Jump to content
Game-Labs Forum

David Fair

Civil War Tester
  • Posts

    891
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    8

Posts posted by David Fair

  1. I'd much rather see an AGEOD's style campaign with the ability to fight battles with the UGG engine.  

     

    That way the community can get involved in designing battlefields, orders of battle, etc. and accelerate the process.  

     

    With proper licensing arrangements UGG can focus on the mechanics while leveraging the community to fill in the voids on individual battles and still make money.

  2. Hopefully the design team will have the discipline to focus on the Civil War for a bit longer.  Too many designers take a game engine and slap in on a different era with different uniforms.  

     

    Napoleonic warfare is a tremendous challenge because of the combined arms aspects of tactics.

     

    It might make sense to do the much simpler, and smaller scale, Lace Wars then think about Napoleonic Wars.  My primary interest in history is the Napoleonic Wars; but I don't think the design team has evolved the combined arms mechanics sufficiently with this game engine to properly implement the Napoleonic Wars.

    • Like 1
  3. Nick,

     

    You might want to consider screened batteries are highlighted in red instead of green?

     

    Alternatively if you went for the target over enemy units instead of arrows then it would be obvious because none of the potential targeted units would be highlighted.  You might even have 2 colors for the target symbol - red for units you could fire on and - blue for units that you could fire on if you artillery were not blocked/screened by a friendly unit.

  4. VegasOZ - the idea of a target vs. an arrow that would show which units you can target from you current location with artillery is important because I don't necessarily want my artillery to move (I think an arrow suggests movement?).  

  5. N.C., ultimately the game needs to be fun and visually satisfying.  Quick to learn difficult to master is always a good goal.

     

    History is great as long as the game doesn't get bogged down in micromanagement.

  6. P*Funk, Buford's cavalry division withdraw to Maryland on July 2 because they had exhausted their specialized ammunition supply for their cavalry carbines.  They were sent to the railhead in Maryland to refit and resupply.  One of my previous (archived) posts dealt specifically in much greater detail with Buford's armament, ammunition supply, and logistics that resulted in Buford requesting to be withdrawn to Maryland.  Meade personally approved Buford's request.

     

    I'd argue that the single most critical ammunition supply at the battle of Gettysburg has already implemented in UGG.  Buford's cavalry division disappears from the field after July 1 due to ammunition supply.

     

    The problem IMO is if you are advocating implementing ammunition in a historically relevant way it absolutely will be another thing for the player to manage.  How is it possible not to be?

     

    The presentation of your arguments in favor of ammunition concern me because:

    1) The ammunition situation is different between a rifled musket vs. an automatic weapon.  I'm not sure how to use your data for comparison.  In my experience poorly grounded logic arguments result in poorly implemented mechanics.

     

    2) The linear tactics of the American Civil War are substantially different than 21st century warfare.  Particularly given the 21st Century dimension of vertical envelopment and the implications on the logistics of ammunition resupply.   

     

    3) Finally the scale and concentration at Gettysburg is dramatically different than IDF operations; which also has significant ammunition and logistical implications.  

     

     

    If we drop back into the context of the American Civil War there were 40 miles of wagons supplying 160,000 men on a battlefield that was 3 miles by 5 miles.  This means that it was about a 20 minute round trip from an ammunition source to units on the line in most cases. Often much less.  Wagons routinely dropped infantry ammunition behind the lines which was then carried by hand to the regiments running low on ammunition.  At Gettysburg there were only two regiments (no divisions) that ran out of ammunition.  Both were on the extreme ends of the Union lines.  In total critical ammunition shortages involved about 500 men for a short period of time at Gettysburg.

     

    It's not that infantry ammunition wasn't important.  It's that both armies managed the resupply logistics so that it wasn't an issue above the regimental level and was rectified expeditiously at Gettysburg (and most other American Civil War battles).  In the grand scheme of the Civil War the ammunition supply for infantry was managed well enough to be militarily irrelevant on the battlefield.  

     

    My concern is if infantry ammunition implemented it will play too much of a role for a game of this scale and the testing community will have yet another anachronism to debate.  Units in UGG fall back routinely enough already.  As they reform aren't they able to resupply before they go forward?

     

    Again, IMO the ebb and flow of UGG already abstracts the infantry ammunition satisfactorily.

     

     

    Artillery ammunition is a different story.  

     

    The ammunition, if not packed and handled properly, can become inert.  As a result there were very precise instructions regarding artillery ammunition.  You couldn't just chuck 50 rounds in the back of a wagon then rush the wagon to resupply a battery.  

     

    Artillery was a Corps/Army level asset and a concern for both army commanders, Corps commanders, and artillery commanders.  If ammunition is going to be implemented it would make sense to start with the artillery.  

