingly.

Or so the story goes. 

[A. P. Hill]

Interestingly, in all my years of reading and studying the ACW, I have never heard of this pre Seven Days lost order.

And to be completely truthful, no such order could have been composed in expectant detail of the campaign when history recalls that one third of the time Lee never knew where McClellan was or what he was about.  Not to mention that if McClellan had had received an order even remotely indicative of what is hinted at for the Seven Days, I'm pretty sure the outcome of those battles would have been entirely different.

The only reason we ended up with the Battle of Antietam, or Sharpsburg is because of the lost 191 order.  History as well as McClellan himself claim that it was this finding that caused him to step up the army's pace and attempt an overthrow of Lee's forces before they could regroup, the problem was, McClellan was much too slow and too much of a military perfectionist.  He took far too much time organizing his lines of battle etc., rather than overwhelm with superior force.  Which was another of McClellan's foibles.  His military information corps, (read Pinkerton,) couldn't successfully count past 10, and invariably always credited the enemy forces at more than twice their actual strengths.

If this information as you say, Lee's orders for the Peninsular campaign ended up in McClellan's hands, why then didn't McClellan, as soon as he heard the guns north of Porter in Mechanicsville, turn left, head west and run pell mell over top of Magruder and Smith?

[Gael]

AP Hill,

Possibly because McClellan only directed one battle - Sharpsburg/Antietam?  Mac was elsewhere busy moving his supply depot from White House plantation (Lee's son's inheritance thru his mother's side - Custis) to a new location. 

McClellan has the curious distinction of rising to high position but having had all "his victories" fought by his subordinates, except for his last battle, whereupon he was relieved of command.

Too bad they torched the home - I would like to have seen it, just I as have visited the home at Arlington plantation (inheritance of son #2) - made into a cemetery.

                   --Gael

[Andre Bolkonsky]

8 hours ago, Gael said:

AP Hill,

Possibly because McClellan only directed one battle - Sharpsburg/Antietam?  Mac was elsewhere busy moving his supply depot from White House plantation (Lee's son's inheritance thru his mother's side - Custis) to a new location. 

McClellan has the curious distinction of rising to high position but having had all "his victories" fought by his subordinates, except for his last battle, whereupon he was relieved of command.

Too bad they torched the home - I would like to have seen it, just I as have visited the home at Arlington plantation (inheritance of son #2) - made into a cemetery.

                   --Gael

My favorite story is Abraham Lincoln, showing the patience of a saint, awaiting a conversation with Napoleon McClellan. He waited in his office, and then waited in McClellan's parlor while he was some function or another. McClellan returned home, saw Lincoln, and walked upstairs and went to bed. 

His next major campaign was running for the White House. The only problem with the war is it got in the way of his political aspirations. 

Seriously, the greatest explanation of the Civil War ever filmes is Henry Fonda as Nimitz in "In Harm's Way". Wait, let him explain it for himself . . . . 

If you're impatient, start at 1:34. 

If you haven't seen the movie, watch it. 

[Gael]

Andre B,

You seem like a fun and insightful guy!

I did see "In Harm's Way" with Patricia Neal a number of times and enjoyed it immensely.

My Great-Great-Grandfather, John Knott, was a private in the 6th North Carolina, Hoke's Brigade, which by virtue of reorganization was in both I Corps and II Corps during 1862.  In Hood's Division at the battle of 2nd Manassas, South Mountain, and Sharpsburg/Antietam at the East Woods adjacent to the Miller cornfield, and then in Early's Division at Fredericksburg (1st and 2nd battles).  At Gettysburg they participated in the "brickyard fight" of the first day, and actually captured some of the guns on top of Cemetery Hill during the evening assault of the second day.  He was badly wounded in the leg and captured at Rappahannock Railroad Station (renamed Remington - where incidentally my granddaughter now lives with her own family) approx November 1863, and spent the next year plus in hospital.  He was repatriated in Jan 1865 to rejoin the ANV in time for the retreat to Appomatox, participate in the surrender ceremony, and as no one was paying attention, he went back to the stack of weapons and retrieved his own weapon and walked back home with it.  John with .59 Sharps is shown in my icon (colorized by my distant cousin Dave Richardson) at top left.  The un-colorized photo of John as an 18-19 year old private has been on display at the Gettysburg National Park museum now for about 25 years - I had sent it to them.

