Commodore Sandurz
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Posts posted by Commodore Sandurz
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Every minute of development time spent on implementing unrealistic 120 thousand ton monstrosities is a minute that is not spent on other far more critical elements. Adding ships which would never have been constructed simply takes away from the development of those things which did exist or could have existed and are currently not implemented or could be implemented better.
On 12/28/2019 at 7:16 AM, Knobby said:Every naval warfare enthusiast has at least once imagined what it would have been like if naval aviation had not developed like it did in real life, or what crazy ships we might have seen if the arms race had gone on longer without the london and washington treaties or WW2 to restrict or cut it short.
To comment on this bit specifically, I don't expect we would have seen any "crazy" ships without the treaties. I have seen a plot of the general trend of battleship tonnage increases over the years before the treaties, that then extrapolated that trend into a hypothetical no-treaties 1920s-1940s, and Yamato ended up fitting right on that trend. So Yamato is effectively a historical example of a treaty-less battleship. But as has been pointed out, it would still likely have been exceptional, just not by as great a margin as it was. Docking, canal and economic limitations would have likely capped most navies' largest battleships at around the 50 thousand ton mark. Eg. see the Royal Navy's late Lion design studies from the mid 40s and the RN imposing a 50 thousand ton limit there.
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Wars between AI nations as well please. The lack of them in RtW (aside from those allied to the player) is another serious campaign flaw there.
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2 hours ago, DarkTerren said:
You seem to forget you not fireing just 1 shell from a battleship iowa was fireing 9 shells on a broadside how many can be fired in the same amount of time it takes a plane to get to the target and back to rearm
Well I'd hope it's not just one plane being sent... And those planes will likely have the opportunity to get back, rearm and return to neutralize the target (if they didn't on the first strike), before the comparatively plodding Iowa can get into gun range.
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On 11/4/2019 at 7:20 AM, sRuLe said:
Yorcktown max is 82 planes, Essex - 85 planes, Enterprise - 80.... okay Midway 95 planes and at least 40 of them is, Hellcats or Bearcats, and only the rest are TBD Devastators(payload max 700kg) or SBD Dauntless(payload max 1080kg). What a Hellcat payload is? Oh dear... 1025kg same as Bearcat, Mark7 16" shell - 1200kg,Yamato's 18,1" shell even heavier - 1460kg.
Essex could carry 100 but that includes a couple of spares; most sources ignore the spares so they get 90ish "active" (usually listed as 36 fighters, 36 dive bombers and 18 torpedo bombers) but there were around 10 others carried, mostly spares. Hence my statement "upwards of 100". Of course the Midway class could carry significantly more, I was thinking Essex because it was the most common.
But let's look at the details of those shells and payloads, in particular the bursting charges:
Iowa AP Mark 8: 18.55 kg
Yamato APC Type 91: 33.85 kg
TBF/SB2C AP Mark 1: 109 kg (3.2 times the Yamato AP shell / 5.9 times the Iowa AP shell)
TBF/SB2C Mark 13: 270 kg (8 times the Yamato AP shell / 14.5 times the Iowa AP shell, plus it's guaranteed damage below the waterline on a hit)
Oh dear indeed! Even Yamato's shell bursting charge is less than a third that of an armour piercing bomb, not to mention the torpedo is in another league of damage-dealing. So much for the "very little firepower" claim on the carrier airgroup. And all of that is not even factoring in that the aircraft can deliver that firepower to a target at a much, much greater distance.
On 11/4/2019 at 7:20 AM, sRuLe said:Max plane in flight operation for a carrier, 42. From which just a half is strike force what means 20 tons max against 22 tons of guaranteed steel from BB. Hit accuracy rate - 11,8% against 18% of an BB's heavy armament.
Christian already covered your hit rate claims but I'll add that if you have to put your battleship within range of the enemy battleship's guns then that's an additional risk that a carrier doesn't have to take. Historically carriers demonstrated that their aircraft had sufficient firepower and reach to mission kill or sink battleships while said battleships could not respond against the carriers. So why close in with battleships when you can engage from a safe distance using aircraft (which were much cheaper and faster to repair or replace)?
On 11/4/2019 at 7:20 AM, sRuLe said:ARE YOU SERIOUS?
The fact that you have still not responded to any of the points I raised in our discussion on page 4, except now this one, which wasn't even part of my response to you, says everything about who is serious in this discussion.
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17 hours ago, SiWi said:
You do realize the amount of Oil the H39 would have used up let alone the amount of steel would have used up? Of course not.
You do realize the amount of oil 1100 u-boats used up let alone the amount of steel they used up? Of course not.
Just in Type VIIs alone: 700 x 770 tons = 539,000 tons combined displacement. H-39 displacement: 53,400 tons. So 1/10th of that spent on VIIs. Let alone the amount of steel, eh?
17 hours ago, SiWi said:So if the KM stooping BB's is suppose to be a reason why CV's can't be in the game, then Submarines would be a reason to stop all ships in the game plans. And they are already in, even thou abstract.
At no point have I argued that KM "stooping" BBs is a reason why CVs can't be in the game... where the heck did you even come up with that?
