[What would you like added to UGG]

  This game really needs to allow regimental control, that is the one major feature I feel that holds this game back, having static brigades severely limits the tactics you can employ and simplifies the gameplay.  

 

  Also  adding 2v2, 3v3 , 4v4 with larger full day scenarios with a chat lobby would do alot for this game or future games. This is all stuff that was available in 1997, with a thriving and social multiplayer community the game will become alot more popular. 

[...and the winner is... UNION !!!]

Hi friends,

 

game became ridiculous!.

 

Regardless which side I choose, the outcome is almost always the same.

 

Winner: union

 

Looks like low skilled played cried enough to reinforce union so hard, that high skilled players are now undeafeatable with union.

What is advantage of  Rebels ?

Close combat ??? Maybe it was, but it isnt anymore.

3 Star Union regiments meanwhile work like machine guns and good god they are fightingmachines in close combat.

Pettigrew and Archer cant charge Meredith out of the woods.

I attacked McPhersons, defended by Meredith and Bucktail today with complete Penders Div, Pettigrew and Archer...

And I failed^^.

 

Atm I would rather agree to a completely even setup instead of giving sides an advantage.

It isnt fun anymore.

The option is: take union or lose.

 

 

P.S.:

If someone is interested to play good old Sid Miers Gettysburg, just send me a pm. Ty

 

 

 

Well historically the Confederates were at a disadvantage in this battle given the terrain and size of the Union Army. Not being able to command troops on the regimental level like you could in SMG limits the angles of attack and approach that you can take. This also works both ways so you must use it to your advantage. I have won more games with the Confederates than I have lost since the new patch in multiplayer by carefully using the terrain and driving the enemy out out of their positions with overwhelming fire. I only charge or engage in melee combat under extreme circumstances. 

 

Example if Meredith is in the woods I would use 1 brigade to screen his fire while I send another brigade into the woods to shoot it out with him in equal terrain cover. Never needlessly waste your condition by charging or running, and never just shoot it out with the Feds in unfavorable terrain unless it's to screen an advance for your troops to get into better cover or to wrap around their flank.

 

A tactic employed by the Confederates during the war was to attack in oblique (diagonal) angles. This meant that the whole enemy line's fire couldn't be brought down on their advance. This would result in either a shift in the enemy's battle line or their line being outflanked, this works great in this game .

 

It requires a bit more planning and quick thinking to win as the Confederates especially if you don't know all the scenarios, since time is always against you and you are also on the attack. Some of the best terrain on the map is not sitting right on the VPs and that terrain can be used as stepping stones and cover for your troops as you move on to take objectives. 

[New beta?]

Grognard_JC,

As requested - you've been corrected.

"To lie like a bulletin" distorted fact frequently including the reported casualty figures on both sides. This cliche predates the Russian invasion. Examples are numerous and include the casualty figures from Eylau in 1807 and Napoleon's Spanish Ulcer. In addition to major battles events such as the Tyrolean uprising/revolt were masked from the French public. Dupont's surrender of 17,600 men at Bailen in 1808 was misrepresented in the French press.

These bulletins often closed with a note that the Emperor's health has never been better; regardless of the previous content/distortion.

kc87,

Military personnel are representatives of the government and take an oath to that effect. Officers sending these reports were acting in their official government capacity.

Scoops often came directly from army officers; which were often "tempered" for public consumption. There is a vast difference between reporting casualty lists by town/county and rolling up all of the casualty figures and reporting these to the press in aggregate.

Friendly reporters had greater access to information/misinformation that they published which was then copied and propagated.

For example:

Shiloh was represented in the Richmond press as a CSA victory.

Davis did not retract or correct the exultant message he sent to Congress after the first day of the battle.

Subsequent articles covered the death of A.S. Johnston and the public on both sides were shocked by the casualty lists at the local level.

 

Whether Shiloh was a victory in the eyes of some of the Confederacy at the time is subjective. While some Southern papers were touting victory, Northern papers were bashing on Grant accusing him of being a drunk who got 3000 of his troops captured and a large amount of his command killed. Having a free press means bias and misinformation alot of the time. The free press could be dangerous to an army on campaign. Example during the Chancellorsville campaign General Hooker wouldn't discuss any future plans or orders to his Corps commanders out of fear of them leaking it to the press for publicity. 

