Winning a scenario - victory metrics

[David Fair]

At the start of the Gettysburg Campaign R.E. Lee saw that the fence on a Pennsylvania farm was being torn apart by his troops.  He stopped, got off his horse, and rebuilt the fence.  He refused the help of his staff or his soldiers while his columns marched past on the road.  Lee wanted to make a point and take a long time to fix the fence to ensure as many of his men saw their commander repairing the damage.  Lee's message - we came North to secure Southern Independence.  If we need to defeat the Union Army we will.  We have not come North to pillage U.S. citizens.  We will pay for what we take (in worthless Southern money; but...).  We will fight Lincoln and the policy of the 'Black Republicans' to protect our 'peculiar institution' and the way of life for the South.

 

Lee's goals, as negotiated with Jefferson Davis for the campaign were to:

1) sustain his army at northern expense

2) keep his army north as long as possible

3) demonstrate that the North could not defeat the South militarily

4) secure international recognition by the British, French, or Russians

5) defeat the Army of the Potomac "if practical"

6) influence the politics of the North for a negotiated separation

7) give southern logistics a chance to recover and gather the harvest

 

Lee envisioned a repeat of the Shenandoah Campaign on a grand scale.  Stuart's raid stole Lee's ability to achieve the strategic aims of the campaign; reconnaissance was the essential element required to stay north and defeat elements of the Army of the Potomac piecemeal.  Lee blundered into Gettysburg and fought a battle because he thought he could get his army together fast enough to defeat isolated Union Corps elements.  He stayed and fought for 3 days because he had lost the strategic initiative once the armies had assembled.  Note - If you are considering night marches extracting one's army intact is the most frequent nighttime maneuver.

 

So with this background defining topographical metrics for victory doesn't make much sense (capture hill A for 50 victory points!).  The goal of the campaign was not to take and/or hold ground.

 

Gettysburg was about killing as efficiently and at the lowest possible cost to the South.  The South needed to kill at about a 2:1 ratio.  Lee needed to capture equipment, cannons, horses and tack, clothing, ammunition...

 

For the North the goal was to:

1) destroy the Army of Northern Virginia

 

Note that after the battle Lincoln was dismayed that the Southern Army was chased South.  Meade had failed in the President's eyes.  The war continued.

 

Every scenario victory should be influenced these strategic campaign goals.  This puts movement, speed, flanking attacks, and efficient planning and command at a premium.  In short; a game of strategy.

 

I've played too many games where some cheesy tactical topographical point is worth sacrificing troops in frontal attacks leading to absurd command decisions and battle results.  Why play a game where Pickett's charge will happen in every game so the results of the battle are preordained by topography?

 

Anyone who has walked the Gettysburg battlefield extensively understands why Culp's Hill was not practical once Union troops had time to fortify the hill.  (I don't mean walk the visitor trails; but to actually crawl up that hill and consider how it would be almost impossible for 300 men abreast to get to the top).  

[Husserl]

Under the current planning for the first official release, UGG will focus on the battle itself and not generally on Gettysburg Campaign. The game will start with the first skirmishes between Heth's advanced forces and Buford's reconnaissance forces on Day 1 and will finish on the evening of Day 3. The term "campaign" that sometimes is used by the developers is referred to the flow of the battle which actually is about a series of battles per day. There are many thoughts on developing further UGG adding more campaign elements but the main objective of first release remains for UGG to be a tactical battle simulator. We are strongly committed to create first the solid base that will permit us to construct safely our vision for strategy games. 

 

So with this background defining topographical metrics for victory doesn't make much sense (capture hill A for 50 victory points!).  The goal of the campaign was not to take and/or hold ground. 

 

 

I agree that victory points are indeed a secondary element and so it is in UGG. However, capturing points in UGG are very important because they constitute critical strategy points that will define not only the outgrowth of the current phase of the battle but also the total flow of the battle for the given day.

[David Fair]

Replicating a historical blunder should not be the justification for a game duration design flaw.  I'm discouraged by your game start on "Day 1 and will finish on the evening of Day 3" response.  