     

    Batteries at Gettysburg were ordered to cease firing, routinely rotated, and these policies were a source of conflict between officers regarding the preservation of ammunition supplies (Hunt (hold fire) vs. Hancock (commence firing) prior to Pickett's Charge).

     

    I'm not a fan of adding another thing for players to manage in UGG.  

     

    At best, it is not obvious to me that you can implement an infantry policy on ammunition without increasing micromanagement.  At worst the potential exists to screw up this game with silly results that weren't anticipated.  My observation is infantry ammunition advocates have proposed solutions they think are "great" or "fun" that have no bearing on the historical basis from battle of Gettysburg.  

     

    Players have the option to pretend their units have run low on ammunition and order a charge.  Which often seems to be the goal anyway.

     

    It is very obvious IMO that you cannot implement a historically reasonable artillery ammunition policy without significantly increasing artillery micromanagement.  

     

    Please keep in mind that the UGG team is already advocating combining artillery batteries into larger organizations because the micromanagement of artillery is too cumbersome for many testers.  

     

    My observation is that UGG seems to be dangerously close to, or over, the saturation point for many players.

  7. Personally I'd give 100 specialty units for a bit more fog of war and better metrics of victory.  The victory point format is both stale and annoying.  Holding an entire brigade on Oak Hill or Herr Ridge to prevent 200 cavalry from capturing victory points is not strategically interesting or militarily relevant.  

     

    But victory points are victory points so damn the strategy and hold those victory point locations!

     

    The precision of information in the game is already way too high and scouts etc. would only increase this precision.  Units in battle seldom knew how many men were still in the ranks; let alone how many enemy they'd killed.  If units in the field had this much precision why would the Iron Brigade need to ask for the "rest of the brigade" when they reached camp?  Usually the side that held the field had a better understanding of who won/lost in terms of body count.  I've read a quote something like, you knew you won a battle by the stench of holding the field.

     

    III Corps includes two sharpshooter units; but, they are militarily irrelevant.  Should sharpshooters have an increased chance of killing leaders?  How would you satisfy players that these units are realistic.  100 players = >100 different opinions.  Further how would you prevent these specialists from becoming mythological gods in their implementation.  Remise and I have had to deal with more than a double dose of "Super Videttes".

     

    There were more than 40 miles of combined wagons supporting the armies at Gettysburg.  Where would you put all these supply wagons?  I guess if you had the wagons on the field then you'd need to protect them which might give the cavalry something more realistic to do.  But I'd be hard pressed to believe this is a good thing.

     

    If you had engineer units would they be cutting paths through the forest for guns to move?  What else do you have in mind?  The creeks at Gettysburg can be crossed at almost all points - often without getting your feet wet.  So engineers wouldn't need to be building bridges would they?  Breastworks were mainly accomplished by the rank and file (i.e., Culp's Hill).  So would engineers be building breastworks?  Building the Shevardino Redoubt?  Train tracks?  Telegraph lines?

     

    What about a couple of Signal Corps stations?  Ambulance Corps?  Commissary? Camp Followers?

     

    Are you certain in a game at this scale and speed you want more to do?

     

    The entire battlefield is only 5 miles by 3 miles.  What do specialists add strategically?

  8. N.C. Rebel - have you read:

    "Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander (Civil War America)"?

     

    My recollection is that Alexander reviews the ammunition expenditures; but, I haven't read this book in years and don't recall his discussion of Fredericksburg.  He was in command of the artillery on Marye's Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg.

     

    William Pendleton is frequently a good resource for ammunition expended by the ANV if you can find his AAR's.  

     

    I'm sure the information is available - it may just take some digging.  

     

    P.S. You can very closely calculate the artillery supply in the field for Civil War Armies.  The ratio of guns to caissons was maintained at 1:1 for the war.  If you check the order of battle you can find the number and type of guns.  The ammunition for each gun caisson is specific to the gun.  With a bit of math you can very accurately identify how much ammunition was on the field.  

     

    Note that railroads are a key piece of the puzzle as resupply was usually not possible until the army reached a railhead.  At Gettysburg for example the Union had a 2:1 advantage in cavalry (12,000 blue vs. 6,000 grey).  A substantial part of the Union cavalry was allocated to protecting the ammunition wagons shuttling the 20 miles to Maryland and back to Gettysburg to replenish ammunition supplies. 

  9. General Hunt's report stating that the Union brought 97,740 rounds of artillery ammunition to Gettysburg.  Union fired 32,781 rounds at Gettysburg.

    General Pendleton's report states the CSA brought 40,800 rounds to Gettysburg.  CSA fired about 22,000 rounds.

