Mr. Mercanto

Its really hard to say, brigade sizes fluctuated wildly. The Irish Brigade fell as low as around 300 by Gettysburg, though a good brigade should have at least 1500 men at arms. The other thing is that the Federals and Confederates deployed their brigades differently. Federals tended to deploy two regiments front and two more in reserve, deploying them as needed in the action. Confederates tended to place all four regiments abreast. Thus, a Confederate brigade arrayed for battle might have a longer length due simply to deployment methodology. In theory, the formation was supposed to stay in a thin phalanx. Essentially an American "Think Red Line" (but blue or grey instead lol). Often times, opposing lines would retreat in the face of a concerted effort, however if the bayonet charge resulted in hand to hand fighting, obviously things would dissolve into an infamous blob. That having been said, there is what was supposed to happen, and what did. The men were supposed to advance in lock step, with the bayonet poised at the correct height. In early war sketches, we see artists anachronistically imposing this order on their subjects; this was their projection, and not reflective of the reality. Men who read these illustrated papers scoffed at their absurdly good order portrayed in the papers. As the sketch artists became more experienced, and their perception less enamored with notions of Antebellum Victorian gallantry, these sketches began to reflect the disorder of combat. Men were not in lock step, some were faltering, some to far ahead, others behind, et cetera. This is likely a more accurate reflection of actual fighting. So, while the men were in theory supposed to advance in perfect formation, instead they probably advanced in a more disordered close order formation, and began to break up when the charge was ordered to "double quick" or when close combat was joined with the enemy.

I like to place my Spencer brigade on the moon. Their aim is really good.

Post of the month

"Its nip and tuck out there; and damned if I ain't afraid its mostly tuck." -Unnamed US infantrymen at the battle of Chickamauga

^ See, contrary to popular belief, I can criticize Lincoln. Sometimes. When I have to. Which isn't often.

So this is a super important and touchy question. Since answering it means I can avoid the gym for another ten minutes, I'll give an answer. The short answer is, yes, people did consider this. In fact, the Colonization Society was set up for this very purpose. Someone else here asked about payment, the fact is that many wealthy "philanthropists" were happy to assist the project, and much was government funded. In fact, as someone has already pointed out, an effort was made in Liberia in 1862. It failed. The fact is, Lincoln supporting this was a real blindspot for him. He made the same mistake that your question has made, if I may be so bold. "ship them back where they came from." Lincoln, like your question, assumed that these men were from Africa. They were not. They were born, lived, toiled, suffered, loved and lost, buried their loved ones, and more often were separated from their loved ones, in the United States. Africa was not their home, America was. The assumption that they should "go back" was based on an old racial narrative that they never belonged. When Lincoln presented this idea to various black leaders, including Frederick Douglass, Douglass responded that America was the home of the black man, and that the nation was his birth right as much as any white man. For Douglass, and hundreds of thousands of black men, the war was not simply to end slavery, but more radically to demonstrate that America was their home to. In the end, Lincoln understood this, and after 1862, never again attempted something so ridiculous. Having once condescendingly stated to the assembled black leaders that the white man would never be able to tolerate their presence in their land, and that black slaves would have to return to a land they had never seen; Lincoln by war's end understood that the white men of the nation would simply have to accept the reality that America belonged to more then just them.

I absolutely love this answer. Though I have to note that despite all logic and reason, 50% of my beloved 1st Minnesota boys re-enlisted when their three year papers expired. Due to the already low numbers of the regiment, the 1st Minnesota was re-organized into the 1st Minnesota Special Battalion. Its new title gave it new muster roles, and is recorded separately in "The War of the Rebellion." So in actual-point-of-fact, the 1st Minnesota did serve through Appomattox, just as the 1st Minnesota Special Battalion. That being said, given their small numbers, they were rarely put into frontline action. Though I'd pity any Southron in front of them if they had been. There's also an interesting example of this in Lee's army on the retreat to Appomattox. One diaist recalled seeing some of the artillery boys shrugging of their guns and going home after Saylor's Creek. He wrote that none of the men begrudged these soldiers, for they had served their time and they were simply done.

