David Fair
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Posts posted by David Fair
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Nick,
Diversity in the units makes the game more interesting.
If you make the cavalry more powerful then they become more like the infantry and can stand in the line with the infantry.
Not only did this not happen historically during the ACW - it homogenizes your units and makes the game less interesting.
(I'll just toss this cavalry in the line as they fight just the same anyway.)
Rather than make the cavalry more powerful I'd suggest that using the cavalry in their historical role on the flanks and rear of the armies will vastly improve the tactical aspects of your game.
I'd suggest going the other direction and add more variety (variety is, after all, the spice of life) by making Lee's irregular cavalry brigades less powerful - forcing them into the role they played during the battle - protecting the flanks/getting in position to attack the rear of the enemy.
Imboden's and Jenkins cavalry brigades were both irregular cavalry brigades.
Lee hated irregular cavalry as they were unreliable/inaccurate in reconnaissance, inept in battle, and useless in screening.
Just about the only role they excelled in was destruction of telegraph lines, raiding soft targets, gobbling up pickets, and collecting supplies.
See this U.S. Army presentation regarding these irregular cavalry brigades as a reference:
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Great to hear you are addressing the flanking issues. This should really help the game.
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WesleyBarras,
Above you stated:
"...Which is a slight problem that became major on the 3rd day. The CSA ran out of artillery ammunition. They couldn't support the army. When their fire slackened, the Union soldiers who were covering for dear life, stood up and went to the wall. Who knows how the battle would have been if the fire could have been maintained."
This is simply not a correct statement. According to E.P. Alexander the CSA brought about 42,000 rounds of artillery ammunition with them on the Gettysburg Campaign. During the three day Battle of Gettysburg the CSA fired 22,000 rounds.
This left them about 20,000 rounds which would allow another two or more days of very serious fighting, or more days if they slowed their rate of fire. The CSA had almost no opportunities to fire canister July 1-3 as they had been on the offensive for most of the fighting. This left Lee with a bountiful supply of ammunition for defensive work; which is why Lee waited, and hoped, that Meade would order an attack on the CSA positions on July 4.
While the ammunition in the gun limbers and ammunition chests were exhausted by the barrage on July 3, it would take about 2 hours to refill these ammunition chests from the supply train and get the batteries back in action along the line with replenished supplies.
Thus if you wanted to implement ammunition supply then the way to do it would be any guns that fire for about 2 hours without a break would exhaust their ammunition and need to return to the supply train to rearm. The game is already broken into phases so it would likely result in more annoyance than it is worth in a phase to need to run off to the supply train to replenish ammunition then return to the firing line.
Keep in mind Alexander, Pendleton, Hunt, Tidball, and others were enforcing "deliberate fire" orders for their guns - which is no more than one round per gun every 5 minutes. This rate of fire would allow a battery to stay on the line for the duration of the day. The guns would then resupply during the evening to be ready for another day's action. The maniacal rate of fire sustained by the CSA on July 3rd for 90 minutes was the exception - not the rule for the ACW. Firing all the ammunition in the four chests carried by each gun over a 90 minute interval would mean the gun is essential "firing blind" as the smoke from the previous discharge could not dissipate before the next round was fired.
While the barrage before Longstreet's Charge on July 3 was noisy, it was ineffective - not a single Union regiment was routed, and the batteries that were damaged in the barrage were rotated out of the line and replaced with fresh batteries from the artillery reserve (which was the standard practice by both sides during the war).
Meade himself scolded the captain of an Ohio battery for attempting to pull out of the line to replenish his ammunition. He ordered the captain to send his caissons for more ammunition, slow his rate of fire, and stay in the line.
Finally,
ACW artillery inflicted only 6% of the battlefield casualties; but played an essential role in eroding the morale on the battlefield. I'd be more interested in seeing the artillery fixed to align more with the historical reality of black powder munitions during the conflict. The ammunition supply would be less problematic and less of a factor IF the artillery was playing its proper role in the combat of the ACW.
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Susimetsa,
I'm confused by your presentation of what you want.
Currently there is a matrix where you select the AI behavior and the difficulty level.
Is the problem that the game isn't "easy enough" to get the degree of victory that you desire?
Are you looking for a "pro-South" and "pro-North" setting so you can strongly influence the outcome of which side will prevail?
Are you looking for a change in the final battle report status of the game that says "Congratulations - You've won a glorious victory" at the end of each phase?
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The general metrics for an ACW lopsided victory in battlefield casualties is 2.5 to 1.
This measure of success was achieved by the South at Fredericksburg and the North at Malvern Hill for example.
In all cases of lopsided victories the defender suffered the lower casualty number.
Defense was much more effective during the ACW because:
1) artillery could not be moved forward effectively
(generally the artillery horses were slaughtered on the advance - at Gettysburg for example the CSA lost 35% of their artillery horses; suffering more casualties than any of the combat arms (infantry 30%, cavalry and artillery 10%)).
2) defending troops usually had the benefit of cover
3) defending troops had the benefit of topography
John Bell Hood managed to give the Union a 3 to 1 battlefield result at the Battle of Franklin when he continued to order attacks despite his devastating losses.
So such casualties would not be possible unless John Bell Hood was the Northern commander and was attacking rather than defending.
The best case metrics for ACW casualties for the attacking side was about 1 to 1.
Note that the benefit of attacking was that it held out the prospect of capturing large numbers of men.
Grant achieved this result in 3 of his battles in each case the South surrendered its armies:
- Fort Donelson (12,000 prisoners)
- Vicksburg (29,000 prisoners)
- Appomattox (25,000 prisoners)
The game is designed to give the illusion that the South could have defeated the AoP by relentless attacks.
Note that in the game's defense you can't take POW's so perhaps you could interpret some of the casualties as captures?
It is stunningly easy to steamroll the AI - which is why the AI boost was added.
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In the past Nick has frowned on talking about other games on this forum.
So I will respectfully decline comment in deference to Nick's previous posts.
PS - Avant garde marketing practice is to be a hub of information - to keep the eyeballs and hearts of your community focused on your forum.
While I don't believe Nick's request to keep this forum exclusively focused on his game alone is the best for the UGG marketing effort, until I hear different from Nick, I will respect his request.
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Hister,
I'm not certain that "lots of new coding of AI behavior" would be required.
It seems like the software architecture should be flexible enough to incorporate combat modifiers without knocking over the AI.
The math behind the AI parameters would simply be triggered differently.
Just trying to find suggestions to make the game a more rewarding experience.
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Immelmann,
Yep, my game experience is the same with the flanks and the rear attacks.
I go to great lengths to get on a flank/in the rear and for god's sake Fits Lee's cavalry brigade with 545 men defeats 3 Union infantry brigades numbering 2,500 in total. Preposterously discouraging!
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I've spent a great deal of time 4 hours west of Gettysburg in DuBois, PA, hunting deer etc...
Central Pennsylvania is great country.
I took a three month sabbatical in my motorhome to tour ACW battlefields.
The plan was to do the war in the east first touring battlefields in chronological order.
Then follow Sherman's path in reverse through Savannah, Atlanta, Nashville, north into Kentucky.
Finally, travel to Corinth and go south to New Orleans.
I haven't hit every battlefield site; but I don't think there are any major ACW battlefields I haven't visited.
Great time and I met some wonderful people.
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Currently UGG is tactically a bit flat.
If there are flank or rear fire modifiers they are not evident (at least to me) over hundreds of hours of playing time.
Basically the game rewards units with higher “Morale” and “Condition” regardless of the tactical skills of the general.
Because the game is a tactical “simulation” it should reward sound tactics.
Flank attacks or taking an enemy in reverse have always been the tactical goals for field commanders because these attacks can be devastating.
The game needs an update and the tactical situations could be much richer for the game’s generals as well as more of a challenge.
Additionally, the game would be much more historically accurate.
I've tried to make suggestions that can:
1) be abstracted into the game without changing the UI and
2) do not demand significant coding changes.
Background for these suggestions:
Over the past week I had an opportunity to talk with a couple of U.S. Army officers, who are ACW aficionados, while walking the Manassas battlefield. Their observations and perspectives on ACW artillery, open flanks, and other topics were insightful and I thought I’d share some of their comments and well as providing implementation suggestions for the consideration of the design team.
Observation #1:
ACW artillery, while not particularly effective at inflicting causalities, was fundamental to the battlefield tactics.
Artillery’s primary role was to keep the enemy’s infantry under constant annoyance.
While this did not inflict many casualties – it had a profound impact on the unit when it came into action.
Units under sustained artillery barrage became “brittle” in action. Units that had been under a sustained artillery barrage, when called into the line could (and usually did) snap in very short order if they experienced setbacks at close range.
For example, the musket-ranged combat during Pickett’s Charge was of an extremely short duration. Fusillades of musketry began at about 400 yards and stalled most of the advance at about 250 yards. Regiments from both Virginia and North Carolina still argue about the “Higher Water Mark” of the Confederacy; but the point is that these were regiments that managed to close to hand-to-hand combat – not entire divisions.
Note that it took about 20 minutes to advance to within musket range, a few minutes less to return and the total duration of the attack is estimated between 45 and 50 minutes. The frontal attack was decimated with 90% of the casualties occurring within the 400 yard perimeter of the stone wall over a period of about 15 minutes. This same observation is true at Fredericksburg for each wave of the troops committed.
However, at Shiloh, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness the troops were in the cover of the forests where artillery could not play on their ranks at long-range prior to musketry-range contact. In each of these musketry-range battles the infantry conflict was sustained for an extended duration at close range.
Avoiding a sustained artillery barrage with troops out in the open was tactically important during the ACW. ACW generals tended to keep their infantry out of artillery range, behind stone walls, which were particularly effective on numerous battlefields, or on reverse slopes of hills, out of the sight of artillery, until they were needed on the line of combat.
Note that stone walls were the preferred cover during the ACW.
With a few inches of digging a trench behind a stone wall vastly improved their defensive qualities.
Dirt thrown on the front of the stone wall cushioned the effects of direct hits by artillery.
Troops in the positions behind stone walls had some of the best cover for stopping the soft lead musketry projectiles, and a shallow ditch made these troops almost impervious to artillery. This is why stone walls played such a critical role in so many ACW battles. The angle is a good example at Gettysburg.
Implementation suggestion for UGG #1:
Beef up the defensive value of the stone walls in UGG. This will help commanders fight their battles in UGG where the armies deployed and fought at Gettysburg.
Regarding Artillery:
Each unit would have an “Artillery Effect Multiplier” (AEM).
Each time a unit was targeted by artillery the AEM would increase by 10%.
When the unit comes within musket/canister range and takes damage to their “Morale” or “Condition” at close range the AEM modifier accelerates the damage to their “Morale” and “Condition” based on the number of times artillery had targeted the unit during the phase.
Thus units that sit out in the open will not have their “Morale” or “Condition” destroyed at long-range; but will suffer the effects of the artillery as they close for action.
When units are stationary the AEM effect would be decreased by the quality of cover the unit is defending. Thus a unit on the defensive in 40% cover, hit by ten salvos of artillery during a phase, would have an AEM acceleration modifier of 160% (10 rounds X 10% = 100%, doubling the “Moral” and “Condition” effects in close combat, reduced by their “cover” of 40% = a 1.6% acceleration factor for the unit.
Historical Accuracy Benefit #1:
Currently the tactics in UGG are very basic.
Everything in UGG is about firing and the casualties and the impact that these casualties have on “Moral” and “Condition.”
But the ACW is rife with examples of units shattered by an enemy charging into the flanks or rear of a unit.
By introducing a bit of tactical diversity it encourages and rewards players who use ACW tactics.
UGG generals will need to establish lines of infantry deployed behind critical stone walls or on reverse slopes or out of range until needed.
For example at Gettysburg the troops used in both of Longstreet’s attacks on July 2 and 3 were kept out of harm’s way until the advance was ordered.
