akd
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Posts posted by akd
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You can report typos with the report shortcut from loading screen.
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The point is with the primary and secondary tower and funnels all at the back, the engine spaces should be there also. The current model has the citadel and engine spaces fixed in the center regardless the of turret / tower+funnel placement.
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I think F11 is screenshot, not smokescreen. Only destroyers and light cruisers can produce smoke screens and the option is in the bottom of the screen commands. The mechanic is poorly connected to how things worked in reality and affect on tactics. It is really more of a per ship accuracy malus “cloak” on an arbitrary timer.
The green circles are radar spots, and I don’t believe there are any false returns. -
Yes, this needs additional work, but it’s not quite so simple:
Range with the originally planned 2,240 lbs. (1,016 kg) AP Mark 5 was 40,200 yards (36,760 m) at a muzzle velocity of 2,520 fps (768 mps).
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_16-45_mk6.php
So still heavier shell than HC and lower MV, but ever so slightly longer range.
And for same two shells described at the North Carolina site (2700lb AP, 1900lb HC) fired from the later 16”/50 Mark 7, the slower, heavier AP has greater range at 20 degrees elevation and higher.
Range
Ranges of projectiles fired at new gun muzzle velocities Elevation AP Mark 8 HC Mark 13 10 degrees 17,650 yards (16,139 m) 18,200 yards (16,642 m) 15 degrees 23,900 yards (21,854 m) 24,100 yards (22,037 m) 20 degrees 29,000 yards (26,518 m) 28,800 yards (26,335 m) 25 degrees 33,300 yards (30,450 m) 32,700 yards (29,901 m) 30 degrees 36,700 yards (33,558 m) 36,000 yards (32,918 m) 35 degrees 39,500 yards (36,119 m) 38,650 yards (35,342 m) 40 degrees 41,430 yards (37,884 m) 40,600 yards (37,163 m) 45 degrees 42,345 yards (38,720 m) 41,622 yards (38,059 m) -
Well, he’s not wrong if you were going to fire them at the same M/V, which is I think what the game does (can’t check right now).
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In fact, the 16”/45 Mark 5 which could not fire the Mk 8 superheavy shell was heavier than the Mark 6 gun that could. The difference was the handling gear.
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2 hours ago, 4plainsq said:
Historically heavy shells posed a design challenge. Recoil needed to be absorbed, gun barrels and gun breaches needed to be much stronger to hold the enormous stress of shooting heavy shells. Right now in game there is NO penalty to the weight of "turret barrels" for going to heavier shells.
I'd like to have to actually choose whether I want to mount heavy shells or a bigger gun calliber, with drawbacks and advantages of both.
Therefore I'd suggest you change the stats on the shell type seletion to:I believe the way around this was to accept lower muzzle velocity, which was balanced out by better velocity retention at range. Shell hoists and other aspects of the loading mechanisms would need to be designed for the shell length used.
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24 minutes ago, Tankaxe said:
Perhaps, I do know that IRL hit rates were in %5 and that's including advanced radar and fire control. However since the bulkhead damage model in-game requires alot more ordinance to damage the lower hit rates makes it feel unwelcome. We already have ships that can 32 large caliber penetrations and still chug along once the proper dam con tech is aquired.
Maybe the hit rate is fine but in that case penetrating hits should be of more consequence.
As noted, that is a damage model problem (and one that is highly circumstantial) not an accuracy problem. I have seen a single 9" penetration sink a pre-dreadnought, which is a bit extreme the other way.
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Yeah, too much special magic being assigned to the term “turtleback” in the OP. Just look to contemporary writing:
QuoteIt is perhaps proper to add that the armour deck beneath the lower deck had the turtleback form then common to all protected cruisers.
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The one in the pop-up is effective thickness after quality modifier. On the right actual thickness is shown followed by the modifier in parentheses.
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Actually built? No. Sketched after too much vino? Yes.
https://stefsap.wordpress.com/2017/09/27/ferrettis-10381-in-quintuples-battleship-design/
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58 minutes ago, RAMJB said:
If you have any source citing those we can take a look and see exactly how bad (or nonexistant, depending on the case) the dispersion problem would be at max ranges. IT certainly didn't look like anything serious for Yamato off Samar, that's for sure, and all accounts about the battle of Jutland mention that dispersions achieved by both british and germans were far too narrow, for the detriment of both sides (as with wider patterns more hits would've probably been achieved). Keeping in mind Jutland happened at 20-15km for the most part, that doesn't really seem like promising huge dispersion patterns at 30km or beyond.
But as I said I'm out of my element so I won't go any further than speculation - until we find some hard data to look at and to comment on :).As I recall, the best possible pattern achievable was 200-300 yards for range.