Actually the banning of slavery in all territories was the fundamental plank of the Republican party. He also stated his support for a strict ban on slavery in all new territories in several speeches, such as the Cooper Union speech and the Douglas debates. Lincoln wanted no slavery in the territories, it was pretty cut and dry. Lincoln essentially said that he could not touch slavery where it existed, but would not see it spread one more inch. It was upon this quiestion of slavery in the new territories that the Civil War was fought. As for the EP. Alan Guezlo has written about this in great length. The EP was a military edict, and therefore could only be applied to territories in an open state of military rebellion. Lincoln could not, therefore, Constitutionally extend it to the slave states. Before and after issuing the EP, Lincoln urged the loyal slave holding states to adopt compensated graudal emancipation packages. He warned them that slavery would die, and that they'd best let it go slowly and be compensated for it, rather then losing it all in a desperate effort to save it. They refused. When Lincoln signed the EP into law, members of hsi cabinet expressed concern over loyal slave states responding aggressively. Of them, Lincoln said that he had repeatedly offered them the opportunity to accept the inevitably of the end of slavery, and now they would have to live with it. Ok so this is a really difficult question to answer in less then essay....and I don't feel like writing an essay. Basically the pro-slavery South argued that, because state law allowed them to hold property in human chattel, then Federal law had to protect state laws. As citizens of these states, they should be able to enjoy their State granted right to hold slaves in any territory controlled by the US, since the Federal government must protect their property rights, which were defined in detail by the state laws. This is called the "States Rights" argument. In the Dredd Scott case, udge Robert Taney tried to foist this precedent on the United States, and in so doing perhaps did more then anyone, save for John Brown, to bring about the great American Civil War. Anti-slavery restrictionists like Lincoln felt that legal precedent indicated that the primary role of the Federal government was to uphold the human rights espoused in the fourth Amendment. As such, the Federal government could not legally hold people in slavery. Thus, while individual States could redefine property to include people, the Federal government could not enforce that independent of State law in territories. Since Territories were Federally controlled, the territories must obey Federal laws, which could not include slavery. Since the future of slavery rested on its expansion, the settlement of this question essentially determined the future of the institution's existence in the United States.

I'm just going to ramble a quick response to this before I go to bed. Hope it is interesting...or, you know, makes sense... In my own studies, I find that a few factors matter. In the broad sense, volunteers appear to have required two things. The first was effective leadership. Officers were not only required to be effective in the field, but to command the respect of their men. In this way, even officers who were appointed "earned" their position. Commanders like Charles Russel Lowel, William Colvill, or Strong Vincent who led by example, cared for their men's needs, and were both conspicuous and competent on the field, often helmed excellent units. The other broad need was elan, and this is harder to diagnosis. In my opinion, this appears to have come from units who achieved early success. This success inspired confidence. This confidence turned to pride, which gave cause for the men to push all the harder. The Stonewall Brigade had much cause for such pride, and in turn elan, following their victories at Bull Run and the Shenendoah. Likewise, despite being amongst the defeated, the 1st Minnesota performed with notable courage and fortitude at Bull Run. I can attest that the men were, at the time, aware of and proud of their uniquely calm and poised behaviour, as well as their key role in the attack on the Confederate left. In my opinion, having read a good deal of their diaries, the men of the regiment built upon this early validation of their courage to form the extraordinary elan that allowed them to do the impossible at Gettysburg, and in so doing, save the army itself. Finally, it is my (somewaht) studied opinion that volunteer soldiers and militia require a balance between their own "civilian" or "personal" interests, and their military duty. Striking a balance between these seems to have produced excellent volunteer soldiers (notably, for example, in the War of 1812, which I once used as a historical laboratory for said analysis of volunteerist soldiering in the 19th century). In the case of the Civil War, I would argue that Federal soldiers and Confederate soldiers civilian interests largely revolved around returning home to their families, and protecting those families, as fast as possibles. For Federals, this meant returning to them with the Union preserved, so that it may continue to be a guarantor of their future. For Confederates, this meant returning to their families free from the perceived anarchy of slavery's abolition and racial equality. When the men felt that their civilian interests were being met, they performed well with high morale. An example of this, I would argue, can be found in late war Confederate disillusion. As the Federals marched further into Confederate territory, Rebel soldiers began to fear that their families might be accosted while they, the Rebel soldier, would be in the army, far from home and helpless to intervene. As such, the congruence between the Confederates military and civilian interests was disrupted, and Confederates naturally chose their civilian interests, over military ones, thus absenting themselves in extreme numbers. These are just some tardy thoughts on your question, which I really did mean to address earlier, before life got in the way. Hope this was worth the wait lol

Lincoln was 6'5", a frontiersman until 21, and known in Springfield for his talent at wrastling. Davis was blind in one eye, dyspeptic, and crippled with pain by neuralgia. Poor Jeff....

