Civil War History: 'What If' scenarios

[Buford Protege]

If you follow Scott's campaigns in Mexico, he generally waited for as much information as he could.  This led to a delay before Cerro Gordo, though it led to his victory, it cost time.  He paused in front of Mexico City while the enemy fortified.  He explored options.  His subordinates necessitated his moves.  David Twiggs (of the Texas infamy) was a full speed ahead type of General.  William Worth was the bookish, probably best tactical commander, yet timid.  His volunteer commanders were less reliable.  He lost control of his own subordinates outside of Mexico City when Worth changed his orders and assaulted Molino Del Rey.  Twiggs suddenly grew cautions and the Volunteers slammed and lost heavily due to his inability to control his subordinates.

It is likely Scott may have taken even more time than McDowell.  Perhaps Johnston still arrives, but Scott calls off the attack and assumes a defensive stance and gathered Patterson's command and forced a battle later.

[Col_Kelly]

In the same vein I wonder how well the Union would have fared on the eastern theater if McDowell had been left in command. Maybe he wasn't perfect but he was still a good tactician and I believe he would have learned from his mistakes. Instead the Union kept changing its generals every six months and no one ever got a chance to become familiar with the burden of high-command.

Most of all the Army of North-East Virginia would never have becomed the Army of the Potomac and it would not have suffered from all these hesitant generals that rose through the ranks with McLelland's blessing.

[A. P. Hill]

I think part of the reason the Northeast Army of the Potomac went through so many generals was because President Lincoln was a very impatient man when it came to the security of the eastern theater.  Mostly from his lack of military training, he makes it appear as though anyone who was put in charge should have automatically had a ticket to a successful campaign.

He was very concerned also how the U.S. federal government was viewed overseas ... and it was imperative to find a leader that would boost that viewpoint world wide ... as it was with so many generals in the eastern theater losing battles, it was as if the world statement on the federal government was .. 'why are you hampering these people on policies you cannot enforce?'

[Bigjku]

I don't see that Lincoln had much choice but to change commanders when he did.  The burden was on the Union to attack.

McDowell had lost confidence from the army and frankly Mac was a fantastic organizer and trainer for the AoTP so he wasn't a know poor choice at that stage.  Really that army was probably better organized and equipped than almost any army fielded elsewhere except for the fact it had too many corps for much of the war.  The troops were also well trained and really did hold their own just fine until general confidence was lost in commanders.  Even then it was more a grumbling problem than a willingness to follow orders thing.

Bringing Pope East wasn't insane.  In theory the government should have released McDowell to come down to join the Penninsular campaign rather than shield Washington but I don't see any reason to suspect that Mac wouldn't have decided that he was up against yet more CSA troops and adopted the same posture.

Post Antitem Mac had to go.  His failure there was abject IMHO and Lee should have been destroyed.  His subsequent actions didn't show he understood the urgency of the Union being seen to fight.

Burnside lost the confidence of his commanders and either you had to let him clean house or fire him.

Hooker you could make an argument for keeping but Chancellorsville was very poorly handled and should have been a war winner.

Meade did fine.  Once Grant was in place Lincoln largely let him alone.  Grant realized in a civil war that one of the key issues is continuing to fight.  Time wasn't on the governments side if it was being inactive. This makes the presidents claim that all he was looking for was a general who would take the tools he was given and fight ring true.  Once he had that he left the war mostly to Grant to conduct.

[Col_Kelly]

Grant wasn't so popular after Shiloh, initially Don Buell was seen as the one who saved the day and many requested that the man who proved to be the finest Union General had too be fired... and yet Lincoln left him in command. Had he done something similar with McDowell I believe the Union would have ended the war sooner.

PS : Meade didn't do that well to be honest. Yes he won Gettysburg but then he let Lee slip away while he had him cornered against a river (the Potomac if I remeber correctly) for several days. A typical display of the McLelland culture that was by then deeply rooted into the AoP : don't take risks and everything should be fine.

