Charge mechanics

[Naldiin]

I'm still relatively new at this, but I wanted to ask about how charges actually work in game.

 

What I have generally been doing, as the CSA, to try to 'shock' the enemy out of a position, is to first take weaker brigades, ideally with artillery support, and start a shooting match - then move a strong, high-rank brigade in and charge it through the gap.  My thinking is that the shooting contest happening prior shields the incoming brigade from fire, and weakens the target.  The thing is, the charges have very little impact - when they work, they seem to just produce a moving ball of soldiers, with the impacted unit taking very few losses, while the attacking unit loses so much Condition that its basically out of the fight.  These are charges where I am reaching 'melee' without substantial losses, so I'm a bit confused - given the descriptions of Union/CSA strengths, having a high rank, high condition, high morale CSA brigade of large size hitting almost any union brigade short of the Black Hats should produce a very decisive and favorable result.  As it stands now, I can inflict more losses on the target with rifle-fire at max range than I can with a point-blank charge.

 

Am I doing this wrong, or do infantry charges just produce very low casualties?  It seems to me that the way this probably ought to work is a fairly large burst of losses on both sides on impact, with the proportion based on unit skill, with a CSA bonus, rather than the current slow-and-steady-bleed.  A unit physically shoved out of position by a charge also probably ought not be able to (as I tend to see) immediately reform and be combat effective - you'd expect a successful charge like that to send a unit to the rear in some haste.  I've also noticed, post-patch, that union artillery can cannister-shot into the mixed union/CSA unit-ball, without causing friendly-fire losses, which strikes me as strange, and further seems to weaken the impact of a charge.

 

I want to stress, i am not charging units over long distances - these are units with 85+ morale and condition on impact (when the units enter melee), attacking with plenty of friendly units covering their flanks.

 

So, am I using this feature wrong, or are charges just very weak?

 

Edit: I suppose I might clarify what I mean here.  I am aware that historically bayonets accounted for a very small proportion of wounds inflicted in the ACW, however, this is because, as Jomini notes, few units would withstand a bayonet charge, meaning that one unit would break and run before impact.  In that case, the current mechanic, with the tendancy to produce a mixed-up unit-ball of melee still doesn't seem to encapsulate that well, even if the casualties are realistically low.  Given the high risk of the manuver, the benefit of it in this context should be, it seems to me, the ability (if the charge is succesfully delivered) to scatter and rout a brigade very rapidly. 

 

So right now, what seems to happen is Charge -> Low Casualty Impact -> Disorganized Unit-ball, which then continues until the player orders the charging unit to halt.  The unit ball causes a steady drip of casualties, and typically slowly pushes forward, as the defending unit tries to 'fall back' out of melee.  It seems to me that, instead of this, the defender should either stand their ground, resulting in very rapid, sudden casualties to both sides, favoring the higher rank, larger unit and csa, or else (and this in most cases) the defending unit should break up, as per the Union XI Corps at Chancellorsville.  That would then put the onus on the defender to break up a charge before it arrives, or get their units out of the way well in advance.

[GShock]

You are fully right.

The charge, musket and arty fire should be finetuned for more realistic results.

 

The DEVs have gotten into the habit of pushing a patch with fixes alongside with gaming tweaks and balance.

You will certainly see a big series of improvements in the fields you mentioned (and more).

[David Fair]

Regarding Charging - you are not fully right.

 

Charges did not necessarily result in one side routing and the other side celebrating.  The results were much more distributed along a continuum of possible results.  

 

Most frequently one (or both) sides would fall back from close combat in reasonable disorder (not a rout) without making contact.

 

As charges neared impact it was unusual for an entire brigade to hit the enemy at precisely the same time - which resulted in mixed results in the charge.  

 

About 7 months ago I did an analysis that was posted on the forum of the melees at Gettysburg, casualties inflicted, and the results.  

The lesson from the analysis was that charges were ordered and resulted in combat ebbs and flows - with units falling back, reforming, and trying again until casualties mounted to the point that the contestants were exhausted (very infrequently routed).

 

My suggestion would be to think through how you'd like the game to perform and suggest specific changes.

