Did France EVER have a chance against Britain at sea?

[Grim DeGrim]

Small problems:

a) Building new ships of unseasoned Wood, does result in BAD ships..

b ) "Ready in port"? Well, to become a good sailor, you need to be at sea and train, not in port and have your ship rot.

So beg to differ with those cited statements of yours.

Whose / which ones? Generally speaking, I agree with you. Edited February 16, 2015 by Grim DeGrim

[Chromey]

Ever since the French revolution the French Navy was gutted of its officers by the new Republican government since most Naval officers were also members of Royalty.  England controlled the seas there after and even though France built many ships afterwards their crews were all new and green and they fared badly against the much more experienced British crews. I wonder if any of the other allied countries (Austria, Russia,Prussia etc.) had naval battles against the Republican Navy? I'm sure if they did the battles might have been closer for France. I don't think any other countries had a real naval power besides England, France, Spain and the Dutch whom had a reason to build large navies to protect their colonies over seas. If Napoleon had managed to save some more of the Royalist naval officers of old then his navy might have stood more of a better chance!

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Santa_Cruz_de_Tenerife_%281797%29          <-Nelsons only defeat?

Edited February 18, 2015 by Chromey

[Sir Madoc]

This topic is stupid. Of course France "had a chance".

Edited February 18, 2015 by Madoc

[Grim DeGrim]

On equal naval terms (eg, standalone naval power)?  Perhaps in 1690.  Perhaps (?) just after the revolution (if they had the crewmen to man the ships).  Perhaps in all the years in between if they had allies with sufficient ships to close the SOL gap differential with Britain.

 

But otherwise, no, as the larger fleet has "generally speaking" always won.

 

I've enjoyed the thread.  Very informative discussion Mr. Madoc.

[Platoon Crusher]

What do real life french victories and losses have to do with being french in a game like this?  Losing a lot in real life does not have any bearing on wheather french will win battles in game.  It should not be discouraging at all. 

 

I agree with this statement 100% It is a game and unless they are hamstrung by the Devs for reality purposes there is no correlation to history.

[Kao1808]

Maybe the French would have done better if they had focused more on their navy sooner. I understand in those times if you were French the more honorable prestigious thing to do was join the army not the navy.

 

But in the end you always have a chance, even against a bigger foe, that’s why we have tactics and alliances.

 

That said in the game, as been mentioned now a couple times, it is not really important if France had a chance because we are here to rewrite history.

 

It is kind of like Fifa. You are not going to not pick England knowing they never had a real chance of winning the World Cup after the sixties 

[Hethwill]

Bumped on this booklet by Douglas Allen ( economics ) [link]

It brings more questions than answers to this discussion but is a highly valuable read. ( and provides a great amount of bibliography to go for as well )

[Rouleur]

Its a game. France certainly had naval potential, but its a continental power and was faced with numerous threats post revolution - so the army was always a greater priority. The argument that leadership was the key weakness may have been true, but much the same happened across all its military and this did not prevents its army from developing the best officer corp during the period - in fact the opportunity to rise through the ranks on merit, was a major advantage, as was its flexibility. So in different circumstances there was no intrinsic reason why it could not have developed better leadership across the board.

[Captain Armstrong]

Its a game. France certainly had naval potential, but its a continental power and was faced with numerous threats post revolution - so the army was always a greater priority. The argument that leadership was the key weakness may have been true, but much the same happened across all its military and this did not prevents its army from developing the best officer corp during the period - in fact the opportunity to rise through the ranks on merit, was a major advantage, as was its flexibility. So in different circumstances there was no intrinsic reason why it could not have developed better leadership across the board.

Napoleon had the same logic. The reason the same system didn't work well with the French navy is that there is a great deal more technical knowledge, skill, and situational experience required to sail and fight a warship of the era. The time it took to develop a new naval officer class experienced enough to be good commanders was too long to pay dividends in the timespan of the war with England, particularly considering the general lack of a strong mentoring class of senior officers from which to learn success, the constant blockade, and the high turnover in new officers caused by frequent defeat and the casualties and imprisonment that entailed.

[Portsdown]

Bumped on this booklet by Douglas Allen ( economics ) [link]

It brings more questions than answers to this discussion but is a highly valuable read. ( and provides a great amount of bibliography to go for as well )

 

I skim read it and seen much I agree with but also things that I strongly disagree with.

