New beta?

[TheHill]

I have seen in a couple of threads that there is a new beta patch out, or in the works. Any chance in some information on that?

[admin]

maybe those threads are about Naval Action?

[yamms]

[Nick Thomadis]

A small misunderstanding

There is indeed a work in progress beta for Ultimate General: Gettysburg, that is currently in its first testing phase. It includes the following:

 

v1.14 PRE-RELEASE rev.8739+ Beta

• AI optimizations. AI should be better in attack and defend overall.
• Melee fixes to inflict more casualties. Previously damage was too low.
• Artillery damage tuned better. Previously it could be too powerful. Now artillery does modest, more sensible damage from long and medium range and is devastating as it should be from close range.
• Artillery more vulnerable to projectile fire. Now you will think twice to risk your arty on the frontline,
• Minor balances to Union and CSA combat effectiveness.
• "Chance to change history" map got VP increase of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill so it is possible for the Union player to win after a successful delaying tactic. 

This patch aims to be the last for Ultimate General: Gettysburg. Some important bug fixes will follow, for example the saves' bugs.

[TheHill]

Is the patch accessible on steam, or is it currently only internal?

[Nick Thomadis]

It is available only to a group of testers for the time being.

[Grognard_JC]

A small misunderstanding

There is indeed a work in progress beta for Ultimate General: Gettysburg, that is currently in its first testing phase. It includes the following:

 

v1.14 PRE-RELEASE rev.8739+ Beta

• AI optimizations. AI should be better in attack and defend overall.
• Melee fixes to inflict more casualties. Previously damage was too low.
• Artillery damage tuned better. Previously it could be too powerful. Now artillery does modest, more sensible damage from long and medium range and is devastating as it should be from close range.
• Artillery more vulnerable to projectile fire. Now you will think twice to risk your arty on the frontline,
• Minor balances to Union and CSA combat effectiveness.
• "Chance to change history" map got VP increase of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill so it is possible for the Union player to win after a successful delaying tactic. 

This patch aims to be the last for Ultimate General: Gettysburg. Some important bug fixes will follow, for example the saves' bugs.

 

Very good news. I have to say I cannot wait for it.

 

What about having the tilft-shift as an option again. I never got the chance to try it, as I bought the game only recently...

Edited May 16, 2015 by Grognard_JC

[Koro]

I doubt the tilt-shift will return any time soon. It was weird too honestly.

But as I understood it, it has issues with the night time battles too and would require new code to write. There wont be any new code written for this announced last of patches to come for UGG: Gettysburg so it seems out to me.

[42ndMS]

For gods sake, fix Barksdales brigade. Him and his brigade is being totally misrepresented. On more than one occasion they proved they were "shock troops" during the war. In the game as now his brigade is not even average. Scales brigade, while not  "shock troops" IRL, it just sucks. Some others to mention but I need more time spent with them before a definite evaluation. The Confederate army at Gettysburg was actually better supplied with Rifles than the Union,( something like 4 Union Regiments having Smoothbores ) and were better marksmen throughout the entire war. Union training was better?? ....  don't think so. Union Arty. is what saved them especially on a battlefield such as Gettysburg. 

 

Please don't take this post as being mean-spirited, I love the game and have been waiting for this since the Sid Meiers CW games. UG is waaay better!

[David Fair]

42ndMS,

There are a number of issues with the quality designations in UGG for various brigades. Gottfried's "Brigades of Gettysburg" is a reasonable resource for examining/comparing brigade quality. While some brigades proved to be superior over the course of the war, at the time of Gettysburg, they were unproven. For example, Heth was so concerned about some of his North Carolina regiments, which had not seen action for more than a year, that he requisitioned regiments from other commands with more experience to steady these unproven brigades on July 1.

There is no evidence supporting some of the "Lost Cause" myths you've repeated above. While it is true that the CSA had more riles as a total percentage for their army it is not true that the CSA had more rifles at Gettysburg. Over the course of the war the Union actually bought more Enfield’s from England than the CSA. However, because the Union army was larger they had a few regiments at armed with smoothbores...but they also had 20,000 more rifles at Gettysburg. A couple of smoothbores in the mix did not change the overall military situation. It is true that the recently recruited, and poorly fitted out, Pennsylvania Militia units were of much lower battlefield quality than more seasoned units.