 

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I don't think a game where the CSA can charge their way to VP after VP point sounds very interesting - but that's just my opinion.

 

Just because a charge is ordered should not ensure contact is made.  Charges frequently stalled - particularly frontal charges faced by troops in sound defensive positions, on higher ground, or behind breastworks.  For example, charges were ordered on Culp's Hill but there was very little actual melee combat as a result of these orders.  

 

Bottom line - I'd prefer to see a game dominated by maneuver with devastating flank attacks than a "charge-a-thon" game where you use fictional attributes of the CSA to chase blue-bellied cowards from defensive position to defensive position.  This would simply be nonsense.

 

In my opinion one of the primary lessons of the ACW is that man-for-man the armies were pretty evenly matched and the casualties at various battles are determined more by the side on the defensive and the qualities of the defensive terrain than the color of the uniform of the men charging.

 

Note that Union XI Corps fell back/routed (depending on your view) when it was flanked - not because it was charged.  The same is true for Union I Corps.  

 

In my opinion the greatest service of the Union artillery arm at Gettysburg was preventing the rout of XI & I Corps by covering the retreat.  

 

Unfortunately, with the inaccurate implementation of artillery in UGG, one of the most compelling and heroic aspects of the Battle of Gettysburg cannot be replicated in UGG.  

See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/OH/1OHArtBatI.php

The artillery simply moves too slowly to represent ACW artillery characteristics.  Note that Dilger's Battery was involved in this action - the same battery that performed the same service at Chancellorsville, preventing the destruction of the routed XI Corps.  Captain Hubert Anton Casmir Dilger won the Medal of Honor for his efforts at Chancellorsville.

 

During Longstreet's Attack (Pickett's Charge) the 8th Ohio is particularly noted for their advance on the flank of Pettigrew's Brigade that shattered the CSA moral regiment by regiment down the line of attack and sent the charge reeling from the Union defenses.  The number of men who actually fought in melee combat during the charge was, at most, in the small hundreds.  The 69th Pennsylvania (258 men) fought hand to hand while the 71st Pennsylvania retreated (not routed) and the 72nd Pennsylvania regiment was ordered to charge but did not obey the order and fought from their position.  The 69th lost 137 men during the entire ordeal of Longstreet's Charge so the number of losses due to melee surely was less than this total of 137 casualties.

See:  http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/69Pa.php

Any true rebel fan will confirm that Longstreet's Charge did not result in a rout of the ANV forces as they withdrew to the safety and cover of their defensive positions supported by their artillery.

 

If you use the number of 2.5X as the metric for casualties you will discover that Fredericksburg, Malvern Hill, the Wilderness Campaign, Cold Harbor, Culp's Hill, Longstreet's Charge at Gettysburg (Pickett's), etc... (some of the most lopsided victories of the war) that the results are quite similar.  The noted exception to the ACW 2.5 rule is John Bell Hood who managed late in the war to continue attacking long after any cognizant general would have realized the futility of continuing to order attacks (Battle of Franklin for example).

 

Hood pissed away 6,000 soldiers for Union losses of 2,000.  

 

Perhaps he was motivated to solve his logistics problems of feeding all of the mouths in his army?

[GShock]

He said charges are inconclusive and cause too few losses. On that he's right.

You can either stall, win or lose a charge. In most cases, I can't even reach the impact point.

 

On the rest you are right because there were inconclusive charges too.

 

That mechanic needs to be finely implemented. It's far from complete right now.

[David Fair]

I respectfully disagree with you that charges should cause more casualties or that they should be more decisive.

 

Civil War records indicate that about 0.03% of battlefield casualties were inflicted by close combat (some sources put this number as high as 0.04%).

 

About 92% were from rifled musket minie ball projectiles.

 

6% to 8% were caused by artillery projectiles.

 

Note that these figures are internally consistent with the hospital reports, number of projectiles fired, and the resupply records from the ordnance departments after battles.

 

The Union alone fired 32,781 artillery rounds (with multiple projectiles/round) (General Hunt's AAR) plus more than 4,000,000 minie balls (General Meade's AAR & ordnance resupply records).  The CSA records are much less precise some 22,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were fired and over 3,000,000 minie balls.