 

I particularly disagree with the equation of the skill levels required of a Military and a Naval officer of the period. For a start, the situation changed radically during the period in question. At the start of the period a RN Captain didn't need ANY naval sill at all to be appointed to command. It was the job of the senior Warrant Officer of the ship, the Master (actually, Sailing Master, which gives a better idea of his duties) to provide that. However by the end of the period the naval skills required of a ships commander, at least in the Royal Navy, required that he begin his career as a mere child - there was so much to learn. For a start he had to be able to 'Hand, Reef and Steer' - that is, he had to be able to do anything a skilled seaman could do. He also had to be able to command men, map ashore and chart afloat, navigate and have developed the seamanship skills to keep a ship safe from ordinary bad weather. He was expected to take scientific observations and be able to negotiate with foreign powers, something that even peacetime provisioning in foreign ports required. He had to know enough of all the skills aboard ship, such as Sailmaking and Carpentry to deal with his specialists. He had to understand gunnery and how to rig a ship. He was also required to know fleet tactics and how to finely control his ship in formation with other ships that had different characteristics. He even had to know enough about medicine to be able to discharge his responsibilities there - if he had a sickly ship the Admiralty would hold him personally responsible.

 

The key difference is shown in the fact that there was no formal examination to rise in rank in the British Military of the time. There was in the Navy, as even in peacetime getting things wrong led to deaths and the loss of valuable ships and trained men. Read Rodgers 'The Wooden World' for more details on the differences. And since the author of that paper HAS read it I wonder why he glossed over it.

 

I didn't have enough time to read in detail, but I'm also not that happy with some of the things he says about fleet tactics. There are good reasons, apart from keeping an eye on your captains to fight in line. Navies were still fighting in line in World War Two (not in exactly the same manner to be sure) - the reasons have to do with control of movement, efficiency in signalling and the geometry of engagement. Somewhere I have a rather old book that goes into the evolution of the system and comes to the conclusion that right from the start Admirals were departing from the classic line vs line but that once is was established the line was the basis from which everybody started, if only because it was just about the best way to keep a fleet together and all going in the same direction at the same speed at the same time.

 

I need to read it in more detail and take notes. He has lots of good points but I think he overstates his case and omits things that should be included such as expectation and culture. Some of my colleagues from our Historical Analysis team have published work on land battles that show striking and consistent differenced between different cultures on such things as the level of casualties taken before a unit will break or surrender  (and no, it doesn't show 'the British are best'). I think that he ignores internal and national culture and expectations without much justification. Even when he is looking at 'carrot and stick' factors he leaves out the huge social pressures - a man with a good reputation would be feted as a hero and might aspire to marry a heiress but a man with a reputation as a coward would not be received in polite society. He also ignores the Honours System - remember that Nelson died as Viscount Nelson, Knight of the Order of the Bath.

Edited February 19, 2015 by Portsdown

[Hethwill]

Thanks.

 

I recognise the similar demand of character was to be provided across all navies although the RN took it one step further, thus having the other european powers mimic it although with one or two generations delay, and it makes a huge experience gap at the officers level.

 

I will go through the title you point out.

[Portsdown]

Point on the skill levels of Land and Sea officers of the time. One of the things a Naval Officer was expected to be able to do was plan, command and execute a land engagement...

[Rouleur]

Napoleon had the same logic. The reason the same system didn't work well with the French navy is that there is a great deal more technical knowledge, skill, and situational experience required to sail and fight a warship of the era. The time it took to develop a new naval officer class experienced enough to be good commanders was too long to pay dividends in the timespan of the war with England, particularly considering the general lack of a strong mentoring class of senior officers from which to learn success, the constant blockade, and the high turnover in new officers caused by frequent defeat and the casualties and imprisonment that entailed.

Agreed. However the period covers over 25 year from the Revolution until the end of the Napoleonic wars, and much longer between the Seven Years war/American war of Independence, so had France not faced so many continental threats, it is possible it could have developed better naval leadership, spent more on its navy and developed a larger colonial presence in the context of this being a game. It was a much more populous county than the UK as well at the time. It was not likely to happen in reality but then the extent of its continental empire did not look likely in the aftermath of the revolution, although it can be argued it would never have happened without it.

