Gael

Mr. Mercanto, I read what you suggest. There would be two couriers sent to each of the primary commanders, to make certain that at least one set of the orders reached the commander. This works the way it should on a field of battle, in case one of the couriers or his horse becomes a casualty. But, between battles would be the opportunity for mischief if one is so inclined - in this case before the Battle of Malvern Hill, and once again before the Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam. When making up sets of orders during the summer of 1862, it would not have been difficult to make an extra mark on each of the two sets of orders to distinguish which courier was carrying the one that would end up in DH Hill's hands if the other came up "missing", which the good Maryland Doctor in Frederick duly reported to the ANV (he was in McClellan's HQ tent and heard and saw everything when the "lost order" showed). There have been a number of books stating the doctor informed the ANV in time that GEN Lee knew of the "lost" order in time to send Longstreet's troops up to defend at the South Mountain gaps and give Jackson the opportunity to capture the Corps' worth of Yanks in Harpers Ferry. Even McLaws was notified by courier(s) that Burnside would be coming up his back-side (I couldn't resist this phrase ) and to make every precaution to move fast across the Potomac to join Jackson once Harpers Ferry had capitulated. There was no leaking an order to simply catch a traitor. They simply took the precaution that if it happened a second time that summer or whenever, they would know exactly who it was and would deal with him. As written in James Kegel's book "North With Lee and Jackson", on page 173, last paragraph: "Even more alarming was Stuart's next dispatch. A copy of Special Orders No. 191 had been found by a Union soldier in Frederick and turned over to McClellan. A Marylander who had been at McClellan's headquarters at the time told Stuart that after reading the contents, McClellan raised his hands and exclaimed, 'Now I know what to do!'" Lee knew of the lost order immediately, and when planning the Gettysburg campaign with Jackson and everyone, he had issued instructions to all his commanders that they were to read, memorize, and destroy any orders that were written. As written in James Kegel's "North With Lee and Jackson", on page 246, 1st paragraph: "This time around there were no written instructions on specific unit movements, so there was no risk of another lost order, as there had been in 1862. Many orders in 1863 were given orally. Some written, and in a few cases, Lee ordered his officers to destroy letters after they had been memorized." --Gael

Lost Orders For your consideration: Description of an observed incident during the time of the Battle of Malvern Hill, the several days after the Yanks left the field: “One very singular incident at this point was the finding of General Lee's order detailing the entire movement for the attack on McClellan. At this time the organization of the army was in divisions, and the order set forth the instructions to each Division commander, from the crossing at Mechanicsville and on. This particular order found at the McGhee house was addressed to Gen. D. H. Hill. How it came there in the enemy's line, Heaven only knows, but it is a fact that one of our men found it, carried it to Colonel (Bradley) Johnson (of Maryland) and he permitted me to read it that night. I remember distinctly that in reading the order I was impressed with the fidelity with which, to that time, the instructions had been carried out, and recalled the celebrated order of General Scott for one of his battles in the Valley of Mexico, which has been so frequently quoted as an evidence of his far-seeing ability and of faithfulness on the part of his subordinates in execution. The circumstance of this lost order has not been made public to any extent, but not very long since General Johnson asked me if I remembered the incident, the facts concerning which, I believe, were known but to him and myself. It is a singular coincidence that Lee's campaign in Maryland in the following September, was exposed to McClellan by means of a similar lost general order, which set for the operations of the army and its dispersion in the movement against Harpers Ferry. This lost order was also addressed to Gen. D. H. Hill, and was handed to McClellan as he approached Frederick, and at once gave him confidence to press forward and carry the mountain passes at South Mountain and Crampton's Gap, knowing how feebly they were held and that Lee's army was scattered from Harper's Ferry to Hagerstown. It has been pretty clearly shown, however, that this last-named order, although intended for General Hill, was never in his possession, having either been lost by the courier, or, as has been claimed, the courier was wounded and the order taken from him. The misfortune, however it occurred, is responsible for the weakened and and illy-prepared condition in which the Army of Northern Virginia received McClellan's attack at Sharpsburg. It is more than probable that but for the order getting into the enemy's hands he would have moved so slowly as to have permitted Lee to concentrate and fight elsewhere.” pages 47-48 The above is from reprint “A Maryland Boy in Lee's Army”, Personal Reminiscences of a Maryland Soldier in the War Between the States, 1861-1865, by George Wilson Booth (1844-1914), Bison Books Edition, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, first printing 2000 Originally published: Baltimore: Privately published 1894 The above ties in with the said lost order leading to the battles of South Mountain and then the Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam. I had read in another book (I forget which one) that during the retreat from the Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam that one small unit had passed by a tree in an out-of-the-way-location, seeing the curious sight of a Confederate courier having been hung. By “connecting the dots”, I would conclude that Lee's HQ (COL Walter Taylor et al) discovered its courier system in delivering orders to Gen Hill had a traitor in its midst, set a trap to determine which courier was guilty, and this was sprung by the second lost order discovered at Frederick, MD. These dots would be: dot #1: lost order to Gen Hill discovered after Battle of Malvern Hill dot #2: lost order to Gen Hill discovered prior to Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam dot #3: Confederate courier hung To maintain army esprit de corps and to not add to long-term demoralization of the ANV troops, I would venture that the rumor of a courier being wounded and the orders taken from him was planted intentionally by HQ ANV. --Gael