Union troops were deployed along Cemetery Ridge behind stone walls.
This AEM system will reward careful tacticians while punishing generals who leave their infantry exposed in the open as artillery targets.
In short – it encourages players to use ACW tactics when they play the game.
Observation #2:
Flanks are critical.
ACW frontal attacks were brutal and often resulted in failure with massive casualties.
Antietam, Fredericksburg, Malvern Hill, Second Manassas, Gettysburg, and Cold Harbor are all examples.
When flanks were exposed and exploited casualties became much more lopsided in favor of the flanking unit.
Implementation Suggestion #2:
Units in line of battle with “supported flanks” get the benefit of reduced “Morale” and “Condition” effects.
Units with their flanks “in the air” suffer accelerated loss of “Morale” and “Condition.”
In order to be “flanked” a unit must be engaged and taking casualties on its front.
This should pin the unit with suppressing fire from the front.
A second, “flanking unit” must be within musket range in a 90 degree arc from the center of the line of battle from the “flanked” units front (the 90 degree arc is 45 forward and behind the ends of the unit) .
Flanked units suffer a “Flank Effect Multiplier” of 1.4% accelerator for Casualties, loss of “Morale” and “Condition” each time the “flanking unit” fires a salvo into the flank of the “flanked unit”.
Observation #3:
Being taken in Reverse is Devastating.
Units taken in the rear by fire often feel “betrayed” by their leadership.
The impact of an enemy unit in a unit’s rear is immediate and usually catastrophic to “Morale” and “Condition”.
Ammunition cannot be brought forward.
Casualties cannot be evacuated.
Orders cannot be carried by courier to outlying regiments.
Worse still canteens cannot be refilled.
Many men surrender.
Survivors who are not captured often run.
In short - chaos becomes immediately pervasive in and the continuity of command and control are shattered.
Implementation Suggestion #3:
Units that are pinned in the front and taken in the rear suffer an immediate loss of 80% of their “Condition” and “Morale”.
Units do not need to be fired upon in their rear to cause the crash of “Morale” and “Condition”; being within musket range of the rear of a unit should be enough to encourage the unit to seek safer ground.
Units that do fire into the rear of a unit get the benefit of a 2X musketry multiplier to represent both casualties and captures.
Note that when a unit is taken in reverse its ability to return fire is limited. The physical and psychological benefit to the troops firing into the rear of a unit while facing limited return fire is electric and tended to boost “Morale”.
Troops firing into the rear of a unit should get a 10% “Morale” increase every time they fire into the rear of a unit.
The rear of the unit is defined as any enemy unit that is entirely behind the 90 degree arc on the flanks of units.
To be considered in the rear of the unit that unit must be under fire from the front as well. Conceptually troops that are taken in the flank or rear will turn to fight on the flank/rear when they are not pinned in place as they receive fire from the front as well.
Historical Accuracy Benefit of #2 & #3:
Rather than dealing with sprites bludgeoning each other regardless of the tactics; the tactics would matter profoundly for the outcome of the game.
Generals that flank positions will be rewarded.
Generals that bludgeon their way forward with frontal attack tactics will be punished.
Sort of like the generals who fought at Gettysburg.
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Below is the data for the Union and Confederate Artillery at Gettysburg.
Analysis of Union Artillery Losses
Summary:
1st Corps: Reynolds 28 guns 596 men ( 9 KIA; 11 MIA; 86 wounded) 18% casualties
2nd Corps: Hancock 28 guns 605 men (27 KIA; 3 MIA; 119 wounded) 25% casualties
3rd Corps: Sickles 30 guns 596 men ( 8 KIA; 17 MIA; 81 wounded) 18% casualties
5th Corps: Sykes 26 guns 432 men (10 KIA; 2 MIA; 7 wounded) 4% casualties
6th Corps: Sedgwick 46 guns 937 men ( 4 KIA; 0 MIA; 8 wounded) 1% casualties
11th Corps: Howard 26 guns 604 men ( 7 KIA; 9 MIA; 53 wounded) 11% casualties
12rd Corps: Slocum 20 guns 391 men ( 0 KIA; 0 MIA; 9 wounded) 2% casualties
Cavalry Corps: Pleasonton 52 guns 925 men ( 4 KIA; 0 MIA; 19 wounded) 2% casualties
Artillery Reserve: Tyler 110 guns 2,376 men (43 KIA; 12 MIA; 187 wounded) 10% casualties
Artillery Grand Total = 356 guns 7,353 men (112 KIA; 54 MIA; 569 wounded) 10% casualties
21 Union guns were disabled during the battle (4 by counter battery fire; 11 by capture [likely spiking the guns]; 1 burst barrel; 1 gun struck on muzzle; 4 unserviceable due to casualties).
Note – Minor discrepancy between “order of battle” and “stone sentinels”. My guess is that the upper echelon commanders were not aware of the actual strength of their commands on the “stone sentinels” and there may have been a number of men absent or alternatively local men who fought with units at Gettysburg who did not “muster in”. The artillery would be a logical place for untrained men to serve. Many of the tasks supporting guns require no training [grunt work]. Specifically, for example, the “runner” on a gun crew is one of the most tiring jobs [running ammunition from the caisson to the gun]. Untrained men could also manage the backbreaking logistics of the artillery brigade’s wagon to resupply caissons, holding horse teams, etc…
For example the “stone sentinels” for 1st Corps individual batteries total 642 men. This is 42 men more than the total for the “stone sentinel” 1st Corps Artillery Battalion’s 596 men. I’d suspect the 642 is the closer to correct number.
With this observation I’d suggest deferring to the numbers in the summary above. The summary ties to the Corps-level “stone sentinels” (immediately below) and the “order of battle” at http://www.bio.brandeis.edu/classes/hist150b/battleorder.html
See:
· AoP HQ Monument: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-AOP.php
· 1st Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-1.php
· 2nd Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-2.php
· 3rd Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-3.php
· 5th Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-5.php
· 6th Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-6.php
· 11th Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-11.php
· 12th Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-12.php
· Cavalry Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-Cav.php
· Artillery Reserve: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes.php
1st Corps: Reynolds
1st Corps Artillery Brigade (28 guns 596 men) (9 KIA; 11 MIA; 86 wounded) 18% casualties
See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-1-Art.php
2nd Maine B (Hall’s) Battery 127 men (18 wounded) 14% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
July 1 Chambersburg Pike & Seminary Ridge
July 2 Cemetery Hill
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ME/2MeArt.php
5th Maine (Steven’s) Battery 136 men (3 KIA; 7 MIA; 13 wounded) 17%
6 Napoleons
979 rounds fired
July 1 Seminary Ridge
July 2 Cemetery Hill “…double canister [“poured”] into their ranks…”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ME/5MeArt.php
1st New York L (Reynold’s) Battery 141 men (1 KIA; 1 MIA; 15 wounded) 12% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
“1 gun captured in the fighting west of town”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatL.php
1st Pennsylvania B (Cooper’s) Battery 114 men (3 KIA; 9 wounded) 11% casualties
4 Ordnance Rifles
1050 rounds fired (4 guns) ~8 hours (1 round every 2 minutes/gun)
July 1 from 1-4 pm Chambersburg Pike & Seminary Ridge 4 pm “heavy artillery contest with the enemy’s batteries on Benner’s Hill”
July 3 “engaged…final attack and second repulse of the enemy” [Pickett’s Charge]
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/1PaArtBatB.php
4th U.S. B (Stewart’s) Battery 124 men (2 KIA; 3 MIA; 31 wounded) 29% casualties
6 Napoleons
July 1 Seminary Ridge repositioned to Cemetery Hill
“Two guns on the [baltimore] Pike and two in the field have been disabled”
July 2 & 3 “Remained in this position”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartB.php
2nd Corps: Hancock
2nd Corps Artillery Brigade 28 guns 605 men (27 KIA; 3 MIA; 119 wounded) 25% casualties
See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-2-Art.php
1st New York B (“Empire” or Rorty’s) Battery 114 men (10 KIA; 16 wounded) 23% casualties
4 10-Pound Parrotts
July 2 “fought near the Wheatfield”
July 3 “directly in the path of Pickett’s Charge”
“Three of the battery’s cannon were disabled in the bombardment preceding the charge”
“Rorty borrowed a score of men from the 19th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment to keep the gun firing”
“Kemper’s Virginians briefly overran the battery in a flurry of hand to hand fighting”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatB.php
1st Rhode Island A (Arnold’s) Battery 139 men (4 KIA; 24 wounded) 20% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
July 2 Cemetery Ridge
July 3 “Hancock overruled batteries under his immediate control, ordering them to return [counter battery] fire [prior to Pickett’s Charge] to give moral support to the infantry”
1 gun destroyed by counter battery fire. Long range ammunition exhausted “four of the serviceable guns pulled back. The final gun “was wheeled up to the stone wall for fire canister into the approaching Rebels. That gun fired the rest of the battery’s canister, the last double-shotted into Confederates who had almost reached the wall.”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/RI/1RIBatA.php
1st Rhode Island B (Brown’s) Battery 103 men (7 KIA; 2 MIA; 19 wounded) 27% casualties
6 Napoleons
July 2 Overrun by Wright’s Georgia Brigade 2 pieces abandoned by Emmitsburg Road (spiked by CSA) & another abandoned by Cemetery Ridge. All three guns recovered by Union countercharges. “One gun…restored to service for the next day.”
July 3 [Preceding Pickett’s Charge]“One gun was struck on the muzzle by a Confederate shell…distorted [the] muzzle.”
Ammunition exhausted the 3 serviceable guns withdrawn by order of General Hunt.
Uncalculated consequence:
“Longstreet’s Artillery Chief, E. Porter Alexander, saw it leave. Union gunfire was also slackening following orders from Hunt and Meade. Alexander reported that the Union artillery on the [Cemetery] ridge – all of it – was pulling back. if Pickett were to charge, now was the time. And so it was that Battery B helped launch Pickett’s Charge.”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/RI/1RIBatB.php
1st U.S. I (Woodruff’s) Battery 112 men (1 KIA; 29 wounded) 27% casualties
6 Napoleons
2 & 3 July Cemetery Hill “assisted in repelling Longstreet’s Assault [Pickett’s Charge]”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/1USartI.php
4thU.S. AI (Cushing’s) Battery 126 men (6 KIA; 32 wounded) 30% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
July 2 “took part in the artillery engagements during the day
July 3 “Engaged in the repulse of Longstreet’s Assault [Pickett’s Charge]”
5 guns disabled and all horses “but three” disabled [83 out of 90; 92% Horses KIA/disabled].