17 hours ago, SiWi said:The only real case for this argument would be in the pacific, where both Japan and USA were in a mainly naval war, but again, if Japan would have lost all of its BB's at midway then it wouldn't have desperately converted BB's to CV's.
So in your scenario Japan wouldn't have desperately converted BBs that they no longer had? You don't say! Hey maybe they could raise them from the seafloor...
I was going to respond to the rest of your post but those last two statements of yours speak for themselves. I suspect you'd again ignore what I post and just go off arguing against things I haven't even said.
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17 hours ago, Illya von Einzbern said:
CVs are balanced and i see reason why not have one or two escort carrier keeping those annoying flies at bay.
Escort carriers are far too slow to keep up with battleships and if you seriously think one or two escort carriers (~20 ac each) are going to be sufficient to keep multiple fleet carrier airgroups away then there's really no point arguing further.
17 hours ago, Illya von Einzbern said:Unlike battleships and cruisers carriers carries very little firepower and is really weak against enemies that are prepared for AA combat.
Upwards of 100 fighters and bombers per carrier is "very little firepower"? You cannot be serious.
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16 hours ago, sRuLe said:
If weather allows (WW2)
Sure, though hoping for bad weather to protect you is what I would call a "Hail Mary" strategy.
And yes I would hope it's understood we're discussing WW2 exclusively at this point unless stated otherwise.
16 hours ago, sRuLe said:HMS Furious and KMS Scharnhorst
Was there an encounter between those two? Or are you attempting to refer to the sinking of the Glorious by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau?
16 hours ago, sRuLe said:Weather conditions, radar surveillance range, enemy sub in the waters... example HMS Royal Arc.
- Weather I already covered.
- Radar range? I suppose it gives more time to prepare crew for AA action, and, if in port, prepare defences around the battleships. So sure, this might increase survivability a bit. But it doesn't solve the core problem.
- What does a sub have to do with CVs vs BBs?
16 hours ago, sRuLe said:Alone? Any example? IJN Yamato was sunk by 3 hour battle where 8 Heavy CV Essex class around and against that. For example attempt to sunk KMS Tirpitz via CV airstrike failed badly in good for Tirpitz AA's.
Why should I care if there were any alone or not? CV airstrike on Tirpitz is a poor example, it was heavily protected by terrain and smokescreens during its stay in the fjords. Tirpitz's AA had little to do with it. On the other hand, it sat there and took damage and casualties and never managed to attack the carriers. Goes back to being able to take punishment while not being able to return it is a losing strategy.
16 hours ago, sRuLe said:Attempt of IJN Hiryu to sank USS South Dakota also failed badly in good of Dakota AA's.
HUH? Hiryu was sunk before South Dakota was even declared ready for active duty! Are you just randomly making this up and hoping people don't know any better?
16 hours ago, sRuLe said:All arguments you throw at... I mostly agree, but in theory, in practice they'r looked awful in results. IRL just two BB,s where sunk during Air Raid Action from CV's - IJN Musashi and IJN Yamato.
You omitted:
Conte di Cavour
Caio Duilio
Littorio
Arizona
Oklahoma
Nevada
California
West Virginia
Ise and Hyuga 😛
I expect your response might "but they weren't at sea" to which I would reply "I couldn't care less, why shouldn't a carrier leverage it's ability to attack a battleship in port much more effectively than a battleship could? Why attack the battleships at sea when you might have an easier time disabling or sinking them in port? How many carriers in port were sunk by battleships?"
16 hours ago, sRuLe said:And both in full overwhelming CV domination in combat situation and quantities.
Well I certainly agree that the CVs dominated but the Musashi was definitely not overwhelmed in quantity. Musashi was part of Kurita's Center Force, which consisted of (going off wiki here):
Yamato
Musashi
Nagato
Kongo
Haruna
ten heavy cruisers
two light cruisers
15 destroyers.
While sailing with this force, Musashi was attacked and sunk by aircraft from:
Intrepid
Essex
Lexington
Enterprise
Franklin
Cabot (light carrier)
So in terms of capital ships the numbers are actual equal. And if you consider tonnage, the heavy escort, and the fact that two of the BBs were really the battleship equivalent of "supercarriers", then they're not even close, the BBs are far ahead.
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18 hours ago, sRuLe said:
Exactly. They where operating on Pacific in a tactical groups by 3-4 CV together. Rather, their "payload per minute" was much less that any BB of same time. As example... payload of TBD's squadron was literally equal by weight to a full broad side salvo of an USS Iowa BB. If Iowa can repeat it more times, CV need to land it's planes, refuel and re-arm them. Btw, to sink a BB there where needed much more effort putted in than sunk CV... Just take a look on how many planes used to sunk Yamato, how RAF sunk Tirpitz(3 direct hit of an 12 ton heavy Grandslams and 4 near hits of them), how long it took to sunk Bismark, with what was sunk Rome(3 hit by 2 tons heavy guided bombs Fritz-X), even good old USS Arizona got 7 hits before 500kg AP Bomb struck a 14" gun turret roof and fall into magazines. And we not talking about IJN Nagato who been as a test target for Crossroads Test, which was towed away and sunk only after by US destroyer 3 torpedoes.