A number of years later I was privileged to be asked by my brother the reenactor if I wanted to be in both a reenactment and in a movie?  I had just graduated from the 2-year course at the US Army War College in July 1992, and my fellow students (O-6's and O-5's - I was the only "true" civilian out of a class of ~165 graduates) were daily keeping me appraised of what was in the TV news of the filming for the movie "Gettysburg", so I was enthused to be included in my brother's reenactment outfit the 119th(?) Pennsylvania to participate in "Pickett's Charge Week" of August 1992 where we actually got to march in formation ("galvanized" to jokingly be the "119th Virginia") in the front line of Garnett's Brigade on the Park itself - from the edge of Spangler's Woods to Business Route 15 near the Codori farm (did this one time and only half as far the other five times as the National Park rangers were going nuts trying to get TNT to stop us - we didn't know where we were to stop that first time).  BUT, the people parked along 15 hoping to get a glimpse of the filming were ecstatic about us 4,000 Southern troops marching all the way up to the fence in front of them!!!  We troops cheered (we were instructed to do the Rebel Yell for the filming of the charge) and the people packed along the road cheered, and we all had a great time! 

                       --Gael

Edited March 23, 2017 by Gael

[A. P. Hill]

On ‎3‎/‎19‎/‎2017 at 6:10 PM, Gael said:

AP Hill,

Possibly because McClellan only directed one battle - Sharpsburg/Antietam?  Mac was elsewhere busy moving his supply depot from White House plantation (Lee's son's inheritance thru his mother's side - Custis) to a new location. 

McClellan has the curious distinction of rising to high position but having had all "his victories" fought by his subordinates, except for his last battle, whereupon he was relieved of command.

Too bad they torched the home - I would like to have seen it, just I as have visited the home at Arlington plantation (inheritance of son #2) - made into a cemetery.

                   --Gael

You seem to have a rather poor opinion of McClellan.  (Not a fan by any means,) But to say he only directed one battle is a bit of a misnomer.  And after Antietam wasn't the only time he was relieved of command.

The whole of the raising of the Army of the Potomac from the dust of the streets of Washington D.C. after the utter defeat of the Northern forces at Manassas were all his work. Designing, finally, the entire Peninsular Campaign to capture Richmond was all his. (And as a side note, two years later, where do we find Grant and the army? McClellan knew that much that early in the war.) The directing of all the movements up the peninsula were his. (Battles such as Yorktown, Williamsburg, Latham's Landing, 1st Mechanicsville, Hanover Courthouse, etc., just to name a few.) And yes, while he did move his supply depot from White House Landing, (which I happen to know what it is as the home of W.H.F. Lee,) and which was situated on the Pamunkey River, he also directed all his subalterns in their movements during the Seven Days subsequent battles, after the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines, which ever you prefer.

It's probably best to note here too, that McClellan actually beat R.E. Lee a couple of times when they met in 1861 in the Kanawha valley of what is now West Virginia/Ohio.  There were 2 or 3 battles, (minor in comparison of latter battles,) but battles none the less, and McClellan sent Lee skedaddling back into the heart of Ol' Virginee.  So I dispute your claim of his "distinction".  Totally made up like your insistence of an earlier set of lost orders of Lee's.

If there was anything close to being considered "lost orders," it could be only in the fact that during Jackson's movement from the valley to approach McClellan's right flank at Mechanicsville, a sulker slipped out of the ranks of Jackson's then moving Valley Army, and made his way into the hands of the Union forces.  He had no copies of any orders, he only had information that Jackson's army was moving east.  Hell even Jackson's destination wasn't know officially in his army as he never told a soul under his command anything other than what they needed to know for the day's activities.

As far as Lee actually composing anything even remotely close to the way the Seven Days Battles played out, Lee had absolutely no idea how it would. In fact it came as a surprise to him on the 28th that McClellan was headed for Harrison's Landing, and not high tailing it down the length of the Peninsula the way he came. Lee had lost all contact with McClellan on the 28th.  So I highly doubt that he would have that in a general orders plan of battle.