Over the course of the war the Union lost 110,000 men KIA in combat and the CSA about 96,000 men. A more balanced KIA result after four years of war would be difficult to achieve. Additionally, if you look at battlefield casualties statistically there is no indication that the CSA had the advantage in quality of men. When the Union was attacking at Fredericksburg the casualty result was 2.1 to 1 in favor of the CSA. When the CSA was attacking at Malvern Hill the casualty result was 2.1 to 1 in favor of the Union. Bottom line – casualty figures had more to do with terrain advantages and the side on the defensive than the color of the man’s clothing who was defending. Lee’s Seven Days around Richmond demonstrate that offensive action resulted in higher casualties for the attacker.

Additionally, artillery only contributed 6% of all battlefield casualties during the ACW. About 2/3 of the guns used by the ANV were captured guns – so if there was much of an advantage in guns it was minimal. The fuze technology, North and South, was notoriously bad during the war. While the CSA had difficulty manufacturing ammunition at the same volume of the North all of the rounds of ammunition had to be transported by wagon – which tended to give the Union about 250 rounds per gun at battles vs. the CSA 150 rounds of ammunition per gun. At Gettysburg specifically the AoP artillery supply was 93,000 rounds which the CSA supply was in the ballpark of 40,000. As the war progressed the impact of artillery on offensive operations was so poor that Grant cut the number of guns in a field battery from 6 down to 4. The basic message was that artillery required too much road surface for the offensive fire power – and the logistical difficulty of feeding the additional horses was more trouble than it was worth.

Civil War artillery was successful on the defensive and its most important contribution during the war was that it precluded the complete destruction of armies. Union armies were saved at Shiloh, and at Chancellorsville, and the CSA artillery positions at Antietam and Gettysburg were a deterrent to potential Union attacks at the end of these battles.

Finally, the idea that the South held individual fire superiority through marksmanship over the course of the war makes no sense. After Gettysburg the CSA was desperate for men. Old men and young boys were fed into the ranks. Convalescents were rushed back to the fight. The quality of the southern armies deteriorated as the South lost 20% of the military aged men over the course of the conflict.

Unique to the American Civil War is that the arms, men, and results were so balanced. But this should not be a surprise when you consider the two sides shared a common history, language, military tradition, and military training. Statistically the argument of southern superiority at the man vs. man level on the battlefield is simply myth.

Where the South did have a significant advantage was in leadership and mobility – Jackson specifically and in particular. The CSA never had the luxury of more than 20 wagons per 1,000 men. Southern men had to get by with much less – and the fact that they could persevere for four years is a testament to their internal fortitude, resourcefulness, and commitment to their cause.

But determination and perseverance doesn't translate into more accurate trigger pullers. Live fire practice goes a long way in marksmanship - and while the South may have started with an initial advantage in experience it did not prove to be a sustainable advantage once the Union had trained their armies.

[42ndMS]

David,

 

You actually made my point on quite a few things other than the "myths" thing. But I'm used to it, its the same ole thing everytime someone goes to mention anything pro-southern. If its true about Heth and I'm not doubting you, then his only real concern should have been the totally green 55thNC of Davis' Brigade, and he made a decent choice putting it in that Brigade. Davis was fitted with three MS Regiments, two highly seasoned, and one, the 42nd with just a little experience, my great-great-Grandfathers who fought at Gettysburg and every battle thereafter eventually surviving the war. The 2ndMS and 11thMS were two of the finest Regiments in the Army. Barksdales Brigade got raped in this game. 

[David Fair]

42ndMS,

My family fought on both side of the war with participants in Virginia, Alabama, Ohio, and Pennsylvania regiments. Lieutenant Rittenhouse commanding the battery on Little Round Top after Hazlett was KIA (5th U.S. Battery D). Robin Leech KIA at Cold Harbor, etc...

It not that I'm anti-southern just pro-history.

Much of the pro-southern rhetoric doesn't follow the historical record. Particularly the "lost cause" stuff.

My point was simply that Barksdale's Brigade is one example where some tuning might be in order. Adjustments should be blue and gray 'color blind'.