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartA.php
3rd Corps: Sickles
3nd Corps Artillery Brigade 30 guns 596 men (8 KIA; 17 MIA; 81 wounded) 18% casualties
See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-3-Art.php
1st New Jersey B (Clark’s) Battery (Judson commanding) 143 men (1 KIA; 3 MIA; 16 wounded) 14% casualties
6 10-Pound Parrotts
July 2 in the Peach Orchard - 1,300 rounds fired in 5 hours withdrawn when ammunition was exhausted
July 3 “in line with the Artillery Brigade…but not engaged”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NJ/1NJArtBatB.php
1st New York D (Winslow’s) Battery 116 men (8 MIA; 10 wounded) 16%
6 Napoleons
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatD.php
4th New York Independent (Smith’s) Battery 135 men (2 KIA; 10 wounded; 1 captured) 10%
6 10-Pound Parrotts
3 guns captured and used by CSA
240 rounds fired in 4 hours
(11 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/4NYBatt.php
1st Rhode Island E (Bucklyn’s Battery) 116 men (3 KIA; 26 wounded) 25% casualties
6 Napoleons
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/RI/1RIBatE.php
4th U.S. Artillery K (Seely’s) Battery 134 men (2 KIA; 4 MIA; 19 wounded) 19% casualties
6 Napoleons
July 2 engaged for 3 hours in the Peach Orchard & Wheat Field
(28 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartK.php
5th Corps: Sykes
5th Corps Artillery Brigade 26 guns 432 men (10 KIA; 2 MIA; 7 wounded) 4% casualties
See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-5-Art.php
3rd Massachusetts (Walcott’s) Battery 124 men (No casualties reported) 0% casualties
6 Napoleons
July 3 “At 3 am moved to and occupied this position until the close of the battle”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MA/3MABatty.php
1st New York C (Barnes) Battery 88 men (“No losses”) 0% casualties
4 Ordnance Rifles
July 3 “transferred to the left flank of Big Round Top”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatC.php
1st Ohio L (Gibbs’s) Battery 121 men (2 wounded) 2% casualties
6 Napoleons
July 2 “went into position under a brisk skirmish fire on the extreme right of Wolf Hill” moved to Little Round Top
July 3 Held same [Little Round Top] position”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/OH/1OHArtBatL.php
5th U.S. D (Hazlett’s) Battery 68 men (9 KIA; 5 wounded) 21% casualties
6 10-Pound Parrotts
July 2 & 3 Little Round Top
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartD.php
5th U.S. I (Watson’s) Battery 71 men (1 KIA; 2 MIA; 19 wounded) 31% casualties
4 Ordnance Rifles
2 July 4:30 pm “moved to the front at the Peach Orchard.” “[battery] captured by the 21st Mississippi Infantry. It was almost immediately recaptured with the assistance of the 39th New York Infantry and being unserviceable was taken to the Artillery Brigade.”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartI.php
6th Corps: Sedgwick
6th Corps Artillery Brigade 46 guns 937 men (4 KIA; 8 wounded) 1% casualties
See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-6-Art.php
Note – Arrived on 2 July and placed under the command of General Hunt Chief of Artillery AoP
1st Massachusetts (McCartney’s) Battery 145 men (No casualties reported) 0% casualties
6 Napoleons
4 rounds fired
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MA/1MABattyA.php
1st New York Independent (Cowan’s) Battery 113 men (4 KIA; 8 wounded) 11% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
3 July “…Confederate lines [Pickett’s Charge] were over the defenses and within ten yards of our guns….” Note bas relief on monument “Double Canister at Ten Yards”
(14 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYBatt.php
3rd New York Independent (Harn’s) Battery 119 men (“No losses”) 0% casualties
6 10-Pound Parrotts
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/3NYBatt.php
1st Rhode Island C (Waterman’s) Battery 116 men
6 Ordnance Rifles
No Monument – This battery lost 27 men during the entire American Civil War so it is likely that if they had casualties at Gettysburg they were very light.
1st Rhode Island G (Adams’s) Battery 116 men
6 10-Pound Parrotts
No Monument– This battery lost 30 men during the entire American Civil War so it is likely that if they had casualties at Gettysburg they were very light.
2nd U.S. D (Williston’s) Battery 126 men (“Not engaged”) 0% casualties
4 Napoleons
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartD.php
2nd U.S. G (Butler’s) Battery 113 men (“Suffered no casualties”) 0% casualties
6 Napoleons
3 July “on repulse of Longstreet’s Assault [Pickett’s Charge]”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartG.php
5th U.S. F (Martin’s) Battery 113 men (“Suffered no casualties”) 0% casualties
6 10-Pound Parrotts
3 July “on repulse of Longstreet’s Assault [Pickett’s Charge]”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartF.php
11th Corps: Howard
6th Corps Artillery Brigade 26 guns 604 men (7 KIA; 9 MIA; 53 wounded) 11% casualties
See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-11-Art.php
1st New York I (Wiedrich’s) Battery 141 men (3 KIA; 10 wounded) 9% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
1-4 July “fought on Cemetery Hill” Battery was overrun on July 2 and retaken by the 73rd Pennsylvania Infantry. Bronze Table of the 73rd directly below. Weidrich’s Battery follows.
(See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PhotoGallery/Bronze-Pennsylvania_73.php)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatI.php
13th New York Independent (Wheeler’s) Battery 118 men (3 MIA; 8 wounded) 9% casualties
4 Ordnance Rifles
1 July engaged north of Gettysburg
2 July Cemetery Hill
3 July “repulse of Pickett’s Charge”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/13NYArt.php
1st Ohio I (Dilger’s) Battery 127 men (13 wounded) 10% casualties
6 Napoleons
1 July engaged north of Gettysburg “silenced [2 CSA batteries] with a loss of five gun carriages”
2 July “extreme right…on Cemetery Hill”
“One gun disabled”
(28 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/OH/1OHArtBatI.php
1st Ohio K (Heckman’s) Battery 118 men (2 KIA; 2 MIA; 11 wounded) 13% casualties
4 Napoleons
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/OH/1OHArtBatK.php
4th U.S. G (Wilkinson’s) Battery 115 men (2 KIA; 4 MIA; 11 wounded) 15% casualties
6 Napoleons
1 July Barlow’s Knoll “Retired about 4 pm…About 5 pm took position on Cemetery Hill”
1,400 rounds fired in action for 8.5 hours
(31 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartG.php
12rd Corps: Slocum
12th Corps Artillery Brigade 20 guns 391 men (0 KIA; 0 MIA; 9 wounded) 2% casualties
See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-12-Art.php
1st New York M (Winegar’s) Battery 96 men (“suffered no losses”) 0% casualties
4 10-Pound Parrotts
“[From Power’s Hill]…duel with Confederate pieces on Benner’s Hill”
See http://www.civilwarintheeast.com/USA/NY/NY1artM.php
and http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatM.php
Pennsylvania Independent E (Knap’s) Battery (Atwell commanding) 135 men (3 wounded) 2% casualties
6 10-Pound Parrotts
July 2 Culp’s Hill “”…5 pm when the three guns engaged the enemy’s batteries on Benner’s Hill”
July 3 Power’s Hill
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/PaIndArtBatE.php
4th U.S. F (Rugg’s) Battery 89 men (1 wounded)
6 Napoleons
1 - 3 July Culp’s Hill area
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartF.php
5th U.S. K (Kinzie’s) Battery 77 men (5 wounded)
4 Napoleons
1 July Culp’s Hill
2 July Culp’s Hill “…assisted in silencing Confederate Batteries on Benner’s Hill. At 6 pm rejoined the battery at the foot of Power’s Hill”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartK.php
Cavalry Corps: Pleasonton
Cavalry Corps Artillery Brigade 52 guns 925 men (4 KIA; 0 MIA; 19 wounded) 2% casualties
See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/AOPCavCorps.php
3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery H (Rank’s) Battery 52 men (1 MIA) 2% casualties
2 Ordnance Rifles
“…attached themselves to McIntosh’s Cavalry Brigade”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/3PaHvArt.php
1st Horse Artillery Brigade 28 guns 490 men (2 KIA; 0 MIA; 6 wounded) 2% casualties
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-Cav-HA-1.php
9th Michigan (Daniels’s) Battery 119 men (1 KIA; 4 wounded) 4% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
322 rounds fired
(23 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MI/9MiArt.php
6th New York Independent (Martin’s) Battery 130 men (1 wounded) 1% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
…in reserve for the battle…”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/6NYBatt.php
2nd U.S. B & L Consolidated (Heaton’s) Battery 99 men (No casualties) 0% casualties
2 July “In reserve…”
6 Ordnance Rifles
3 July “…for a time exposes to a severe fire. In the evening withdrawn…”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartBL.php
2nd U.S. M (Pennington’s) Battery 117 men (1 wounded) 1% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
3 July “Engaged in Brig. General Custer’s Brigade with Major General J.E.B. Stuart’s Confederate Cavalry on the right of the Union Army”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartM.php
4th U.S. E (Elder’s) Battery 60 men (1 KIA) 2% casualties
4 Ordnance Rifles
3 July “Arrived on the field and took position on a hill southwest of Round Top and engaged [serving] under Brig. General E.J. Farnsworth in the afternoon against the Confederate right”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartE.php
2nd Horse Artillery Brigade 22 guns 435 men (2 KIA; 0 MIA; 13 wounded) 3% casualties
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-Cav-HA-1.php
1st U.S. E & G Consolidated (Randol’s) Battery 84 men (“suffered no casualties”) 0% casualties
4 Ordnance Rifles
3 July “…hotly engaged in repelling the attack of Major General Stuart’s Confederate Cavalry Division…”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/1USartEG.php
1st U.S. K (Graham’s) Battery 114 men (No casualties) 0%
6 Ordnance Rifles
3 July “…engaged during the attack of Brig. General E. J. Farnsworth…”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/1USartK.php
2nd U.S. A (Calef’s) Battery 74 men (12 wounded) 16% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
1 July “Advanced with the Cavalry…”
2 July “2 am marched with First Brigade of Major General John Buford’s Division to Taneytown en route to Westminster [MD]”
(13 Horses KIA)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/2USartA.php
3rd U.S. C (Fuller’s) Battery ~120
6 Ordnance Rifles
4 July “Arrived at Emmitsburg Not engaged”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/3USartC.php
Artillery Reserve: Tyler
Artillery Reserve 110 guns 2,376 men (43 KIA; 12 MIA; 187 wounded) 10% casualties
See: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes.php
First Regular Brigade 24 guns 445 men (13 KIA; 2 MIA; wounded 53) 15% casualties
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-1Reg.php
1st U.S. H (Eakin’s) Battery 129 men (1 KIA; 1 MIA; 8 wounded) 8% casualties
6 Napoleons
2 & 3 July Cemetery Ridge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/1USartH.php
3rd U.S. F & K Consolidated (Turnbull’s) Battery 145 men (9 KIA; 1 MIA; 14 wounded) 17%
6 Napoleons
2 July in the Wheat Field (on the right flank of III Corps) “…compelled to retire with the loss of 34 horses killed and 4 guns which were afterwards recaptured.”
3 July “…left of Cemetery Hill.”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/3USartFK.php
4th U.S. C (Thomas’s) Battery 95 men (1 KIA; 17 wounded) 19% casualties
6 Napoleons
2 & 3 July Cemetery Ridge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/4USartBatC.php
5th U.S. C (Weir’s) Battery 104 men (2 KIA; 14 wounded) 15% casualties
6 Napoleons
2 July Cemetery Ridge “…The Confederates in front advanced to within a few yards no infantry opposing. Three of the guns were captured by the Confederates…but were recaptured by the 13th Vermont and another regiment.”
3 July “…[Pickett’s Charge] opened with canister at short range on the advancing Confederates…
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/US/5USartC.php
First Volunteer Brigade 22 guns 385 men (17 KIA; 5 MIA; 71 wounded) 24% casualties
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-1.php
5th Massachusetts E (Philips’s) Battery 104 men (7 KIA; 13 wounded) 19% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
700 rounds fired
2 July “Withdrew at 5 pm from the field near the Peach Orchard…”
3 July “…fired on the Confederate batteries but did little damage…assisted in repulsing the [Pickett’s] assault. A charge was made…by the Florida brigade…driving the cannoneers from their guns which they abandoned.”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MA/5MABatty.php
9th Massachusetts (Bigelow’s) Battery 110 men 9 (10 KIA; 20 wounded) 27% casualties
6 Napoleons
2 July “…Wheatfield Road…Enfiladed with canister Kershaw’s Brigade C.S.A…By ‘prolong firing’ [using the recoil from each shot fired to move the gun rearward] retired before Kershaw’s skirmishers…ordered to hold enemy in check [Trostle’s House] until line of artillery could be formed 560 yards in the rear. Was without support and hemmed in by stone wall. Enemy closed in on flanks. Man and horses were shot down when finally overcome at 6:30 pm…7:15 pm Willard’s Brigade 2nd Corps and later Lockwood’s Brigade 12th Corps came to support of artillery. 8:00 pm the enemy finally repulsed.”