You guys are testing my memory ... The first successful cavalry charge I recall was Jeb Stuart's cavalry charging into the right flank of the Fire Zouaves during the Battle of 1st Manassas. I remember reading about one of the officers carrying a horse pistol and shooting one Soldier in the chest and blew a sizable hole all the way through. Stuart had about 400 cavalry and it was very effective at that moment. The Fire Zouaves were recruited from the fire houses in the city of New York. The use of square formations was performed by BG Lane during the 1st day of the Battle of Gettysburg. After causing the I Corps to retreat to Cemetery Hill, BG Buford played for time as best he could by lining his troopers in charge formation to attack Lane's right flank as he was moving toward Cemetery Hill. By appearing readying to charge, Buford caused Lane to order his regiments to form squares - just in case Buford was serious. The third cavalry case I recall was during the last part of the Battle of Cedar Creek in the lower Shenandoah Valley in 1864 when Sheridan's force outnumbered Jubal Early's II Corps by about 40,000 to about 11,000. After the sudden dawn attack upon the Yankee force at the bottom of Massanutten Mountain surprised and defeated them, Sheridan (visiting with Grant elsewhere) rode full speed to the field of battle, rallied his troops and pinned back the Southerners to a fairly firm defensive position at Fisher's Hill(?). Then Sheridan sent Custer and a large cavalry force to the right flank to form up for a cavalry charge to smash Early's left flank, which collapsed the Southern force. This ended Early's foray to Washington DC and back, and Early's reputation as a general was basically shattered from then on. This may have been the somewhat hidden reason that he was one of the main attackers against LTG Longstreet after the war - if one doesn't like the light shown on one's own record, some people often attack someone else to shift the boss's focus from themselves ... --Gael

I read somewhere that on the march to Gettysburg, MG Hood's division marched in 4 states in one day: 1) the State of Virginia; 2) the State of Maryland; 3) the State of Pennsylvania; and 4) the state of intoxication when they stopped in a town where the troops discovered barrels of spirits. From then on, either Hood or Longstreet had riders go forward to destroy all the booze before the troops could get to it.

Ariete, I am finding that the final casualty count is MUCH MORE IMPORTANT than the terrain point scores. Whip the opposition and surround/eliminate - or push the opposing forces off the playing field to rack up big scores of them. I won a Decisive Victory this week as the ANV racking up ~46,000 AoP casualties while suffering ~16,000. The terrain points will accumulate more and more quickly as the AoP is destroyed. It doesn't seem to matter WHEN (during a present scenario, or the following scenario) the point positions are captured During game start - opening scenario - one thing can help if one is the Army of Northern Virginia - Heth's & Pender's Divisions - is to put everyone back up the hill into the woods and DO NOT attack. One game opening scene I ended with ~350 casualties and the Yanks had about 550. (I always target Calef's battery first and reduce it to 15 troops which knocks it out of action for the rest of the game. Otherwise it can really rack up the casualties against Heth's units.) With the ANV at full strength, wait during the 2nd scenario for Rodes' and Early's Divisions to attack from the North and THEN have Heth and Pender attack from the West. This will allow the ANV to start attacks at 2:1 advantage and allow some flank attacks to occur. As the Yanks desperately hold the point positions, swing the arms of the ANV around the Yanks around these ridge-points to surround them. They will disintegrate in a short time. Then push with all you can to gain Cemetery Hill points. After this in all scenarios, the ANV does NOT have to attack but first play defense with good terrain and all your batteries, and knock the Yanks silly. Once a good portion have run away in confusion, then move forward and push them back. I realize many playing ANV want to attack Big and Little Round Tops, but they only chew up troops with little or no reward. Defend and THEN attack other portions of the battlefield when you have the Yanks back on their heels and fleeing. Ariete, I realize you are playing the Army of the Potomac, so you will have to use the above as a bit of insight and adapt to your army. As the Yanks - play defense and knock the ANV units backward, and then go onto the offensive, taking all those batteries with you. If you spy a single opposing battery, I always run an infantry brigade toward it, and hit it twice with musket fire to pretty much knock it out of the game. After the first shock of massed infantry fire, the shattered battery will take time to recover and reorganize which gives the attacking brigade time to reload and fire to crush it. Good luck! --Gael by the way, by winning greatly as the ANV, one does not have to go to Washington right away with all those forts with the huge guns. One will then be poised to threaten DC, Baltimore, Philadelphia (big manufacturing center and port), or New York. The capture of any of these on the coast will cut the rail and barge supply lines to DC and the AoP, and likely cause the capital to be abandoned ...