One of the most interesting things about Sherman's march was the vast resources he was able to extract from the South. We learn in the history books that by this point in the war the South was on the verge of collapse - yet Sherman's forces discovered significant untapped resources in Georgia and South Carolina that had managed to dodge the repeated calls for horseflesh, food, etc...and requisitioning efforts by the South. Additionally, it is interesting how frequently men of military age were hiding out waiting for the war to end. As in most economies there is a flourishing underground economy that seems to exist despite official efforts to toe the line. I've always thought an examination of the resources and manpower remaining in the South at the start of Sherman's march would make an interesting doctoral thesis. I'm certain many men were delighted to get away from the war and get back to life afterwards.

[42ndMS]

David,

 

All respect to your relatives who fought. You have every reason to be proud!

 

Regarding Barksdales Brigade, a fix should be done to every Confederate Brigade. As stated in the game, the picking of sides stating that the Union provides better firepower especially at longer ranges ( which is the foundation of my first post ) is total bogus. And according to your earlier statements, you realize this ( I think and hope ). Historians have always pointed out that "Southern Musketry" was better for years and years ( especially in wooded terrain, which was by far the most common terrain ). Now all of a sudden its a myth. Born and raised in the South, we strive in that department to this day, not saying there wasn't any shooters up North, just more of us than them.  

 

What does sherman have to do with this conversation?? ... I used to have a "sherman" conversation with a New Yorker about sherman, he compared him to Clausewitz, the dummy didn't know that Clauswitz was so wrong about a lot of things, especially the one where he claimed sherman brilliantly executed one of Clauswitzs' theories. More Northern propaganda to pump up their supposedly superior abilities.

[David Fair]

42ndMS,

When the game was originally tested it was designed as a CSA charge-a-thon.

Just keep the CSA charging and the Union never had a chance.

The UGG team design goal was to make fighting the different sides have a different tactical feel.

Artifacts of this design goal continue to impact the game design.

Yep, I completely agree that balancing the firepower would be much more accurate historically.

There is no historically-based argument, I can think of for, blue fire superiority - and minimal arguments for gray fire superiority (that I'm aware of).

Many other changes to the game would also improve the historical accuracy.

There is often a vast chasm between marketing spin claiming historical accuracy and a game's implementation.

History-motivated changes would not necessarily improve the game experience.

The goal of the building a game is not really historical accuracy - it's usually about feeding, clothing, and paying for college for your family.

Southern musketry advantage is an interesting topic. There is a vast difference between hunting, a shooting range, and the battlefield. Translating individual superior marksmanship off the battlefield to firepower superiority on the battlefield is problematic. Noise, smoke, fear, confusion, uncertainty, danger, stress, and sleep and food all have a leveling effect on fine motor skills. Rate of fire in a fight tends to become more important than precision.

Of the 37,000 guns collected at Gettysburg after the battle half were unloaded or had a single round. The other half had 2 or more rounds - in some cases men had loaded their guns until they couldn't jam anymore ammunition down the barrel. Fighting is a high-stress activity. It is possible that all of the serviceable guns picked up at Gettysburg were from southerners - and it was only those cowards from New York with their blue-bellied propaganda that failed to pull triggers and panicked - but I'm a bit skeptical.

If the South had a unique advantage in musketry accuracy it is almost impossible to detect statistically from the various battlefield results. The Seven Days Battle goes a long way to demonstrating that the most important factor in casualty ratios was which side was defending. The results are statistically predictable - and in my analysis quite balanced. If this were not the case the overall battlefield casualties for the war should be more skewed.

My comment on Sherman was specifically directed at your musketry observation. But I did a poor job conveying my thoughts into writing.

Let me try again...

Both sides had difficulty keeping men in the ranks. The Southern cavalry policy was on the cutting edge of the problem. Soldiers could sell their horse to a comrade and go on an unofficial furlough back home to find a remount. In some cavalry commands the practice verged of a formal rotation policy to give the men a break.

Infantry had no such opportunity. For many men in the infantry the only option was a wound or desertion. Sherman discovered surprising numbers of men, who were very likely skilled trigger pullers, hiding out for the end of the war. We don't know what the numbers were over the course of the war. But we do know attrition resulted in the South growing increasingly desperate for manpower - and that they ultimately drew on young boys and old men to fill the ranks. We also know that as ammunition became more precious that musketry practice was relegated to on-battlefield live fire exercises - not an environment conducive to marksmanship accuracy/precision.