Some of those hit claims seem off... such as you seem to be counting "near" misses as hits which is a bit disingenuous to say the least (for example Roma was only directly hit by 2 Fritzs and probably only the second hit alone would have sunk it). Or the Nagato, do you have a source on it being torpedoed after Baker instead of sinking on its own? First I've heard that claim. Anyway, I'm not going to cover all of them. I agree that that in general battleships could obviously could take a bit more punishment then carriers, and *potentially* inflict more damage in a shorter period of time, but both of those are meaningless when:
- The carrier can locate the battleship much more easily than vice versa.
- The carrier can avoid damage by simply staying out of range of the battleship's guns.
- The carrier's aircraft (which are comparatively cheap and expendable) can attack the battleship at leisure.
- The carrier's aircraft, even if their overall firepower is less than the battleship's, are still capable of at least disabling the battleship.
- These effects are amplified the more carriers and battleships you put in the fight, since carrier aircraft can easily concentrate fire on a single battleship, return to rearm and repeat.
Being able to take more punishment than your opponent but at the same time not being able to fight back at him is a losing proposition.
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On 10/29/2019 at 11:20 AM, SiWi said:
First of all the you are comeptllly missing the point of the german situation of germany during WW2.
After Bismarck was lost it was pretty obvious that germany had NO HOPE to defeat the UK with surface ships. It fact Hitler in one point order the surface fleet to be scrapped.
2 more BB would change nothing on germanys chances and indeed cost alot of resources, reichsmark the least important. Tehy would have simply joined the rest of the fleet in the docks being bomb day in day out.
Also you seem to compelty forget that germany was in a land war against the UDSSR were TANKS were more useful then BB or sub. Also you seem comeptlyl to ignore that Germany also didn't build any CV's. And for the record 1-2 CV's would have not helped germanys situation.
The H-39s were cancelled before:
- The Bismarck was lost.
- German warships were being continuously bombed in harbour.
- Germany was fighting a land war with the USSR.
Speaking of missing the point, I accounted for Germany's situation by only referencing their existing, historical naval spending. Did you completely miss that part of my post, and the entire discussion it was a small part of? I didn't forget about the eastern front as it's irrelevant to this discussion; I mentioned the numbers of Type VIIs that were built and that was despite the eastern front, so clearly sufficient resources were still allocated to the naval war to allow the construction of many battleships had they chosen to construct them instead of u-boats. With over 1100 u-boats commissioned any claim that they didn't have the resources to do so is absurd. If the Kriegsmarine had expected the H-39s to be cost effective then they would have continued their construction and built more by reducing their u-boat construction. Since they weren't, the Germans, like everyone else, ended up abandoning battleship construction.
On 10/29/2019 at 11:20 AM, SiWi said:So why not list the cancellation of the Hindenburg how CV's were obsolete?
Because that cancellation did not coincide with other widespread cancellations for the same class of ship. Ships can get cancelled for any number of reasons (such as Hitler's whims), but when there is a consistent pattern of all new construction of a class of warship being abandoned by every major naval power at almost the same time during a world war, then the implication of that should be quite clear to everyone.
And since you brought it up, Graf Zeppelin's construction was actually continued for years after the H-39s were cancelled, so even the Kriegsmarine appeared to view carriers as more valuable to their war effort than battleships.
On 10/29/2019 at 11:20 AM, SiWi said:And the pacific is a very unique environment for naval warfare the one were CV's are the most useful.
So effectively getting your CV force wiped out in one battle mean you do need to have fast replacements. Even it if has to be conversions.
How many BB's did the british convert to CV's after Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sunk Glorious?
See this is the problem with your argumentation you try to compeltly blend out the overall situation of the navies making the decisions.
Even if that means that you ignore the land war between 3rd Reich and UDSSR....
Not sure what you're actually trying to argue here... that battleships weren't obsolete in the Atlantic? Everyone stopped building battleships, whether their primary theatre was the Pacific or the Atlantic. And why should the British waste resources on making some questionable conversions just because Japan did it?
By 1942 every major navy had determined that they preferred new carriers or other types of warships over new battleships, regardless of each nation's particular situation - there's no "blend out" of the overall situation there.
I don't get your obsession with the land war, I have only ever referenced Germany's historical naval construction which occurred *despite* that land war, and how that historical naval spending could have been used for battleships instead of u-boats.
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11 hours ago, SiWi said:
The cancellation of the H-39's or H-42 as well as the Shinano or Ise conversions, had little to do with BB's being obsolete but Germany having no hope to win the naval war or the resources to build and maintain them and japan had lost its carriers, not its BB's.
Two H-39s were laid down and the cost of each of them was estimated at 240.85 Reichsmarks, or roughly equivalent to 50 Type VIICs. Seeing as how over 700 Type VIIs were built and some money had already been spent on design and construction of the H-39s when they were cancelled, I don't agree with the notion that Germany did not have the resources. They could have completed them if they had wanted to, in exchange for a reduction in u-boat numbers.
http://www.kbismarck.com/warship-construction-cost.html
H-42, 43, 44 were a paper designs as I mentioned only as an example of what was being planned in an attempt to design a sufficiently armoured battleship. Obviously these had no realistic chance of being constructed by Germany or really any country when they could build much more cost effective ships.