3 & 4 July “Two guns…Only officer and guns effective after engagement on Trostle’s farm July 2nd, 1863”
(80 Horses KIA/disabled) 91% casualties
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MA/9MABatty.php
Note to “prolong” a gun is to manhandle the gun into position. A Rope is attached to the gun for men to pull it to a new location without a limber. See rope on cannon below and image at https://www.google.com/search?hl=en&site=imghp&tbm=isch&source=hp&biw=1162&bih=770&q=american+civil+war+prolong+a+gun&oq=american+civil+war+prolong+a+gun&gs_l=img.12...2854.13369.0.16458.34.13.1.20.21.0.62.641.13.13.0....0...1ac.1.32.img..12.22.689.gpXzaNudLzE#hl=en&q=american+civil+war+prolong+a+cannon&tbm=isch&facrc=_&imgdii=_&imgrc=CakUahXQbytmOM%3A%3B15YAz1wUF1edGM%3Bhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.nps.gov%252Fhistory%252Fhistory%252Fonline_books%252Fcivil_war_series%252F20%252Fimages%252Ffig44.jpg%3Bhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.nps.gov%252Fhistory%252Fhistory%252Fonline_books%252Fcivil_war_series%252F20%252Fsec5.htm%3B500%3B486
15th New York Independent (Hart’s) Battery 99 men (3 KIA; 13 wounded) 16% casualties
4 Napoleons
2 July “Engaged in the Peach Orchard…”
3 July “…open[ed] on the Confederate batteries with solid shot and shell. Upon the advance of the Confederate infantry, fired shell and shrapnel and canister when the line was within 500 yards. A second line advancing was met with double canister which dispersed it. The fire of the battery was then directed against the artillery on the Confederate right and several caissons and limbers were exploded by the shells.”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/15NYBatt.php
Pennsylvania Independent C & F Consolidated (Thompson’s) battery 105 men (1KIA; 3 MIA; 10 wounded) 13% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
2 July Peach Orchard “…most of the horses being killed and the drivers wounded.”
3 July Cemetery Ridge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/PaArtBatCF.php
Second Volunteer Brigade 12 guns 241 men (1 KIA; 2 MIA; 5 wounded) 3% casualties
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-2.php
1st Connecticut B (Brooker’s) Battery “Not engaged”
4 (four) 4 ½-inch Rifles; for performance characteristics see: http://www.civilwarartillery.com/tables.htm
No Marker
Note the total guns in the details = 106 and the total for the Artillery Reserve is 110. I suspect the missing guns are in these two Connecticut batteries.
See Page 37 for the Gettysburg History, “That we were not in action at Gettysburg is much to be regretted, as was expressed by General Meade, commanding the army, and by General Hunt, Chief of Artillery. That guns of this range and caliber would have made terrible havoc in the enemy’s forming columns and lines non can doubt.” See:
1st Connecticut M (Pratt’s) Battery “Not engaged”
4 (four) 4 ½-inch Rifles See image middle of page at: http://markerhunter.wordpress.com/2013/11/07/4-5-inch-rifle-at-kellys-ford/
No Marker
2nd Connecticut (Sterling’s) Battery 106 men (2 MIA; 3 wounded) 5% casualties
4 James Rifles and 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers
(3 Horses KIA/disabled) 1 caisson destroyed
2 & 3 July “Engaged on Cemetery Hill”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/CT/2CTArt.php
5th New York Independent (Taft’s) Battery 146 men (1 KIA; 2 wounded) 2% casualties
6 20-Pound Parrotts
2 July Cemetery Hill “…Four guns…firing on a Confederate battery on Benner’s Hill…”
3 July 1 burst gun
1,114 rounds fired in 12 hours
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/5NYBatt.php
Third Volunteer Brigade 22 guns 431 men (10 KIA; 3 MIA; 24 wounded) 9% casualties
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-3.php
1st New Hampshire (Edgell’s) Battery 111 men (3 wounded) 3% casualties
4 Ordnance Rifles
2 & 3 July Cemetery Hill
353 rounds fired
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NH/1NHBatA.php
1st Ohio H (Huntington’s) Battery (Norton Commanding) 123 men (3 KIA; 4 wounded) 6% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
2 & 3 July Cemetery Hill
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/OH/1OHArtBatH.php
1st Pennsylvania F & G Consolidated (Ricketts’s) Battery 144 men (6 KIA; 3 MIA; 14 wounded) 17% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
2 July Cemetery Hill “…engaged the Rebel batteries on Benner’s Hill. 8 pm A Rebel column charged the Battery and a desperate hand-to-hand conflict ensured which was repulsed after every round of canister had been fired.”
3 July East Cemetery Hill
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/PA/1PaArtBatFG.php
1st West Virginia C (Pierpont’s) Battery 124 men (2 KIA; 2 wounded) 3% casualties
4 10-Pound Parrotts
July 2 & 3 Cemetery Hill
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/WV/WVartBatC.php
Fourth Volunteer Brigade 24 guns 499 men (2 KIA; 0 MIA; 34 wounded) 7% casualties
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ/HQ-ArtRes-4.php
6th Maine F (Dow’s) Battery 103 men (13 wounded) 13% casualties
4 Napoleons
3 July Cemetery Ridge “…suffered 13 men wounded in the artillery duel that preceded Pickett’s Charge…”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ME/6MeArt.php
1st Maryland A (Rigby’s) Battery 106 men (“…no casualties…”) 0% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
July 2 & 3 Power’s Hill
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/MD/MD1artBatA.php
1st New Jersey (Hexamer’s) Battery (Parsons commanding) 116 men (2 KIA; 7 wounded) 8% casualties
6 10-Pound Parrotts
3 July “…in reserve S.W. of Power’s Hill galloped into action at 3 pm…Fired 120 rounds shrapnel at Pickett’s column, and 80 shell at a battery in left front…”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NJ/1NJArtBatA.php
1st New York G (Ames’s) Battery 132 men (7 wounded) 6% casualties
6 Napoleons
2 July Peach Orchard
3 July Cemetery Ridge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatG.php
1st New York K (Fitzhugh’s) Battery 149 men (7 wounded) 6% casualties
6 Ordnance Rifles
3 July “…assisted in repulsing Pickett’s Charge…)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/NY/1NYArtBatK.php
Analysis of CSA Artillery Losses
Summary:
First Corps: Longstreet 87 guns 2,118 men (46 KIA; 26 MIA; 211 wounded) 13% casualties
Second Corps: Ewell 78 guns 1,679 men (21 KIA; 24 MIA; 82 wounded) 8% casualties
Third Corps: A.P. Hill 84 guns 1,893 men (22 KIA; 29 MIA; 112 wounded) 9% casualties
Cavalry Division: Stuart 17 guns 406 men (11 KIA; 0 MIA; 15 wounded) 6% casualties
Artillery Grand Total = 275 guns 6,096 men (100 KIA; 79 MIA; 420 wounded) 10% casualties
8 guns were disabled during the battle (6 by counter battery fire; 1 by accident; 1 burst barrel). The most likely cause of a disabled gun was a broken wheel; which could be replaced in less than an hour with a crew of 6 men.
The only gun (I can find) abandoned by the CSA at Gettysburg was the gun with the burst barrel.
Horses KIA/disabled = 276 minimum (not all batteries reported losses in horseflesh)
I’ve counted 65 CSA batteries at Gettysburg. You can double check my count:
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateBatteries.php
276 horses = 46 completed teams of 6 or 36% of all front line CSA artillery (gun/caisson) horses
“After Gettysburg it was our habit,” wrote Stiles, “when a piece became engaged to send the horses to the rear, to some place of safety, preferring to run the risk of losing a gun occasionally rather than the team that pulled it”. Indeed, horses were so valuable that in the 1864 campaign Stiles reported that when artillery officers met, the first thing they asked each other was, “How many horses did you lose?” Philip Katcher, “The Army of Northern Virginia: Lee’s Army in the American Civil War 1861-1865” p. 52
See:
· ANV HQ Monument: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV.php
· 1st Army Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ANV1Corps.php
· 2nd Army Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ANV2Corps.php
· 3rd Army Corps: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ANV3Corps.php
· Cavalry Division: http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ANVCav.php
First Corps: Longstreet
McLaws Division (16 guns 378 men) (12 KIA; 4 MIA; 31 wounded) 12% casualties
(80 Horses KIA/disabled)
Pulaski (GA) Battery 63 men (July 2: 6 KIA; 13 wounded) 30% casualties
2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts 2 Ordnance Rifles
Ammunition exhausted (30 minutes in Peach Orchard) in 7 hours
(18 Horses KIA/disabled)
July 3 operational See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Pulaski.php
Carlton’s Battery (Troup County (GA) Light Battery) 94 men (1 KIA; 6 wounded) 7% casualties
2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts
Ammunition exhausted in 9.5 hours (in Peach Orchard)
(17 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Troup.php
1st NC Artillery Battery A (Manly’s Battery) 131 men (3 KIA; 4 MIA; 4 wounded) 8% casualties
2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers and 2 Ordnance Rifles
1146 rounds expended over 15 hours (in Peach Orchard)
(20 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/NC1artBatA.php
1st Richmond (VA) Howitzer Battery (McCarthy’s Battery) 90 men (2 KIA; 8 wounded) 11%
2 Napoleons and 2 Ordnance Rifles
850 rounds expended in 9 hours (in Peach Orchard)
(25 Horses KIA/disabled) 1 gun disabled
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Richmond1Howitzers.php
Pickett’s Division (18 guns 419 men) (8 KIA; 17 wounded) 6% casualties
(25 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-1-Pickett-Dearing.php
Fauguier (VA) Battery 134 men (No losses reported)
4 Napoleons and 2 (two) 20-Pound Parrotts
Ammunition exhausted in 2 hours
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Fauquier.php
Lynchburg (VA) Battery (Blount’s) 96 men (No losses reported)
4 Napoleons
Ammunition exhausted in 2 hours
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Blount.php
Richmond (Fayette, VA) (Macon’s) Battery 90 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts
Ammunition exhausted in 2 hours
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/RichmondFayette.php
Richmond (Hampden, VA) (Caskie’s) Battery 90 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 1 Ordnance Rifle, and 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott
Ammunition exhausted in 2 hours
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Hampden.php
Hood’s Division (19 guns 403 men) (4 KIA; 23 wounded) 7% casualties
1500 rounds fired on July 2 & 3.
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-1-Hood-Henry.php
1st NC Artillery (Reilly’s) Battery D (The Rowan Artillery) 148 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles, and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts
1 burst rifle; replaced with captured Union pieces (Smith’s Battery)
3 hours firing & participated in repelling Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Rowan.php
The Branch Artillery (NC) (Latham’s Battery) 112 men (No losses reported)
3 Napoleons, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer, and 1 (one) 6-Pound field gun
Howitzer and gun disabled; replaced with 2 captured Union pieces (Smith’s Battery)
3 hours firing & participated in repelling Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Branch.php
Charleston (SC) “German” Light (Bachman’s) Battery 71 men (No losses reported)
4 Napoleons
3 hours firing & participated in repelling Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/German.php
Palmetto (SC) Light Garden’s) Battery (Garden commanding) 63 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts
3 hours firing & participated in repelling Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Palmetto.php
First Corps Reserve Artillery (43 guns 918 men) (22 KIA; 22 MIA; 140 wounded) 20% casualties
Alexander’s Battalion (24 guns 576 men) Losses not reported by individual battery (19 KIA; 6 MIA; 114 wounded) 20% casualties
The sum total of the losses in my battalion during the period covered by this report are as follows: In the battle of Gettysburg, July 2 and 3, killed, 19; wounded, 114; missing, 6; total, 139 men. There were also 2 killed and 3 wounded of a detachment of 8 gallant Mississippians at Captain Moody's guns, who volunteered to help maneuver them on very difficult ground. Horses killed and disabled in action, 116. Many of my wounded sent to Cashtown fell into the hands of the enemy there. On the night march across the Potomac, 8 men missing. Deserted near Martinsburg, 3 men. Upset near the pontoon bridge and thrown into the river, by order to clear the passage to the bridge, one limber of 24-pounder howitzer caisson. Destroyed in action: one 12-pounder howitzer, two 12-pounder howitzer carriages, and six wheels. The howitzer, however, was brought off in a wagon.