 

 

 

"If I had my choice I would kill every reporter in the world, but I am sure we would be getting reports from Hell before breakfast." - William T. Sherman

[New beta?]

kc87,

Above you stated:

"Personally I don't believe there was any reason for Lee to under report casualties to the Confederate government given the dire situation on hand in Virginia after Gettysburg."

I didn't intend to suggest Lee was failing to accurately report his casualties to the Confederate government.

My incomplete thought was that the CSA government was intentionally under-reporting casualties to the press and the public. Many of the casualty returns were destroyed later in the war. CSA casualty reports are often estimated from sketchy/incomplete sources.

Governments running short of manpower often under-report their casualties in the press. As Napoleon faced increasing longer odds his casualty reports released to the press were so obviously flawed that, "To lie like a bulletin" became so common as to become a cliche in everyday business dealings in France during those wars. I'd posit that after the invention of the printing press it has been far more common than not to mislead the press regarding casualty returns. Even today many countries are less than diligent and/or don't have the press scrutiny that we have in the U.S.

 

 

The CSA had a large free press throughout the war, with different opinions and bias, and many critical of the government. Since regiments were composed of soldiers from the same counties it was up to the company and battalion officers to report  directly to their towns and districts and their families would be informed through their local newspapers, not from the government.

[Next Ultimate General Game, What would you like to see?]

Peninsula Campaign and Jackson's Valley Campaign would be awesome. 

[New beta?]

kc87,

Above you stated:

"I'd say there is some weight to the "Southern battlefield superiority" in the Eastern theater. What they were doing to achieve that type of superiority or advantage is another subject for debate altogether, a more accurate result might come from Brigade ordinance and inspection/review reports."

Now you're tapped into the issue we were discussing! "...the another subject for debate altogether..."

The factor that continues to be missing from inclusion in the discussion is that firepower is usually determined by superior firearms. Not only do you need ordnance report but also armament reports. For example, the "new fangled gimracks" that General Ripley resisted proved to give the Northern cavalry a significant firepower advantage (Spencer & Henry repeaters). The firepower advantage was based on repeating rifles - not the superiority of the men wielding them.

I agree with your point but we need to define "battlefield superiority" in this discussion - the term includes too many factors to isolate and credit individual man-for-man trigger pulling superiority.

Was Chancellorsville a demonstration of "battlefield superiority?"

In my mind it was a demonstration of "leadership superiority" - bordering on military genius. It took a great deal of testosculosity to divide the Southern army and march an half of it in column around the front of an army that was twice its size.

In that battle the leadership advantage gave the South "battlefield superiority" during the early phase of the battle on the Union's right flank. As the day wore on the Union re-established their lines and manged to fight their way out of a very difficult situation. At the end of the day the difference in casualties was minimal - and Lee was in a worse position relative to his position at the start of the battle.

So if the South ended in a relatively worse position after the Battle of Chancellorsville had the South gained or lost "battlefield superiority?"

Lee's behavior suggests he was frustrated that not only had the South lost "battlefield superiority" over the course of the day but that the officers under his command did not understand the concept of "battlefield superiority".

Lee wanted to gain and sustain battlefield superiority until the AoP ceased to exist. His officers were satisfied winning a battle.

Lee had his chance at Chancellorsville. He also had his chance at Gettysburg - but after July 1 "battlefield superiority" had again slipped from his grasp. Gettysburg was the last opportunity for Southern "battlefield superiority" in the East. From that point forward until the end of the war Lee was on the defensive and the war devolved to grinding attrition.

Did Lee gain battlefield superiority at the Wilderness? He inflicted more casualties but the North moved South, replaced their losses and ground on to the end of the war.

 

   If the Army of Northern Virginia could not take the field at the end of the day, there would be hell to pay for months, not the political hell that the AOP would face, but starvation, lack of supplies, farmland and valuable resources destroyed, the officers knew this well. At the Wilderness the stakes were even higher and the Federals had their back to the Rappidan. Control of Telegraph Road, Old Turnpike road and Plank road and the Fredricksburg/Richmond railroad were on the line for this fight. Withdrawing and losing those junctions meant that the AONV from then on. would always have to protect those roads leading south and stay in between the Federal Army, those roads and Richmond making any kind of sustained defense or initiative impossible due to the Federal Army moving south exposing any kind of defense Lee could mount. The North Anna river was too long to protect all the vital junctions and rail lines in central Virginia so it was just a matter of time at that point. 

