Remise
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Posts posted by Remise
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I am talking about the Randy Reed of "Tobruk" and "The Longest Day" fame. There are people who want to get in touch with you. PM me if you are willing.
Touch the elbow,
B.C. Milligan
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Even the Iron Brigade was roughed up and took a huge loss on men
Yes. I remember reading that when some of the survivors went back to camp that night, they asked where was the rest of the brigade. They were shocked to be told that there was no "rest of the brigade."
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Maybe a global storage of ammunition is the solution. Everytime a piece or a unit fires a little amount is used. This storage is carried over from day to day. That would take take of the micromangement but would also confront players with the problems the Generals faced at the real battle.
That might work. I think the old SPI monster game on Waterloo did something like that. Despite the huge amount of artillery rounds fired at the battle, the Confederates, according to Alexander or somebody, still had enough remaining for one more battle, and for the Federal troops, because of their relatively close proximity to Washington and Philadelphia, ammunition shortages would have been temporary enough that they probably would have fired off all they had.
Did I not have to mow the lawn, I would poke around in the Official Records, as surely there are reports somewhere of how much ammunition remained, at least for the Army of the Potomac, after the battle.
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Nick --
Thanks for explaining the videttes. If I may say so, my primary complaint about this intention (besides the oft-repeated statement that videttes were never units), is that I am unaware of any incident at Gettysburg in which artillery was "harassed" by enemy cavalry. Most Civil War cavalry fought on foot, unless it was fighting other cavalry. I do not recall any cavalry, at any time during the entire war, acting as mounted skirmishers and annoying artillery.
For starters, this would have been suicidal, as a man on foot offers a far smaller target than a man on horseback, both to canister and to round shot, and thus a dismounted skirmisher -- who, unlke his infantry counterparts, could easily load and fire while prone, and who would have been extremely inaccurate if attempting to fire his carbine while mounted -- would have been much safer from all types of artillery projectile than a man on horseback. You will note that all of the formed cavalry on the first day quickly dismounted when it arrived on the battlefield -- they did not charge the Confederate artillery or infantry, because their officers knew very well what the result would be. So I don't even see why you need to offer this ability in the first place.
I don't exactly know what you mean abut having a historical meaning, as there is nothing historical about this decision. As far as pleasing every type of player, if your goal is to please people who know nothing about the Civil War, then perhaps the battle of Gettysburg is not the platform for this. You may make your fantasy gamers happy, but in doing so, you will lose your historical gamers. This, of course, is your decision.
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The First Minnesota was not all that successful, from a tactical point of view. It was almost completely destroyed, but the sacrifice bought time for additional units to plug the gap it had occupied.
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One the questions I would ask myself is this: At what level do we want the player to be making decisions? Although grognards always opt for micromanagement, it seems to me that the player has enough to do in this game just controlling every single brigade and battery on the field.
A Civil War regimental commander would know very quickly if his men were running out of ammunition, and as such, he would report this to his brigade commander as soon as possible. One reason -- not the only -- brigades were typically deployed in two lines (and I don't mean ranks!) was so that the second line could replace the first if needed, either due to losses, unsteadiness, or a lack of ammunition. If possible, the units replaced would then fall back to the rear, resupply, and if possible, clean their weapons, as a black powder musket tends to foul rather quickly.
Using this system, some of Greene's men at Culp's Hill, though they had probably taken only 60 rounds into battle (40 in the box, and 20 in their pockets or haversack), fired over 700 rounds apiece on the second day. And the 20th Maine, with only about 350 men in the line at start, fired over 15,000 rounds. But this was admittedly not common.
Anyway, I would prefer it if ammo and resupply, like artillery ammuntion choices, could be set on "Auto," or if ammunition was not even a factor, as Generals Lee and Meade were certainly not thinking about which brigades had enough of it -- that was the job of the officers in command of those units.
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My only hope -- re both these cogent posts above my own -- is that while, as both a game designer and a player, I understand that UGG is a game, and I have been witness to the "game" versus "simulation" battle (which for wargamers is like the eternal war between Good and Evil, though nobody has ever been able to figure out, in this case, which is which!). I want to enjoy a game first, or I probably won't play it for very long. Having admitted this, a game that chooses to take up an historical mantle should at least make an effort to adhere to the basic facts of that history.
And since I have been immersed in the Civil War for most of my life, I would really like, for once, to see a Civil War game that actually had some direct correlation to how Civil War battles were fought. Do that, and I promise to stop complaining about the bizarre field music which has nothing to do with the Civil War (including postwar cavalry bugle "Charge" calls for infantry, among other things), and the fact that the Federal infantry, at least, carries its muskets on the wrong shoulder -- there is a reason the position is called RIGHT Shoulder Shift!
There is one reason that some of us have been raving about the vidette shock troops for so long -- a small amount of research will reveal the real use of videttes, not to mention the fact that though one early war unit called itself "Vidette Cavalry," there was never, ever, a "unit" of videttes. The number of men in a vidette "unit" could easily have fit into two dog tents, and the only purpose -- ever -- of a vidette was to gather intelligence. To use it for any other purpose would be like sending a jeep with three men armed with .45s out to attack a battery of German 88s in World War II.
The cohesion rule could be hard to implement, at this point, though there are games that have such rules. But my suspicion is that this game is too far along to reprogram things such as that.
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I hope I am not the only person you are waiting for! Every time I get going on a scenario, there seems to be a new version. Trying again. Where is everybody else?
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The map looks excellent and I can't wait to try my turn at "What If?"