Paheej, A couple more thoughts: 1) Attacking artillery units - attempt to go after an isolated artillery unit with a brigade - march toward it - when almost within rifled musket range, RUN your brigade halfway to the artillery unit, HALT, and fire - this should knock the stuffing out of the artillery unit if it is out in the open - RUN halfway once more, HALT, and fire - this should decimate that unit while suffering acceptable casualties. 2) If you see a brigade fleeing directly past the front of one of your brigades - CHARGE if at all possible, as the fleeing brigade is not capable of defending itself, and this racks up bigger numbers of casualties for the enemy side. --Gael

Paheej, Upon playing the full battle probably 30 times and starting the opening scenario about 180 times (at least it feels like it ), here is the Southern strategy I suggest (verified it again yesterday against DETERMINED AI): 1) the opening battle for McPherson's's Ridge is the most important event that shapes the rest of the 3-day battle - follow Lee's orders and DO NOT set off a major offensive engagement - be very patient and do not chase after the Yankee skirmishers all over creation only to have the regular infantry and artillery show up and give your troops a bloody nose by the end of the first battle. Take and hold the McPerson woods - be patient. DO NOT be afraid to have your units retreat west off the top of McPherson Ridge, and then later come back over it when there is a tempting target that you can WIN against with infantry and artillery. If you can't win the individual fight - fall back to a good defensive position and regain your strength. Confederate units designated HOLD in woods and/or hills can be very difficult for the Yanks to charge and dislodge. 2) Check with the LTG Hill counter every so often to look at the friendly-enemy "kills" numbers - you are doing good to keep the numbers fairly even - if they are lopsided to the opponent, you'll likely never catch up and get thrashed ... 3) Play defense at first in each part of the battle until you have battered them with your troops in good cover and high ground - cannons firing shell and especially canister are wonderful if you are the one dishing it out (but not receiving it). 4) Do not rush out in all-out attack or firing line unless one of your brigades is in a stand-up firefight, and then run another brigade up and fire into his flank or front - 2:1 odds are wonderful in racking up numbers of the enemy - if he precipitously retreats, then fall back into your defensive position(s) and watch for the next opportunity to pounce 5) conserve your artillery - do not take losses - especially early - conserve the numbers of guns and numbers of troops 6) Do NOT fiercely contest the point positions on Seminary Ridge during the first battle unless the opportunity is just too good to pass up and just walk in! The reasoning here is that you wish to get into the next phase with fairly strong infantry brigades and artillery units, and wait for Rodes' Division and Early's Division to come straight down from the North - with Rodes fronting and pushing I and XI Corps, and Early's troops coming down and swinging into the back-side of the Yankees - AIMING to surround with all the still-strong Southern units and grind down the I and XI Corps brigades into fleeing fragments that run off the map never to reappear 7) The POINTS positions on Seminary Ridge are like magnets to the Yanks, who will hold to the last on them. This is the reason 6) is a tremendous opportunity for the ANV to surround - where you have to - and knock out Yank units while racking up casualty numbers. 8) Aim to go into the 2nd day with most of your infantry and artillery units still strong - play defense with your artillery backed up by infantry. Use a strong or all-out counter-attack when the Yanks are beaten back in their attacks 9) Use the defensive-offensive strategy to best advantage when playing as the Army of Northern Virginia -- all-out attack is fun when winning or trying out a game early on, but can quickly turn into disastrous defeat that one can seldom recover from - you start off out-numbered and it will take a lot of self-discipline to make up for this deficit, but it can be done 10) the 400 Heth skirmishers are interesting in that if at the beginning you send them off after the northern group of Devin's vedettes they can end up near or preferably ON the 750 point location - the AI goes nuts and will send skirmishers or Cutler or Iron Brigade after them - play cat-and-mouse AND OUT OF RANGE and they might send 2-4 units after them - then skedaddle up thru the woods and back to your own lines. ---- I have tried a number of times to send them on the southern route to the Seminary's 2500 points and then play cat and mouse, but I usually end up suddenly losing 75-90% of them if I don't have very-careful timing and pull them out of there before the skirmishers, vedettes, and I Corps turn them into mush. Great game - have fun and success! --Gael