It did become clear that Lee was losing more than 1,000 men per day to desertion after the loss of Richmond.

````````````````````````````````

I've learned something new - I didn't know Clauswitz authored "Northern propaganda". I've always thought him focused on the logistics, tactics, and lessons of the Napoleonic Wars - only some of which applied to the ACW.

There is a tremendous amount of blue and gray propaganda around today. But man for man none of this bias usually stands up to analysis/scrutiny regardless of the hue of the perspective.

My favorite response to this propaganda is the picture from the 50th Anniversary of Gettysburg. The old soldiers re-enacted Longstreet's Charge on July 3*. As they closed at the Angle they embraced. The propaganda, wounds, and vitriol that motivated the nation to war had dissipated and was buried in the past. IMHO that is where arguments of superiority should remain.

Unfortunately, the "Lost Cause" rhetoric inspired a pro-northern reaction - and arguments on superiority abound.

My observation is that myth often has a foundation in an inferiority complex. Reconstruction certainly gave the South a firm foundation and mass-appetite for myth and an alternative reality. As one former slave stated to his returned master after the war, "Bottom rail on top now." It is more difficult to pin northern myth on a historic event other than it is reactionary and likely rooted in the makeup of the individual. I'm not aware of a mass market for northern myth - but I'd be very interested in anything you can point me to to learn more. Perhaps I'm just not attracted to this genre and am blissfully unaware.

Others have theories for the mass appeal of the Lost Cause. At the time of the war the U.S. was deeply religious. Both sides stated, and may have believed, god was on "their" side. Thus, the losing side, may have suffered losing the war because of the "sin" of owning another human. Turning the war into anything other than about the issue of slavery may have been therapeutic and consoling for those that god had turned against. See for example Shelby Foote and other authors...

I'm not a psychiatrist or a psychologist so personally, I'd rather just move along...

``````````````````````````````

*The name "Pickett's Charge" was coined after Pickett's wife went on the speaking circuit after Pickett had died. My hunch is Pickett continues to roll in his grave having his name associated with that debacle. But it has become common parlance in the myth/propaganda of the war. There is even a book that states that Pickett "planned" Pickett's Charge. Complete rubbish - but if it sells books then as Lincoln said, "You can fool all of the people some of the time. You can fool some people all of the time. But you cannot fool all of the people all of the time."

[R.E.B.Blunt]

David,

 

You actually made my point on quite a few things other than the "myths" thing. But I'm used to it, its the same ole thing everytime someone goes to mention anything pro-southern. If its true about Heth and I'm not doubting you, then his only real concern should have been the totally green 55thNC of Davis' Brigade, and he made a decent choice putting it in that Brigade. Davis was fitted with three MS Regiments, two highly seasoned, and one, the 42nd with just a little experience, my great-great-Grandfathers who fought at Gettysburg and every battle thereafter eventually surviving the war. The 2ndMS and 11thMS were two of the finest Regiments in the Army. Barksdales Brigade got raped in this game. 

 

Being that my current civil war reenactment regiment is the 11th Miss and having studied the 11th Miss extensively I would have to agree. Davis Brigade was full of top tier crack soldiers who happened to have to attack crack dismounted cavalry and I Corps soldiers and unlimbered arty fortified behind wooden fences and on hills forever disgracing the men of the 11th Miss who were attached to the Davis Brigade. They had the hardest position in Longstreets charge on the third day. The extreme left flank when Brockenbrough's men began to withdraw, where they endured brutal enfilade cannon fire suffering 103 dead 166 wounded and 41 captured. Only 40 men were left alive unscathed to march back to Virginia.The 11th was the last regiment to cross into Pennsylvania having guard the baggage train and missing the first day. It was the last to cross the Potomac having to protect Lees retreat the 11th suffered even more casualties protecting their brothers safe crossing. Davis Bridages 11th Miss were some of the best men the Confederacy had.

[David Fair]

RebBlunt & 42ndMS,

Pitch your suggestions/preferences to Nick and the gang.

I suspect the question you need to be prepared to answer is how will the two sides be different after these adjustments?

The design goal, as I understand it, is that commanding the two sides offers players a different command experience.

It's a good question now that we know Antietam is over the horizon.