One of the key features I'd like to see incorporated into the game is the importance of Skirmishers for Infantry and Cavalry. They were the eyes and ears for the Regiments and Troops. I feel that a units skirmisher status, (i.e. deployed, gone to ground or recalled) should be reflected in how far and to what degree a unit has spotting. Likewise Artillery Spotters. Also, factoring into LoS ability, I feel that level/ability of command and unit quality/experience should factor in.
I mostly agree with the above. A man who is lying prone cannot see far at a place like Gettysburg, even without as many trees as we have today, as even foot-high grass makes any real visibility unlikely -- plus the smoke of battle would quickly obscure even the most open field. There were veterans of the war who, years later, wrote that all they ever saw of the enemy was from the knees down, due to the smoke.
There were -- at least so far as I know -- never any real artillery spotters as are known today. It was more that the battery commander and gunners would do their best to witness the fall of the shot (as it was called), and adjust fire accordingly. Having said that, I absolutely agree that experience had a lot to do with this. Ditto with musketry itself. Both sides tended to fire too high with all weapons, and that, combined with the poorly cut Confederate artillery fuses and bad powder, could make artillery, in particular, far less deadly to the enemy than those behind the guns might imagine. This certainly happened on the third day!
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My vote goes to "Option Fair."
Having said that, I would much rather see flags waving, preferably two per brigade (for Federals, this would be the national colors and a state flag, for most brigades), than icons. I will remind you that one of the most-disliked "features" of the CA games was their banners, and one of the most-liked features of DMUC, etc., was the realistic flags.
I know this is more work for an artist, but the large esthetic boost you wil get might be worth it!
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Working on it! Started a second day battle this morning, but now have to rush off to manage a fencing tournament.
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Don't forget Gottfried's Brigades of Gettysburg, which will give you very good insights not only into the quality of the brigades themselves, and their previous history, but also of their commanders.
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This comment is somewhat relevant to terrain, but also to gameplay and things you may not be able to change.
Civil War officers and soldiers did not like street fighting, any more than soldiers today do. Back then, without the benefit of radios, and with a need to keep troops close together and in formation, it was impossible to control a regiment, much less a brigade, in urban combat. Although there was some fighting on the first day, as the Federals retreated through the town, you will note that for the most part, nobody made a stand there, and on the second and third days, other than some annoying sniper fire, the town was not that involved.
This is significant, as you would have imagined that, if possible, Lee would have formed up his assault columns for the third day in the town, so they could, for example, make a rush at Cemetery Hill without being exposed to artillery fire. But this thought apparently never occurred to anybody, not because they were not smart enough, but because they realized the command and control issues this would present.
Secondly, although in playing the second day test scenario it seems that Federal artillery is firing into the town (I could be wrong about this), in reality that would never have happened. Not only would the Federal artillerists never have fired upon friendly civilian dwellings, after Fredericksburg, when they had battered the Confederate town because of snipers, they were strongly condemned as barbaric for firing upon civilian homes, and I strongly suspect that there were, if not written, unwritten orders, against this.
Finally -- and maybe I missed this -- is there a topic for general typos? In particular, I noticed that the name of the hero of Culp's Hill -- General George Greene -- is missing an "e" at the end.
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A nice post. I guess we could say that Lee's retreat from Gettysburg -- which certainly had its heroic moments -- was as much a victory as was Napoleon's campaign in France in 1814. The final result was still a strategic defeat, but at the operational level, each outfought its much stronger foe.
I agree as well that Vicksburg -- which cost the South access to much of its raw material, plus the loss of an entire army -- was a more important event. It is my personal belief that had Lee withdrawn after the second day at Gettysburg, which some of his generals urged him to do, and essentially declared victory and taken his loot home, that the battle might, indeed, have gone into the annals of history as a Confederate victory.
I haven't perused the thread on the scope of this game yet, but if this does become a strategic game of the entire campaign, that might be an interested concept, i.e., what to call it if Lee marches into Pennsylvania, smacks the Army of the Potomac around and hurts it, and then marches back to Virginia.
B.C. Milligan
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And just for the record, while I think the effects of lack of ammunition must be modeled, I agree with Mr. Woodchuck that this does not necessarily mean that the player should have to be involved in this, unless players can actually take the role of a brigade commander. At that level, ammunition would be a consideration. At a higher level, it would be more likely that the player would just have to know that an individual brigade was played out, whether this be because of lack of ammunition, casualties, fatigue, morale, or -- most likely -- a combination of some or all of these factors.
The question that I would always ask myself, were I one of the designers of this game, is what decisions were typically made by the commanding officer at any particular level. When I was involved in my own -- never published -- Gettysburg game, which was going to be 3-D and allow players to to watch the game in first person, we agreed that IF a player were to place himself at this level of play, while he was there, he would have no access to either the mini-map or whatever we were going to call it, nor to messages or other information that would normally only be seen by division, corps, or the army commander.
B.C. Milligan
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Since we have moved from scale to "superheroes," here is my two cents worth:
Another problem with "superheroes" is that one stray bullet makes them irrelevant. A lot of heroes died at Gettysburg, including some officers (such as Reynolds, to use an obvious example) who were considered the finest at their level of command.
My theory of game design at this level is that we assume the lower ranks for the most part, know their jobs. That's one reason games where you, the army commander, determine whether a gun crew should be loading case shot, roundshot, or canister annoy me.