 

Day 4 is the opportunity to "what if" the decisive battle of the Civil War and end the war in 1863 vs. 1865.  The combination of the loss of Vicksburg and the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia would have ended the war.  Alternatively, the destruction of the Army of the Potomac would have changed the course of the Civil War.

 

Lee kept his forces at Gettysburg for 4 Days.  On Day 4 Lee consolidated his positions and gave Meade the opportunity to attack his army deployed on Oak Ridge and Seminary Ridge.  The Confederates constructed breastworks and rifle pits that extended 2.5 miles from the Mummasburg Road to the Emmitsburg Road.  Lee sent his wagon train carrying vast quantities of captured equipment and supplies and 8,000 wounded who were fit to travel to the rear in advance of his remaining forces.  Just because Meade chose not to attack on Day 4 does not mean that the game should end on the evening of Day 3.  

 

Day 4 at Gettysburg would likely have been the decisive day.  

 

Historically Day 4 was not decisive; but from a gamer's perspective I'd urge you to consider the historical opportunity that was missed.  Lincoln pushed to get Meade to attack; what if he had?  Day 4 is the reason to game Gettysburg.  Lee had lost 1/3 of his forces.  Meade had lost 1/4.  The odds were getting longer for the Confederacy.  

 

There is ongoing debate about who won the Battle of Gettysburg.   If there was a winner it was a marginal victory.  Neither side accomplished it's goals.  

 

Capturing key topography is very important.  Using topographical data to tie phases of the battle makes sense for the "total flow of the battle for a given day".  What does not make sense is awarding "victory points" to determine the game metrics for "winning". 

[Husserl]

I totally agree with you. Please see the use of "Day 1 to Day 3" as the necessary historical time line limits and not as the limits of a predefined course of the battle. UGG is very open to "what if"  scenarios for both sides, even from Day 1. It is depending on the player's performance reproduce or rewrite the battle of Gettysburg.

 

Given victory points will never be the required objective nor will define directly the outcome for any battle in UGG. You'll never see a "capture hill A for 50 victory points!" objective. They are just numerical interpretation of the capturing points which appear only in the outcome report for every battle. Added to other numerical factors (e.g. casualties) will produce the final score for the current phase of the battle. However, as noted, this score is a secondary evaluation for the battle outcome. The main important factor will be always the capture points.

 

Every scenario victory should be influenced these strategic campaign goals.  This puts movement, speed, flanking attacks, and efficient planning and command at a premium.  In short; a game of strategy.

 

 

The need of using strategic plans and tactics will be more than necessary in the battle as well. Especially the upper levels of AI characters will keep "remind" that to the player on the battlefield. Here is a small part of one of my battles (Day 1, Phase 2, player US against Defensive AI character):

 

"(...)  From the moves of the AI, I can see that he aims to Oak Ridge. I have already fortified it with artillery batteries and enough infantry. Fresh reinforcements allowed me to extent the front line Seminary - Oak Ridge to the south of Barlow's Knoll, creating a Γ line, protecting the same time Oak Ridge from the east and the city from the north.

(...)

That was just in time: new enemy reinforcement approach from north east towards Barlow's Knoll. Now Defensive will be able to attack Oak Ridge from west, north and east. Should I stick to the plan protecting Oak Ridge at all cost? Or I should re-deploy my forces on a new line Seminary - North Gettysburg? I cannot afford loosing Oak Ridge and let the the enemy deploy his batteries over there. I can stand an attack from west and north. If he will move his north east forces to attack there as well from the east, I'll bring my forces south of Barlow's closer to Oak Ridge reforming my front line from Γ to Λ. The same time my reserves in west Seminary, could help by attacking from the south to his attacking forces west of Oak Ridge. It looks like a good plan.

(...)

But it was not good enough against this Defensive. AI made a couple of sporadic attacks from the north which proved it was just for diversion. Almost the same time he launched a simultaneous attack against my both flanks. My right line which it was supposed to move closer at the east of Oak Ridge, was breached and cut off. My left flank was pushed hard from his right flank, unable to help the imminent main attack towards Oak Ridge (...)"

[David Fair]

I retract my criticism.  This looks great!  You guys are really thinking this game through for both historical accuracy, metrics, and flexibility.  