David, Thanks for the order of battle. According to Gettysburg Magazine of July 1990, the article "The Wounding of Albert Jenkins, July 2, 1863" by Paul M. Shevchuk, page 51, Brigadier General Albert G. Jenkins' independent West Virginia cavalry brigade was assigned "its role as the vanguard of Lee's Army going down the Valley, crossing the Potomac on 15 June." The article does go on to say there were command difficulties in coordination with MG Rodes, as BG Jenkins and his 1,300 man brigade were well-trained for fighting in the rugged hills of WV, but had never worked with the ANV before. The article does state that Jenkins' brigade participated in some sharp actions, doing well in a couple, and not so well in a couple others. Jenkins was mortally wounded on Blocher's Knoll when viewing a map in regard to his just-received orders from General Lee on where to position his brigade to protect MG Johnson's left flank. His brigade was one of the 4 that LTG Stuart took with him that resulted in the fighting east at the cavalry battlefield of 3 July 1863. Cavalry brigade of 1,300 + 20,572 of II Corps appears to have been of sufficient strength to destroy coal mines. The West Virginians may also have had some knowledge of coal mines. All the best to you in your other endeavor. --Gael

David, COL John Mosby was with LTG JEB Stuart, acting as guide and leading the way thru the Northern forces. During the initial scout of the AoP, Mosby found that they were not moving. During the short time he went back and informed Stuart, the AoP started moving north and blocking the path Mosby and Stuart had started to follow - hence an unexpected two-day delay in their time-table to get back to GEN Lee. II Corps along with its attendant cavalry brigade(s) had enough manpower to do in the mines (Mosby's small force of ~150 were busy elsewhere), and they had been stymied earlier when Jackson attempted to destroy the lock(s) of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, so I would imagine Jackson and others had plenty of time and resources to figure out engineering-wise how they were going to destroy coal mines in quick fashion. COL Mosby's house is currently under control of the Warrenton Historical Society, Warrenton, VA. I toured the home once about two years ago. Up around Front Royal, VA, and that area, Custer and Mosby got into it: http://www.historynet.com/americas-civil-war-john-mosby-and-george-custer-clash-in-the-shenandoah-valley.htm It got pretty ugly per order of Grant, until the two were able to agree to be more civil toward each other's troops. --Gael

True, Lee was trying encourage the ANV to act in a good way toward the people of Pennsylvania, and was hoping to provide a good example as to how the Northern Army and it political leaders should act during this conflict. The populace was definitely fearful after hearing the horror stories of some of the things that were being done to the Southerners. After all, the ANV's commander's front yard of Arlington Plantation was turned into a cemetery the year before, along with his son Rooney's White House Plantation being burned to the ground when the Northern army of McClellan moved its supply base to a different location - both in 1862. In 1861, in Annapolis, MD, when the state government was starting to debate the issue of secession, Northern troops were seen and heard (while the session was ongoing) the building of a gallows outside the state house. When GEN Lee said he wanted to suppress John Pope and his army, he meant it and so did many others. Apparently the olive branch extension was not effective as the burning of the farm buildings and farm equipment in the Shenandoah Valley, and the same burnings across Georgia in 1864 demonstrated - ordered and condoned by the Northern military and politicians. These and other actions were enough to cause the international convention of European nations to convene in 1864 in Geneva, Switzerland, to come to agreement they would now allow to happen in any future European wars what was then occurring the U.S. internal conflict. As to Gettysburg for the moment, I have stated an alternative that I think has a lot of credibility and could also be considered by the interested readers of this board. As to my Great-Great-Grandfather in the 6th North Carolina State Troops, he participated in the Brickyard Fight of 1 July, and in the assault of East Cemetery Hill of 2 July 1863, assuming he helped others or was himself able to get up into Weidrich's and Rickett's batteries, momentarily capturing some of the guns: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_East_Cemetery_Hill ... " with bayonet, clubbed musket, sword, pistol, and rocks from the wall, …75 North Carolinians of the Sixth Regiment and 12 Louisianians of Hays's brigade… cleared the heights and silenced the guns." In one previous engagement of 1862, he was with his regiment in East Woods while the 2nd and 11th Mississippi (6th, 2nd, & 11th were part of Law's Brigade along with possibly some of your Alabama relatives if any were in the 4th Alabama) were to the 6th's left in the Miller Cornfield and to the right of the 1st Texas at Sharpsburg, MD. As organized then, Law's Brigade and the Texas Brigade comprised Hood's Division. (John Knott was drafted, along with many neighbors. His brother hid from the draft unit in a haystack and later fled into the piedmont region. A different relative from the Cleveland area has his name listed on an Ohio monument at the site of the attack on the Muleshoe defensive line at Spotsylvania battlefield - KIA 1864.) The attack on East Cemetery Hill. Baltimore Pike: Artillery lunettes downhill and along the east of the pike were uphill of the Union infantry line at the Brickyard Lane stone wall. Northwest: Maj. Gen. Robert Rodes's division along the dirt path (now Long Lane) in the darkness was not ready to attack a different side of Cemetery Hill until the east battle was almost over. Confederate Union