    I'd suggest every time a battery fires the number of guns firing is subtracted from the ammunition supply.

    Artillery ammunition became a key concern for both sides.
    The CSA fired about 22,000 rounds (150 rounds/gun average) which was more than half of their supply.
    The Union fired 32,781 rounds (270 rounds/gun average) which was about a third of their supply.

    Given the Union rail supply lines were less than 20 miles from Gettysburg it is obvious the Union had a much less complex logistical problem replenishing artillery ammunition.

     

     The CSA's nearest railhead was Charlottesville, VA more than 150 miles distant. 

  10. In one of my previous posts the precise and complete Gettysburg artillery ammunition data was provided.

     

    General Hunt reported the Union fired 32,781 rounds at Gettysburg.  The Union brought about 90,000 rounds to Gettysburg.

     

    The CSA fired about 20,000 rounds at Gettysburg.  The CSA brought about 40,000 rounds to Gettysburg.

     

    Now that the "Historical Artillery Performance" topic has been resurrected I'll try to find the precise numbers for the Union & CSA artillery supply and the number of rounds fired by the CSA.  The information above is in the ballpark and Hunt's number is directly from his AAR from Gettysburg.

     

    Hunt instructed his men to "fire deliberately" which was one round every five minutes.  This allowed aimed fire with minimal obstruction of target from the smoke from the previous shot.  Additionally, the battery could fire for about 8 hours at this rate of fire.  

     

    In a heated contest artillery frequently fired all the ammunition it could carry in about 2 hours.  Rapid fire, and retiring the battery to the artillery reserve to replenish supply, became such a problem for the Union that Hunt gave orders forbidding batteries that had exhausted their ammunition supply to pull out of the line.  Instead he ordered them to sit in place while the limbers returned to replenish artillery ammunition.  This helped slow the Union rate of fire.

     

    Note that during the artillery barrage that preceded Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg Hunt ordered the Union artillery reserve to hold fire after 15 minutes of firing.  This helped ensure the Union artillery had ammunition during Pickett's Charge.

  11. Nick,

     

    I want to be on the record that I respectfully disagree with your post above.  In my opinion these videttes are not fixed and continue to plague the game with an unrealistic and anachronistic unit that fundamentally alters the play balance of UGG in the favor of the Union.  These videttes can destroy as much as 10% of the CSA artillery in the first phase and alter the balance of the game for the duration of the battle.

  12. Hi ZZZzzzzz, 

    Just a quick update on the beta test in steam.  UGGs been up and running and testing is ongoing.  The tester's responses are being reviewed and the next iteration for the beta test will be out soon.  

     

    I have no idea what the development team schedule looks like or when early release will be available.  Nick did give an update yesterday under the topic of Beta Testers.

    • Like 1
  13. Brutus,

     

    I've had a great time testing UGG and you've identified and raised a couple of good historical accuracy points:

    Units falling back should not move at the same rate as advancing infantry,

    Infantry units are either line units or skirmishers and these unit designation function differently (line infantry cannot select "skirmish" formation),

    Infantry units are in either double line or column (there are a few smaller brigades that deploy in a single line),

    Dismounted cavalry units cannot mount.   They function like fast infantry in quasi-skirmish/fire & run formation.  This begs the question, "who do you think would win a 100 yard dash: guys running in cavalry boots wearing spurs or guys running in infantry boots?"  There are times IMHO when it is important to support the design team's decisions and not think too deeply about the historical accuracy of game implementation details.  

    The mounted units you see in the video are designated "videttes" but function like a mounted 200 man Seal Team 6; attacking isolated batteries or the flanks/rear of infantry divisions to crash their morale.  Again, don't think too deeply about the historical accuracy of game implementation details.

     

     

    Here are some thoughts from a game tester's perspective:

     

    During the American Civil War the AoP & ANV each had units that were known by their reputation rather than the brigade commander.  The "Stonewall Brigade", "Irish Brigade", and "Iron Brigade" are examples.  The same is true for batteries that had earned a reputation.  

     

    While the general rule was to identify brigades by their brigade commander units that had earned their reputation took pride in the unit distinction they had earned.  What is the benefit to throwing out historical unit designations in favor of "uniformity" in your perspective?  

     

    As a game tester I can assure you that "named brigades" tell me instantly that I have selected a unit that can take and dish out better than average punishment.  Uniformity in the naming conventions would reduce player's reaction time - and, as you've noted, the game is fast.

     

    Also the roman numeral distinction between Corps commands and brigades is helpful (helpful for the CSA and historically accurate for the Union).  At the pace of the game these roman numeral distinctions help the player identify and manage the pace of the game.  