 

   As far as battlefield superiority goes the Army of Northern Virginia was vetted, and the stakes were alot higher for them. That conviction and desperation made them very dangerous even under the most desperate circumstances. They knew what it was like to starve and suffer if they didn't carry the field at the end of the day. When you have an army of mostly capable leaders plus veteran experienced troops it is a deadly combination regardless of the circumstances.  

[New beta?]

kc87,

Thanks for dealing in the reality of actual numbers!

Note the 10 X 10 target in the analysis. I'm not aware that many of the soldiers who fought the war were 10 feet tall.

All of the numbers need to be cut by about 50%.

Additionally, fighting from the prone position was very common which reduced the threat profile to about 2 square feet.

There is a reason millions of rounds were fired to inflict thousands of casualties during ACW battles.

Also note that the tests you've quoted are for volley fire. Which is exactly my point. It is difficult to argue superior CSA marksmanship when on battlefield results were cumulative.

I'd be more convinced if the discussion was about superior sniping/skirmishing capabilities where individual marksmanship is more important.

But again, few people had rifled muskets in their personal possession - so I'm questioning the logic of the CSA having superior firepower. It seems like Lincoln had this right when he observed that "we are all green alike" prior to First Manassas. Both armies learned the art and skill of war. They used the same weapons and tactics. There is no evidence that CSA held an innate advantage in superiority of musketry.

 

Firing from the prone and reloading prone was very awkward and would severely slow the reloading process, although it was in the manual of instructions for skirmishing. The amount of smoke constricting the view and the limitation on ammo would have made 200 yards and under ideal for any kind of decisiveness. The skirmishers screening the battle line would lead the way for these for these deadly engagements to take place at such close range. I would argue more for reload speed and discipline as being the deciding factor due to the nature of the fighting. At 3 rounds a minute troops generally had about 20 minutes or less worth of ammo in ideal conditions unless they captured or held a position. 

[New beta?]

kc89,

I re-read your post above on the casualty numbers. This seems like a good baseline.

Captured muddies the water a bit; but roughly the wounded tie closely enough to the KIA numbers.

After Gettysburg some sources cite Lee as intentionally and systematically reducing the number of casualties he reported.

My recollection is that the CSA and Union had different methods of counting who was "wounded." For the CSA men who could be dressed in the field and returned to recover with their regiments were not counted as wounded.

Additionally, Union numbers were tallied at the field/tent hospitals. CSA were tallied at permanent hospitals. Many in the South were encouraged to return to their homes to recover to keep bed space available in hospitals.

In the North men were sent to military hospitals to recover. That way the hospital had control over when a soldier returned to duty or was discharged.

Interestingly this difference may have only made about a 3% difference in the numbers.

(I expected the calculated number to be larger).

If we accept these numbers the question we initially were discussing was, "Southern musketry firepower superiority."

Specifically, are these numbers representative of the battlefield situation or does this difference represent superiority of the South on a man-for-man basis?

After thinking about the distinction a bit and looking at the numbers I've realized - I really don't care either way.

Thanks for the data!

 

     

      Sorry for the Lost Cause jab. The numbers I posted represent killed, wounded, captured and missing from the major Eastern theater engagements.

 

 

       The captured earlier in the war were usually quickly exchanged, also I did not include minor engagements which would bring the          numbers  back to roughly where they started. A greater number of Union troops could have returned for duty than Confederate, there are all kinds of possibilities. Wounds caused disease and death, and some wounded returned to their units. I don't think  it's possible to get a 100% accurate set of statistics so it would be best to go by widely accepted statistics, then look for a disparity. Personally I don't believe there was any reason for Lee to under report casualties to the Confederate government given the dire situation on hand in Virginia after Gettysburg. At that point in the war it was very clear to himself and everyone at the top of the Confederate government he was the only person capable of commanding the army in those extreme circumstances, there was nothing to hide or accomplish by being ignorant about the situation, this is evident after his angry reaction at the outcome of his victory at Chancellorsville.

 

 

   Since a very low percent of battlefield casualties were not from musket, rifle or artillery fire, I'd say there is some weight to the "Southern  battlefield superiority" in the Eastern theater. What they were doing to achieve that type of superiority or advantage is another subject for  debate altogether, a more accurate result might come from Brigade ordinance and inspection/review reports, AARs and breaking the stats  down by year. In my opinion it was possibly a combination of desperation, training/experience and the Christian revival in the AONV, similar to the Swedish Carolean Army who ironically suffered a similar fate. Losing the field was detrimental to the survival of the AONV and all their field commanders knew this, the sheer size of the AOP and it's abundance of supplies ensured it's own safety in case of withdrawal. 