Now, when it comes to officers from brigade commander up, I do think that there should definitely be marked characteristics. There is a general, so to speak, consensus that Ewell's timidity in the first day might have cost Lee a quick victory, when he interpreted Lee's weak order to take Cemetery Hill "if practicable," were the words I think Lee used. Ewell decided that his boys were tired, and instead did nothing. You can bet this would not have been Jackson's decision, were he still alive at the time. The differences between their characters would be a great asset to the game. Plus you need this stuff anyway for the AI.
By the way, heroes in all wars are usually created after the fact. Because of the movie "Gettysburg," Chamberlain is probably better-known to most non-students of history than is Meade. But I would argue that if there was in fact one hero at Gettysburg on the Union side, that would have been General Greene in his outstanding defense of Culp's Hill against what should have been overwhelming odds.
But who has even heard of Greene (at the time, considered the army's outstanding expert on field fortifications, as well as, I believe, being the oldest general at the battle)?
B.C. Milligan
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I agree that Fremantle certainly had an agenda. My sole point was that -- and perhaps he wrote what he wrote for his audience, while knowing it to be essentially untrue -- he was there, and felt Lee had won, sort of. I will have to start rummaging through some first-person accounts, but I do believe that he was joined in this opinion by many of Lee's men, if not his generals. If they were not in Longstreet's corps, at the worst, they might have thought they had fought the Army of the Potomac to a draw, and were then going home in semi-triumph, as they had the year before from Antietam.
Further research, is, of course, required and expected.
P.S. I have Fremantle's other book as well, and I agree. I also have William Howard Russell's book (though he went home before the battle), and, somewhere, a mildly interesting book by a Prussian officer who was sent to observe the war. P.P.S. I erred when I said I had 'Amanda Knox's" book. I meant, of course, Amanda Foreman!
B.C. Milligan
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Mr. Fair --
A great post which deserves, if any reply, a detailed one, but I am on my way out the door to teach a bunch of nice people how to hit one another with steel swords. As a quick response to you question, I just pasted that entire article into my post. Maybe that's the secret; I don't know! Perhaps if your photo comes from a URL it will work.
I will try to put in another photo...
No workee. Will try something else later.
Touch the elbow,
B.C. Milligan
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As a bit of an addendum to what I wrote last night, here is an interesting commentary by a reenactor on the use of bayonets not only by us (reenactors, I mean), but also in the war itself. I think some of what he writes might be pertinent to the game. Edit -- for reasons unknown, that link does not work here when I paste it. So instead I will try pasting the copy itself, and apologies in advance for its length. I do believe it is worth a read:
"The Cold Steel"
Observations on the use of the Bayonet
T.R.Wheeley
After having determined to write this article upon the subject that McClellan fittingly described as "the brave man's weapon it was mentioned to me that perhaps the article should be entitled 'the brave man 's subject!'To my dismay, I soon discovered this to be true, for it is indeed a very ambiguous and contentious aspect of civil war combat. Nevertheless, somewhat enthused by the subject's historical elusiveness, I continued. I propose this article not to be definitive nor conclusive, rather, it serves to make some observations about, and perhaps to stimulate some discussion upon, the subject of the use of the bayonet.
' An intimate weapon'
Developments in black powder weaponry from its first invention, it has been argued, progressively "made virtually all previous forms of weapon obsolete. This applied especially to edged weapons." 1 Despite this fact however the use, and indeed the need for edged weapons was not completely eclipsed, the development of the bayonet from sword, to plug-bayonet and finally to socket-bayonet and the fact that the bayonet is still employed today pays testament to this point. It is however often pointed out that as the 'distance' of warfare increased, there was less and less need for the employment of the 'cold steel'. Equally so, it seemed more and more that combat was losing its 'human aspect', that is, it was becoming impersonal - "all you do is move that finger imperceptibly." 2 .But was the impersonality of war absolute? In a word, no, it was not. As Joanna Bourke correctly comments in her excellent book 'An intimate history of killing peoples' imagination of war is often of grand charges and bayonet wielding soldiers, heroic and personal. Indeed, in terms of the American Civil War, the recruiting posters of 1861 portray this psychology well, and often echo a somewhat romantic image in which the 'cold steel' draws parallels with medieval gallantry and chivalry, combat between good and evil and the enemy as the 'ultimate other'. It was the dawning of reality, the realisation that war was not wholly made up of grand bloodless charges, and the overstating of the historical myth that edged weapons had become ineffective against the modernity's of the battlefield, that went someway in perpetuating the belief that the blade was an archaic and somewhat anachronistic throwback of earlier centuries.
A versatile instrument indeed: The bayonet was a neccessity in stacking arms which ever drill book was used
On the contrary however, the bayonet offered the personal touch that soldiers often believed the battlefield was losing. Bourke uses the example of the First World War, in which troops in the trenches were "keen .for intimate struggle... They were willing to go over the top with a penknife." 3 Relatively recent first hand accounts from WWI reveal the true feelings of working with the bayonet. Bourke quotes the words of a British soldier the first time he stuck a German with his bayonet, he described it as being "gorgeously satisfying... Exultant satisfaction ". Another found that bayoneting Prussians was "beautiful work", whilst a New Zealand sapper reported bayonet work as "sickening yet exhilarating butchery [that was] joy unspeakable. "In reality, the bayonet proved to be too personal in some cases. One soldier who was open about killing prisoners "delicately distanced himself from the narrative when mentioning the bayonet - 'one' killed with the bayonet as opposed to 'I' or 'we' " 4 Such descriptions of bayonet work in civil war memoirs are howeverfar and few between - most civil war historians never coming across such openly shocking descriptions and admissions. This however does not mean that the 'joy' felt by combatants in the civil war was any different from that felt by WWI combatants. Although veterans when asked about war "hated it so much, it was so terrible that they would prefer it to remain buried", often, it has been proved, it is the fact that "somewhere inside themselves, they loved it too", that was behind their reasoning in wanting to bury their memory of it. 5 Therefore this is a phenomenon that is not confined just to WWI, but rather a pattern that is present in any conflict from the beginning of time, to which the civil war is no exception. It is the social context and conditioning of the period that has led to such comments on face to face fighting to remain hidden in the memory of those that participated, as indeed is the case with most wars, even today. For a veteran to admit to the joy of killing would have been frowned upon then the same, if not more, as it would be today. More importantly however, this highlights that the bayonet was in no way eclipsed during the civil war.