On Shinano and Ise/Hyuga, yes Japan hadn't lost BBs at the time the conversion was decided upon, but by the very nature of the conversions it was effectively going to lose them, just to gain some "hybrids" and a limited capability (for its size) carrier. Even the Fusos were planned to be converted at one point. That the IJN was going to reduce their battleship force in exchange for these questionable vessels says a lot about the IJN's view of battleship obsolescence circa 1942.
11 hours ago, SiWi said:Also the "end of BB's" had not just to do with CV's but also with missiles, jet planes and the fact that you couldn't armored good enough for the new weapons coming.
The last BBs were laid down in 1941 so it's safe to say that by 1942 it was well understood by the major navies that the battleship was obsolete. In 1942 there were no operational missiles or jets but there were carriers, and plenty more of them being laid down.
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On 10/25/2019 at 1:57 AM, Illya von Einzbern said:
I see really any reason for this CV will make BBs obsolete.
Because in reality they did. Why build a battleship when you can build a carrier for equivalent (or usually actually lesser) cost that has ten or more times greater strike and scout range?
On 10/25/2019 at 1:57 AM, Illya von Einzbern said:Kamikaze and air attacks towards USN ships became suicidal and futile due to tech advantage of USN (no pun intended).
On 10/25/2019 at 1:57 AM, Illya von Einzbern said:Even then the USN was more than capable show middle finger the planes as well were the Royal navy after some technological upgrades and retrofitting.
Kamikazes suicidal? I admit I got a chuckle out of that one
But as to USN showing a middle finger, well, a quick scan of
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Allied_vessels_struck_by_Japanese_special_attack_weapons
shows 400+ hits, including fifteen hits on US battleships, almost all in 1945. 42 hits on carriers too (unsurprising, they were the primary targets), including 3 CVEs sunk. Now imagine a Japan with equivalent resources to the USN and RN and how much more damage they could have done.
On 10/25/2019 at 1:57 AM, Illya von Einzbern said:If we only look at the ships that got sank due to carriers. They all have in common the fact that they were never expected to defend them self against plane attacks. (Repulsor, pre dreads and old cruisers).
After the attack on Pearl harbor carriers were reevaluated and considered to have potential in offensive role.
USN also adopted this approach after the incident. Before the attack carriers were never considered to be used mainly offensively. Main purpose was to spot the enemy and allow the fleet to have the upper hand in ship engagement.Are you really trying to claim that every warship built before Dec 7, 1941 was never expected to defend itself against air attacks? Despite aircraft and carriers having existed for decades before that?! The anti-aircraft guns fitted on some of them beginning in the 1910s were just for decoration?
The utility of carriers in the offense was well understood by the USN by the early thirties, even if the formal offensive force was still the battleships. See the USN "Fleet Problem" exercises of the early 30s (which included simulated dive bomber attacks and damage on battleships) and the subsequent construction of CV-4 to CV-8. Further the carriers were equipped with torpedo and dive bombers in the 20s and 30s, hardly a sign of a force whose sole intended purpose is to spot the enemy.
On 10/25/2019 at 1:57 AM, Illya von Einzbern said:Reason why sword fish and sea gladiators were a thing in Royal navy carriers before pearl. They were more than enough to provide intel and help scuttling enemy ships.
You might want to look up the primary role of the Swordfish... And I suppose the Taranto attack didn't happen either?
On 10/25/2019 at 1:57 AM, Illya von Einzbern said:Next argument would be attack on Bismarck and how CVs are not OP.
Well the carrier never sank Bismark only harassed it. If the carrier wanted to sink Bismarck it should have sent more planes and attack more often. This would have made the whole task force chasing Bismarck pointless.Or it could be said that a partially-equipped carrier with a small flight group of obsolescent aircraft managed to damage the latest and greatest German battleship with no damage to itself. Seems like a win for the carrier to me.
On 10/25/2019 at 1:57 AM, Illya von Einzbern said:In game this sudden change in carrier doctrine should occur 1941 December and continue from that point onward. How to counter this. Retrofit AA mounts to your ships and improve fire control and radars as well build your own carriers to escort your own fleets. Simple really no need for this massive CV OP plox remove.
I hope the game doesn't have some sort of pre-scripted event that always occurs in December 1941... It would be nice if technology research was dynamic to a degree (as in dependent on foreign technologies and/or events in battle) but that's asking for a lot.
Anyway at that point why build carriers to escort your fleets when instead you can build them to become the centrepiece of your fleets (existing battleships notwithstanding)?
On 10/25/2019 at 1:57 AM, Illya von Einzbern said:I do hope this short sited view on the carriers would simply stop as they are not so OP as thought and some what easy to counter. Hollywood might have tough that one CV dominates the world (might lord ring :D) but in reality CVs were more of humble spotter and skirmisher before Yamamoto thought outside the box.
It's amusing that you say others have a short sited view and then claim Yamamoto was the first one to think outside the box. See Grand Joint Exercise No. 4 where USN carriers launched a highly successful simulated surprise attack on Pearl Harbour in 1932, nine years before Yamamoto's alleged "outside the box" thinking!