     

    Note also that it doesn't matter if Cutler and Meredith are deployed together because Division Commanders don't exist in UGG.  It is only important to keep I Corps together to get the benefit of the Corps Commander (though I guilty of trying to keep my units organized by division).  While keeping units organized by division would be more historically accurate it would also add a significant amount of micromanagement to a fast paced game.  Also, despite the effort to keep everything organized battles are chaotic and historically divisions ended up a bit scrambled at the end of the day.  My hunch is you'd drive players nuts if you built an RTS game based on the historical chain of command structure.  The design goal was to make an enjoyable game where players get the flavor of Gettysburg in a reasonable time scale. 

    • Like 1
  14. 79Maliboo,

     

    Just back from 2 days in Gettysburg.  My primary interest was to take another look at how Smith's Battery (4th New York Independent) managed to get into the position where it was captured.  Running ammunition up to these guns must have been a chore.  General Hunt predicted that Smith would lose his guns - and of course he did.

     

    Also I took a 6' bike flag with me and ran some experiments on the gun positions you highlighted in your 16 April post.  My goal was to follow the path of Barksdale to see how close I could get to the flag before I could see the flag.  I played around with a 100 yard front and 150 yard front for the advance.  As you point out above the undulations make an interesting study on both fields of artillery fire and cover for infantry.  The terrain makes an interesting study motivating skirmisher tactics against artillery.  

     

    The other aspect I looked at was fields of fire from supporting batteries on Cemetery Hill.  While most games allow you to plop artillery just about anywhere and blaze away; in reality it is much more difficult to find a great artillery positions with unrestricted fields of fire.  The fields of fire for all 6 guns of Hazlett's Battery on Little Round Top was very limited and it would have been difficult to get any more than 6 guns in position.  It was nearly impossible to work guns on sloped terrain.

     

    The key lesson from this trip with my flag was even if you get permission at Park HQ you still attract significant attention from Park Officials when you post a 6' flag in the ground at Gettysburg.

  15. Personally, as a tester, in my opinion the delay is a good thing.  There were serious issues to address.  

     

    Generically with any history game the designers need to make a choice between "history" and "game".  These are two discreet targets; each with a bullseye.  No designer has been successful having it both ways.  If you try to shoot between the communities you'll likely miss both targets.  

     

    If you satisfy the "gamers" you have stuff like artillery tracers and bodies flying through the air, charging cavalry.  Exciting graphics are really important.  

     

    If you satisfy the grognards then stuff like "cavalry had the choice of inaction or suicide against infantry during the American Civil War" or "50,000 rounds of artillery ammunition was fired at Gettysburg and most of these artillery rounds didn't hit anything" is important. For many grognards graphics are less important than getting the game to perform "historically accurate enough" to be interesting.  Too much "game" stuff drives grognards away (e.g., did any grognards seriously interested in history buy "Age of Empires"?).

     

    My hope is that UGG will be a step in the direction of merging the game and gognard communities.  But, I'm concerned that with Tablets as the design target the tension for resources will limit the implementation making a merger less likely. 

     

    `````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````

     

    On the other hand if the UGG team is using this time to integrate Cavalry into Gettysburg then it will only lead to the next "brick wall of suggestions" from a broader audience that will be divided along the "game" vs. "history" fracture line.  

  16. Thanks for sharing your perspective!  

     

    If the flat terrain puts the artillery "in the position for musket fire on their flanks" isn't it also true that the artillery has an open field of fire on the flanking infantry that should not exist if the ground were undulating?  

     

    Terrain at first glance seems like a "sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander" relationship.  In fact rolling terrain favors infantry rather than the direct fire artillery of the American Civil War.  Terrain features obscure fields of fire for artillery; but provide cover for infantry.  Your argument is interesting because it might help explain why artillery casualties during the Civil War were between 6% and 8% of the battlefield casualties inflicted.  The rifled musket was the dominant force of the Civil War inflicting >90% of the battlefield casualties - very likely because the terrain of America is rarely flat.

     

    My limited understanding of the Civil War suggests that the key vulnerability for artillery, that was not supported with friendly infantry, was that enemy infantry attacked in skirmish order.  This prevented the artillery from having a concentrated target.  First-hand artillery accounts describe this problem as "trying to shoot mosquitoes with a rifle".  Bigelow's battery was infiltrated by skirmishers who shot down the battery's horses by rebel infantry, "standing on the limbers".  Bigelow attempted to address the skirmisher problem by deploying his guns in an arc; but without infantry support his battery was doomed and overrun.

     

    Note that in the 1861 and 1864 edition of the "Artillerist's Manual" artillery that is not supported with infantry is recommended to limber to the rear for infantry support.  

×
×
  • Create New...