' A useless archaic anachronism?'
One of the most commonly quoted facts about the use of the bayonet in the civil war is that according to casualty returns, only 0.4% of all casualties were inflicted by edged weapons. 6 However, this figure requires the historian to raise certain questions. Is this percentage a total of all casualties, including those that died of fever and those that died in prison camps - if so, it is hardly a fair reflection upon the number of men that died in hand to hand combat on the actual field. Also, how can this figure be comprehensive when nobody counted the cause of death of all those lying on the battlefield and interred in the mass graves? Therefore, one must be wary of such a figure, which has ultimately been plucked from some official returns and used to emphasise the deadliness of modern weapons such as rifled muskets and rifled field pieces.
This argument is supported further when one examines the nature of hand to hand combat in the civil war. Almost every action in the civil war had some detail of hand to hand fighting. To take just a few obvious examples; the charge of the Black Horse Cavalry at First Manasas, the railroad cut at Second Manasas, the Angle at Gettysburg - the list is endless. When almost every action saw hand to hand fighting of some sort, then why is the number of casualties officially recorded to have been inflicted by edged weapons so low? Apart from the reasons already stated above, ultimately, when in close quarters, the blade was not the only weapon. The combatant could also call upon his musket as a club, his bare fists and also his loaded musket as means by which to defeat his foe, none of which would leave an injury that could be described as having been inflicted by an edged weapon. Therefore, although the combat was initiated by one side executing a bayonet charge - the casualties were not necessarily caused by the bayonet.
On the other hand however, if the figure was taken from wounds tended in the field hospitals, then not only is the figure unreliable in terms its restricted 'pool', but also at a more basic level. It would presuppose that casualties from hand to hand combat were as likely to be carried to the rear as those who received their casualties during say, a fire-fight. In reality this would not be so. The area in which close combat would have taken place would generally have been one which was of high importance strategically (thus justifying the need for a bayonet charge) and therefore in the front line in the 'hot' action - too 'hot' for non-combatants to carry the wounded to the field hospital. Also, the ferocity and sheer deadliness of hand to hand fighting that eyewitnesses describe would probably not have left many wounded - most would be hors de combat. These reasons also help show that perhaps generally accepted figures in relation to close-quater fighting are somewhat dubious.
Another reason that helps explain low casualties for edged weapons or hand to hand fighting other than the fact that the figures themselves are probably misleading - who would go around the field examining how every soldier died anyway? - is the fact that combats were often short and sweet. True melees were rare, most close quater action only lasting perhaps a matter of minutes. Far more commonly, one side would break before a true bloodbath could begin. Sam Watkins in describing the attack upon a Union battery in the action around Atlanta comments on how the presence of heavy support would often sway a charge one way or the other, ensuring that close combat was over quickly;
Equally so, the very force of seeing a charge coming on would sometimes be enough for one side to break, the threat of impending combat being too much for one side to bare. James 0. Bradfield of the 1st Texas pays testament to this in his description of the fighting on 2nd July at Gettysburg;
"But being heavily supported.. The Federal lines waver, and break and fly leaving us in possession of their breast works, and the battlefield" 7
Hence, it can be seen that figures regarding casualties inflicted by edged weapons should be treated with a certain degree of suspicion. In a very real sense the belief that the bayonet charge was an obsolete reminder of Napoleonic warfare upon the 'modem' battlefields of the civil war could well be regarded a 'civil war myth'. The unreliability of casualty figures, the intimate nature of hand to hand fighting and the fact that a bayonet charge would not always result in close combat all go someway in disproving the 'myth' that personal struggle, or even the threat of it, was rare in the civil war.
"The enemy stood their ground bravely, until we were close on them, but did not await the bayonet." 8
' Re-enactorisms'
Other myths, or rather re-enactorisms that occur in relation to the bayonet is the position of the musket during a charge, and hence, how a charge should be executed. Perhaps the most common re-enactorism present in today's ACW re-enactment community is the practice of the rear rank assuming the position of Right Shoulder Shift. In no drill manual is this practice specified. D.D. Bello, in his article on 'Charge Bayonet' offers the a potential source for this common mistake. In his description of the Battle of Antietam, John B. Gordon pays attention to a federal attack on the sunken road in which he states that the front line came to Charge Bayonet,and the rear lines came to Right Shoulder Shift. This has probably sometime been taken as endorsement for the mistake which is sometimes strangely justified as a safety measure. However the point that has been missed is that Gordon is describing an attack column - the front line (a two ranked regiment) at Charge Bayonet, and the rear lines (supporting regiments, each of two ranks) at Right Shoulder Shift.
This image by J.D. Edwards shows Gaston Copens' Louisiana Zouaves on parade at Pensacola, Spring 1861. Both ranks are at 'Charge - BAYONET' and the Officers extend their swaords at arms length.