See http://www.civilwarhome.com/alexandergettysburgor.htm
Madison (LA) Light Artillery (Moody’s) Battery 135 men (Losses heavy)
4 (four) 24-Pound Howitzers
5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Madison.php
The Brooks (SC) Light Artillery (Rhett’s Battery) 71 men (Losses heavy)
4 (four) 12-Pound Howitzers
5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Brooks.php
Ashland (VA) (Woolfork’s) Battery 103 men (Losses heavy)
2 Napoleons and 2 (two) 20-Pound Parrotts
5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Ashland.php
Bath (VA) (Taylor’s) Battery 90 men (2 KIA; 10 wounded) 13% casualties
4 Napoleons
5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Taylor.php
Bedford (VA) (Jordan’s) Battery 78 men (Losses heavy)
4 Ordnance Rifles
5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Bedford.php
Richmond (VA) (Parker’s) Battery 90 men (Losses heavy)
3 Ordnance Rifles, and 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott
5 hours firing (in Peach Orchard)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Parker.php
Eshleman’s Washington (LA) Artillery Battalion 329 men (3 KIA; 16 MIA; 26 wounded) 14% casualties
(37 Horses KIA/disabled) (3 guns disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-1-Eshleman.php
Company A (Squires’s) Battery 77 men (No losses reported)
1 Napoleon
2 hours firing
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Squires.php
Company B (Richardson’s) Battery 80 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer
2 hours firing; used captured 3” ordnance rifle
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Richardson.php
Company C (Miller’s) Battery 92 men (Losses heavy)
3 Napoleons
2 hours firing; 3 Napoleons advanced 450 yards with Pickett’s Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Miller.php
Company D (Norcom’s) Battery 80 men (2 guns disabled; losses not reported)
2 Napoleons, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer
2 hours firing; 2 Napoleons advanced 450 yards with Pickett’s Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Norcom.php
Second Corps: Ewell
Early’s Division (16 guns 290 men) (2 KIA; 6 wounded) 3% known casualties
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Early-Jones.php
LA Guard (Green’s) Battery 60 men (2 KIA; 5 wounded) 12% casualties
2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts
161 rounds fired; 1 hour at Barlow’s Knoll + Day 2 withdrawn 1 mile from counter battery fire
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/LAGuard.php
Charlottesville (VA) (Carrington’s) Battery (No casualties reported)
4 Napoleons
Firing 1 hour at Barlow’s Knoll
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Charlottesville.php
Richmond “Courtney” (VA) (Tanner’s) Battery (Tanner commanding) 90 men (No casualties reported)
4 Ordnance Rifles
595 round expended; firing 1 hour at Barlow’s Knoll + 10 hours on Day 2
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Courtney.php
Staunton (VA) (Garber’s) Battery 60 men (1 wounded) 2% casualties
4 Napoleons
106 rounds expended; firing 1 hour at Barlow’s Knoll
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Staunton.php
Johnson’s Division (16 guns 356 men)(10 KIA; 40 wounded) 14% casualties
(30 Horses KIA/disabled)
Note – 48 reported wounded by battery command; I suspect 8 of these wounds minor and not reported by Johnson at the Division level.
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Early-Jones.php
First Maryland (Dement’s) Battery 90 men (1 KIA; 4 wounded) 6% casualties
4 Napoleons
(9 Horses KIA/disabled) (1 Caisson exploded; 1 disabled)
2 hours firing; withdrew from Union counter battery fire
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/MD1bat.php
Fourth Maryland (Chesapeake) (Brown’s) Battery 76 men (4 KIA; 12 wounded) 21%
4 (four) 10-Pound Parrotts
(9 Horses KIA/disabled)
2 hours counter battery fire; ammunition exhausted; one gun disabled
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Chesapeake.php
Allegheny (VA) (Carpenter’s) Battery 91 men (5 KIA; 24 wounded) 43% casualties
2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles
(9 Horses KIA/disabled)
2 hours counter battery fire; ammunition exhausted
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Allegheny.php
Lynchburg “Lee” (VA) (Raine’s) Battery 90 men (8 wounded) 9% casualties
1 Ordnance Rifle, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott, and 2 (two) 20-Pound Parrott
(3 Horses KIA/disabled)
2 hours counter battery fire + 2 hours on July 3
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/LeeArt.php
Rhode’s Division (16 guns 385 men) (6 KIA; 24 MIA; 35 wounded) 17% casualties
1898 rounds fired
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Rodes-Carter.php
Jefferson Davis (AL) (Reese’s) Battery 79 men (no losses reported)
4 Ordnance Rifles
229 rounds expended; 2 hours firing at Barlow’s Knoll + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/JeffDavis.php
King William (VA) (Carter’s) Battery 103 men (4 wounded) 4% casualties
2 Napoleons, and 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts
572 rounds fired; 2 hours firing at Barlow’s Knoll + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/KingWilliam.php
Morris (VA) (Page’s) Battery 114 men (4 KIA; 26 wounded) 26% casualties
4 Napoleons
215 rounds fired; 2 hours firing at Seminary Ridge
(17 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Morris.php
Richmond “Orange” (VA) (Fry’s) Battery 80 men (no losses reported)
2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts
882 rounds fired; 5 hours Day 1 + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Orange.php
Second Corps Reserve Artillery (30 guns 648 men) (3 KIA; 1 wounded) 1% casualties
Dance’s Battalion (20 guns 367 men) (3 KIA; 1 wounded) 1% casualties
1888 rounds fired
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Rodes-Carter.php
Powhatan (VA) (Cunningham’s) Battery 78 men (No losses reported)
4 Ordnance Rifles
308 rounds fired; 3 hours on Day 2 + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Powhatan.php
2nd Richmond (VA) Howitzer (Watson’s) Battery 64 men (No losses reported)
4 (four) 10-Pound Parrotts
661 rounds fired; 3 hours on Day 2 + 2 hours Pickett’s Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/RIchmond2.php
3rd Richmond (VA) Howitzer (Smith’s) Battery 62 men (1 KIA) 2% casualties
4 Ordnance Rifles
314 rounds fired; 3 hours on Day 2 + 3 hours Pickett’s Charge
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Richmond3.php
1st Rockbridge (VA) (Graham’s) Battery 85 men (No losses reported)
4 (four) 20-Pound Parrotts
439 rounds fired; Day 2 “July 2 Remained in position on the left firing occasionally”
14 hours maximum firing
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Rockbridge1.php
Salem (VA) “Flying” (Griffin’s) Battery 66 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles
154 rounds fired on July 3
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Salem.php
Nelson’s Battalion (10 guns 277 men) (No casualties reported)
48 rounds fired
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-2-Rodes-Carter.php
Georgia Regular (Milledge’s) Battery 73 men (No losses reported)
2 Ordnance Rifles, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott
48 rounds fired; half on July 2 and 20 to 25 on July 3.
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Milledge.php
Amherst (VA) (Kirkpatrick’s) Battery 105 men (No losses reported; no ammunition expended)
3 Napoleons, 1 Ordnance Rifle
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Amherst.php
Fluvanna (VA) “Consolidated” (Massie’s) Battery 90 men
3 Napoleons, 1 Ordnance Rifle
(No losses reported; no ammunition expended)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Fluvanna.php
Third Corps: A.P. Hill
Heth’s Division (15 guns 396 men) (17 MIA; 5 wounded) 6% casualties
(13 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-Heth-Garnett.php
Donaldsville (LA) (Maurin’s) Battery 114 men (No losses reported)
2 Ordnance Rifles, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott
3.5 hours firing on July 1; 4 hours firing on July 2; “fired upon but no returning the fire”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Donaldsonville.php
Norfolk “Huger’s” (VA) Artillery(Moore’s) Battery 77 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 1 Ordnance Rifles, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott
3.5 hours firing on July 1; 4 hours firing on July 2; “inactive all day though sometimes under fire”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Huger.php
Norfolk ‘Light Artillery Blues” (VA) (Grandy’s) Battery (No losses reported)
2 ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers
July 2 “Afternoon and evening in the artillery duel with Union batteries on Cemetery Hill”
July 3 “Held all day in reserve without firing a shot though sometimes under fire”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/NorfolkBlues.php
Pittsylvania (VA) (Lewis’s) Battery 90 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles
July 2 “Artillery duel in the afternoon and evening with Union batteries on Cemetery Hill”
July 3 “Not engaged at any time although from time to time under fire”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Lewis.php
Pender’s Division (16 guns 377 men) (2 KIA; 6 MIA; 24 wounded) 8% casualties
657 rounds fired
(17 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-Pender-Pogue.php
1st North Carolina “Charlotte” (Graham’s) Battery 125 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers
July 3 at 7 am opened on Union position; ordered to cease firing as they drew concentrated fire of several batteries. Supported Pickett’s Charge.
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Charlotte.php
Madison (MS) Light Artillery (Ward’s) Battery 91 men (No losses reported)
3 Napoleons, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer
Supported Pickett’s Charge.
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/MadisonMS.php
Albermarle “Everett” (VA) (Wyatt’s) Battery 94 men (No losses reported)
2 Ordnance Rifles, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer, 1 (one) 10-Pound Parrott
July 3 at 7 am opened on Union position; ordered to cease firing as they drew concentrated fire of several batteries. Supported Pickett’s Charge.
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Albemarle.php
Warrenton (VA) (Brooke’s) Battery 58 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers
Supported Pickett’s Charge.