When on my high school senior trip in 1968 (lived in NW Ohio), we visited Gettysburg along the way. One of the things that struck me then was when looking from the area of the Lee statue, the distance to the Angle of the stone wall appeared to be not far. However, looking from the Angle to the Lee statue the distance seemed to almost double, which was somewhat of an optical illusion. In a later instance in 1992, during the filming of TNT's "Gettysburg" I was extremely fortunate to be participating with my brother's CW reenactment unit during "Pickett's Charge Week". The distance in our marching from the Spangler's Woods to Business Route 15 seemed to be almost never-ending (we went that far only once as the Park Rangers were going nuts telling the filmmakers to stop us 4,000 - we in the ranks did not know where we were to stop so we marched up to the fence on 15 cheering all those parked along there hoping to catch a glimpse of us - they from their campers and cars, etc., were cheering right back at us - as the line was so long, this one poor deer was dashing left and right trying to determine a direction to take to flee from our line of march). They filmed the reenactors of each scene 6 times, so there were 5 more times in marching toward 15 but only half as far as that first one. Although having visited G'burg many times, I still remember comparing the views from the two sides and being surprised as to how the distances appeared to be different. --Gael

David F, nice map you posted - similar to the one Kriegel put into his book. MG Couch, military commander of that department deduced almost immediately where the ANV II Corps was headed and called out the Pennsylvania militia units to guard the couple long bridges across the Susquehanna River, and if threatened, to burn them - which they did. As to those talking about the improbability of successfully wrecking coal mines, just realize that once a coal mine starts burning they are really tough to put out: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centralia,_Pennsylvania . Centralia's fire and Couch's actions seem to place immense credibility on this strategic movement. Note that Centralia is in one of those counties your map designates in red. PA can be rugged in spots, but the photo shows other areas to be rather traversable. Centralia, Pennsylvania From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Centralia is a borough and a near-ghost town in Columbia County, Pennsylvania, United States. Its population has dwindled from over 1,000 residents in 1981 to 10 in 2010[5] as a result of the coal mine fire that has been burning beneath the borough since 1962. Centralia, which is part of the Bloomsburg-Berwick micropolitan area, is the least-populated municipality in Pennsylvania and is completely surrounded by Conyngham Township. Centralia as seen from South Street, July 2010 Map showing Columbia County in Pennsylvania

As to anthracite versus bituminous (soft) coal - bituminous coal deteriorates much much faster in the damp ocean air and would have provided much more difficulty for the northern ships to remain on station on blockade duty. --Gael