Bello in his article, also points out that none of the drill manuals point out how a bayonet charge should be carried out in the field, or as one Lazyjack put it using a driving analogy, 'they teach you how to use the steering wheel, how to change gear and what to do with the accelerator, but they don't teach you how to conduct yourself on the road.' Using Scott's tactics and manuals, Bello comes to the conclusion that a charge should be conducted thus;
- The line moves forward at Arms-Port, and...
- Only when the line reaches the enemy does the front rank, and only the front rank, come to Charge Bayonet... The rear rank should be ready to assist the front with their bayonets, and this is best done from the position Arms-Port.
- The command "Charge Bayonet" does not even have to be given in an actual charge - the front rank coming to charge bayonet when they meet the enemy (not necessarily all at the same time). In practice, could the men hear the command anyway?
This argument can however be rejected on a number of points. Firstly, it would be unlikely that troops drilled in either Casey's or Hardee's tactics would execute a charge at Arms-Port as both Casey and Hardee removed Arms-Port from school of the soldier, both however prescribe the position of Charge Bayonet - why would troops execute a manoeuvre that they had not been drilled in whilst neglecting one that they did know? Secondly, by its very definition, troops executing a 'bayonet charge' would naturally feel inclined to lead with the intended weapon - the bayonet. Whilst Charge Bayonet is a very aggressive position, Arms-Port in comparison is rather passive, and would hardly help to intimidate the enemy. Also if the troops had loaded weapons which they were intending to discharge on impact, then Charge Bayonet would be a much more suitable position for the musket than Arms-Port. Thirdly, charges would often break up before hitting home as Bradfield of the 1st Texas describes;
"without awaiting orders, every man became his owncommander and so sprang forward toward the top of the hill at full speed."9Again, leading with the bayonet would be natural when the troops intend to 'give 'em the cold steel', especially if not formed in ranks. Fourthly, a point that both Ed Beaton and Richard O'Sullivan have made is that although Hardee instructs the soldiers in one rank, when considering firing he makes clear the differences between the positions of the front and second rank. Why then, would he not specify such a big difference asArms-Port when instructing the troops in charging their bayonets? The absence of any other instruction can only lead one to the conclusion that both ranks come to the position of charge bayonet. Lastly, most images and descriptions of using the bayonet fail to reflect or mention anything about Arms-Port, rather, they all describe both ranks coming to Charge Bayonet. Alexander Hunter of the 17th Virginia remembered some of the action at Frazier's Farm that illustrates this point well;
Another example of both ranks using the charge bayonet is depicted in the August 16, 1862 issue of Harpers Weekly.
"At last, a little after 4 o'clock, the whole brigade, in line of battle swept forward... The men advanced at a run, one straight unbroken line, with the guns before them at a charge, the bayonets like lances projecting forward and fencing off the rays of the sun, the colours waving proudly, while thousands of feet beat the earth in rhythmical time, the officers well in front with their unsheathed swords in hand
This illustration was sketched by Mr A.R. Waud and depicts the "Bayonet charge of the second Exelsior Regiment, Colonel Hall, at the battle of Fairoaks, June 1862"
Regarding the illustration Mr Waud writes - "I send this under the direction of General Sickles and Colonel Hall (his was the only Regiment of the Excelsior Brigade that charged). The locality is correct. The line of the men is correct, and the enemy skirmishers as Hall found them. No hand -to-hand desperate work by demonic individuals in Zouave dress and caps - the Excelsior Brigade wears the infantry uniform, with felt hats. I could not send this at the time as I was flat on my back"
It could therefore be argued that instructing re-enactors to adopt Arms-Port in a charge is merely replacing one anachronism with another, the latter being just slightly more plausible. Ultimately though, the weight of evidence does point towards the fact that when carrying out a bayonet charge, both ranks should charge with their muskets at Charge Bayonet. This is not really any more dangerous than any of the other positions if everyone takes care, and even to a certain degree, if the attacking troops are taking casualties as they advance, then dropping the musket from the Charge Bayonet position is a lot safer than either Right Shoulder Shift or Arms-Port.
' An instrument of fear'
The importance of the bayonet in civil war combat, as in any other war, was not simply limited to its ability to inflict casualties, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a psychological weapon. The threat of the 'cold steel' as has already been demonstrated, was such that often the defending force would break before impact came about. Thus, although the bayonet charge was far from certain to inflict casualties, especially when one considers the fact that if contact is reached then one would probably receive just as heavy casualties from one's foe. The psychological effect of the bayonet was not entirely one sided either. As well as being detrimental to the enemy's morale, the use of the bayonet would also prove to be positive in boosting the attacking forces morale. Troops even today pay testament to the fact that they feel more inclined to advance against the enemy with the-reassurance of 18 inches of steel on the end of their weapons. Indeed, the fact that the bayonet was used to carry and defend vitally important positions, often as a last resort, then the order to fix bayonets would doubtless have instilled in the men the gravity of the situation.
The procedures that surround the bayonet often reflect its standing as a psychological weapon. When bayonets are fixed, the soldiers keep their muskets in the position with the butt upon the ground rather than shouldering arms as a when each man has done so. This ensures that when the order Shoulder-Arms is given, then the whole unit does so as one man. It could be argued that this is done for effect upon the field of battle, and not just through the needs of military precision. For the enemy watching a line of battle preparing to charge, what they would see would be a line of hundreds of men suddenly as one man come up to the shoulder in a flash of bare metal with the entire line topped with glinting steel, as if to say 'we're coming to get you!' - enough to send a shiver down even the bravest man's spine. Frank Haskell, a federal soldier on Cemetery Ridge on July 3rd wrote this description of the confederates as they formed for the assault, it gives a good idea of the effect that massed bayonets could have;
"None on that ridge now need be told that the enemy is approaching... More than half a mile their line extends,... man touching man, rank pressing rank, and line supporting line. The red flags wave, their horsemen gallop up and down, the arms of 15,000 men, barrel and bayonet gleam in the sun, a sloping forest of flashing steel... Magnificent, grim, irresistible."