On 10/25/2019 at 1:57 AM, Illya von Einzbern said:Shortly the whole wall
1. CV are not OP due to their role before December 1941
2. Retrofit AA to your old ship designs (historically accurate action)
3. Build own CVs and have the combat air patrol cover your fleet (historically accurate action)
4. Focus on air radars and fire control to show middle finger to planes (USN Historically accurate action)
5. BBs simply wont become obsolete only low tech ones and even then it will not be long before ship AA becomes sufficient (Historically accurate sadly IJN didn't get the memo)
6. CV OP plox remove cry is silly and unreasonable not to mention immersion breaking and historically inaccurate to not have carriers.The cancellations of the Montanas, the last two Iowas, the Lions, the H-39s, the Shinano and Ise conversions, plus the "design a battleship that might actually survive" studies like the H-42+ is pretty much all one really needs to know about battleship obsolescence in the 40s.
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I actually agree with you and I think they would have been effective. But as you say we don't know for sure and it's debatable hence why I used the word arguably. That's why I think that, at least for a surface combat focused game set in the game's official timeframe, I think you can probably get away with not having in-battle air attacks while still being reasonably historically plausible. Admittedly it does get worse the further into the 20s and 30s you go... And that's why I'd be perfectly happy if the base game was to end in the 20s and for the devs to focus on getting the surface combat of that era right instead of trying to do everything all at once.
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9 hours ago, Cptbarney said:
That still doesn't prove subs were king of the seas no matter how you spin it.
I never claimed they were. There is a huge difference between "king of the seas" and "irrelevant" though.
9 hours ago, Cptbarney said:Like i said its mainly down to skill and good intelligence (sometimes) on the subs part, huge amounts of luck. Underestimation on the enemy's part plus lack of ASW and imcompetance, bad luck, poor intelligence etc.
I've already covered this and I'd be saying the same thing again, but I just don't see any basis for your claim that the enemy had to have "lack of ASW and incompetance" to get torpedoed. A quick scan of carriers and battleships torpedoed by subs in WW2 shows that almost all were torpedoed while being screened usually by at least 4 escorts. That's not what I would call a "lack of ASW and incompetance". But I do agree that "luck" played a part as sub's typically slower speeds than most large warships meant reduced intercept opportunities. But given enough time and enough boats intercepts would and did inevitably occur.
9 hours ago, Cptbarney said:The real kings are CV's.
In an individual CV-vs-SS comparison, pre-Type XXI, I definitely agree that the CV was king. But on the basis of cost effectiveness in the sea denial role and how many subs you could get for the price of a single carrier, a case could probably be made that the subs would be a more effective use of resources if your sole objective was sea denial.
9 hours ago, Cptbarney said:Subs are good, but like i said before sub's would fare extremely poorly in combat where both combatants know the positions of each other and have the ability to sink each other (most ships did).
They were just less likely to attack or be attacked. Generally speaking if they pre-positioned into spot where they could get a shot off at the enemy they could do damage and if not, the surface battle would occur without them, which is what usually happened. I don't consider a smaller probably of engagement to be the same as "faring extremely poorly".
9 hours ago, Cptbarney said:Hense why subs never fought alongside main fleets but usually veer'ed of somewhere else to get a better angle and/or were in a position days/hours before to launch an ambush.
Depending on what you mean by alongside that isn't strictly true. For example the infamous British K class was very much designed to and briefly operated "alongside" the Grand Fleet. It just wasn't very good (though to be fair, it never really got much of a chance to prove itself). Normally it wasn't done because it was more effective to send the subs ahead and hope they got into a good position, or just have the subs operate independent of the fleet in the first place.
9 hours ago, Cptbarney said:Yeah subs sunk a lot but far more were sunk by guns, depth charges and aircraft. USS wahoo being an example.
Really really rough numbers but there was about 25 million tons of ships sunk by subs in WW2, vs about 1 million tons of subs sunk. So a "kill" ratio of about 25:1 in tonnage sunk by subs vs tonnage of subs lost. And it of course includes all the U-Boats and I-Boats sunk by the allies with their colossal resource advantage (and therefore isn't really representative of what a more "balanced" alt-history fight would have looked like; for example I imagine if the Kriegsmarine had resources similar to what the allies did, that number on the left would certainly be far higher still).
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I make the distinction because the carriers built in the 10s and 20s, or more specifically the aircraft they carried at that time, were arguably not capable enough to present a direct threat to surface warships maneuvering at sea.
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20 hours ago, Cptbarney said:
That was due to the allied submarine plans being ineffective at the start
I don't see any major issues with Royal Navy ASW (if that's what you mean) "at the start" anymore than would have affected any other power. It was arguably the most capable ASW force in the world and it had the entirety of WW1 experience plus advancements in the two decades since. But Barham was sunk over two years into the war so that's not "at the start", the escort carriers were even later.
20 hours ago, Cptbarney said:the IJN getting way too overconfident that subs couldn't do anything so ASW was a very low prioity to the japanese, radar and sonar on there end was pretty bad as well and commence defence was a joke.
I certainly don't think the IJN was overconfident that subs couldn't do anything and that ASW wasn't a priority for them by November 1944. Their radar wasn't up to par with the best allied sets but was sufficient to detect Sealion. Their best passive sonar, being based on the German GHG, was actually better than the allies'. Kongo wasn't part of a merchant convoy so I don't see the relevance there.