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But Narvik is very good example of a floatplane playing a very important role at the smallest tactical level (straight up destroying direct threats and orienting guns onto other threats in near real time, not just bringing a fleet into the vicinity of another, as the same pilot did at Matapan, but Narvik was a pretty unique tactical situation).
Quote“Warspite’s Swordfish aircraft was catapulted off at 11: 52 off Barøy to scout ahead of the fleet and in particular to look for German vessels in the side fjords. During the ensuing operations this aircraft and its crew, Petty Officer Frederick ‘Ben’ Rice, Lieutenant Commander W ‘Bruno’ Brown (observer) and Leading Airman Maurice Pacey (gunner), were to give exceptional service in spite of difficult flying conditions, and show results way beyond normal expectations. ‘I doubt’, wrote Vice Admiral Whitworth later, ‘if ever a ship-borne aircraft has been used to such good purpose.’”
— The German Invasion of Norway: April 1940 by Geirr H. Haarr
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High above the action was the Swordfish piloted by Petty Officer Rice. The Warspite was down to just one aircraft at the time, so he had his work cut out:
“Our other Swordfish had been flying in support of the Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney but had failed to find the action she was involved in. Rather than bring a full bomb load back to the ship they thought they would go over and bomb the Italians at Tobruk. Unfortunately for them some RAF Blenheims had just carried out a raid so the enemy was waiting for them. They got shot down and ended up prisoners of war for five years. That left just my Swordfish. They used us for spotting the fall of Warspite’s 15-inch shots at Calabria. The Italians could do thirty knots but Warspite could only do twenty-four knots, so it was quite a chase. When the Warspite fired back at the Italians, initially her shells were falling short, so we were telling them to correct. They were adjusting by 200 yards but should have done so by 600, so they only got one hit. The Italians did fire on us with their AA but failed to hit my aircraft. Was I scared? No. I was only twenty-four and well trained in how to react when things turned hot.”
From Ballantyne’s Warspite. He, of course, might be tooting his own horn a bit. That the gunfire was not conducted solely by aerial observation, however, is evidenced by the Italian destroyers blocking further accurate fire with smokescreens as the Giulio Cesare withdrew after being hit. This highlights an earlier point: spotting aircraft could be very useful for improving range corrections for long range gunnery, but targeting was still dependent on the ship’s own fire control seeing the target. Spotting planes did not act as “eyes” of the battleship allowing them to “see” and accurately target other ships underway at long range, although they did play that role for shore bombardment on many occasions (where seeing the target from the ship was often impossible).
Other highlights in Rice’s remarkable service aboard Warspite can be found in his obit:
QuoteSwordfish pilot who sank a U-boat at Narvik and helped the Navy to beat the Italians at Cape Matapan
FREDERICK RICE, always known as “Ben”, initiated his impressive career in the Fleet Air Arm by being the first rating pilot to land on an aircraft carrier, HMS Courageous, in February 1939. He subsequently made important contributions to both the Second Battle of Narvik and the Battle of Cape Matapan. He graduated from Colchester Technical College in 1932 and became an apprentice at the Redwing Aircraft Company in Ardleigh, Essex. When this enterprise went out of business, he joined the Royal Navy as a boy seaman and served in the cruiser York on the West Indies station and the destroyer Brilliant during the rescue operations accompanying the Spanish Civil War. As a leading seaman, he volunteered for flying and joined the first ratings’ pilot course, No 41, at Leuchars, Fife, in May 1938. In January 1940 he joined the battleship Warspite, flying a seaplane variant of the “Stringbag” Swordfish. Although a biplane and obsolete before the war started, this remarkable aircraft was still in service in nine squadrons in 1945 and responsible for the sinking of numerous enemy warships and submarines. Robust, highly manoeuvrable and easy to land on a carrier’s pitching deck, it was a pilots’ favourite. A bright spot for the Allies in the otherwise melancholy Norwegian campaign was the Second Battle of Narvik. The first battle had ended with considerable destroyer casualties on both sides, and on April 13, 1940, under the command of Rear-Admiral Whitworth, it was decided to take the enormous risk of sending Warspite with nine destroyers many miles up the narrow Ofotfiord towards Narvik to finish off the substantial remaining German forces. Rice, with Lieutenant-Commander “Bruno” Brown as his observer and Leading Airman Pacey as his telegraphist air- gunner, was catapulted off at about midday. Flying between steep cliffs and under low cloud, they sighted and reported the destroyer Koellner lurking in a small bay. She was attacked by destroyers and sunk. Meanwhile, Rice spotted the submarine U64 anchored near a jetty in the Herjangsfiord. Attacking with two 100lb bombs, he scored a direct hit, but his tailplane was damaged by return fire which was suppressed by Pacey’s Lewis gun. The crew then spotted the fall of shot for Warspite’s devastating 15in guns until the remaining seven German destroyers