"A sloping forest of flashing steel." This image of a Union regiment portrays well the visual impact of massed bayonets - terrifying indeed!
Equally so, the process of Charge bayonet is a psychological one. To see two advancing ranks bring their muskets down to the charge would have as much impact as seeing them go up to the shoulder before the attack began, and it is likely that this was done when the line was close enough to the enemy for this to have a good impact - perhaps 50 yards. Bello on the other hand, argues that only the front rank should come to the charge when only two or three yards from the enemy. Doing this however would somewhat diminish the psychological impact of a bayonet charge, for when within two or three yards of each other, the defending force by that time would have made the conscious or unconscious decision whether or not to break and run. Also, in terms of the attacking force, if only the front rank came to the charge, it would mean that the psychological buffering of having the physical support of the rear rank's bayonets protruding to your sides would be lost. Sam Watkins in his memoirs of the action around Jonesboro in 1864 shows how Charge Bayonets was used to spur on the troops as they were expecting to go into action;
All re-enactors and living historians when carrying out Charge bayonets make a loud 'hurrah' or cheer. Whilst the drill manuals does not specify that this should be done, in reality it is very plausible that this would be carried out as it would aid the psychological impact, and it also allows the troops to express the pent-up emotion of wanting to close with the enemy. In fact Sam Watkins mentions in passing the 'hurrah' of Charge bayonets when describing a charge;
"We expected to be ordered into action every moment and kept seesawing backward and forward, until I did not know which way the Yankees were or which way the Rebels. We would form line of battle, charge bayonets, and would raise a whoop and yell, expecting to be dashed against the Yankee lines." 11
"We gave one long, loud cheer, and commenced the charge. As we approached their lines... Confederate and Federal meet. Officers with drawn swords meet officers with drawn swords, and man to man meets man to man withbayonetsand loaded guns."12Therefore when considering the impact of the bayonet upon the battlefield the historian must remember that its importance was in no way proportional to the number of casualties that it inflicted. Indeed, its psychological impact must not be underestimated.
' The employment of the bayonet in defence and attack'
Another minor mistake that is often made with bayonet drill is the difference between Charge bayonet and Guard against infantry. Apart from the obvious, that Charge bayonet is an offensive employment of the bayonet whereas Guard against infantry is a defensive one the main difference that is not always recognised is the position of the feet and arms. Hardee illustrates this with plates and text in the 'School of the soldier'. In Charge bayonet, the feet should make a half right face with only three inches between the feet and with the legs straight, whereas in Guard against infantry the feet, whilst making a half right face, should have twenty inches between them, with the knees slightly bent. Also, in the former, the musket should first be brought up slightly with the right hand from the Shoulder arms position until the lock is at the point of the cap pouch, and then using that point as the pivot, the musket should be brought down with the left hand so that the point of the bayonet is at the height of the eye. In the latter however, although the musket is brought up slightly, when it is brought down, the arms should fall naturally at their full length, with the point slightly elevated at the height of the waist. The same differences are true of the defensive position of Guard against cavalry except for the point being at the height of the eye, or rather the height of the horse's chest. Both defensive positions require the feet to be placed far apart with slightly more weight resting upon the back foot in order that the line could absorb the impact of the enemy line coming in at the run.
' "Trust to the bayonet"'
Despite all the controversy over the use of the bayonet in the civil war, one thing is certain - the commanders of the day were of the opinion that the bayonet was a highly valuable weapon. It was a weapon that despite its archaic nature was considered to be the weapon that could make that decisive blow and could win or lose the battle. Indeed, perhaps it was the rustic appeal of the cold steel that echoed something of the chivalry of centuries passed that ensured the bayonet's position of reliability and highly personal nature. General A.S. Johnston's speeches at Shiloh in preparing his troops to charge the 'Hornet's nest' reveal something of the emotions that the bayonet could evoke in both the commanders and the men and the trust that was put in its effectiveness to shift an enemy;
'Men of Arkansas! They say you boast of your prowess with the Bowie knife. Today you wield a nobler weapon-the bayonet.Employ it well." 13Minutes later he rode further along the lines until he came to the 45th Tennessee, the regiment that he would lead into the action, and at the bead of which he would receive his mortal wound, here, he reiterated his belief in the need to employ the bayonet to win the day;
'Men they are stubborn; we must use the bayonet. I will leadyou!" 14Johnston is only one example of many. Stonewall Jackson is another who realised what a powerful weapon the bayonet could be. Minutes before he won his immortal 'title' he was reported to have uttered these words to a fellow officer;
"Sir we'll give them the bayonet... Trust to theBayonet." 15' Conclusion'
As was stated at the beginning, this article is intended not to be either definitive or conclusive, however it has proved to highlight certain aspects about the bayonet that are often forgotten or dismissed. Particularly its status as a weapon that could provide the intimacy that combatants would crave, its archaic aspirations and smacks of chivalric combat, the dubious nature of casualty figures that may well underestimate the ability of the bayonet to inflict injury. Also notice has be drawn to re-enactorisms and myths concerning the bayonet, and has hopefully gone someway in exploring these. Indeed one of the most valuable conclusions that could be drawn is that the bayonet's importance as a psychological weapon is in no way proportional to the number of casualties that it could inflict. Thus, the trust that commanders placed in its ability to emplore a higher sense of duty was well founded. However, if only one conclusion was to be drawn from all of this, it is that when one couples its fighting capabilities with the secondary uses for which the bayonet was employed, such as for stacking arms, as a roasting spit, as a candlestick or as a tool to dig a hole, then the bayonet was an invaluable item of the soldier's accoutrements, and so the common belief that soldiers would throw away their bayonets at the first opportunity is completely without foundation and is merely another 'civil war myth'. As with all things however, the civil war soldier found humour in the bayonet too. The closing quotes illustrate this. The first is a description of bayonet drill by a federal private, ant the latter should serve as a warning to drill instructors when carrying out Charge bayonets - always do it when facing away from camp!