[42ndMS]

  Now come on David, you're putting words in my mouth I didn't say. The Clausewitz statement was about the guy I used to debate with, to him ( and a gazillion more ) sherman was the most genius of all CW generals because he followed Clausewitzs theories ( or at least one ) which were wrong, proven even by his own countrymen years later. Call it post-war propaganda to build him up. Shelby Foote is from my hometown, I never gave him much credit nor does anyone else that I know of. And when I say " Musketry", that does include re-load times as its part of it.

 

 

Hey REB Blunt, its good to hear you're with the 11thMS. A lot of interesting history with that unit. I know they're called the "University Grays", Personally I call it the " Ole Miss " Regiment. I'm sure you know what that refers to. And a lot what you don't hear about is that they did make the deepest penetration during Picketts Charge but the Virginia boys gets all the publicity. I visited the field in '04 and "eyeballed" it myself. I'm now living not far from you, I'm in Farmington MO. now.

[David Fair]

Gents,

I’ll take a stab at challenging notion of Southern musketry supremacy.

Then you can course correct where my logic has gone astray.

You’ll need to forgive my sarcasm in the post below – but taking the time to respond to the Southern Musketry Supremacy myth should have some kind of humor-based reward for the author IMHO. ;-)

The Minie ball was invented in France in 1847. Rifled muskets were state of the art military technology and civilian access to manufactured arms was limited. Most civilians living in the United States prior to 1861 did not have the means or need to arm themselves with rifled muskets. The Enfield 1853 was not widely deployed on the ACW battlefield until April, 1862. From 1862 forward the Enfield saw action on every field of combat to the end of the war.

Prior to 1861 civilians in the U.S. had access to three basic firearm alternatives: rifles, smoothbore muskets, and shotguns.

Rifles were of the antiquated 1812 era. They were slow and difficult to load, heavy, long, and poorly balanced. They were also at the pinnacle of accuracy for marksmanship at long-range prior to 1861. Not many of these obsolete firearms made it to the ACW battlefield – by the 1850s the numbers of these weapons that remained serviceable in the field was so small that they are militarily irrelevant to the discussion.

Smoothbore muskets were the preferred choice for local militias, and men with the means or need for dedicated large-game hunting/trapping. Accurate marksmanship was limited to about 50 meters. Beyond 50 meters the physics of the spherical shape of the projectile reduced marksmanship to a hit or miss proposition on a 4 foot diameter target. At 150 meters targets smaller than the side of a barn became challenging. These firearms were adequate for the battlefield - assuming Napoleonic linear tactics, which presented regimental targets massed at approximately the width of a barn and the height of a man. The basic rule for military marksmanship was at 50 meters fire at the knees, at 100 meters fire at the belly, and at 150 meters fire just over the head of the target. The goal was to achieve a gut-shot which was almost always lethal once infection set in.

Shotguns of various calibers were the primary gun of the civilian population. They could fire bird-shot, buck-shot, buck-and-ball combinations, or one or more slugs (balls). The most common round fired by civilians was bird-shot which combined enjoyment, low –cost, ridding the farm of varmits, and meat for the table. Targets larger than rabbits and squirrels required heavier gauge shot. Transitioning to bigger game/warfare shot guns could be loaded with fewer more-lethal projectiles for ranges within about 75 meters.

Given this suite of armament alternatives how was the South developing their superior long-range marksmanship skills?

The average civilian had access to a gun – but most of the hunting experience would have been limited to ranges of less than 100 yards; most frequently at ranges of less than 50 yards.

Given the Southern supremacy of firepower this should be most dramatically displayed statistically early in the war – before those blue bellied gun-shy cowards had time to get trained. The South clearly entered the war with a tremendous man-for-man advantage in skills with firearms. Southern men should be inflicting casualties at a 10 to 1 ratio according to the rhetoric of the day.

At First Manassas each army numbered about 34,000 men. About 18,000 were engaged on each side. The first shots of the Union offensive were fired at about 5:15 a.m. and the Confederate counter-offensive started at about 4 p.m.

The Union suffered 481 KIA. The South had 387 KIA.

There were 1,124 wounded men in blue. Another 1,582 men in gray lay wounded on the fields.