After he finally got his beaten army back to the "safety" of Harrison's Landing, he sat there and did absolutely nothing.  In fact Lee assumed that McClellan was so thoroughly beaten that he was able to leave a skeleton force just northwest of the landing to keep an eye on McClellan's movements, if any, and basically left him sitting there while he took the bulk of his army as we now know, and headed northwest to Cedar Mountain, Manassas for a second time, and ultimately to the Maryland campaign.  It was during this period that Lincoln essentially relieved McClellan of command the first time, and started transporting his army back to the environs of D.C. to be distributed as he saw fit, leaving McClellan wondering what to do ... until Pope got his ass handed to him, and essentially started the race back to D.C. at which time Lincoln called McClellan from the peninsula to D.C. and asked him to "save the capitol."  Which didn't really need saving, but he was "Johnny on the spot" when it came time to chase Lee into the western environs of Maryland.

Where even there, McClellan didn't really do anything.  He spent the whole of the 16th of September arranging his troops, basically wasting an opportune day where if he would have pushed what he knew from orders 191, he could have crushed Lee ... again.    BUT ... as we know, that didn't happen.

[Andre Bolkonsky]

4 hours ago, A. P. Hill said:

You seem to have a rather poor opinion of McClellan. 

He is like Captain Sobel of Easy Company. 

As a trainer, he is brilliant; you burn off your hatred for him learning how to run Curahee  in your sleep after a heavy meal of spaghetti. 

As an actual commander; No one in their right mind wants to follow him into combat. 

McClellan loved his army, he would hate for anyone to get hurt doing any real fighting. A political animal if ever there was one. 

[A. P. Hill]

6 hours ago, Andre Bolkonsky said:

He is like Captain Sobel of Easy Company. 

As a trainer, he is brilliant; you burn off your hatred for him learning how to run Curahee  in your sleep after a heavy meal of spaghetti. 

As an actual commander; No one in their right mind wants to follow him into combat. 

McClellan loved his army, he would hate for anyone to get hurt doing any real fighting. A political animal if ever there was one. 

Another non fan, I see.

[General Kazden]

10 hours ago, Andre Bolkonsky said:

 McClellan loved his army, he would hate for anyone to get hurt doing any real fighting.

Also @Gael

I love the movie Gettysburg I can only imagine how awesome it was to be apart of that.  However I was only 11 when the movie came out but that movie really got me interested in the history of the civil war.  Ended up doing a report on the 54th Mass. Regiment for National History Day in middle school.

Anyway the quote above reminds me of what General Lee said in the movie.  "To be a good soldier you must love the army.  To be a good commander you must be willing to order the death of the thing you love."   Does anyone know if General Lee actually said this to Longstreet during the battle?  Was this just a nice bit of dialog from the writers?  To me it seems to fit the problem of General McClellan pretty well.

[Andre Bolkonsky]

6 hours ago, A. P. Hill said:

Another non fan, I see.

He is not my favorite, no. 

As a general training men, brilliant. 

As a politician, very skilled. 

As a commander in the field, highly ineffective over the long haul because, to borrow from the earlier quote, he refused to put that which he loved in harm's way. 

[Col_Kelly]

13 minutes ago, Andre Bolkonsky said:

He is not my favorite, no. 

As a general training men, brilliant. 

As a politician, very skilled. 

As a commander in the field, highly ineffective over the long haul because, to borrow from the earlier quote, he refused to put that which he loved in harm's way. 

One very efficient way, imho, to estimate a commander's quality is to see how he reacts after a failure

McLellan after Antietam : '[This is] my masterpiece of art'

Lee after Gettysburg : 'It is all my fault'.

One keeps living in his bubble while the other has no problem in admitting the hard truth (it was his fault), and the ability to face reality is obviously paramount for a general. 

That being said, McLellan was indeed very talented as an administrator, after he got put back into office in late summer of 1862 it only took him 7 days to reshape the AoP the way he wanted it to work, which is quite a feat. 

[veji1]

what is funny is how efficient he was in the west virginia campaign and how ineffective he got as a CnC.. Without many troops, on a small theater, he was a good commander, but once he had many he just couldn't bare risking defeat and losses, probably knowing how much was now at stake.