[Grim DeGrim]

There are so many impacts and variables. In reading last night, just after King Louis XVI was executed, a short time late they fill the Naval administration position (pardon my recollection, the book is at hone). To make a long story short, the gentleman disband the existing naval. "artillery" group, and the "French navy impact is 20 years of slow & inaccurate cannon fire".

In line with what Rouleur is saying... But noting that one decision can have an impact for many years in end.

Ps- can clean up this passage later tonight, for the sake of clarity.

[Charles-René Magon]

« The war of 1778, between Great Britain and the House of Bourbon, which is so inextricably associated with the American Revolution, stands by itself in one respect. It was purely a maritime war. Not only did the allied kingdoms carefully refrain from continental entanglements, which England in accordance with her former policy strove to excite, but there was between the two contestants an approach to equality on the sea which had not been realized since the days of Tourville [...] No such conditions existed in any war between the accession of Louis XIV. and the downfall of Napoleon. » A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (1890).

 

And, as if by magic, France won...

[maturin]

Not exactly magic. The combined French-Spanish navies put the British in the most vulnerable strategic position of the century.

In this environment, the French fleet was able to avoid decisive defeat long enough for French land forces to accomplish their objectives. The British soundly beat both their opponent's fleets at the Saintes and Cape St. Vincent, but lost the colonies.

[Hethwill]

Not exactly magic. The combined French-Spanish navies put the British in the most vulnerable strategic position of the century.

In this environment, the French fleet was able to avoid decisive defeat long enough for French land forces to accomplish their objectives. The British soundly beat both their opponent's fleets at the Saintes and Cape St. Vincent, but lost the colonies.

 

Actually the "Sun never sets on the British Empire" thing starts at Trafalgar. Despite the military importance it was a global statement with a strategic scope never observed before. ªBut its full effect could only be seen once we reach the middle of the 19th century. 

 

What is quite interesting is that the importance that it became for England is way bigger than the sense of tragedy gave by the French. One simply stated that they actually ruled the seas, or would fight hard for it. For the second it simply was a "delay" in their continental plans. Was a battle of importance BUT in the minds of the continental powers it simply saved Britain from invasion. It did not change the Status Quo lived in land.

 

We see the opposite in the European wars as we saw in the Seven yers war. France armies as conquerors and navy very weak. Before, France was quite a menace in the sea while its armies faltered greatly in the northern countries...

Edited February 20, 2015 by Hethwill_Khan

[maturin]

I'm not really sure what you are responding to, khan.

Certainly the French navy was a serious threat, but only for a brief moment in the 1770s (combined with the Spanish) was it a truly existential one.

And the French navy virtually ceased to exist periodically in that century, due to neglect by the state. Not to say that you aren't correct overall

[Portsdown]

The key thing about Trafalgar is that it set the seal on British dominance at sea. And that dominance had tremendous economic implications in terms of trade, with the Empire and elsewhere. This meant that not only could the Royal Navy be afforded but we could subsequently weather the impact on our trade of the Continental System, through shifting our trade away from Europe (although lack of control of the sea off her coast also made it difficult for France to prevent the large scale evasion of the system through Smuggling), finance the Peninsular War, and continue to deploy the 'Golden Cavalry of St George' (subsidies that partially financed the land campaigns of our coalition partners).

[Hethwill]

I'm not really sure what you are responding to, khan.

Certainly the French navy was a serious threat, but only for a brief moment in the 1770s (combined with the Spanish) was it a truly existential one.

And the French navy virtually ceased to exist periodically in that century, due to neglect by the state. Not to say that you aren't correct overall

 

Actually that brief moment was enough to ensure the independence of the Thirteen Colonies by all means, plenty of blockade runners and frigates presence was enough to disrupt many of the English plans to ford armies across the ocean. Amazing how a simple few ships can become a nightmare to HQ planners regarding logistics

If anything the navy was great while the army lost all holds in Canada for the most part. After the Revolution the scenario changes. Army gets high quality and Navy returns to a "parade" show.

Edited February 20, 2015 by Hethwill_Khan

[Grim DeGrim]

Place holder for response... The war at sea was not won by France during the war of of American independence.

Their naval fleet "contributed" to the winning of the war, but certainly did not "win the naval war" against Britain.

I'll revise my post after picking up the novel I just read. If I'm mistaken, I'll post it here with apologies. I'm pro-French, but don't wish to over state Historical fact.