 

One final thought for your consideration.  MIA troops.  It took substantial efforts to sort out commands, particularly after major movements culminating in fighting (Pickett's Charge).  This was especially true in major attacks that were repulsed or units that routed.  Severely demoralized troops had much higher MIA rates (Howard's XI Union Corps on Day 1; General Schimmelfennig in particular).

 

 - Men shirked or got into the fight and were confused, lost, scared, helped a comrade to the rear, dropped out of the ranks to help/stay with a wounded friend/brother or officer

 - Men that fought close to home had a propensity to elect AWOL discharges.  This was especially true after the South abandoned Richmond where Lee's army dwindled to 25,000 men.

 - Men close to Gettysburg had an opportunity to spend some time in "high feather" to supplement rations, find a bottle, souvenir hunt, etc... 

 

It sometimes took days to get reunited with commands.  General Schimmelfennig was trapped in a woodshed for on Day 1 and returned to his command on Day 4. (Sherman's "bummers" didn't return to the ranks until they hit Savannah where supplies were only issued to men in organized units).

 

MIA is a primary component of the fog of war.  I'm looking forward to a discussion on the cumulative effects of fog of war and reserve status/night recovery rates.

[Nick Thomadis]

David thank you a lot for your very informative posts. Just a clarification, we will allow the possibility that battle can continue up to 4 days, according to what if scenarios

[David Fair]

Nick,  Thanks for the feedback.  My work demands time/thought so opportunities to game are limited; it's important to find efficient and intellectually challenging gaming.  UGG looks like it has the potential to be one of the best historical simulations for Gettysburg.  Keep up the great work and I'm happy to contribute/help.

[llcw08]

 

 

The Gettysburg Battle has a unique place in military history; Gettysburg Clearly marks the CSA’s “high water mark” in its hope to politically exist.

 

Surrounding this battle site was an enormous Union capability in that theater; that was never brought to bear. Alexander the Great would not have started Gen. Lee’s northern campaign.

 

If Gen. Lee “wins” this battle; he still gets annihilated by the Union Army from Washington D.C and Gen. Meade’s AoP. Everybody knows where the remains of the ANV is going! Even the French government.

 

 

 

At the start of the Gettysburg Campaign R.E. Lee saw that the fence on a Pennsylvania farm was being torn apart by his troops.  He stopped, got off his horse, and rebuilt the fence.  He refused the help of his staff or his soldiers while his columns marched past on the road.  Lee wanted to make a point and take a long time to fix the fence to ensure as many of his men saw their commander repairing the damage.  Lee's message - we came North to secure Southern Independence.  If we need to defeat the Union Army we will.  We have not come North to pillage U.S. citizens.  We will pay for what we take (in worthless Southern money; but...).  We will fight Lincoln and the policy of the 'Black Republicans' to protect our 'peculiar institution' and the way of life for the South.

 

Lee's goals, as negotiated with Jefferson Davis for the campaign were to:

1) sustain his army at northern expense

2) keep his army north as long as possible

3) demonstrate that the North could not defeat the South militarily

4) secure international recognition by the British, French, or Russians

5) defeat the Army of the Potomac "if practical"

6) influence the politics of the North for a negotiated separation

7) give southern logistics a chance to recover and gather the harvest

 

Lee envisioned a repeat of the Shenandoah Campaign on a grand scale.  Stuart's raid stole Lee's ability to achieve the strategic aims of the campaign; reconnaissance was the essential element required to stay north and defeat elements of the Army of the Potomac piecemeal.  Lee blundered into Gettysburg and fought a battle because he thought he could get his army together fast enough to defeat isolated Union Corps elements.  He stayed and fought for 3 days because he had lost the strategic initiative once the armies had assembled.  Note - If you are considering night marches extracting one's army intact is the most frequent nighttime maneuver.

 

So with this background defining topographical metrics for victory doesn't make much sense (capture hill A for 50 victory points!).  The goal of the campaign was not to take and/or hold ground.