20 hours ago, Cptbarney said:Barham also detected a sub around 1000metres out but disregarded it and all three torpedoes struck pretty close together causing a huge mag explosion.
Barham still got sunk whether it detected it or not.
20 hours ago, Cptbarney said:Also kongo was attacked by escort carriers and destroyers not just a lone sub (although badly damaged the escort carrier and some damage was inflicted onto kongo despite being near misses.
That was a different battle a month earlier. The "dent" was on the starboard side. Sealion hit Kongo on the port side.
20 hours ago, Cptbarney said:Still once countermeasures came into play and peeps actually started being aware of their surroundings, torping big ships became pretty difficult afterwards. Subs were effective to a degree, but mainly if the enemy was unaware, poor equipment, imcompetance or poor ship design (or all of them at once).
Except that there are numerous instances of torpedo hits on large ships despite the enemy having good equipment, being aware (I'm assuming it means being aware of a sub threat, but any warship at sea fighting a war with an opponent with subs should be aware of a sub threat), having good ship design and trained crews.
What I would have said is torpedoing of big ships becomes pretty difficult if your opponent has an overwhelming advantage in resources that they can devote to ASW vis-a-vis comparatively very limited resources for your sub force. For example the Kriegsmarine vs the Allies who spent at least 9.6 times the resources (and that's a very conservative figure) on the 2nd Battle of the Atlantic.
20 hours ago, Cptbarney said:(shinano kept turning into the sub despite detecting it pretty early despite this the zig zag movements were pointless as all they needed to do was kite away and simply allow depth charges to sink her, funnily enough one of the DD's litterally sailed right over the sub but didn't detect her)
Humans make mistakes. For every ASW mistake I'm sure you can find just as many mistakes by sub crews. I wonder how many additional capital ships would have been sunk if every sub crew never made a mistake?
20 hours ago, Cptbarney said:True, subs did sink a lot of ships but the overwhelming majority were, ocean liners, troopships, hellships.
Yes, because among many reasons there were far, far more merchants than warships, they were easier targets, and in some cases they were more important to the war effort.
20 hours ago, Cptbarney said:Although almost all AC's sunk by subs were japanese (which either says a lot about their ship design or the competance of american sub crews).
I don't have time to find an exact list at the moment but I’m fairly certain it's around 8 each for both Allied and Axis carriers sunk by subs. Obviously all Axis carriers sunk were Japanese since they were the only ones who completed any.
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16 hours ago, Diabolic_Wave said:
Implementing multiplayer might be relatively easy, but that isn't all you have to do for multiplayer. You also have to make sure it actually works, make sure that it is balanced and fun, make sure there's actually something to do in it.
UA:D will probably have lots to do with friends, if you each play as different countries in a campaign, but Balance is going to be worrying, as might making multiplayer actually work. For two examples, look to War Thunder and From the depths.
War Thunder has a pretty horrible time trying to balance historical elements against gameplay elements because, in theory, each country has to be balanced against the others to be fair to the players of each nation. There isn't supposed to be any ludicrously overpowered things at any particular tier. I am personally pretty sure that they haven't achieved this. It's an extreme example and isn't anywhere near a 100% perfect analogy, but it makes me somewhat nervous for anything historical or pseudohistorical trying to balance multiplayer.From the Depths Has had multiplayer since relatively early alpha. However, since there are no servers and it isn't particularly polished (which seems to be quite a likely scenario for UA:D), there are very many glitches such as things not being in the same place for both players and frequent crashes.
I have no grandiose expectations for multiplayer. As far as I'm concerned a skirmish battle mode with the host setting a limit to finances, year, number of ships, environment and perhaps an allowed technology selector would be more than sufficient. I hope a similar function becomes available in SP. Don't know how the campaign will play in SP so have no expectations for it to be MP compatible at this time. The balance is in the actual performance and cost of the equipment of that era, so no additional time is needed to be spent on that.
War Thunder is a free to play/pay to win mmo. I don't see how it relates to UAD multiplayer unless the devs decide to make a free to play standalone version of the game. I know next to nothing about From the Depths but from a quick glance it looks like a sandboxy block building game that doesn't appear to have almost anything to do with a historical strategy/simulation game.
16 hours ago, Diabolic_Wave said:I think that it's probably a lot easier to simulate WWII era naval technology. A lot of it might have to be abstracted away and folded into tangentially related technologies, but let's use an example.
If we have carriers on the field of battle,
- we need another hull.
- Aircraft would have to have a finite amount.
- The aircraft weapons would have to be ammunition.
- Aircraft would have to somehow be recovered after attacking.
I've certainly missed a few things out, but these few points only seem to have one major problem with them, which might be solved by treating aircraft as vehicles from a mothership and Carriers as being aircraft ports; Perhaps abstract this as embarking new aircraft at sea when close enough to friendly ports?
This seems a lot easier than trying to make multiplayer work and be balanced to me.The most major problem is developing basic flight physics, AI and weapon systems for these aircraft. And corresponding anti-aircraft weapons. And 3d models. And damage models. And how the player will use them (will require additional UI functions). And how the strategic and tactical AI manages them. But that's just the "major" problem for WW2 carriers. Then there's the minor problems, like how about flight deck animations? Or are aircraft going to magically pop out of empty, flightcrew-less carriers? And this is just WW2 carriers, not talking about the plethora of other WW2 tech. The amount of development time required to implement all that is immense.