Given these numbers, if all other things are equal, the Southern musketry advantage was nonexistent at First Manassas. In total there were 1,605 Union vs. 1,969 CSA casualties. The Union was 23% more effective in their overall musketry.

Obviously First Manassas was an anomaly to the argument for Southern firepower supremacy.

Man-for-man the South was ten-times better. No I meant 20 times better.

Forty days after First Manassas we can prove Southern musketry supremacy at the Battle of Wilson’s Creek.

The Union attack by 5,430 men commenced at daylight. The noise disrupted the sleep of 12,120 Rebels. By 11:00 a.m. the CSA had again shattered a Union onslaught. The South had lost 277 KIA. The North suffered 258 KIA. Wounded Southerners numbered 1,232. Union casualties included 873 wounded.

Given these numbers, if all other things are equal, the Southern musketry advantage was 1.07 to 1.

Now that is a compelling demonstration of Southern firepower superiority!

For every Fredericksburg there is a Malvern Hill.

Casualty ratio for the winners of major victories over the loser is usually in the 2.1 to 1 ballpark for the ACW.

The key to ACW battlefield deaths is defensive terrain – not the dye in the fabric.

I used my 4 kids in an experiment and discovered it is possible to teach a quick course on ACW tactics and topography to see how well they can predict casualty ratios. All four performed very accurately when presented with actual battlefield situations from the ACW.

As Shelby Foote says the ACW was, "more like reciprocal murder."

Many people today, and many generals in the conflict believed, something like General Fremont stated, "I think it can be done gloriously." The ACW was a war of balance and attrition. Over the four years of war 110,000 Union and 96,000 Confederates died in combat. Another 450,000 died of diseases far from the battlefields. Both armies suffered about 35% casualties rates from disease. Disease, like bullets, and musketry supremacy was color blind during the ACW.

The only statistical anomaly in the war was John Bell Hood’s ineptitude. He continued to attack long after rational generals would have learned their lesson. His men paid a high price for his learning curve as General in Chief. For example at the Battle of Franklin he came close to losing men at 3 to 1 ratio.

Both sides managed to get their hands on rifled muskets at about the same time during the ACW. Both seem to have about the same results on the battlefield in similar conditions.

If you have some compelling evidence that the CSA held an advantage in musketry I’d be very interested in the proof and the logic of the argument.

Personally I'm not persuaded by race, creed, color, or geography supremacy arguments.

Firepower supremacy is achieved by superior weaponry.

During the ACW the armies used the same equipment, had the same training and manuals, and often were born from the same parents. The notion of blue or gray fire supremacy is baseless because it cannot be demonstrated in any battlefield results.

[David Fair]

42ndMS,

Yep, Guilty.

I was having fun pulling your leg on the Clauswitz topic based on the sentence structure rather than your intent.

No malice intended.

I'm not really certain the ACW produced any generals of genius.

As a topic for books I'm quite certain it has produced few authors of genius.

Military genius is a metric based on results.

The ACW was a war of attrition and battlefield results were frighteningly predictable.

There was only one general during the war that successfully eliminated 3 armies - all by surrender.

But I don't consider the sieges of Vicksburg or Petersburg much to crow about in the annals of military brilliance.

If it wasn't the best war we've had we'd celebrate it less. ;-)

[kc87]

42ndMS,

There are a number of issues with the quality designations in UGG for various brigades. Gottfried's "Brigades of Gettysburg" is a reasonable resource for examining/comparing brigade quality. While some brigades proved to be superior over the course of the war, at the time of Gettysburg, they were unproven. For example, Heth was so concerned about some of his North Carolina regiments, which had not seen action for more than a year, that he requisitioned regiments from other commands with more experience to steady these unproven brigades on July 1.

There is no evidence supporting some of the "Lost Cause" myths you've repeated above. While it is true that the CSA had more riles as a total percentage for their army it is not true that the CSA had more rifles at Gettysburg. Over the course of the war the Union actually bought more Enfield’s from England than the CSA. However, because the Union army was larger they had a few regiments at armed with smoothbores...but they also had 20,000 more rifles at Gettysburg. A couple of smoothbores in the mix did not change the overall military situation. It is true that the recently recruited, and poorly fitted out, Pennsylvania Militia units were of much lower battlefield quality than more seasoned units.