were scuttled or sunk. The Swordfish dropped its final two bombs on a beached German destroyer before returning to Warspite after more than three hours in the air. U64 was the first U-boat of the war to be sunk by the Fleet Air Arm. The official report of the action commented that “it was doubtful if a shipborne aircraft had ever before been used to such good purpose”. Rice was awarded the DSM and Brown the DSC. Warspite left Narvik in late April for the Mediterranean and became Admiral Andrew Cunningham’s flagship, leading the Mediterranean fleet in a series of Malta convoys, brushes with the Italian fleet, bombardments and the devastating Swordfish aircraft night attack on Italian battleships at Taranto. News on March 27, 1941, that Italian heavy ships were at sea, threatening an Allied convoy, caused Cunningham to sail his battlefleet in pursuit. His memoirs recount a frustrating day punctuated by differing reports from a variety of sources about the enemy’s composition and manoeuvres. Rice was catapulted shortly after midday with Pacey and the new fleet observer, Lieutenant-Commander (later Rear-Admiral) “Ben” Bolt to try to clarify the situation. Their first sortie — of nearly five hours — was fruitless. Warspite and the other battleships were struggling to close the range on the modern Italian battleship Vittorio Veneto and to recover the floatplane, by the usual method of turning sharply to form a calm “slick” to land on, would have caused further unacceptable delay. Instead, Rice landed his aircraft in front of the charging Warspite and matched her speed by taxiing until the crane hook could be grabbed — an unpractised but effective manoeuvre. Refuelled, they were launched again and Bolt was finally able to report the disposition, course and speed of the Italians. Cunningham remarked: “By 6.30 we had the first of a series of reports from this highly trained and experienced officer, which quickly told us what we needed.” Cunningham’s bold tactical handling thereafter resulted in the sinking of three Italian heavy cruisers and two destroyers for no British losses. Rice had to land at Suda Bay in Crete in the dark, having prudently brought along a few floating flares to tell him where the surface was, and taxied some five miles to get into harbour. He had been airborne for more than eight hours. Bolt received a bar to his DSC and Rice a mention in despatches. Rice stayed with Warspite throughout her many actions of the Mediterranean campaign. Damaged by German bombing during the evacuation of Crete, she went to Seattle for repairs. Rice left her in early 1942. The rest of his war was mainly spent communications flying in a variety of single and twin-engined types. In 1945 he was promoted to warrant officer and was personal pilot to the Flag Officer Naval Flying Training. In 1947 he was appointed to a squadron based at Trincomalee in Ceylon. He contributed to the winning of the Fleet Air Arm’s Boyd Trophy for flying three Beech C45 Expeditor aircraft from Trincomalee back to Lee-on-Solent in adverse winter weather. He continued flying a multiplicity of aircraft types until the end of his career. Having been commissioned, he was variously in command of the Safety Equipment and Survival School near Portsmouth, staff officer to the RN Test Squadron at Boscombe Down and senior pilot of 750 Squadron, based at Hal Far in Malta. He retired from the navy as a lieutenant-commander in March 1967. In retirement he managed Enterprise House, a 200-apartment complex for old people in Chingford. This he ran for 13 years in disciplined naval fashion. Much sought-after as a raconteur, he was famous for his flying stories at such institutions as the Portsmouth Retired Naval Officers’ Club. He is survived by his wife Edna, whom he married in Kirkwall in 1939, and by their son and daughter. Lieutenant-Commander “Ben” Rice, DSM, wartime Swordfish pilot, was born on March 17, 1916. He died on February 14, 2003, aged 86.
Datum: 01. 04. 2003
http://www.militaria.cz/cz/detail-154‘
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1430473/Lieutenant-Commander-Ben-Rice.html (Login required)
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Straddling a target at that range was likely not possible at Jutland, but I think Angus’s point is valid. There is a going to be a minimum dispersion pattern for a salvo at a given range that no amount of fire control correction is going to reduce. Accuracy improvements in game allow you to keep reducing this pattern until it is possible to have most of the shells in salvo strike a target in one salvo at extreme range. There should be diminishing returns on increasing accuracy at the upper ends to account for shots that are accurate, but precision that cannot be increased further. (The game of course treats accuracy and precision as a single factor.)
p.s. Did you know Warspite had one of her aircraft aloft and spotting fall of shot when she hit Giulio Cesare, the longest hit between two moving battleships. That speaks to a bit more tactical relevance (contributing, not decisive) than you have allowed for in previous posts. The same pilot also played a crucial tactical role at the Second Battle of Narvik. 😜
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51 minutes ago, RAMJB said:
Correction - what I'm stating is that they were useless for purely tactical applications, and in the context of ship-to-ship gunnery engagements. To be precise, in "spotting the shot", which is the most commonly referred role for those things in naval engagements, and where they were truly useless.