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Brooke.php
Anderson’s Division (17 guns 384 men) (3 KIA; 6 MIA; 21 wounded) 8% casualties
1082 rounds fired
(36 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-Pender-Pogue.php
Sumter Artillery (GA) Company A (Ross’s) Battery 130 men (1 KIA; 2 MIA; 7 wounded) 8%
1 Napoleon, 3 (three) 10-Pound Parrotts, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer, 1 Ordnance Rifle
506 rounds fired; July 2 “Under a heavy fire of artillery” North of the Peach Orchard
July 3 supported Pickett’s Charge
(9 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Ross.php
Sumter Artillery (GA) Company B (Patterson’s) Battery 124 men (2 KIA; 2 MIA; 5 wounded) 7%
4 (four) 12-Pound Howitzers, 2 Napoleons
170 rounds fired; July 2 “Opened fire upon Union positions north of the Peach Orchard”
(? Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Patterson.php
Sumter Artillery (GA) Company C (Wingfield’s) Battery 121 men (2 MIA; 9 wounded) 9%
3 (three) 3” Navy Rifles, 2 (two) 10-Pound Howitzers)
406 rounds fired; July 2 “Actively engaged and exposed all the while to a heavy fire from the Union artillery”
July 3 supported Pickett’s Charge
(20 Horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Wingfield.php
Third Corps Reserve Artillery (36 guns 736 men) (17 KIA; 62 wounded)
McIntosh’s Battalion (16 guns 357 men) (7 KIA, 25 wounded (16 of the wounded captured)) 9%
(38 horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-McIntosh.php
Hardaway AL) (Hurt’s) Battery 71 men (No losses reported)
2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 Whitworth Rifles
July 1 “Opened fire slowly and effectively”
July 2 On Seminary Ridge “exposed to a heavy fire from the Union sharpshooters and artillery”
July 3 On Seminary Ridge “Fired with great effect”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Hardaway.php
Danville (VA) (Rice’s) Battery 114 men (No losses reported)
4 Napoleons
July 1 “Firing when Union forces were visible”
July 2 “Actively engaged under heavy fire of sharpshooters and artillery”
July 3 “All the guns were actively engaged”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Danville.php
Second Rockbridge (VA) (Wallace’s) Battery 67 men (No losses reported) (1 gun disabled)
2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles
July 1 “actively engaged in the evening”
July 2 “actively engaged. Had one gun disabled”
July 3 “actively engaged”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Rockbridge2.php
Johnson’s Richmond (VA) (Johnson’s) Battery 96 men (1 KIA)
4 Ordnance Rifles
July 1 “Not engaged though under fire and losing one man killed”
July 2 “actively engaged under a heavy fire of sharpshooters and artillery”
July 3 “actively engaged”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Johnson.php
Pegram’s Battalion (20 guns 375 men) (10 KIA; 37 wounded) 13%
3800 rounds fired; engaged all 3 days
(38 horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-3-Pegram.php
PeeDee (SC) (Zimmerman’s) Battery 65 men (1 gun disabled on July 1 returned to action July 2)
(No losses reported)
4 Ordnance Rifles
1 July “engaged and did effective service” [gun] “disabled by accident…hastening into action”
2 July “engaged with Union batteries”
3 July “Took an active part in all the operations…including [Pickett’s Charge]”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/PeeDee.php
Fredericksburg (VA) (Marye’s) Battery 71 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles
1 July “Fired the first cannon-shot of the battle…actively engaged until the close of the day’s conflict”
2 July “Opened at intervals upon the Union lines”
3 July “Participated actively in all operations…including [Pickett’s Charge]”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Fredericksburg.php
Richmond “Crenshaw’s” (VA) Battery (Johnson commanding) 76 men (No losses reported)
2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers
1 July “took an active part in the battle”
2 July “actively engaged throughout the day…sometimes annoyed by sharpshooters”
3 July “Participated in all the operations of the artillery”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Crenshaw.php
Richmond “Letcher” (VA) (Brander’s) Battery 76 men (No losses reported)
2 Napoleons, 2 (two) 10-Pound Parrotts
1 July “fired upon the Union infantry with much effect”
2 July “engaged at intervals in firing upon the Union lines and batteries”
3 July “Actively participated in all the operations…including [Pickett’s Charge]”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Letcher.php
Richmond “Purcell” (VA) (McGraw’s) Battery 89 men (No losses reported
4 Napoleons
1 July “actively engaged”
2 July “Took part in the day’s conflict with Union batteries and…busy sharpshooters”
3 July “Actively participated in all the operations”
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Purcell.php
Cavalry Division: J.E.B. Stuart See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-Cav.php
6,389 men and 17 guns (36 KIA, 64 MIA; 140 wounded) 4% casualties
Division Horse Artillery (15 guns 406 men) (11 KIA; 15 wounded)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/HQ-CSA/ANV-Cav-Beckham.php
Only two markers exist for the 6 Division Horse Artillery Batteries:
Second Baltimore (MD) Light Artillery (Griffin’s) Battery 106 men (No marker)
4 Ordnance Rifles
Ashby’s (VA) (Chew’s) Battery 99 men (No marker)
1 Ordnance Rifle, 1 (one) 12-Pound Howitzer
First Stuart (VA) Horse Artillery (Breathed’s) Battery 106 men (6 KIA; 8 wounded)
4 Ordnance Rifles
(14 horses KIA/disabled)
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Stuart-Breathed.php
Lynchburg (VA) Horse Artillery (Moorman’s) Battery (No marker)
1 Napoleon, 3 Ordnance Rifles
Second Stuart (VA) Horse Artillery (McGregor’s) Battery 106 men (5 KIA; 7 wounded)
(11 horses KIA/disabled)
2 Napoleons, 2 Ordnance Rifles
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/McGregor.php
Washington (SC) (Hart’s) Battery 79 men (No marker)
3 Blakely Rifles
Imboden’s Command – not part of ANV, but led retreat near the Potomac crossing (No marker)
Staunton Horse Battery (McClanahan’s) Battery 64 men (?? losses)
1 Ordnance Rifle, 4 (four) 12-Pound Howitzers
Charlottesville (VA) (Jackson’s) Horse Artillery Battery 75 men (No losses reported)
2 Ordnance Rifles, 2 (two) 12-Pound Howitzers
See http://www.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ConfederateMar/Jackson.php
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Immelman,
Your question regarding artillery is neither difficult to answer nor much of a challenge to implement.
The information is readily available.
It is NOT COMPLICATED if you can understand an inverse relationship in a 4 column chart with 10 rows (4 ammunition types in column, 10 gun types in rows).
I've repeatedly provided this information on this forum.
Your question has been answered in detail in my other posts - at great length.
In previous posts I've layed out the composition of every battery for both sides, and the performance characteristics of the ammunition types.
Let me know if you want this information and I can post it again if you can't find it on this forum.
The game portrays different batteries with different artillery characteristics.
As SidChigger points out - select a battery and change the setting to "canister" for example.
Different batteries have different ranges for each type of ammunition.
Generally in UGG batteries with longer canister range will have longer shell and solid shot range.
This is absolutely incorrect for the ACW. There is an inverse relationship between accuracy at range and effectiveness with canister.
The game does not correctly assign these differences to the correct batteries nor does UGG assign the correct attributes to the guns that made up each battery historically.
For example - check out Calef's battery (Only Union battery on the field at the start of the game).
Calef's battery was armed with six 3" Ordnance Rifles.
Historically this was the worst gun in the entire arsenal of both sides for delivering canister.
Yet the canister pattern for that battery in UGG is among the largest in the game.
The design team wanted to make a fight out of Buford's cavalry stand heroic; so Calef's canister pattern was increased to one of the most effective in the game.
This helped stave off the onslaught from the CSA and balance the game.
Historically Buford lost about 100 men.
Calef's battery's major contribution was to mask the fact that Heth was facing a skirmish line of cavalry.
Buford's cavalry along with Calef's battery were sent to Westminster, MD to refit and resupply after their diversion/skirmish on July 1.
Smoothbores were the most effective tools for delivering canister:
The most effective gun on the field at Gettysburg for canister was the 24 pounder howitzer.
Its short barrel and wide bore made it a devastating weapon at short range.
But these characteristics made the howitzer almost worthless for accuracy and range. (Not very complex).
The 12 pounder howitzer was next - smaller bore with a short barrel.
Next would be the 12 pounder Napoleon Model 1857 that was used extensively by both sides.
This was the most versatile gun for canister, shot, and shell.
McClellan recommended that the Union standardize on this piece exclusively to reduce the complexity of logistics and artillery ammunition resupply.
Northern cannon manufactures prevented McClellan's proposal from adoption.
The small bore of the 6 pounder smoothbore made this gun largely obsolete in the ACW. The small bore was inadequate for effective canister. The bore was roughly the size of the 3" Ordnance Rifle, but the 6 pounder lacked the benefit of a rifled barrel for range and accuracy of the 3" Rifle.
About half the guns at Gettysburg were rifled:
Rifled guns were not as effective at delivering canister. The rifling in the tube caused the canister to have a left-hand twist leaving the barrel of the gun and interferes with a uniform distribution of canister in the flight pattern. Generally the effectiveness of canister with rifled artillery is affected by the size of the bore. Thus:
The 3" Ordnance Rifle (preferred by cavalry of both sides for "flying batteries") was the poorest at delivering canister during the ACW.
Rifled guns with a larger bore were increasingly more effective.
Because of the generally poorer quality at delivering canister, and the superior characteristics at delivering accurate fire at range, rifled guns were preferably deployed behind the line of battle where their accuracy could be used to pick of targets at longer range.
Keep in mind that artillery contributed about 6% of battlefield casualties during the ACW. 93% were inflicted with small arms.
It took on average about 35 shots for artillery to inflict a single casualty.
At Gettysburg the CSA fired about 22,000 rounds (E.P. Alexander).
The Union fired 32,781 rounds (Hunt).
Casualties at Gettysburg were 50,000.
According to the medical reports after the battle about 3,000 of these casualties were inflicted by artillery.
3,000 casualties divided by 55,000 rounds fired at Gettysburg = about 1 casualty per 20 rounds.
Canister was the only effective round at consistently inflicting more than a single casualty per round.
If you deduct the canister casualties from the 3,000 artillery casualties then you end up with about 1 round in 35 inflicting a single casualty at longer range.
Note that at Gettysburg the Union picked up about 6,000 CSA wounded rebels - so we have reasonable information from both sides from the same medical source for this data.
So the point is black powder artillery was a direct-fire weapon whose contribution on the battlefield was "more moral than physical" (See "The Artillerists Manual 1861 or 1864" by John Gibbon).
Note that it was unusual for CSA batteries to be homogeneous. Generally at least two types of guns made up each CSA battery. Thus CSA batteries were generally fought by two-gun section. Smoothbores forward with rifles located in more advantageous positions to the rear.
The primary target of long range rifles was artillery on the move; as this presented the largest target on the ACW battlefield.
Infantry in line of battle presented two ranks with a threat surface per file of about 22 square feet (man = 5'5" height X 2' width X two ranks).
By comparison a limbered gun includes 6 horses, 2 men, and a threat surface of over 350 square feet plus the surface of the gun and limber.
Multiply this 350 square foot threat surface times 12 for a Union battery on the move (six guns, six ammunition caissons, plus 100 men).
For the CSA the multiplication factor is 8 times (4 guns, for ammunition caissons, plus about 70 men).
The result is a juicy target with a threat surface just south of 5,000 square feet.
The CSA lost 35% of their front line artillery horses at Gettysburg - primarily to long range artillery rifle fire.
Note that the artillery horse casualties were greater than the artillery and cavalry casualties; each ten percent, and the infantry casualties which were just under 30%.
Regarding the Whitworths:
There were two of these guns at Gettysburg. They were posted on Oak Ridge and fired at long-range during the battle. Recently a Whitworth bolt was dug up on Little Round Top - conclusive evidence that these guns had a range of 5 miles. These long slender barrels made the Whitworth more of a heavy-duty sniping rifle. These guns were so few in number, with such a small bore, and carried such a small payload they were militarily irrelevant.
The screaming bolts from the Whitworths did rout a Pennsylvania militia regiment at Gettysburg; but these men were chided back into the line by the hoots and cat calls of the veteran units on hand to witness the scare.
After Gettysburg the primary question CSA artillery battery commanders asked each other was, "how many horses did you lose today."
The loss of these draft animals hindered the CSA war effort and left many Confederate guns in static positions in static defenses for the remainder of the war.
Mules and cattle can move artillery. Hood used these animals extensively late in the war in the west.
But mules can be contrary in combat and were not used on the battlefield for service in artillery batteries.
Mules are smarter than horses and consider their own personal safety paramount. Not at all a "for glory, god, and nation" kind of self-sacrificing creature.
Cattle used for draft purposes are really slow. They can move a gun to a position - but were not mobile enough to keep batteries safe in the event they needed to be moved.
Let me know if you have other questions regarding ACW artillery.
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Avtomatik,
Your actually suggesting that it is possible that the Union might have won the battle of Gettysburg?
Yet another funny example of the oxymoronic content on this forum.
Gettysburg, and the ACW generally was an extraordinarily balance affair as the Union had to defend large swaths of Southern territory which ensured relative battlefield parity.
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It is bold to confess that you don't know the basic facts yet argue the correctness of your logic. Good on ya mate!
First hand accounts of enemy casualties are always highly suspect and the ACW is no exception. See for example every war in history.
Briefly...
The ancient Egyptians carved their victories in stone but when you compare their reports to the reports of their 'defeated' enemies the political results of the battles don't align with the propaganda chiseled into the wall of Karnak. Often both sides reported a stunning victory yet the political outcome is a fairly balanced treaty so it is more likely than not that both sides misrepresented the magnitude of their victories.