"[bayonetdrillwas like watching]... a line of beings made up about equally of the frog, the sandhill crane, the sentinel crab, and the grasshopper: all of them swinging, stirring, jerking every which way, and all gone mad."16"Even such a wearisome proceeding as drilling was not without its humourous side. Sometimes in making the soldiers charge bayonet in line, they would increase their speed and keep on, and never stop until they reached their camp, when the whole force would Disappear!"17
Images such as this of Petersburg and Appomattox only go to prove that bayonets would rarely be discarded as an impediment. Its uses were not limited to fighting, and so it would be kept as a valuable tool.-
Davis W.C. The illustrated history of the Civil War Bramley Books 1997 p206
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Bourke J An intimate history of killing - ch. 1 'The pleasures of war' p2
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Ibid p17
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Ibid p24
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Ibid p1
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Davis W.C. The illustrated history of the civil war p215
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Watkins S Co.Aytch New York 1997 p183
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Ed. Cannan J War on two fronts: Shiloh to Gettysburg Conshocken PA 1994 p366
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Ed. Cannan J. War on two Fronts: Shiloh to Gettysburg p367
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Hunter A. Johnny Reb and Billy Yank New York 1904 p188-89
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Watkins S. Co.Aytch p207
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Watkins S. Co.Aytch p183
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Troiani D & Pohanka B.C. Don Troiani's Civil War Stackpole Books 1995 p20
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Ibid p20
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Davis W.C. The illustrated history of the civil war p210
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Ibid p210
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Hunter A. Johnny Reb and Bill Yank p79
Bibliography
Bello D.D. Notes on Charge - BAYONET http://33rdwisconsin.civilwarmuseum.com/33articles/chargebay.html 1998
Bourke J. An intimate history of killing - ch.1 'The pleasures of war'
The Blue & Grey Press The Photgraphic History of the civil war Vol. I Secaucus 1987
Ed. Cannan J. War on two fronts: Shiloh to Gettysburg Conshocken PA 1994
Davis W.C. The illustrated history of the Civil War Bramley Books 1997
Eds. Davis W.C. & Wiley B.I. The Image of War: 1861-65 - Vol II: The Guns of '62 New York 1982
Hunter A. Johnny Reb and Billy Yank New York 1904
Troiani D. & Pohanka B.C. Don Troiani's Civil War Stackpole Books 1995
Watkins S Co. Aytch New York 1997
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Mr. Fair --
I could ramble on here, or say in turn that yours was a great response, and that essentially I am in complete agreement. I guess there could be -- there has been, of course -- some argument as to whether or not Lee's advance into Pennsylvania shortened the war (by weakening his army and raising Union morale, which was near its nadir), or lengthened it (by giving the farms and people of Virginia the better part of a summer and harvest season mostly unhindered), and also by raising Southern morale, too -- there were troops in Lee's army who had fought mostly on the first and second days who were absolutely convinced they had won the battle, and were in fact just going home victors. The British observer Colonel Fremantle, who was on the field, seemed, as I dimly recall, to agree with this perception.
"What ifs" are always fun, and of course that is one reason we play games such as this one!
B.C. Milligan
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Mr. Hughes --
Thank you for your reply.
First, re ammo -- I would suggest we determine an average. I cannot find the citation, but I do know that some units at Culp's Hill fired off several hundred rounds per man during the second day, but these were the same units that Greene rotated in and out of his firing pits, who were able to clean their weapons and refill their cartridge boxes.
As you probably know, General Hunt, who commanded the artillery of the Army of the Potomac, had issued very strict guidelines regarding the employment of artillery during the battle, especially on the third day, when a general advance was expected from the Confederates. Among his various improvements to the overall artillery organization (including the creation of the artillery reserve, and a central reserve of ammunition as well), he gave very explicit orders regarding the return of fire -- i.e., that it was not to begin for at least 15 minutes after the Confederate bombardment began; that batteries were only to fire at targets they could see; that ammunition should be used sparingly and not wasted, etc.). And Hunt had also emphasized that the primary target for artillery -- especially the smoothbore Napoleons -- should not be other guns, but enemy infantry.
Hancock, in command of II Corps and a legend in the army, ordered his corps batteries to fire -- at least in Hunt's opinion -- prematurely, at which the artillery commanders protested, but colonels and majors were not going to overrule a corps commander, thus his batteries were almost out of ammunition when the actual attack began on the third day.