Over the course of the war the Union lost 110,000 men KIA in combat and the CSA about 96,000 men. A more balanced KIA result after four years of war would be difficult to achieve. Additionally, if you look at battlefield casualties statistically there is no indication that the CSA had the advantage in quality of men. When the Union was attacking at Fredericksburg the casualty result was 2.1 to 1 in favor of the CSA. When the CSA was attacking at Malvern Hill the casualty result was 2.1 to 1 in favor of the Union. Bottom line – casualty figures had more to do with terrain advantages and the side on the defensive than the color of the man’s clothing who was defending. Lee’s Seven Days around Richmond demonstrate that offensive action resulted in higher casualties for the attacker.

Additionally, artillery only contributed 6% of all battlefield casualties during the ACW. About 2/3 of the guns used by the ANV were captured guns – so if there was much of an advantage in guns it was minimal. The fuze technology, North and South, was notoriously bad during the war. While the CSA had difficulty manufacturing ammunition at the same volume of the North all of the rounds of ammunition had to be transported by wagon – which tended to give the Union about 250 rounds per gun at battles vs. the CSA 150 rounds of ammunition per gun. At Gettysburg specifically the AoP artillery supply was 93,000 rounds which the CSA supply was in the ballpark of 40,000. As the war progressed the impact of artillery on offensive operations was so poor that Grant cut the number of guns in a field battery from 6 down to 4. The basic message was that artillery required too much road surface for the offensive fire power – and the logistical difficulty of feeding the additional horses was more trouble than it was worth.

Civil War artillery was successful on the defensive and its most important contribution during the war was that it precluded the complete destruction of armies. Union armies were saved at Shiloh, and at Chancellorsville, and the CSA artillery positions at Antietam and Gettysburg were a deterrent to potential Union attacks at the end of these battles.

Finally, the idea that the South held individual fire superiority through marksmanship over the course of the war makes no sense. After Gettysburg the CSA was desperate for men. Old men and young boys were fed into the ranks. Convalescents were rushed back to the fight. The quality of the southern armies deteriorated as the South lost 20% of the military aged men over the course of the conflict.

Unique to the American Civil War is that the arms, men, and results were so balanced. But this should not be a surprise when you consider the two sides shared a common history, language, military tradition, and military training. Statistically the argument of southern superiority at the man vs. man level on the battlefield is simply myth.

Where the South did have a significant advantage was in leadership and mobility – Jackson specifically and in particular. The CSA never had the luxury of more than 20 wagons per 1,000 men. Southern men had to get by with much less – and the fact that they could persevere for four years is a testament to their internal fortitude, resourcefulness, and commitment to their cause.

But determination and perseverance doesn't translate into more accurate trigger pullers. Live fire practice goes a long way in marksmanship - and while the South may have started with an initial advantage in experience it did not prove to be a sustainable advantage once the Union had trained their armies.

 

Those statistics aren't relevant cross theater.

 

A lopsided amount of the CS casualties were from the Western Theater. Vicksburg, Nashville and Atlanta. 

 

Those statistics are also not taking wounds into account, many of which were fatal but not added to the killed in action reports. You were far more likely to get wounded than killed in the ACW. Wounded and killed shows shows 282,000 dead or wounded Confederates and 394,000 dead or wounded Federals. 

 

 

 

Army of the Potomac total killed, wounded or captured in major engagements             - 163,746        (.43%)

 

Army of Northern Virginia total killed, wounded or captured in major engagements      - 127,082        (.56%) 

 

 

 I wouldn't call it a "lost cause" myth that the Army of Northern Virginia generally performed better than the Army of the Potomac in the Eastern theater, it's a fact. However I wouldn't credit it alone to individual southern marksmanship but rather to various circumstances and assets including leadership, morale, logistics, initiative etc. 

 

The "lost cause" myth would be that the Army of Northern Virginia could have won the war despite the horrible disaster the Confederacy faced in the Western theater. Even if Lee had won a major decisive victory the Battle of Gettysburg the situation in the West had deteriorated to such that the war itself was a lost cause. 