[What would you like added to UGG]

More multiplayer replayability. ( We need the random battles like SMG had!!! )

 

More commands for Infantry ( fire while advancing, Fire at will, volley ) 

[New beta?]

accidental double post

[New beta?]

David,

 

 

Did you notice that both of the battles you use for examples were VERY early battles? ... In all theatres the Confederates at that stage were under-armed with Rifles especially the Trans and Western ones. The Trans was just ridiculously low on them as at Wilsons Creek all the way to Pea Ridge where the Union had no shortages of them in either. Could you so dearly consider more future battles and show me the results when the Confederates were better armed, a good start would be Gettysburg where the Confederates for the majority frontal assaulted every position at a terrain disadvantage complete with Union Arty. advantage for the entire battle. And you definitely don't want to mention "The Wilderness" where Union Arty. was neglible. And there you go again with the blue-bellied cowards, you said that I didn't! ... are you trying to convince someone with the IQ of a Turnip that I'm an ignorant moron?? ... is that your nature really? if you are then it is back-firing.

 

But one thing for sure that we agree on ... There was definitely strokes of brilliance on both sides with Generals, but none in the overall scheme was consistent enough to be called geniuses. But Lee came closer by far. Nathan Forrest on the more tactical side.   

 

 

Interesting enough the Smoothbores weren't as ineffective as thought. They were percussion cap and loaded just as fast as a rifled-musket. They were effective at 200 yards, possibly more effective because of the amount of projectiles. ( maybe less effective at long range volleys, but most people can't hit anything above 200 yards in 2015 with a modern rifle) Essentially a brigade of 1000 soldiers is firing 4000 rounds instead of 1000, which could be devastating at 200 yards and under which was the ideal effective range for infantry combat anyways.

 

 

 Claud E. Fuller, in his book The Rifled Musket, shows tests of a rifled musket firing minie balls, and a smoothbore musket firing round ball and buck rounds at various ranges against a 10' x 10' target. The firers consisted of several men in line shooting in volley. At ranges of 200 yards (180 m) and under, the buck and ball from the smoothbore musket, while less accurate than the rifled musket, actually produces a greater number of hits due to the greater number of projectiles. At 200 yards, 37 of 50 Minie balls strike the target, vs. 18 of 50 smoothbore balls and 31 of 150 buckshot, for a total of 49 hits in 50 shots. At 100 yards, 50 shots by smoothbore buck and ball against the 10 x 10 target result in 79 buckshot hits and 37 ball strikes, as opposed to 48 minie ball hits in 50 shots. Beyond this range, the buckshot will have lost too much energy to be effective due to its lower ballistic coefficient. 

[New beta?]

42ndMS,

There are a number of issues with the quality designations in UGG for various brigades. Gottfried's "Brigades of Gettysburg" is a reasonable resource for examining/comparing brigade quality. While some brigades proved to be superior over the course of the war, at the time of Gettysburg, they were unproven. For example, Heth was so concerned about some of his North Carolina regiments, which had not seen action for more than a year, that he requisitioned regiments from other commands with more experience to steady these unproven brigades on July 1.

There is no evidence supporting some of the "Lost Cause" myths you've repeated above. While it is true that the CSA had more riles as a total percentage for their army it is not true that the CSA had more rifles at Gettysburg. Over the course of the war the Union actually bought more Enfield’s from England than the CSA. However, because the Union army was larger they had a few regiments at armed with smoothbores...but they also had 20,000 more rifles at Gettysburg. A couple of smoothbores in the mix did not change the overall military situation. It is true that the recently recruited, and poorly fitted out, Pennsylvania Militia units were of much lower battlefield quality than more seasoned units.

Over the course of the war the Union lost 110,000 men KIA in combat and the CSA about 96,000 men. A more balanced KIA result after four years of war would be difficult to achieve. Additionally, if you look at battlefield casualties statistically there is no indication that the CSA had the advantage in quality of men. When the Union was attacking at Fredericksburg the casualty result was 2.1 to 1 in favor of the CSA. When the CSA was attacking at Malvern Hill the casualty result was 2.1 to 1 in favor of the Union. Bottom line – casualty figures had more to do with terrain advantages and the side on the defensive than the color of the man’s clothing who was defending. Lee’s Seven Days around Richmond demonstrate that offensive action resulted in higher casualties for the attacker.

