Jump to content
Game-Labs Forum

Mr. Mercanto

Civil War Tester
 View Profile  See their activity

  • Posts

    684

  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    1

 Content Type 

Everything posted by Mr. Mercanto

  1. Mr. Mercanto
    Agreed, but in using the word "traitor" in this context, I am intentionally invoking the language of Radical Republicans in their struggle against "Southern Redemption." So in this case my employment of the word is directed to my broader point..
  2. Mr. Mercanto
    But we cannot discount the five years of Conrgressional Reconstruction under Radical Republicans, nor their existence as a political force until the end of the Grant admin. Nor can we ignore the presence of more radically minded abolitionists such as Frederick Douglass and Wendell Philips. That having been said, I suppose we both no that counter-factuals are as fun as they are impossible to resolve. So I think we will have to agree to disagree on this.
  3. Mr. Mercanto
    I also liked his focus on Chattanooga, it always seemed to me that for such a central railroad depot, it receives very little attention. Can you elaborate on Northrop? I'm not very familiar with that and you've sparked my curiosity.
  4. Mr. Mercanto
    Those are already on my list! My ever growing list....
  5. Mr. Mercanto
    We will have to agree to disagree on that. I happen to agree with Downes, Blight, and Foner that a "Golden Opportunity" did exist during Reconstruction, and that, no matter how you sice it, traitors were allowed to be citizens, and loyal men cast into apartheid; and it was done to appease the traitors, all due to race. These ideas are not exclusive to these historians, such contemporary views in the 1860s and 1870s are very well documented. Indeed, the Civil War was not about racial egalitarianism, but I think Reconstruction in many respects was. Obviously Reconstruction had several agendas, and one can argue if Reconciliation failed them by failing to secure racial equality and create a truly pro-Union South, or if it succeeded by creating in the South a power structure which could embrace the Union. All of this depends on which agenda one decides fits Reconstruction. My own view is that Reconstruction should have aimed to deconstruct the power structures that created secession and the war, above all the planter class and the hegemony of racism. Such would achieved by the appropriation of planter property for social uplift of white yeomens and Freedmen, and by racial equalty. Failing this, Reconstruction settled for allowing the old antebellum families to return to power, a new system of laws restablish racial hierarchy, and a memory of the war to flourish that celebrated treason, and buried the memory of Southern Unionists, black and white. In doing so, Reconstruction failed to destroy the heart of secession, and thus, in my estimation, was a failure.
  6. Mr. Mercanto
    What did you think of it? I loved it, personally, though I'll warrant I've read far less on the subject then yourself.
  7. Mr. Mercanto
    I suppose I fall into the position that it must be interpreted with both. On the one hand, history needs to be contextualized to be understood. Indeed, much of the confusion about the causes of the war, Emancipation, et cetera, exist because our views are anachrnoistically imposed on historical contexts. However, the Civil War is a seminal event in American history, and the questions over which it was fought are not yet entirely resolved, and resonate today. The public memory of the war is as much a crucial area of Civil War historioraphy as any other, perhaps more crucial, if like myself you view historians as having a responsiblility to aid the public in understanding the framework and context of the country, community, et cetera. In this respect, I would argue that the Civil War must also be viewed with modern eyes. So in a sense, I think Civil War historians need to walk a fine line of doing both. Either way, Foner and McPherson use undeniably excellent research, as does Blight; and their contributions to the historiography have been tremendous.
  8. Mr. Mercanto
    Have you read Donald Stroker's new book. He definitely seems to suggest Clausewitz is more crucial then Jomini on understanding the war. I'd be very curious to hear your thoughts on the matter.
  9. Mr. Mercanto
    I've mentioned Chandra Manning several times on this forum, though I've posted a great deal, so I can hardly expect anyone to have read every post. I must admit that I am unfamiliar with Ed Sebesta. I spoke about DiLorenzo because a) while no historian is free from influence, personal, political or historiographical, what makes DiLorenzo's history poor is that his politics come first. He has a poor tendency to manufacture evidence or ignore contrary evidence. While Blight and McPherson have their political views, their scholarship is extreemly sound, employs reliable sources, and can be defended. Surely as a scholar, you would agree that this is a crucial distinction. b ) the person who I was debating continually refered to DiLorenzo as a source. Believe me, I would be very happy to never discuss DiLorenzo again lol. As for Barbara Fields, I think her scholarship is interesting, but flawed. I broadly agree with Gallagher's critique of her work in The Union War I was under the understanding that the volunteer system was reformed during and after the 1812 war, though I freely admit that that is not my area of expertise.