Basic multiplayer's major problem is synchronizing game state. Compared to the above I think it's a minuscule amount of effort in comparison. Not that I’m advocating MP at the expense of SP.
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And that's fine, but if I were to make a counterpoint, in another thread you requested no multiplayer because you'd like to see the game finished this decade. I'd argue that implementing multiplayer would take much less time then adding the vast amount of naval warfare tech and equipment needed to do a decent job simulating 1937-1945.
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On 10/21/2019 at 7:35 AM, Cptbarney said:
Not really, once countermeasures came into play subs became irrelevant very quickly even more so than BB's in general when having to engage ships. Those events could of been avoided with proper screening and scouting (CV's could easily spot Subs from the air and some where even sunk from the air). Maybe not all of them but probs most.
Numerous warships were sunk by subs despite being screened. Even in the quoted example Barham and Kongo were both heavily escorted. The US sub force sank almost as much of the IJN as the carriers did, despite being a tiny fraction of the USN. Heck, there were escort carriers sunk by subs...
On 10/21/2019 at 7:35 AM, Cptbarney said:Never heard of sub being spotted and still sinking an enemy ship after a decent engagement.
Plenty of examples, recommend to begin by reading about U-9's attack on the 7th Cruiser Squadron in September 1914 all the way to Sealion's attack on the First Striking Force and Archerfish's attack on the Shinano!
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My suggestions:
1) Carriers should not be abstracted in battle, they can and were engaged by gunfire (eg. Gambier Bay and Glorious – yes these were in WW2 but no reason such events couldn't have happened in UAD's timeframe).
2) In most of UAD's timeframe, carriers would provide scouting, recon, and strategic strike capabilities. These can all be handled abstractly, so for example having carriers would:
-increase your ability to spot and track enemy fleets and therefore increase the likelihood of engaging on your terms or avoiding battle if desired
-provide information about the enemy
-deliver strikes at fixed targets such as enemy ports or other large installations which cause corresponding damage to the enemy on the campaign map
-reduce probably of sub attacks
3) Carriers do not need to be customizable in the designer. Have a few pre-set generic types of "carrier" such as 1 – Seaplane tender (Eg. Campania), 2 – Early light/escort carrier (Eg. Argus), 3 – Late fleet carrier (Eg. Saratoga). The player chooses which to build depending on the available tech and each one progressively provides a stronger version of the above capabilities.
4) For in battle capabilities like artillery spotting, I don't know if and how the devs currently plan to implement that so will reserve comment. But we could probably live without it, and if so aircraft shouldn't really need to appear in battle and that makes things much easier on the devs.
So I think carriers could be implemented fairly plausibly without requiring too much effort as long as the game sticks to the mid 1930s time limit where it could be argued that direct carrier air power was not yet decisive in naval battles.
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Not sure what you mean by late refit of the Yamato (which mostly focused on extreme amounts of AA IIRC), I see a Yamato-looking "hull" is there but that's not a huge deal in itself, the Yamato was laid down in 1937 so close enough to the game's timeline that a ship of similar appearance could have been built a few years earlier I'm sure, especially in an alt-history without the WNT. The radar FC (which doesn't appear to be modeled in any way besides "big boost to accuracy and spotting") is a bigger deal to me and if it stays in I hope it is at least limited to some sort of post 1936 "would you like to keep playing indefinitely?" game mode. And if not then that it can at least be modded out so that I’m not facing AI warships in 1929 packing pseudo-1945 tech.
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I disagree with extending the timeline. The devs really need to stick to 1936 as the absolute max date, and I feel even that is too much. Inserting bits and pieces of WW2 technology will simply take development resources away from elements that are crucial to the 1890-1930ish period and instead create these conundrums like how to model aircraft carriers without turning it into an aircraft carrier centric game in ~1940 and all of the development time needed to do a proper simulation of that. Even now we already have some WW2 era tech like a sort of radar FC in the game and yet it’s been reported that it hasn't been decided if searchlights will be visually represented... So please focus on the tech which is most relevant to naval warfare of the selected period. Save the WW2 tech for Ultimate Admiral: Carriers.
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10 hours ago, Christian said:
numbers of hits is number of hits before they were guaranteed dead i believe
It should be noted that those numbers are disputed, and regardless of the numbers of hits taken, there's a lot of debate about at which point these ships were "doomed" with further hits merely being overkill. The number of hits claimed they took before going under does not necessarily equate to the number required to cripple or sink them. But either way those hit numbers are the "high" estimates and significantly exceed the numbers from Japanese sources or the US Technical Mission to Japan. For example, for Musashi, from the US Technical Mission to Japan S-06-2:
34. Thus there were five starboard and five port certain hits, possibly augmented by one or more of the four purported hits received in the last attack, although these possible hits are considered improbable. The equal distribution, port and starboard, and the interval between attacks undoubtedly were responsible for MUSASHI´s lingering death throes.