[Bigjku]

2 hours ago, Col_Kelly said:

Grant wasn't so popular after Shiloh, initially Don Buell was seen as the one who saved the day and many requested that the man who proved to be the finest Union General had too be fired... and yet Lincoln left him in command. Had he done something similar with McDowell I believe the Union would have ended the war sooner.

PS : Meade didn't do that well to be honest. Yes he won Gettysburg but then he let Lee slip away while he had him cornered against a river (the Potomac if I remeber correctly) for several days. A typical display of the McLelland culture that was by then deeply rooted into the AoP : don't take risks and everything should be fine.

Meade had days to take control of the army prior to fighting.  Could he have moved more quickly at Gettysburg?  Sure.  But the AoTP was in very poor shape after that fight compared to its condition after Antitem.

All Mac needed to do at Antitem was commit his forces in a coordinated fashion and then put in the reserves and he could win on the field.  Meade couldn't do much differently until day 4 really.  At that point the army was down to around 55,000 effectives IIRC and had lost its two best corps commanders.

Yes he wasn't aggressive there but his situation was far more excusable than Mac's.

McDowell was a big part of Second Bull Run and Union forces weren't well handled there.  I don't see him building up the army needed to actually win the war.

[Col_Kelly]

13 minutes ago, Bigjku said:

At that point the army was down to around 55,000 effectives IIRC and had lost its two best corps commanders.

55.000 ? The Union lost something like 23k at Gettysburg and was 93.000 strong prior to that (according to minimalist estimates). That's 70.000 men following 50.000 confederates (at most). Besides we're talking about an army crossing a river, an ideal situation for an attack.

Maybe i'm missing something but I don't see why the AoP would be deprived of 15.000 men overnight. Besides I'm not saying Meade commited any major mistakes at Gettysburg itself. He just refused to attack Lee later when he was stuck against the river because of a flood.

As for 2nd Bull Run I can't find anything blaming McDowell directly. He was responsible for some of the troops but the two major mistakes (believing Jackson was retreating and exposing the southern flank) were made by Pope. If you have extra informations on the matter I'd love to hear about it (honestly, no irony here).

[Bigjku]

http://a.co/gywA099

That should be a segment from Catton's book that covered the immediate post battle state of things.  I and III corps were basically destroyed.  II corps was down by a third.

The army would recover and one can argue it should have attacked when it had Lee cornered during his retreat.  But I am not so sure it wouldn't be a blood bath pressing up against prepared fortifications.  Obviously if you could wipe out the AoNV it's probably worth it but again he was relatively new to high command and I believe all his senior commanders at the time advised him not to attack.  I can forgive the mistake there that I won't in Mac simply because Meads command tenure at that point had basically been one ongoing crisis.

As for McDowell he didn't handle his troops particularly well at Bills Run and frankly soldiers just had lost confidence in him.  Leaving him in command was probably impossible post Bull Run and certainly after 2nd Bull Run.  He was just seen as bad by his troops.

[James Cornelius]

I disagree about McDowell being an acceptable choice. While Bull Run can be excused, 2nd Bull Run cannot. His complete lack of control, coordination, communication, and reconnaissance (aided and abetted by all the same lackings by Pope) were the major contributors to the Union debacle. Ironically it was Fitz John Porter, who was courtmartialed for the battle (due to his disagreements with McDowell and Pope) who prevented it from being worse than it was by his delayed attack (though J.F. Reynolds was the real hero by holding Henry Hill with his division to cover the rest of the retreat).

 

5 hours ago, Col_Kelly said:

As for 2nd Bull Run I can't find anything blaming McDowell directly. He was responsible for some of the troops but the two major mistakes (believing Jackson was retreating and exposing the southern flank) were made by Pope. If you have extra informations on the matter I'd love to hear about it (honestly, no irony here).

 

Read anything by Sears. I am currently a third of the way through "Lincoln's Lieutenants" (which is fantastic) and it paints a terrible picture of McDowell all from first hand sources.

[Akmatov]

On 7/10/2017 at 1:00 PM, Major Grigg said:

So what do you think this continent would look like today if the CSA had won? 

Actually the force behind the end of the international slave trade was Britain and the RN AntiSlave patrols. Which I might add cost the lives of thousands British sailors due to disease.