[FOG in the game]

Including signals sounds complicated to me and of questionable game experience value.  But, if you plan to incorporate semaphore/signals please keep in mind that both sides could read each others semaphore codes.

[The map, what do you think?]

Clinch,

UGG looks like a great battlefield engine; and would be greater if it allows more flexibility than refighting Gettysburg 20 times. Even great games against new gamers get old.

Maps of the Civil War period varied tremendously (Same was true in WWII...). Local knowledge was essential to fill in map details. Hostile locals reduced intelligence significantly. The precision of maps, population sentiment, and recon all had an impact on C2 decisions. Sickles decision to move his Corps forward at Gettysburg was based on faulty perception of the line he was defending. He moved forward to "higher ground" and his Corps was decimated. If his maps were so accurate why did he sacrifice his Corps?

Sherman at Chattanooga attacked a hill that he believed was part of Missionary Ridge. It wasn't until he had taken the hill that he realized that he couldn't get his troops off the hill and over the ridge he was suppose to take. Note that Sherman had been in Chattanooga with maps for a couple of weeks to plan the attack; but couldn't correctly interpret the lay of the land from telescope or maps.

This was much more the rule than the exception during the Civil War; ravines, fords, deep brush all impact combat/movement to an extent that is not obvious until you walk the land. Custer at Bull Run rode his horse into the run to show his general how deep the water was and that it could be crossed at all points immediately. Despite this intelligence Union troops continued to march to the bridge and cross. Antietam is another great example of a battle where the maps from both sides were good; but, the casualties were extraordinary because the lay of the land allowed troops to close to point blank range by following the topography for cover. Note that the topography of the battlefield had to be studied in the last 20 years to understand why the casualties were so high. Topography is tricky.

You've clicked into the idea - only I think of this as quasi-random map generator.

It would be great to have a game engine that could be tied to Campaign software. AGEODs is a good example of a strategic game with a terrible battle interface.

It would be great to have the flexibility to link UGG battles in a campaign engine.

When a battle occurs I'd like to reference historical maps or even fill in details with Google earth to zoom into my battlefield topography.

The Battlefield series, for example, had a project that tried to do something like this for the Napoleonic Wars. Gamers were able to build maps etc. The game had no campaign interface; so the result was a series of battles that really didn't have much context.

[The map, what do you think?]

The map looks great but knowing the topography over the next hill is a huge advantage historical leaders seldom enjoyed. Military balloons were employed during the Civil War to help reduce this problem; but, at Gettysburg neither side deployed balloons during the battle. I'd almost like to see the LOS control how much of the map I can see. This puts recon at a premium. Additionally, it makes Jeb Stuart relevant/critical and why Lee needed him during the early days of the battle.

See: "Why military balloons were not used at Gettysburg"

http://www.yorkblog.com/cannonball/2011/12/31/military-ballooning-at-the-january-harrisburg-civil-war-round-table/

[Concept Art Feedback]

Concept #7 looks great; but, the relationship of the map to the troop scale and temporal aspects are critical to answer the question.

Trading off topographical eye candy for playability is not a good alternative.

[Old 'Battleground' Series by 'Empire Games']

The Battleground series took a tremendous amount of micromanagement and thus time.  

 

You really never got the sense or satisfaction that you were commanding an army or making "big decisions".  Everything was really tactical at a large scale.

[First impressions]

Map looks great.  

 

Hopefully this will be a game with a little "fog" in the "fog of war".  

 

It's annoying when the Army Commander knows the precise strength, ammunition supply, and moral of every unit in the Army at all times.  One key historical leadership metric was understanding what troops were capable of achieving given their current state.  Smoke, confusion, exhaustion, and supply were critical leadership intuitions rather than data points for issuing orders.  It would be refreshing to play a game where the outcome wasn't predetermined by how much minutia I have about my troop's state.  Local commanders knew which troops were fresh and which had been on the line and rotated troop orders according to their fatigue, experience, and reputation.  

 

I'd like a leadership gut vs. algorithm gaming experience.

 

In almost every Civil War memoir leaders, when pressed to hold or attack replied, "we'll try".  Famously after Pickett's Charge Lee went out to greet his shredded regiments apologizing for believing they could do the impossible.  Longstreet knew better, and on that day for that charge, Longstreet had a deeper understanding and perspective on the fog of war in that valley.  Lee's inability to grasp the fog of war was masked by his desire to win the war, or at least win the support of England/France so the South could get out of the Civil War as an independent nation.

[Is ammo needed?]

Ammo Tradeoffs

In historical simulations it is important to consider, "what impact did ammunition supply have on the actual battle?"

Small Arms Ammunition

Ammo was a key issue for Buford's U.S. Cavalry at the start of the battle to delay Archer's Brigade. The rate of fire was slowed to preserve ammunition until Reynolds/Doubleday I Corps arrived. Once Corps level organizations arrived on the field the ammunition crisis was alleviated. Front line troops could draw ammo from regimental supply, reverse troops and their regimental supplies, and finally Corps supply trains. Every evening supplies were moved from the Army reserve to restock the Corps, division, regimental, and front line ammunition reserves.

Note that the defense of Little Round Top was another case of isolated troops that were stationed to hold a position that had been detached from their Corps. They ran out of ammunition after 3 attacks.

My suggestion is that troops operating within the zone of their Corps are supplied. Troops operating independently had finite supply.

Artillery

Armies were limited on how much ammunition could be carried on campaign. The level of artillery ammunition was a key logistic decision for every Civil War Campaign. Lee limited his artillery ammunition supply to fight one three-day battle during the Gettysburg Campaign because of his limited supply capacity; both wagons and draft animals were in short supply. Sherman also, for example, reduced his artillery park prior to the March to the Sea because he could not carry enough artillery ammunition for all of the artillery he had accumulated during the Atlanta Campaign. When he abandoned the railway supply line he also had to abandon about half of the artillery he had used in the siege of Atlanta.

Artillery batteries and Corps organizations carried limited artillery ammunition; usually enough ammunition to fight for 1 day. They were then resupplied from the Army reserve supply train; which carried enough ammunition for the Army to fight for 3 days. July 2 was the major artillery duel at Gettysburg. The Confederates planned an artillery barrage that was to last more than two hours prior to Pickett's Charge. However, they had failed to bring forward enough ammunition from the Army reserve supply to support a rapid-fire barrage of two hours. Confederate rate of artillery fire was ordered to slacken to ensure ammunition would last up to the time ordered for Pickett's Charge. During the charge ammunition was brought up from the Army reverse to prevent a Union counter-attack.

Note that during the preliminary barrage from the Confederates the Union batteries stopped firing after an hour of counter-battery fire to preserve ammunition. Once Pickett's Charge provided ample targets the Union batteries opened on the target rich infantry in the valley between Seminary and Cemetery Ridge.

Lee's artillery ammunition situation was a key factor in forcing the Confederates to abandon the Gettysburg Campaign after the battle. His reverse supply of artillery ammunition was exhausted.