So there were 10 confirmed torpedo hits on Musashi, with another 1-4 possible but considered improbable.
For Yamato (on page 15):
Certain: 9
Probable: 1
Possible: 2 (although the text indicates It is considered doubtful, in view of the lack of information concerning them and the angles of list reported, that they occurred)
These reports have a lot of information that could also be used to possibly infer at which point the ships were doomed (or perhaps how an attack of lesser numbers of torpedoes could have sunk them), so I'll just recommend reading through the report's points. For example points 37 and 38 deal with counterflooding:
Although a moderate list could be removed quickly, as in MUSHASI's case, counterflooding capacity was limited to little more than required to right the ship when struck by three torpedoes on one side, if the torpedoes did not defeat the torpedo defense system. In YAMATO's case, if the two starboard hits had not occurred, the inability to control angles of list greater than about 10' undoubtedly would have become apparent much earlier in the action. Counterflooding of outboard engineering spaces is an extreme measure and inadvisable except under the most adverse circumstances. It can scarcely be classes as a routine operation. 38. With a sharp list, of the order of 16', where the upper (U.S. main) deck takes the water, the outboard voids could be filled only to about 55 per cent capacity by flooding from the sea - a serious deficiency in attempting to control list, by virtual of the small righting moment thus available. This was an important factor in the capsizing of both YAMATO and SHINANO. There was no damage control pumping system of adequate capacity provided for completely filling the outboard voids in case of large angles of list.
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Are the sky graphics expected to be replaced at some point? Right now the static skybox makes that part of the game look a bit 1990s... Recommend adding volumetric clouds, they can greatly increase the feeling of depth and scale.
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Reading the Designing Warships blog post, the following caught my eye:
QuoteAs technology progresses, towers may include Hydrophone or Sonar Stations which increase the detection range of underwater objects (Torpedoes, Submarines and Mines).
Specifically the torpedoes part. Does anyone have any info about non-visual torpedo detections in WW1 or WW2 that resulted in a warship successfully avoiding a torpedo attack? To my knowledge, torpedo detection by a moving warship at any meaningful range by hydrophones or asdic in the WW1 to WW2 era was improbable. For hydrophones, while there were systems with a "torpedo detection" mode I'm not aware of any actual successful use of this to detect, identify and avoid wartime torpedo attacks. I suspect that these were "brochure" capabilities; perhaps a lone escort moving at slow to moderate speed in sea state 1 or 2 could detect and identify an inbound torpedo, though whether it would have sufficient time to accelerate and maneuver to avoid it I would question. But I doubt this being realistic for a fleet moving at speed.
For WW2 active sonar with it's limited fov this would be even worse; it would need to be pointed in the right direction, detection ranges would be extremely short for torpedoes, and the operator would need to identify the contact as a torpedo.
From my readings, even in the Falklands war 40 years after WW2, none of the submarine launched torpedoes from either side were detected by their targets or escorts.
So I'm hoping that this isn't really an effective capability in the game as I would find it highly immersion breaking if ships are regularly able to detect and avoid torpedo attacks by just equipping some hydrophone/sonar equipment. Or at least, that there is some way to minimize or remove it by modding. I admit that the blog post doesn't outright say that the detection range would be sufficient to successfully evade so perhaps I am worrying about nothing. But I thought I'd bring this up as perhaps someone does have information about the successful use of hydrophones or sonar to detect torpedo attacks in the WW1-WW2 era.
But as to USN showing a middle finger, well, a quick scan of
The argument against playing with submarines
in General Discussions
Posted
My thoughts on how to have a decent implementation of subs without requiring too much effort:
On the campaign map (so outside of the realtime battles between surface warships) subs should be abstracted with some chance of attacking and sinking ships based on technology, numbers, etc. Depending on how the campaign ends up working, the player could perhaps decide patrol areas for subs.
Within battle, if subs are present they act independently outside the player's control. If enemy ships pass close enough, they may attempt a torpedo attack. The player could increase the probability of friendly subs appearing in battle through doctrine (eg. putting all subs on "fleet support"), building "fleet" subs like the K class, or perhaps some other method but too early say without seeing how the campaign works.
So basically, similar to how Steam and Iron did it.
If people don't want to play with subs, have a campaign and custom battle option to not have them.
At this point I don't know what the game's timeline actually is, but if we are including the entirety of WW2, I would say that while ASW tech improved so did much of the equipment to counter it. Even the surface-optimized submersibles could generally survive and remain somewhat effective provided they got the right equipment: Radar and radar detectors capable of covering all the threat bands, snorkels, acoustic homing and pattern running torpedoes, anechoic coatings, etc. That's not even counting the XXI or Walter boats which could render even the best WW2 ASW forces impotent. Of course in the case of the second Battle of the Atlantic the Germans were out-spent by the allies by a factor of 9.6 or more, and so even when they could equip some of their u-boats it wasn't nearly enough due to the comparatively massive number of well equipped allied ASW assets. Reduce the allied resources by a factor of ten or increase them for the Kriegsmarine by the same amount (or bring the XXI forward a year or two instead of the literal last days of the war) and you'd have had a very different outcome. In such a more "balanced" fight like that in the Pacific, the US Navy sub force were very effective right up to the very end of the war.