 

Gettysburg was about killing as efficiently and at the lowest possible cost to the South.  The South needed to kill at about a 2:1 ratio.  Lee needed to capture equipment, cannons, horses and tack, clothing, ammunition...

 

For the North the goal was to:

1) destroy the Army of Northern Virginia

 

Note that after the battle Lincoln was dismayed that the Southern Army was chased South.  Meade had failed in the President's eyes.  The war continued.

 

Every scenario victory should be influenced these strategic campaign goals.  This puts movement, speed, flanking attacks, and efficient planning and command at a premium.  In short; a game of strategy.

 

I've played too many games where some cheesy tactical topographical point is worth sacrificing troops in frontal attacks leading to absurd command decisions and battle results.  Why play a game where Pickett's charge will happen in every game so the results of the battle are preordained by topography?

 

Anyone who has walked the Gettysburg battlefield extensively understands why Culp's Hill was not practical once Union troops had time to fortify the hill.  (I don't mean walk the visitor trails; but to actually crawl up that hill and consider how it would be almost impossible for 300 men abreast to get to the top).  

The Gettysburg Battle has a unique place in military history; Gettysburg Clearly marks the CSA’s “high water mark” in its hope to politically exist.

 

Surrounding this battle site was an enormous Union capability in that theater; that was never brought to bear. Alexander the Great would not have started Gen. Lee’s northern campaign.

 

If Gen. Lee “wins” this battle; his army still gets annihilated by the Union Army from Washington D.C And Gen. Meade’s AoP. Everybody knows where the remains of the ANV would go after "winning" Gettysburg! Even the French government.

 

I have always suspected that Gen. Lee's last northern campaign was "fey" on his part; a suicide of his flawed cause by honorable combat. Pickett’s Charge was the climax of Gen. Lee’s ambitions for that suicide campaign. Gen. Hood, to the day he died; was suspect and critical of Gen. Lee’s mindset at Gettysburg.

 

But, the military genius that was Gen. Lee; he failed to fail, completely.

[David Fair]

llcw08,

But for the Gettysburg campaign I suspect southern logistics would have collapsed in the second half of 1863 or early 1864.  When Lee went North he effectively extended the American Civil War by 18 months (in my opinion).  Union troops from Gettysburg were transported by train to the New York Draft Riots.  McClellan and the Copperheads were not enthusiastic about supporting Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation.   Lincoln was furious with Meade.  It was not clear at the time if Gettysburg was a victory.  The election of 1864 hung in the balance and after Gettysburg Lincoln was certain he would lose the election.

 

We know what the historical outcomes were.  But, it is much more challenging to say for certain (unless you belong to the French government) what might have been.  However; I'm pretty certain Alexander the Great could not have been a solution in 1863 and  I'm also pretty certain that the ANV was not annihilated; but did survive to surrender in 1865. 

 

As for Hood as a reliable resource regarding Lee!!!!   For Hood's ability as battlefield commander I'd suggest you take a closer look at his results at Atlanta and the impact of his march north into Tennessee.  Lee warned Jeff Davis that Hood was not the brightest bulb in the CSA  and warned Davis that Hood would fight; and burn through CSA troops in pointless activities.  Strategically Hood accomplished????  It was after Hood was appointed commander that Sherman Marched to the Sea unimpeded.  Hood traded off defending one of the last breadbaskets of the south in favor of moving into a war ravaged Tennessee where he was defeated.

 

I've always viewed Lee's effort at Gettysburg as strategically taking pressure off the home front, particularly the Shenandoah Valley, to allow time for the harvest season to replenish the southern food supply.  The most difficult time of year for an army to survive in the field when they are short of rations is in the summer; before the harvest has been gathered again in August/September (See http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/).  When Lee went North he gained a fresh supply base untouched by war.  

 

Grant observed that the Shenandoah Valley was so critical to the Southern cause that he sent Sheridan to gut the Shenandoah Valley in 1864 to starve the ANV out of Richmond/Virginia with this strategy.  Grant's offer at Appomattox to feed the 25,000 men remaining with the ANV was immediately accepted by Lee; proof that the most astute military minds on the scene during the conflict understood the logistics challenges that Lee attempted to solve in his Gettysburg Campaign.