[Col_Kelly]

10 minutes ago, veji1 said:

what is funny is how efficient he was in the west virginia campaign and how ineffective he got as a CnC.. Without many troops, on a small theater, he was a good commander, but once he had many he just couldn't bare risking defeat and losses, probably knowing how much was now at stake.

Pr. Gallagher, a historian I really appreciate, actually states that a competent army commander is a very rare thing. Longstreet and Hood were terrific at lower levels but failed badly when given a large force of their own. The south only had one of those and the North three at the very best (Grant, Sherman and Thomas).

[Andre Bolkonsky]

36 minutes ago, Col_Kelly said:

One very efficient way, imho, to estimate a commander's quality is to see how he reacts after a failure

McLellan after Antietam : '[This is] my masterpiece of art'

Lee after Gettysburg : 'It is all my fault'.

One keeps living in his bubble while the other has no problem in admitting the hard truth (it was his fault), and the ability to face reality is obviously paramount for a general. 

That being said, McLellan was indeed very talented as an administrator, after he got put back into office in late summer of 1862 it only took him 7 days to reshape the AoP the way he wanted it to work, which is quite a feat. 

Go back and watch the Nimitz clip above, it only reinforces exactly what you said here. 

[Col_Kelly]

Grant always puzzled me, in a way it's very challenging to admit that not giving a damn about specifics is actually a great leader trait.

'The art of war is simple enough'

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Grant is a frigging butcher who had to drug himself to do what had to be done. 

I am sure he is roasting over a low flame right now. 

Don't ask the South, ask the Indian Nations of the Great Plains what they think of him, Sherman and Sheridan. 

[thomas aagaard]

And what is your Evidence that he drugged himself during the time he was in command of Union troops?

 

And if Grant was a butcher, then so was Lee.
Lee lost more men over a shorter period of time than Grant did.

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Alchohol. Grant was known as a major drunk. Perhaps you've heard of this, everyone else has. 

 

[A. P. Hill]

1 hour ago, thomas aagaard said:

And if Grant was a butcher, then so was Lee.

Lee lost more men over a shorter period of time than Grant did.

As you require of anyone else making generalized statements, provide your proof Sir.

[Col_Kelly]

2 hours ago, A. P. Hill said:

As you require of anyone else making generalized statements, provide your proof Sir.

I don't have the figures for Grant but if you were a soldier in Lee's army you had a 74% chance of becoming a casualty, which is aboslutely huge. I'll never call this man a butcher but I also feel Grant doesn't deserve that name. Yes he suffered huge losses but his determination put an end to the war, and putting an end to the war prevents further deaths... ironically McLellan and his hesitant style are indirectly responsible for all the casualties that came after him.

If someone has to be called a butcher however it's definitly John Bell Hood 

[The Soldier]

Hood and his Pickett's Charge of the West?

[thomas aagaard]

I can't find the math I read a year or two ago... 

But just looking at it logical with the numbers from some of their main battles.
(numbers from http://www.civilwar.org/)

Most of grants early battles was smaller in size and he had fewer.
He lost about 13k at Shiloh,
2,5k at Champions Hill
5k at Vicksburg
6k at Chattanooga...
When he came east this naturally changed with
18,4k at Wilderness,
18k at Spotsylvania,
12,7K at Cold harbour... 

Lee in comparison fight more big battles and got a few very costly one.
Starting out when he took over command of ANV on June 1st 1862.
Bever Dam, Glendale, Malvern Hill and Gains Mill cost him 20k
Second Manassas 8,3k
Antietam 10k,
Fredricskburg, 4,5k
Chancellorsville 13k, 
Gettysburg with 28k,

Wilderness 11k,
spotsylvania 12k,
Cold harbour 4,6K

This is not in any way scientifically done. Some smaller fights not included, the Petersburg siege missing and so one...

And note, Iam not blaming Lee in any way.
But he simply fought more battles, and they often where bigger and he took serious loose during the 7days and at Gettysburg.
So by the time Grant comes east Lee have lost a lot more men than Grant have. And even if Grant suffers way more during the overland campaign this simply don't make up for it.

I don't think Lee was a butcher... He knew he had to go for the big win.  But neither was Grant he did what he could with the force he had.

Edited March 25, 2017 by thomas aagaard