Edited May 22, 2015 by kc87

[42ndMS]

David,

 

 

Did you notice that both of the battles you use for examples were VERY early battles? ... In all theatres the Confederates at that stage were under-armed with Rifles especially the Trans and Western ones. The Trans was just ridiculously low on them as at Wilsons Creek all the way to Pea Ridge where the Union had no shortages of them in either. Could you so dearly consider more future battles and show me the results when the Confederates were better armed, a good start would be Gettysburg where the Confederates for the majority frontal assaulted every position at a terrain disadvantage complete with Union Arty. advantage for the entire battle. And you definitely don't want to mention "The Wilderness" where Union Arty. was neglible. And there you go again with the blue-bellied cowards, you said that I didn't! ... are you trying to convince someone with the IQ of a Turnip that I'm an ignorant moron?? ... is that your nature really? if you are then it is back-firing.

 

But one thing for sure that we agree on ... There was definitely strokes of brilliance on both sides with Generals, but none in the overall scheme was consistent enough to be called geniuses. But Lee came closer by far. Nathan Forrest on the more tactical side.   

Edited May 22, 2015 by 42ndMS

[kc87]

David,

 

 

Did you notice that both of the battles you use for examples were VERY early battles? ... In all theatres the Confederates at that stage were under-armed with Rifles especially the Trans and Western ones. The Trans was just ridiculously low on them as at Wilsons Creek all the way to Pea Ridge where the Union had no shortages of them in either. Could you so dearly consider more future battles and show me the results when the Confederates were better armed, a good start would be Gettysburg where the Confederates for the majority frontal assaulted every position at a terrain disadvantage complete with Union Arty. advantage for the entire battle. And you definitely don't want to mention "The Wilderness" where Union Arty. was neglible. And there you go again with the blue-bellied cowards, you said that I didn't! ... are you trying to convince someone with the IQ of a Turnip that I'm an ignorant moron?? ... is that your nature really? if you are then it is back-firing.

 

But one thing for sure that we agree on ... There was definitely strokes of brilliance on both sides with Generals, but none in the overall scheme was consistent enough to be called geniuses. But Lee came closer by far. Nathan Forrest on the more tactical side.   

 

 

Interesting enough the Smoothbores weren't as ineffective as thought. They were percussion cap and loaded just as fast as a rifled-musket. They were effective at 200 yards, possibly more effective because of the amount of projectiles. ( maybe less effective at long range volleys, but most people can't hit anything above 200 yards in 2015 with a modern rifle) Essentially a brigade of 1000 soldiers is firing 4000 rounds instead of 1000, which could be devastating at 200 yards and under which was the ideal effective range for infantry combat anyways.

 

 

 Claud E. Fuller, in his book The Rifled Musket, shows tests of a rifled musket firing minie balls, and a smoothbore musket firing round ball and buck rounds at various ranges against a 10' x 10' target. The firers consisted of several men in line shooting in volley. At ranges of 200 yards (180 m) and under, the buck and ball from the smoothbore musket, while less accurate than the rifled musket, actually produces a greater number of hits due to the greater number of projectiles. At 200 yards, 37 of 50 Minie balls strike the target, vs. 18 of 50 smoothbore balls and 31 of 150 buckshot, for a total of 49 hits in 50 shots. At 100 yards, 50 shots by smoothbore buck and ball against the 10 x 10 target result in 79 buckshot hits and 37 ball strikes, as opposed to 48 minie ball hits in 50 shots. Beyond this range, the buckshot will have lost too much energy to be effective due to its lower ballistic coefficient. 

Edited May 22, 2015 by kc87

[kc87]

accidental double post

Edited May 22, 2015 by kc87

[42ndMS]

True kc87,

 

And very effective in Woods but with one big problem. In the open such as at Pea Ridge or anywhere. It was the gap you had to close where you're under the duress of Rifle and Cannon fire for quite some time for it to become effective. On the defense with them in the open, you were gonna get beat up pure and simple. A target that presents itself basically as a horizontal line shoulder to shoulder at 300 yds. could actually be quite easy with a CW Rifle. You will get a hit with the right elevation for the most part. The biggest problem with that was the ability to do it with the obscurity from Smoke especially with arty around. But with disciplined Volleys and not free-fire it could be done. In Woods we're talking a different story, the Trees Limbs & Leaves will hold down the smoke making the already short range even shorter, great for smoothbores..

[42ndMS]

nevermind

Edited May 22, 2015 by 42ndMS