 

Close combat was quite rare, seldom decisive, and usually small scale during the ACW generally and at Gettysburg specifically.

 

First hand sources sometimes talk about bayonet wounds that were inflicted on defenseless men that were previously wounded by projectiles.

[Naldiin]

I respectfully disagree with you that charges should cause more casualties or that they should be more decisive.

 

 

I am fairly sure I noted an awareness of the low casualty figures for charging attacks in my first post, and I suspect a moderately careful reading of the original post would suggest that I am not advocating for a 'charge-a-thon' - the method I assumed was encouraged would be one in which the charging unit was supported, and delivered (by virtue of covering units and flanking attacks) in near perfect condition and morale to the enemy, which had already been weakened.  That's hardly CSA untis charging everywhere, but instead careful, prepared and relatively rare shocks to capitalize on local superiority.

 

As it stands, what you are essentially arguing for is problematic on two levels, both historically, and in terms of gameplay.  The key problem is that charges are high-risk, beause they involve being very close to enemy units, and the damage inflicted by fire is heavier the closer you are - close range volleys are a lot more devastating than long-range ones, and while close-range flanking vollies are astoundingly devastating, charging into an enemy unit's flank results in exactly the same pointless 'unit-ball' as charging the front or rear.  If charging attacks are neither decisive, nor do they inflict high losses, then the charge button is simply, "Do not press this at any time, execept against isolated artillery."  From a gameplay perspective, this is deeply silly - not only is there a feature that is basically pointless, but it's also a feature upon which, at least in theory, the game's balance (as a game, rather than a historical simulation) depends - CSA are supposed to have stronger charges, and tougher morale in order to carry out those charges, while Union forces are supposed to be stronger in ranged exchanges.  So on a gameplay level, a high risk, low reward mechanic is a dead mechanic - and balancing a faction around a dead mechanic is a little silly.

 

On the historical level, commanders continued to charge in the ACW.  Hancock ordered a charge of the 1st Minn. at the Wheatfield, Armistead's Brigade made it into close-combat during Pickett's Charge, three union regiments charged Davis at the unfinished railroad cut, and that's what I have off the top of my head at Gettysburg alone.  In short, this method of attack, while not excatly common, did happen both in the ACW, and in this battle, which makes reducing the infantry charge to a dead mechanic is also a-historical.  Someone on both sides clearly thought that there was a time and place to charge.  And they were not always wrong, as per the Chancellorsville example. 

 

So we return to the question, "What is the circumstance where this button is worth pressing?"  You advocate for only situations where the charging unit can strike a flank or rear, which is fine, but not in any way simulated in the game mechanics and it also fails the historical-tactics test, since commanders did charge frontally as well.  It seems to me that the three circumstances where a charge was seen as a valid option were, 1) attacks on an enemy in such high quality cover as to make fire-exchange pointless, 2) spoiling attacks to prevent an enemy advance (see Wheatfield example above) or 3) attacks on an enemy unit expected to be unprepared to retaliate, either due to heavy barrage or flanking.  I would submit that the current mechanics do not effectively encapsulate any of these scenarios.  Charging a weakened unit with a strong unit merely produces two weakened units, even if the charge is delivered on the flank, or without intercepting fire.

 

One problem with the charge is how unclear the situation is once the 'unit-ball' forms - it probably ought to not be immediately clear who is winning until one side runs, but it's also not clear which side is even 'running' given the jumbled nature of the unit-ball.  Now Blunt's guide over in the support forums recommends slamming the 'halt' button the moment the defending unit breaks, which is something I do, but it seems like that is a function that ought to be something that the unit-awareness AI does all on its own, since (due to the very low casualties) there is basically no reason to continue a melee after the target unit falls back - and one would assume the decision to get back into firing order would not be made by the commanding general.  That change alone, at the very least, produce attacks that the player can make some sense out of, either Charge -> Crash -> I now hold the ground, or Charge -> Crash -> My unit is wrecked, or Charge -> Crash -> Inconclusive result, both units reform for another go.

[GShock]

Don't forget to mention the cases of the "no ammo" leaving the charge as the only possible way to fight as well as the "battery in range".

Neither of these are available in the game, at this point.