As to why Pickett's charge was named after George P., it is somewhat logical in that forces from both the I and III corps were involved in the attack. MG Pickett was a known entity and the main punch would have to be supplied by his 3/5 division (President Davis had detained BG Corse's and BG Jenkins' brigades at Richmond for its defense). BG Pettigrew was taking the place of Heth - wounded on the 1st day, and MG Trimble (badly wounded in the leg at 2nd Manassas and healed enough to travel north with the ANV) had only been placed in command a few hours before, and also important was that the troops and their two brigade commanders had not worked together with Trimble and vice versa. AP Hill was sick during the battle. From what we know, it could have been named after LTG Longstreet or Pickett, but as the much more senior corps commander compared to Hill or Ewell, Lee could not afford to lose Longstreet if he were badly wounded so soon after Jackson's loss and due to Lee's heart problem. As Pickett was placed in overall command of the attack, it is easy to see why it was named after him, especially as the Virginia newspapers were able to get their accounts of the attack into the newspapers first. As a point of what-if, it would be interesting to know what might have occurred if the additional 2500-3000 fresh men of Corse's and Jenkins' brigades been at Gettysburg and participating in the attack - likely Stannard's Vermont brigade would have faced their own attack instead of being able to wheel and fire into the flank, and the collapse of Brockenbrough's Virginia brigade might not have mattered so significantly (MG Trimble directed his two brigades to the left to prop up that side). Additionally, with Corse and Jenkins, Wilcox's brigade might have had the little extra time to come up to the line and throw its weight into the fight at the stone wall.

The Battle of Solferino was won by Napoleon III's Imperial Guard breaking through the opponent's center. (The previously referred-to final attack of the Guard at Waterloo (1815) was a forlorn hope, with almost no real chance of ultimate success.) GEN Lee and all the other officers on and off the field would have studied that battle of 4 years earlier and come to their own conclusions as to how and what lessons-learned could apply to the situation of the 3rd July. (They would not have had access to today's American Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth.) Minie of "Minie-ball" fame was a French officer, and the French as a whole were considered one of the premier armies in technical cutting edge equipment, so GEN Lee had a vivid example of a top-notch modern army in a contemporary large battle as to what possibly might be achieved. --Gael ------------ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Solferino - The Battle of Solferino (referred to in Italy as the Battle of Solferino and San Martino) on 24 June 1859 resulted in the victory of the allied French Army under Napoleon III and Sardinian Army under Victor Emmanuel II (together known as the Franco-Sardinian Alliance) against the Austrian Army under Emperor Franz Joseph I. It was the last major battle in world history where all the armies were under the personal command of their monarchs. Perhaps 300,000 soldiers fought in the important battle, the largest since the Battle of Leipzig in 1813. There were about 130,000 Austrian troops and a combined total of 140,000 French and allied Piedmontese troops. After the battle, the Austrian Emperor refrained from further direct command of the army.

As to why Pickett's Charge? The 1859 battle of Solferino between France and Austria had been won by a charge of the ~10,000 man French Imperial Guard. Lee was looking at the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble attack with Stuart coming from the backside as a very possible attempt at surrounding and capturing I, XI, XII, and part of II Corps, which would have wrecked the Northern Army and possibly Northern morale as well. --Gael

An alternative perspective is offered in the book "North with Lee and Jackson" by Kriegel. Go after the anthracite (hard coal) mines in Pennsylvania just east of the Susquehanna River. There were only 6 counties - all located there - in all the northern states that produced the coal that supported the Northern blockade and the heavy manufacturing. COL Walter Taylor stated that Lee used the same strategy during 1862-1864 - however never written openly anywhere - go up there and destroy those mines. This was the strategy proposed by Jackson to Lee and Davis, which is said to be what ANV was working to achieve during the "Antietam Campaign" that went awry, and then again in early summer 1863, which is why the fastest - II Corps was sent bounding down the Valley with a portion of the cavalry in the attempt to quickly get across the Susquehanna and then wreck the mines. The I and III Corps were a bit behind II Corps but were there just in case II Corps got into trouble. Jackson's strategy once the mines were wrecked was to pull back and then bound North-Northwest to the little tip of Pennsylvania that butts up against Lake Erie cutting the Northern rail system into two parts and then daring the Northern forces to come after him. The book is a fascinating read with this perspective. Living near Manassas and now near Baltimore (attended school for a short while at Carlisle) where Harry Gilmor's raid along Mountain Road took place (destroying rail bridges) during Early's 1864 move toward Washington DC helps one see the possibilities of what was going on. In addition, if the two right-hand regiments of Law's Brigade had not been redirected to Devil's Den - moving behind the others, they would have extended way beyond the left of the 20th Maine. additional pause for thought would be the question of what would have occurred if Stuart had been able to get around the Northern right flank on the 3rd day and showed up at Meade's little house headquarters at the same time as the bombardment was winding down and the Pickett attack was getting ready to launch? My Great-Great-Grandfather was Pvt John Knott, Co A, 6th North Carolina State Troops, Hoke's Brigade, Early's Division, so I have a slightly biased view of things. --Gael