The Napoleonic Wars is a classic example where reading first hand accounts of battles leads to intentionally misrepresented accounts.
Perhaps it is just the nature of men and war.
A more current example: during the Battle of Britain RAF pilots reported more than twice as many kills as the entire Luftwaffe had airplanes.
Note that many of the Luftwaffe aircraft were deployed in other theaters of operation (i.e., Africa).
The problem of estimating enemy strength became so acute that cameras became standard equipment to confirm first hand intelligence.
With this in mind...
You might consider doing some basic math before you draw your conclusions from first hand accounts.
While canister was the most effective anti-personnel round a 12 pounder Napoleon canister round held 28 projectiles.
Double canister would double this to 56 but the effective range of canister drops precipitously as these projectiles compete to exit the tube.
Authorized strength for a company was between 83 and 101 men.
Thus it would be mathematically possible that a battery of 6 guns firing 168 projectiles could "wipe out" an entire company.
It is twice as likely if you consider double canister with 336 projectiles.
But if you understand basic statistics the mathematical likelihood of such of event is absurd.
At one point I ran the calculation and the possibility of a battery wiping out an entire company.
If I remember correctly the odds were less than 1 in over 100,000 given the frontage of a company and the dispersion pattern of canister and less likely with double canister beyond 100 yards.
Now if we consider the ordnance reports for artillery ammunition this means that such an event, if it ever occurred once during the war, would have required all of the artillery ammunition fired by both sides during the 6 largest ACW battles for such an event to statistically happen once.
There certainly were cases where canister was effective. Dilger's use of his Napoleons at Chancellorsville earned his the Medal of Honor and stalled the Confederate advance long enough for the Union to assemble enough guns to prevent the ANV from further destruction of the AoP.
So...
Basically I'm saying you are drawing false conclusions from fictional data.
If you match the AAR reports in the OR against the casualty returns for regiments it is not unusual for a battery to report 450 enemy casualties (Gettysburg Day 2 Longstreet's Offensive) yet the regimental return for the unit (in this specific case CSA) list only 45 casualties for the entire three-day battle. Both sides made ridiculous first hand claims in their AARs.
It is great that you enjoy the game and are satisfied with its historical accuracy.
We have had different experiences with the game and each have our own conclusions.
Bottom line the game is for entertainment. Agreement and/or disagreement on our perspectives of the game is irrelevant.
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Hmmm...we certainly agree that rifled muskets were a game changer during the ACW and that Napoleonic tactics became obsolete as a result.
But...
Artillery did not see a "climb in effectiveness." ACW artillery performance actually dropped off compared to the Napoleonic Wars. During the Napoleonic Wars artillery could be prolonged forward because musket range and accuracy were abysmal. Canister range at 400 yards was superior to musket range thus it was safe for artillery to move up and blast squares of infantry out of existence.
Not so with the ACW because infantry could pick off gunners before they could deploy forward. Thus artillery was moved from the front ranks to more protected positions during the ACW.
The net result was that artillery-inflicted casualties were a mere 6% of battlefield casualties during the ACW.
At Gettysburg there were roughly 22,000 rounds of artillery ammunition fired by the CSA and another 32,781 fired by the Union. Given that there were about 50,000 casualties then each round of artillery inflicted less than one casualty per round - assuming that every casualty was inflicted by artillery - which it was not.
If we accept the primary data and the research done at the U.S. Artillery School at Fort Sill then roughly 3,000 of the Gettysburg casualties were from artillery.
In other words the artillery inflicted a single casualty for about every 20 rounds of artillery ammunition fired. Note that this includes casualties by canister - which was the only really effective round at inflicting multiple casualties per round.
The problem with artillery is that it was going through and experimental phase with new types of ammunition transitioning from solid shot and canister to shells and canister. Additionally, the army was transitioning from smoothbores to rifled guns which dramatically reduced the number of casualties a round could inflict. The intent of shell was to inflict more casualties - however they relied on fuses that were woefully inadequate to match time over target with detonation. Additionally, the projectiles transitioned from spherical to conical with the adoption of rifled artillery - thus rather than spheres bounding along the ground the pointed rounds buried themselves in the ground - which absorbed the impact if the shell ultimately detonated.
So the data from the ACW demonstrates that while the rifled muskets inflicted 93% of the casualties the artillery was not "bombarding" either army to pieces - hence the statement from Gibbon that the effects of artillery was "more moral than physical." Robert E. Lee provides another reference point from the siege of Petersburg when he stated to CSA Senators who asked if the artillery was particularly active. He stated indeed it was but it was the rifled musket that actually killed men. Note that the CSA bombardment prior to Longstreet's Charge on July 3 was noted as one of the greatest humbugs of the war. Bottom line artillery fire routed a single Pennsylvania militia regiment at Gettysburg. These green troops were under fire from Oak Hill by 2 Whitworths. Though these guns hadn't inflicted casualties the sound of the screaming projectiles unnerved the men (which were different from the thud of a 12 pounder smoothbore). Veteran units laughed and mocked the Pennsylvania militia back into the line.
You might want to double check your facts regarding artillery because you don't have 'em correct or even in the ballpark for the ACW.
Enough about artillery...
How about cavalry?
The cavalry during the ACW was also of limited utility on the battlefield. In UGG I'd trade every unit in either army to have them deployed as cavalry skirmishers.
The fact is Buford lost about 100 men - and Heth's orders prevented him from steamrolling Buford and bringing on a battle.
In UGG the opening phase is one of the most egregious historical inaccuracies of the game and the cavalry generally outperforms the historical reality of the ACW.
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Taggert - the lack of historical realism in this game is why UGG has alienated the core of historical game enthusiasts.
Right now the game focuses on Union artillery vs. Confederate infantry which is to miss the mark completely on historical realism for the ACW.
The UGG Team built a game they think is cool - which is great. It's great they've attracted players who enjoy the game.
Personally I'd prefer to see a historically tuned version of UGG - even if it was only a single player game.
Such a game might have the support of the historical gaming community and the potential to attract more serious history enthusiasts.
Sadly the "weaknesses of each side in history" are not represented which IMHO is dismal for a ACW game - and why many ACW enthusiasts have been driven from this game.
UGG has little left to recommend the game regarding "historical realism." It is just a game about guys masquerading in blue and gray in a galaxy far far away...
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Mr. Mercanto,
Just for clarification are you looking for the multiplayer, single player, or both to be revised to a more historically representative game?
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Thanks to Nick and his Game Labs Team for the great tactical game.
It has been a pleasure to test this game and participate in its development over the past year.
Best wishes to the community and I look forward to your next product release.
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Collector's Showcase,
If you want additional balanced phases to play why don't you politely offer some suggestions on ideas you have to generate a few more phases?
Nick and his team have been very willing to add phases as players have made suggestions.
In my opinion this is not a fair criticism of Nick and his team.
It may even be possible to have a scenario editor where players could select parts of the battlefield and Corps-level elements from the order of battle to play against each other (not sure if you could do this at a lower-level of granularity without a bunch of new code).
Then players could pick and choose their preferences for customized battles.
```````````````Here's why the Ewell map is important in my opinion...
The Campaign Game offers a variety of challenges in various to players. Some balanced, some not.
The experience gained in these less-balanced phases provides players with a full-spectrum of challenges from steamrolling an enemy to doing your best against overwhelming odds.
This historical reality of the battle is one of the aspects that brought me to the game - inclusive of the Ewell map.
It doesn't seem fair to criticize a single phase out of a series of phases in a campaign game when the goal of the campaign game and its various phases is to achieve victory over the course of the multi-day battle of Gettysburg.
While I agree that playing a single unbalanced phase (i.e., the Ewell map) may not be rewarding as a stand-alone phase; without these historical phases the campaign game would lose its current state of continuity and the historical challenges faced by the Union by their decision to fight at Gettysburg.
The fact is the Rebs got to Gettysburg with more men earlier in the fight then lost their numerical advantage as more of the Union army arrived. If you completely strip the historical timeline away from the game you don't really have anything left of the historical battle of Gettysburg.
The game, in essence, will just be a series of blue and gray chess pieces played out on a map of the Gettysburg battlefield. IMHO such a design vision for a historical game could only be fathomed by "a good short order cook."
I'd prefer take my games at breakfast with a heapin' helpin' of sloosh with half a sweet potato on the side!
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Nick,
Given that you know perfectly what I like and do not like why would you need me to review the latest release?
Yes I fixed my Steam account three times. It takes multiple emails and about 4 to 10 working days to get the account reinstated. Each time my account is fixed Steam cancels my account within 48 hours of getting the account fixed.
I’ve grown weary of dealing with the dreadful account support from Steam and their absurd cancellation cycle.
You have had dozens of posts from hundreds of hours of my testing with detailed feedback and numerous suggestions on UGG.
Not that much has changed.
You’ve stated that the game is finalized and the team has moved on to other projects.
Rather than continue to invest my time in testing cycles for a game that’s been completed I’ve been learning a tremendous amount by watching the posted battles and learning the tips and techniques of other players (Koro, Nick, etc…). This allows me to evaluate the state of the game without investing more of my time with Steam or another iteration of “more of the same UGG.”
Besides Nick, Mr. Mercanto and others have highlighted the same problems I documented 12 months ago.
Hearing this again from me obviously has less impact than hearing it from your active community members playing on the current release.
Perhaps, when enough of your community speak up in favor of player input on the fundamentals of the algorithms, your game design may evolve to include a couple of sorely needed player-tuned input options. This could be as simple as:
Infantry Modifier:
Union -50% -25% Standard Setting +25% +50%
CSA -50% -25% Standard Setting +25% +50%
Artillery Modifier:
Union -50% -25% Standard Setting +25% +50%
CSA -50% -25% Standard Setting +25% +50%
This way I can tune my games to align with the ACW history while others can tune their games for the result they favor.
I’ve managed many software development projects over a 30 year career and know that if the design is structured to accommodate user input then the implementation effort is minimal to accommodate users. The key is getting the design team to embrace the breadth of their customer base.
America’s Civil War is not a “one size fits all” proposition.
Alternatively, open up UGG to modding.
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Hister,
AGEOD's Civil War is a strategic campaign game - tactics are absent from game design entirely. So the focus is different from UGG.
It would be great to have an AGEOD's-like campaign game where it would be possible to use the UGG engine to fight the battles.
The AGEOD's design has some very strong points as well as many historical accuracy issues.
AGEOD's is a game that offers the player the freedom to make strategic decisions and try different approaches to winning the war. It retains the continuity and flow of the players decisions over the course of the game.
There is very little freedom (and sometimes less continuity) in the UGG design as the battle jumps from canned phase to canned next-phase.
I'm not a fan of the 'wild cards' system in the newer AGEOD's design.
IMHO the older version of AGEOD's was much better historically than the newer game.
As the ACW progressed both sides evolved from a regiment/brigade-centric mixed combat arms organization in the direction of the Corps system with the combat arms mutually supporting each other. The net effect was that all of the combat arms were more effective as a result.
I believe AGEOD's misses this evolution of trial by fire.
Units gain more experience but the composition of the Divisions/Brigades remains static through the war and a real pain in the neck with lots of clicks to alter division composition.
Artillery for example was initially tied to mixed combat arms brigades and evolved in the direction of quasi-independent and more concentrated artillery brigades.
The 20 pounder Parrott rifle decreased in numbers in the field armies as the war progressed.
These heavier guns were moved out of the field as too unwieldy and rough on horses to be effectively maintained on campaign.
The weight of a 20 pounder Parrott shell was 35 pounds but the impact of these rounds vs. the 12 pounder Napoleon ammunition was so militarily irrelevant that these batteries were increasingly relegated to garrison duty as the war progressed.
Then Grant figured out that heavy artillery batteries were all but useless and converted these formations to infantry during the final year of the war.