[MikeK]

Charges were the subject to extensive military study beginning in the enlightenment, when practical lessons were analyzed and formalized. Shock action is psychological - charges are psychological phenomena and among the most uncertain of contests within a battle, highly sensitive to both the gross factors and nuances of terrain, formation, position, leadership, cohesion and everything down to happenstance etc. Coup d'oeil, courage, and command presence in the lower chain of command are key to respond and adapt to circumstances.

 

The time to charge is when the enemy is not merely worn down in some degree, but the charge prepared by the enemy's defensive capabilities being dislocated materially or psychologically, or both, such as in a surprise flank attack. Even today, the bayonet remains psychologically important to the soldier and his adversary as demonstrating his willingness to close, and the shrewd timing of psychological boosts/shocks such as fixing bayonets, not drawing swords too soon or without command, a cheer or roar (or ominous muteness), a closing volley, etc. make a great difference.

 

The game changes and I don't know the underlying model math, but at times there is the sense of this in the game.   

[David Fair]

Naldiin,

 

 "What is the circumstance where this button is worth pressing?" is a great question.  

The answer used to be "whenever you play the CSA".  Fortunately, this is now a bit more balanced and the game is not a charge-a-thon as it was 6 months ago.

 

Today the game has evolved and it is better.  But, flank attacks should shatter defenses long before you can get close enough to order a charge (in the context of the UGG charge mechanic).  Union XI Corps was shattered by maneuver at both Chancellorsville & Gettysburg.  In both cases melee combat was not decisive at either Chancellorsville or Gettysburg - the fact that units in the ACW were aware of their flanks and understood that they had been flanked was sufficient to force them to surrender or withdraw - and for some units to rout.  

 

In UGG the AI does not seem to be flank aware enough and you need to fire/charge to get the results that should be happening much sooner.  Generals who put their troops in harms way and get them flanked/surrounded should be severely punished by having their troops surrender - as 6,000 Union men did on July 1, 1963.  This mechanic should function properly without pressing the "charge" button.  Men routinely surrendered before they were in a fist fight (or a "Unit-ball" fight).

 

UGG relies on the "Unit-ball" resolution approach - which as you point out is a flawed mechanism.  

 

But, I'm having difficulty understanding how you want the game to change.

 

I'm not a fan of the "Unit-ball" implementation problem (or the charge-a-thon problem).  This has been the topic of much discussion over the last 11 months of development.  Over months of testing it was not unusual for the AI (usually the Union) to get its units completely surrounded around the VP locations holding out for the end of the Phase when the lines were reformed for the next iteration of the same behavior.

 

"Should there be a predictable result for charges" is also a great question.  

 

Isn't it the nature of a melee that the results are unpredictable?  The Union charge at the RR cut resulted in the surrender of about 400 rebels to a Union regiment down to about 200 men.  The actual hand to hand combat was minimal but the fact that the rebels were being charged while they were in the bottom of the RR cut was decisive - because they couldn't fire back effectively.

 

Was there some melee involved?  Yes, but it was very small scale and was not the decisive factor that drove the ANV men trapped in the RR cut to surrender.  Additionally, many of the ACW charges were acts of desperation - a last gasp to achieve victory.

 

Units fighting in the ACW did not know precisely how many men they were facing and didn't have the precision of the UGG data.  As a result charges were much more unpredictable in the ACW than they are in UGG.

 

Fog of war is not very well represented in UGG.

 

 

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My charge-a-thon comment was not directed at your first post - but the statement that "you are fully right" following your original post as a "moderately careful reading" should reveal. 

 

I think your original post and your longer post was well reasoned, reasonably accurate, and highlights one of the mechanics in UGG that needs some additional work (rout comment excepted as there were many charges ordered that did not have decisive results or even result in close combat (as currently occurs and is represented by the "Unit-ball")).

 

Note that UGG is a brigade-level game and the examples you've posted above are regimental-level actions.  At the brigade-level charges were very seldom "decisive" across a frontage as broad as a brigade.

 

What is your proposal to fix the problem you've identified?

How do you want the game to change?

Is an "auto halt after charge" all that you'd like to see changed?

Is this enough?