Additionally, artillery only contributed 6% of all battlefield casualties during the ACW. About 2/3 of the guns used by the ANV were captured guns – so if there was much of an advantage in guns it was minimal. The fuze technology, North and South, was notoriously bad during the war. While the CSA had difficulty manufacturing ammunition at the same volume of the North all of the rounds of ammunition had to be transported by wagon – which tended to give the Union about 250 rounds per gun at battles vs. the CSA 150 rounds of ammunition per gun. At Gettysburg specifically the AoP artillery supply was 93,000 rounds which the CSA supply was in the ballpark of 40,000. As the war progressed the impact of artillery on offensive operations was so poor that Grant cut the number of guns in a field battery from 6 down to 4. The basic message was that artillery required too much road surface for the offensive fire power – and the logistical difficulty of feeding the additional horses was more trouble than it was worth.

Civil War artillery was successful on the defensive and its most important contribution during the war was that it precluded the complete destruction of armies. Union armies were saved at Shiloh, and at Chancellorsville, and the CSA artillery positions at Antietam and Gettysburg were a deterrent to potential Union attacks at the end of these battles.

Finally, the idea that the South held individual fire superiority through marksmanship over the course of the war makes no sense. After Gettysburg the CSA was desperate for men. Old men and young boys were fed into the ranks. Convalescents were rushed back to the fight. The quality of the southern armies deteriorated as the South lost 20% of the military aged men over the course of the conflict.

Unique to the American Civil War is that the arms, men, and results were so balanced. But this should not be a surprise when you consider the two sides shared a common history, language, military tradition, and military training. Statistically the argument of southern superiority at the man vs. man level on the battlefield is simply myth.

Where the South did have a significant advantage was in leadership and mobility – Jackson specifically and in particular. The CSA never had the luxury of more than 20 wagons per 1,000 men. Southern men had to get by with much less – and the fact that they could persevere for four years is a testament to their internal fortitude, resourcefulness, and commitment to their cause.

But determination and perseverance doesn't translate into more accurate trigger pullers. Live fire practice goes a long way in marksmanship - and while the South may have started with an initial advantage in experience it did not prove to be a sustainable advantage once the Union had trained their armies.

 

Those statistics aren't relevant cross theater.

 

A lopsided amount of the CS casualties were from the Western Theater. Vicksburg, Nashville and Atlanta. 

 

Those statistics are also not taking wounds into account, many of which were fatal but not added to the killed in action reports. You were far more likely to get wounded than killed in the ACW. Wounded and killed shows shows 282,000 dead or wounded Confederates and 394,000 dead or wounded Federals. 

 

 

 

Army of the Potomac total killed, wounded or captured in major engagements             - 163,746        (.43%)

 

Army of Northern Virginia total killed, wounded or captured in major engagements      - 127,082        (.56%) 

 

 

 I wouldn't call it a "lost cause" myth that the Army of Northern Virginia generally performed better than the Army of the Potomac in the Eastern theater, it's a fact. However I wouldn't credit it alone to individual southern marksmanship but rather to various circumstances and assets including leadership, morale, logistics, initiative etc. 

 

The "lost cause" myth would be that the Army of Northern Virginia could have won the war despite the horrible disaster the Confederacy faced in the Western theater. Even if Lee had won a major decisive victory the Battle of Gettysburg the situation in the West had deteriorated to such that the war itself was a lost cause. 

[PC - Dynamic campaign in multiplayer?]

Hi Lumpy,

 

It would be very good that we added it in the future but as it seems it is not going to happen, at least for Ultimate General: Gettysburg.

The reason is other development priorities.

 

is there any way it could be added to multiplayer like the single player decisions? maybe the winner of the map gets to chose the next much like the decisions in the single player campaign?

[Nick please just fix the game]

I understand your busy working hard , but what you have is a broken game. Union is absurd. The more I play the more I see how broken the stats are. But oh well maybe you are busy on other projects.

 

 

I agree. The Confederate Infantry seem too weak in prolonged firefights against Union Infantry, if anything the Confederates had far more Veteran Infantry by Gettysburg. The Union should not get any advantage whatsoever when it comes to musketry. I miss the rank system from SMG.