Thus at Antietam the Union had many 20 pounder Parrott batteries which made the disparity of artillery caliber at Antietam "artillery hell" for the Confederates - but the military contributions of these guns was so small that they were subsequently all but abandoned in the field by the Union. Heavy caliber guns were brought forward for the siege of Richmond/Petersburg but were left in position during the Appomattox campaign.
Sherman sent about 500 guns north out of Atlanta before the March to the Sea retaining only about 60 guns for the campaign and the remainder of the war.
AEGOD's misses completely the evolution and mix of guns in the armies of the ACW.
The timing of evolutionary events in AGEOD's relies heavily on parity. The Union grasped the Corps structure about a year before the CSA for example. The CSA, and Longstreet in particular, evolved trench warfare concepts much more rapidly and employed these innovations much earlier than the Union. Longstreet's innovations in mutually supporting trench systems was the single most enduring contribution to the art of warfare during the entire ACW conflict. In AGEOD's both sides can form Corps and upgrade trenches at exactly the same moment in time.
Similarly the treatment of cavalry in AGEOD's is relatively static. The Union was much slower to adopt cavalry brigades - yet in AGEOD's the Union has complete freedom to form cavalry brigades without the evolution and learning that was required in reality to bring parity between Union and Rebel cavalry.
Hopefully this summary satisfies your question - there is a great deal more that could be said...and a limited number of hours in the day.
C'est la guerre.
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Hister,
Please see Mr. Mercanto's 28 November post above.
He's usually an accurate tester and has offered a wealth of sound advice on multiple topics so I tend to value and trust his perspective.
It doesn't seem like the feedback in this thread aligns with your statement that the sides are evenly matched now.
I'm not certain what you mean by the statement the sides are "evenly matched." I think it means you are happy with the game as is...which is fantastic.
If you mean that the game is now properly balanced so that each side in each scenario is "evenly matched" this is something completely different than the point of my post above.
I'll try to be a bit more clear:
The relationships of the combat arms are fundamental to the ACW and therefore game design for the ACW.
The point is that the Union had 100 more guns at Gettysburg. If the artillery of both sides are now "evenly matched" then this is a flaw in the game - because the sides shouldn't be "evenly matched."
A 12 pounder Napoleon should behave the same regardless of the color of the uniform firing the gun.
And the Union had 100 more of 'em at Gettysburg.
The disparity in guns at Gettysburg was not decisive because the impact of the artillery on the battlefield during the ACW was not the decisive combat arm.
When you artificially crank up the casualties artillery can inflict in the game then the relationship of the combat arms impacts the historical balance and the relationship of the combat arms that existed in the battle.
Fudging artillery performance introduces game imbalance in favor of the Union...which means to achieve game balance you need to offset this artificial error by creating something else false with an offsetting imbalance...like the rebel yell or charging as the decisive weapon of the ACW.
The net result is a cascade of fiction resulting in the ongoing effort for Ultimately Unachievable Game balance by manipulating these fictional variables. Which is why Myes! on 28 November makes his comment above:
This update has overpowered the CSA to the point of unplayability. I've watched Federal troops with 75% cover be demolished by Confederate Infantry that is not even within firing range. I genuinely feel guilty for using Federal infantry t this point, because no matter where I place them or what I do, any brigade that is fired upon is guaranteed to be ravaged.Myes! - If I copy your quote the design team may ban me again so I'll not be pasting your quote into this post...but I echo your sentiments.
The game design concept is great. I'm a huge fan.
But the implementation needs a bit more flexibility to attract a wider range of players and offer what a broader spectrum of players are seeking in an ACW game.
I'd like to see the combat arms in their proper historical relationships.
Visually I'd love to be able to turn off the unit icons. IMHO they clutter up the visual appeal of the game (aka destroy the game visually).
Ditto the VP locations. I understand the AI runs off of the VP locations...but visually it really sucks having them hover over the battlefield IMHO.
It would be great to have an option so that VPs would not be displayed on the player's screen.
That way the game code can still use the VP locations for the AI without the player(s) having to see them.
Personally I don't care if the designer assigns 400 points or 4,000 points to a VP location.
The only metrics that interest me are the historical metrics: casualties, POW's, guns, colors, supplies captured.
The game wasn't designed to deal with the historical metrics of winning an ACW battle.
I'm not motivated by arbitrary contrivance of VP allocations.
I can live without the metrics ACW commanders considered important - but I don't want to be shackled to arbitrary design decisions that define "victory."
The tally of historically relevant metrics at the end of the battle is what matters to me and why I'm interested in the game..
The only historically relevant metric included in the game is casualties so it's what I'm interested in using to define "victory."
Just imagine for a moment that Robert E. Lee writes to Jefferson Davis claiming a resounding victory at Gettysburg because he captured Oak Ridge, Cemetery Hill, and Big Round Top at a cost of 10,000 more men than he inflicted on the AoP. Davis scratches his head and wonders where is Oak Ridge, Cemetery Hill, and Big Round Top and why the loss of 10,000 more Rebels will help defeat the Federals or win independence for the South...
Perhaps you can get excited about a game with this result...I can't.
The loss of 10,000 more men by the ANV would have been catastrophic regardless of the topographical features captured during the battle.
None of the topography in the vicinity of Gettysburg was "strategic" or could help bring an end to the war.
Gettysburg was simply about one army destroying the other completely and ending the war - at least that is what Lee claimed.
Imagine Abraham Lincoln getting word that Union forces had inflicted 10,000 more casualties on the ANV but; gasp, the Rebels were on Culp's Hill near Gettysburg...
He drops his head in his hands and mutters, "My God! We've lost Culps Hill! Our only option now is end the war and acknowledge Southern independence."
Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.
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One of the aspects of the ACW that makes it unique in the annals of military history is that both sides were trained and armed almost identically. Captured guns and ammunition could be almost immediately provisioned to units with appropriate caliber requirements.
Over the course of the four-year conflict these similarities resulted in staggering similarity in battlefield-related casualties.
UGG Gettysburg disregards these historical similarities in favor of artificial contrivances to make the two sides different. Then attempts to balance the fictional imbalances with superior Union artillery vs. CSA charging capabilities.
History is full of examples of differences in armament that gave each side unique characteristics...but the ACW is uniquely not one of these conflicts.
Why build a game of the ACW and not capture this fundamental truth of the war?
The game would be much better if a 12 pounder Napoleon was a 12 pounder Napoleon, canister was canister, and an Enfield was an Enfield.
Game balance should be achieved by CSA leadership advantages, unit elan, and VP allocation rather than nerfing armament or ammunition characteristics.
Note that during the war the Aberdeen Proving Ground analyzed CSA powder because Union generals and their troops concluded that in action the Rebels had a "power advantage" due to superior black powder. The evidence from these tests demonstrated that Union and CSA powder were precisely the same. But Union generals who did not want to admit that they were being out-generaled insisted that the CSA had a firepower advantage based on the inferiority of Northern ammunition.
Over the course of the war the Union claim of superior Southern powder was scientifically and irrefutably proven to be false. Lincoln realized the only way to snuff out the myth of CSA armament superiority was by decapitating the leadership of his army until he could find generals who could and would fight based on the reality of parity in armaments and superiority of numbers on the Union side.
The artillery ammunition of both sides was universally crappy. REALLY CRAPPY. About 50% of the artillery ammunition fired actually detonated. The Boremann fuse was the pinnacle of timed detonation devices for both sides and performed equally miserably for the Blue and Gray.
At Gettysburg there were about 60,000 rounds of artillery ammunition fired. Which demonstrates conclusively that each round on average killed less than 1 man (60,000 rounds fired vs. 50,000 casualties).
The statistics get much worse if you consider that in addition to artillery ammunition about 5 million rounds of small arms ammunition also inflicted some of the casualties.
If the analysis of the military professionals at the U.S. Artillery School at Fort Sill can be trusted then about 6% of the casualties during the ACW were inflicted by artillery.
If we use the baseline of 6% of the 50,000 Gettysburg casualties then somewhere in the ballpark of 3,000 casualties at Gettysburg were inflicted by artillery.
The math suggests that 1 round in every 20 inflicted a single casualty at Gettysburg. While it was mathematically possible to inflict as many as 16 casualties per round with other than canister the actual occurrence of this phenomenon was so rare that instances of such a devastating round were noted by Corps Commanders (Longstreet at Gettysburg noted a single round that inflicted 14 casualties). If you factor in these rounds that inflicted more than a single casualty (primarily canister; but also the occasional shell) then the average round per casualty inflicted jumps to about 1 round in every 33 inflicted a single casualty at range beyond about 400 yards.
There is a good reason that E.P. Alexander, Gibbon and other artillery experts state that the effects of artillery were, "more moral than physical."
Effectively the only round that could inflict multiple casualties reliably was canister. The metrics that Halleck, Hunt, and battery commanders such as Tidball align on is that an artillery battery of six guns firing canister at less than 400 yards roughly equaled the firepower of a 200 man regiment (roughly 1/5 the firepower of an UGG brigade).
There are many reasons for the poor artillery performance during the war including non-standard manufacturing of munitions and fuses, ammunition alternatives, gun calibers and design limitations, and primarily the fact that black powder is a low-explosive propellant which is too impotent to inflict massive numbers of casualties.
Bottom line - the ACW was primarily an infantry conflict.
At the end of the battle of Gettysburg the artillery of both sides was the only combat arm still capable of continuing the contest. The artillery arm of both armies had suffered about 10% casualties. All of the batteries that entered the fray on July 1 were available on July 5 though some had been more severely punished than others. When the armies moved from Gettysburg virtually all of the guns from both armies (modulo one gun with a burst barrel abandoned by the CSA on the field) were present for duty. The fact that the artillery arms of both sides were intact was a key factor contributing to the war of attrition and parity of casualties.
In UGG the reality of the relationship between the combat arms in the ACW has been lost in the never-ending quest for the Ultimately Unachievable Game-balance (UUG).
See above the statement from Myes! that the CSA is overpowered vs. GrandGeneralRevShand's comment that the CSA is now "utter crap."
The only way to resolve these balance complaints is to give players the ability to edit VP values as well as the weapon characteristics and charging balance algorithms and then let players adjust to their preferences/abilities.
Perhaps a Pro-South, Pro-North, and a balanced option (historically most accurate) would be a wonderful addition that might attract players like myself to return to this game.
I've grown weary of the game design attempts to please everyone all of the time. You can't.
But you can provide a few options that would embrace more of the community.
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Lee withdrew over the Potomac after the battle of Antietam at Boteler's Ford. The Shepherdstown Bridge had been destroyed.
Note: If forced north he could also have used Shepherds Ford, located between the gap in Shephers Island in the Potomac River.
The location of both of these fords and the destroyed bridge at Shepherdstown may be beyond the scope of your Antietam maps.
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Nick,
What about the fords at Antietam Creek and also on the Potomac River?
On Antietam Creek there were:
1) two fords south of the Upper Bridge.
2) one ford above and one ford below the Burnside Bridge
3) and Snavely's Ford further south (also below the Burnside Bridge).
On the Potomac Boteler's Ford and White's Ford.
Number of wounded
in General Discussions
Posted
Statistically what is the difference of calling casualties a "kill" or "wounded"?
The point is that you have one less man on the firing line.
Isn't this just semantics?
I agree that on the final battlefield summary you could show the breakout.
The algorithm to calculate the number of wounded vs. killed in the ACW is very simple.
But during the game isn't "kills" succinct enough to represent what is going on?
The suggestion would have battlefield relevance if you deducted men from the firing line that were removing the wounded.
During the ACW men looking to get out of harms way would often accompany a wounded comrade to an aid station.
When an officer was hit they could be accompanied by more than a dozen men.
I guess the thought might be that "stretcher bearers" would be lost for the remainder of the phase and rejoin in a later phase?