The Wiard guns were actually some of the best artillery produced in the war. It kind of irks me that they are speced so low in the game

It would be super boring.... I have the honor of demanding your surrender I refuse Commence two days of fireworks!!! ...on second thought, that sounds kind of awesome...

*Tear running down my cheek* Godspeed you magnificent bastard...

We aim to please, here at the UG:CW Forums

About to get to bed, but I'll just a list a few good books off the top of my head. Sorry if its a bit slim. I know there are books not springing to mind at present lol. Also, I did not include Battlecry as it has already been established above. For the record, any understanding of the war can begin with this book as a foundation. @The Soldier, I highly recommend you make it your first Civil War monograph (and indeed it can be interpreted as a monograph) when you have the time. For Battle histories and tactics: "Gettysburg: The Last Invasion" by Alan Guezlo "Chancellorsville" and "Landscape Turned Red" By Steven W. Sears Military History: "A Military History of the American Civil War" By John Keegan "Grand Strategy in the American Civil War" By Donald E. Stroker Any of the "Civil War Campaign" Series. Right now I have most enjoyed the Chickamauga collection. "The Hard Hand of War" By Mark Grimsly Causes of the War: "Disunion! The Coming of the Civil War: 1791-1858" by Elizabeth R. Varon Socio-Military history: "What this Cruel War was Over: Slavery and the Civil War" By Chandra Manning "Billy Yank" and "Johnny Reb" by Bell Irwin Wiley Home Front Socio-Military: "Unruly Women: The Sexual and Racial Politics of the Antebellum South" by Victoria Bynum "Confederate Reckoning" by Stephanie McCurry "This Republic of Suffering: Death and the Civil War" by Drew Giplin Faust Regimental Histories: "The Last Full Measure" By Richard Moe (A Regimental History of the 1st Minnesota) Memoirs: "No More Gallant a Deed: A Memoir a Soldier in the First Minnesota during the Civil War" by Sgt James A Wright (Edited by Steven W. Sears) Grant's Memoirs by, you guessed it, Ulysses S. Grant. Edited by Samuel Clemens. Historiography: "The Union War" By Gary Gallagher Essay Collections: "This Mighty Scourge" and "Why the Civil War Still Matters" By James M. McPherson "Weirding the War: Tales from the Civil War's Ragged Edges" Edited by Steven Berry. Anything from the "Campaign Series" especially the newest edition "Cold Harbor to Petersburg" which reflects the growth of new Socio-Military historiography in Civil War studies. Reconstruction: "After Appomattox: Victory, Defeat, and Slavery at the End of the Civil War" By Elizabeth R. Varon "After Appomattox" By Gregory P. Downes "Race and Reunion" By David W. Blight "A Brief History of Reconstruction: 1863-1876" By Eric Foner.

Lol he's being sarcastic. Both 1stVermont and myself made frequent reference to it, though 1stVermont struggled somewhat in the effort, on account of him not having actually read it, but simply quote mined it.

Honestly, rifled cannons really weren't that great in the war. They were accurate in theory, but blackpowder is not conducive to long range accuracy reports, and the rifling concentrated canister fire considerably, disabling it as an anti-personal weapon. This was unfortunate as canister was at this time the only real effective and reliable form of artillery. The only rifled cannons that compensated for this second issue were the Wiard guns, which are rather underpowered in this game Broadly speaking, Little Mac was right when he insisted that smoothbore canons were better. It wouldn't be until Cordite powder that artillery would really be able to enjoy the benefits of rifling. Ok, Nerdy Mercanto interlude over.

Couldn't agree more. An easier difficulty is a godsend to those of us who enjoy a rum as they organize their armies. In the Koro Edition, they will have Huey Gunships and Metal Storm Artillery. For added challenge...

The AI is constantly being improved and, as far as I am concerned, is leaps and bounds over UG:G who had a bad habit of standing around at inopportune times. Still, until @Nick Thomadis actually invents Skynet, there will always be limits. Nick, when you do invent Skynet, remember all the times I made you laugh on the forums (unless I didn't).

Yeah...that's it... >.> That's why I play Colonel...

Hey @Koro! We're getting a joint interview! For me, I find campaign to be oppressively difficult on anything higher then Colonel, I jsut can't seem to get a sufficient number of experienced soldiers together at times, and the high level of late game enemy troops is staggering. For Historical Battles, I can win handily on Brigadier.

Ah thanks, I'm fond of you too, @The Soldier

From the "Maple Syrup Collection"