[Charles-René Magon]

Place holder for response... The war at sea was not won by France during the war of of American independence.

 

Why ?

 

(Parlez-vous français par hasard ? J'aimerais débattre avec vous de cette question mais malheureusement mon anglais est bien trop médiocre pour le faire efficacement...)

Edited February 21, 2015 by Charles-René Magon

[Hethwill]

You are right Grim. Strategically the France presence was enough to complicate any plans to ford another army to the colonies. That helped if not won and bought all the time in world to the rebels.

 

In strategic terms which for me is way more interesting than isolated events such as Trafalgar, no matter how decisive it was, was simply a mean to an end along a line of strategic thought. Indeed it was a "all-in" bet but it had a backup plan. The Canal Fleet was a second hand reserve if the battle went wrong and eventually the french fleet would be destroyed. The plan of attracting the brittish fleet away was of no consequence. There were 3 more fleets the same strength as Nelson's at the post, Canal, Mediterranean and Madeira/Azores ( Ocean Fleet ) and all these consisting of Portuguese, English and Russian parts. So in the strategic context Trafalgar was a isolated event with a decisive result. There are very few events like this in military history.

 

But we forget the rest of the nations in the Revolutionary and Imperial wars against France. Overall France had no chance even with Spain aid. The English and Portuguese combined forces were too strong. The siege at Malta is a perfect example of France weakness. In a place so close to their main port at Marseilles they couldn't even conduct a proper campaign in strategic terms. Plus the Peninsular Campaign was half won by the navies and France could do nothing to stop it. Armies were ferried back and forth at will in the face of the french marechals...

[Grim DeGrim]

Why ?

(Parlez-vous français par hasard ? J'aimerais débattre avec vous de cette question mais malheureusement mon anglais est bien trop médiocre pour le faire efficacement...)

Mon Français... C'est... Horrible. But I would never have guessed you are native French speaker, you English post was excellent.

I reviewed book last night. I started writing a post... After a 2 page word document, I found I was only half done summarizing the war. I will finish but I will start a new thread, and reference it here.

To be honest, in review... This maybe was one of France's greatest opportunity to defeat England - WITH the assistance of Spain as an ally. In terms of raw nation v. Nation power, France was still under shipped ~60 ships to 100 ships.

Trés bien monsieur!

Edited February 21, 2015 by Grim DeGrim

[Grim DeGrim]

Charles-René Magon:

 

In review...I think you have highlighted a bright spot in the history of Naval Warfare for France.  A few points:

 

• Firstly, France as a stand alone naval power STILL, during this period of time, did not match that of England.  So on a "Nation versus Nation" platform, France did not have a chance "alone".
• The France / Spain alliance during this period DID have enough fleet power to overcome Britain.  And late in the war when the Dutch joined that alliance, the odds were even more against Britain.
• By 1779 the combined French / Spain naval power was 120 Ships of the Line, versus Britain's 90 (in service).
• The invasion attempt of that same year is probably one of the greatest lost opportunities for a definitely French victory (though it should be noted their goal was not to replace the George III, this was instead to provoke a call for peace from Britain).
• Invasion attempt of 1779 (by France/Spain) fails.  They send 36 Spanish and 30 French ships of line to escort 20,000 troops in transports for the invasion...however contrary winds, delays in assembling, and spread of disease aboard crowded ships ... caused the ships to never leave port.  Britain had fewer than fewer than 40 ships of the line [available for defense].
• Skipping a bunch of stuff....
• 1781 de Grasse (French Admiral, 24 ships of line at Chesapeake Bay) defeats Commodore Thomas Graves & Samuel Hood (20 ships of the line).  Though De Grasse captures no ships, the victory buys the Americans time and Cornwallis surrenders...essentially ensuring American independence, as the American army was almost out of food.

Now there's alot that happens in between and afterwards.  I think I'll compile a post on the much broader topic.  Both sides had victories and losses.  But there really were not many (if any) decisive victories.  French naval efficiency declines severely in 1882 to the point where De Grasse losses ships because the crash into each other (quality of crewmanship declines).  and by the end of the war, France has spent 1 Billion Livres in the war effort...and this sets the stage for eventual bankruptcy (equivalent) and the French Revolution.

Edited February 21, 2015 by Grim DeGrim