I think we need a caveat here: in the circumstances that developed in WWII they proved mostly useless for tactical employment in ship-to-ship actions, and arguably a liability. However, we could imagine circumstances that might have developed differently that could have placed a greater premium on that role. A significant naval conflict in the Mediterranean before the advent of radar and dedicated air platforms might have seen wider employment in the spotting role.
It is quite clear from doctrine and exercises conducted that they were considered a significant potential multiplier for gunfire control. That is not, however, an argument that they need to be included, which without careful inclusion of a number of factors would likely lead to them serving as a must-have combat multiplier in all circumstances (think to the secondary gun debate: if ships had these they must have been super effective, therefore make them super effective in the game and ignore actual data.)
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On 1/13/2020 at 3:26 PM, admin said:
this year will also start work on a new single player focused game with first person view from deck - Sea Legends - about smugglers and privateers in the Mediterranean and North sea. This research will be shared and will greatly benefit the improvements of quality of PVE combat in Naval Action.
Congratulations on the Steam accolade. This sounds really exciting as well. Hope it gives an opportunity to provide deeper fidelity for sailing and combat model, as well as allowing for more realistic time scales.
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1 hour ago, RAMJB said:
Not really. Longitudinal bulkheads were used to contain flooding, same as any other bulkhead. The idea was that just because you have a hole in one side that's flooding that side's boiler, or engine, room, it doesn't mean the flooding has to spread evenly and also affect the boilers, or engines, on the other side. By putting a longitudinal bulkhead right down the middle of the ship you'd hold that flooding in that particular side of the ship, compartimentalizing the damage and potentially saving a big chunk of your machinery from potential flooding.
You are correct, the goal is compartmentalization either way, but since many of these designs were calculated to be able to withstand a single compartment with centerline bulkhead flooding, then the assumption must have been that would be the typical result. Underwater explosions tend to damage to a much larger area than a gunfire hit and so multiple compartments flooding simultaneously and quickly is the likely outcome.
Or it was just outright stupidity.
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10 hours ago, Ruan said:
Would this make any sense? Bulkheads are pretty much just big armored walls. The only limitation was weight and space.
Bulkheads aren’t armored walls. Armored bulkheads are. There were advances in design that could contribute to the effectiveness of compartmentalization beyond just increasing or decreasing numbers of bulkheads. A few off the top of my head:
- longitudinal bulkheads (improved protection for machinery from damage by gunfire, but greatly increased the danger of underwater damage)
- unpierced bulkheads (greatly improved watertight integrity and resistance to damage, but crew would have to move up and over through the ship to access lower compartments)
- machinery unitization (decreased the chance that damage to machinery spaces would lead to total loss of power and improved compartmentalization)
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39 minutes ago, arkhangelsk said:
Note how thanks to the limited mounting points, I am stopped from the atrocity of concentrating 3 11-inch turret on the bow of a relatively small, 17000 ton hull, even with the tower at the rearmost point. If I had been permitted to use anywhere on the line, that red turret would have just fit and I could easily make a ship with five 11 inch gun turrets on a mere 17000 ton displacement hull.
Hold CTRL and you can place the turret anywhere along the line. Doesn't work with barbettes.
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For torpedo evasion, or generally just turning away from the enemy, I’d really prefer a simple toggle for “turn together” to a new heading rather than having to micro-manage the rudder settings, but the direct rudder input is appreciated and useful in other ways, particularly in overcoming some of the AI’s more boneheaded collision avoidance logic.
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If they are not included in tactical combat in any way in the game, then yes.
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22 hours ago, RAMJB said:
Subs should be as abstracted as they were in RTW. Probably with a somewhat larger control of their strategic deployement, but other than that being out of the player's control.
In general and in raw terms - submarines did not work well for surface fleet operations. The few times they were deployed with that intended use, their effectiveness was next to none and their general impact pretty much zero.Contributing their firepower directly, yes, the impact was near zero, but shaping movements of forces even at the tactical level simply through their possibility of encountering submarines was an important factor in some cases. A fleet encounter where you know no submarines are present might develop very differently than it did historically.
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Yeah, that doesn’t make sense then. To simplify:
With Mark I turrets, 8-inch can fit at front but not at rear. Only 7-inch and smaller can be mounted at rear.
With Mark II turrrets, only 6-inch and smaller can be mounted at front, and as with Mark I, only 7-inch and smaller can be mounted at rear.
There is no way to reconcile above with lack of space.
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in General Discussions
Posted · Edited by akd
There is no LOS effect from smoke.
If you are talking about the green line extending from your ship, that is radio-direction finding and should show the bearing to the nearest enemy ship.
Distant radar contacts beyond vision are shown as intermittent green circles at their actual location. Unfortunately, radar also modifies visual sight distance, so this can all be a bit confusing.