Luckily, because of the presence of the reserve batteries, and the extra ammunition, this was not fatal, but it could have been. Again, to answer your question, I would set an average. I would also try, if possible, to design the game so that the quite different doctrine of the opposing armies -- not to mention the inferior Confederate fuses and powder, which were notorious at least among the Rebel infantry -- be built into the game as well. Lee had nothing really like the AOP's Artillery Reserve.
As far as bayonets go, I will admit my evidence is mostly anecdotal, and it would take some time to assemble. I will say, as you probably also already know, that a three-sided wound, such as the bayonets then in use would have created, cannot be sutured. If you were stabbed by one of these bayonets, and probably more than once at that, you were not going to make it back to any field hospital, especially in a war when the non-walking wounded were seldom retrieved until very late in the day. And I should add that although this is not reflected in casualties, the real value of the bayonet was more moral than physical, thus the French Army and its misguided pre-WWI mania, "The spirit of the bayonet." We all know that the spirit of the machinegun turned out to be somewhat more potent, but it is a fact that a determined foe armed with bayonet and seemingly bent upon close action could often rout an enemy, as happened not only at Little Round Top, but at least to some degree, when the Minnesotans charged (I think it was they) Barksdale's Mississipians.
B.C. Milligan
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One of the problems with subjects such as this -- outside of games, at least -- is that, at least in my opinion, if Lee had "won" at Gettysburg, he still would have been saddled with over 20,000 Confederate wounded who needed to get back to Virginia, plus hundreds of wagon loads of loot, plus his artillery train would have had, at most, enough ammunition left for one more day's worth of combat.
If Lee had routed Meade's army -- again in my opinion -- he still would have had no choice but to retire back to Virginia, as not only were about 15,000 hastily raised Pennsylvania militia converging to block his supply lines and generally make a nuisance of themselves, Meade's largest Corps -- the VI -- had not even been committed to the battle, and there were additional Federal troops that Meade could have called upon to quickly rebuild his (presumably) defeated army.
Meade did not attack on the fourth day both because the rest of his army was in a shambles, and he did not want to risk his only reserve, and also because of Lee's reputation. His troops were in no condition, after marching over 120 miles and fighting hard for three days, to fight another day.
But getting back to the original question -- I bet you thought I never would -- although I don't know your definitions for "Strategic" and "Decisive," I would call this both a strategic and decisive victory for the Union. Not only had Lee lost thousands of his best troops, and of course the battle itself, after Gettysburg, there was no remaining chance (if there ever had really been one, see Amanda Knox's book on this subject) for European recognition of the Confederacy.
Having said all this, if we are moving out of discussion of the battle itself, let us not forget that had soldiers in the Union army not been permitted to vote in the Presidential elections of 1864, Lincoln might not have been re-elected; peace might have been agreed upon, and the South might have won the war (as they defined victory) after all.
B.C. Milligan
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I know I am arriving somewhat late to this discussion, but I will say that I feel ammo is critical in any Civil War battle, though it does not have to be micro-managed.
If we start with the assumption that all key decisions in this game are being made at the brigade level -- as seems to be the case -- you can bet that by 1863, no brigade commander would have "forgotten" to have adequate supplies of ammunition near to his troops, and neither would the respective armies' quartermaster corps.
Having said that, here are some bullet points worth considering:
* The typical private carried 40 rounds in his cartridge box, and 20 in his haversack or pockets.
* A well-trained soldier could load and fire three times a minute.
* Very rarely did anybody fire this quickly, because if you did, your box would be empty in 15 minutes. One or two rounds a minute was more likely (most of the time) in sustained combat, though at Culp's Hill, some men fired far more rounds during the course of that key battle.
* Just as important to ammo consumption was the effect of fire upon the musket itself. After a dozen rounds or less, a the bore of a black powder musket can begin to foul, making loading increasingly difficult. At Culp's Hill, when units were pulled out of the line to resupply their cartridge boxes, they would boil water for coffee, and use the leftover hot water to clean their barrels.
* The lack of ammunition, was at times, pivotal during the war -- the successful charge of Hood's Texans at Gaines Mill came at a moment when the Federal troops facing Hood's men were just in the process of being pulled out of the line to replenish their ammunition. And, of course, the bombardment that preceded Pickett's Charge ended sooner than it might have, as artillery ammunition was running out.
What I think, from my (admittedly amateur) studies of the war, is that a Civil War regiment was good, on the average, for an hour or less of sustained combat, before it had to be pulled out of the line to replenish its ammo, its water (if possible), and to regroup its companies, who sometimes might have fallen into disorder or lost key officers or noncoms.
If, rather than keeping track of rounds fired, there was some sort of an overall meter that would indicate when a brigade was used up -- in terms of combat efficiency, and which included ammunition, morale, exhaustion, etc., all as part of one scale, this might be a fairly simple concept.
I get really tired of games -- such as many of the TW ones, of course -- that let every unit fight to the last man, with no allowance for any of these factors.
And finally, for those still reading, although I believe the bayonet played a far larger role in Civil War battles than is commonly acknowledged, there were few cases of a unit fixing bayonets and charging, a la Camerone or for that matter Little Round Top, once they were out of ammunition. Had the 20th Maine faced effective musketry, instead of a disorganized group of exhausted foes, or for that matter, had Confederate artillery been able to play upon it effectively, Chamberlain's charge would have been nothing but a glorious failure.
B.C> Milligan
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Paging Randall C. Reed
in General Discussions
Posted
Randy --
Rumor has it that you are a playtester here. I have been trying to get in touch with you for 15 years. Please send me a PM, or email me, even, at Remise@aol.com. There are some people who are looking for you (not process servers or ISIS!).
Thanks,
B.C. Milligan