  10. Mr. Mercanto
    The short answer is, the Civil War would have happened in 1856. The Civil War is caused by Southern secession, and secession by the election of an anti-slavery President, and the loss of power and security in the slave-holding class that such an election indicated. Frémont was no less a determined and passionate fellow then Lincoln, and would have pursued war as necessary solution to maintaining the government. Perhaps the Confederacy might have stood a better chance, as Lincoln was a far superior political and military leader to Frémont (who demonstrated his naive political sensibilities and the limits of his personal self-control while acting as head of the Missouri Department). In Lincoln, the Confederates had a powerful foe. I suppose one might argue that the state of technology might also have aided the Confederacy. The rifle musket was available (which gave the South a tremendous advantage fighting defensively), however the various mechanically advantageous instruments of the Union, the New Model Sharps Carbine and repeating Spencer, had yet to be manufactured in prototype. That having been said, the metal cartridge was well on its way to military service, and the original Sharps falling block needed only some improvements and modifications to achieve the sterling quality of the 1859 model, so these likely would have simply been produced a few years earlier to meet wartime demand. Warfare has a way of speeding up such processes. Otherwise, it is possible that the people of the North would have been less incensed, as the pro-Southern slavery "doughface" actions of Buchanan did a great deal to further exacerbate tensions over the expansion of slavery, most notably in the cases of the Le Compton Constitution in Kansas, and Buchanan's intervention in the Dredd Scott case. however, within the parameters of your question, a Frémont victory in 1856 would indicate that the people were already sufficiently chagrined by the aggressive expansion of slavery, and needed no more such aggregious actions on the part of the pro-Slavery interest. Free will! Free men! Free soil! Frémont!
  11. Mr. Mercanto
    You can read Brookes D. Simpson's scholarship for more on this. Sorry to be so blunt, but its one of the myths I've grown weary of hearing about. Its a lazy calumny on Grant's character. Grant wasn't perfect (he was painfully and cripplingly nepotistic, for example), however his pre-war struggle with alcoholism was shamelessly and disgustingly exploited by his detractors during the war, and political opponents and rivals afterward. The historiography of the mythology is very easily traced to these unsubstianted claims made by interested parties. Not only is it unfair to Grant, its also just bad history, which annoys me.
  12. Mr. Mercanto
    Absolutely, almost makes the effort worth it lol
  13. Mr. Mercanto
    Hey everybody! I brought my Sharps Carbine to the range yesterday, and recorded some shooting! I thought perhaps some of the folks on this forum might enjoy taking a look at the ubiquitous UG:CW cavalry/skirmishing rifle. Enjoy! PS: I'm not a great shot... Part 1: The Sharps, and engaging our friends, the enemy (Confederate plastic bottles) Part 2: Close up shot of the barrel firing Part 3: More about the Sharps, and shooting generally. Trouble shooting new ammunition loads. Part 4: Counterattacking Bottle's Brigade, ANV Part 5: Wrapping up, interior of a Sharps round, and a few more pot shots.
  14. Mr. Mercanto
    1. While McClellan did not outright adopt a peace plank, he did run on a platform of mediation "on the basis of Union." Such an idea was a pipe dream. The CSA had no interest in embracing reunion, even if it maintained slavery. Once suspended, it would be very difficult for the United States to resume its war effort if/when McClellan's peace talks failed. Furthermore, McClellan was empowered by the Peace Democrat "Copperheads," who would give him little leeway in threatening a resumption of fighting if the Confederates refused to reunify. Lincoln recognized that armistice was, in effect, Confederate victory; hence his refusal to countenance any such proposal. All the Confederates had to do was agree to the armistice, and then insist on their independence. McClellan would give them an armistice and a government to weak to resume war. If, in the extremely unlikely event that war did resume, the armistice would have given the Confederates desperately needed time to replenish their coffers through European trade, rebuild and improve Confederate infrastructure, and recover their armed forces. McClellan would resume the war against a strengthened foe, with US morale at an all time low, and with an administration and head of government fundamentally unequipped to fight the Rebellion. Neither case seems to hold favourable outcomes for the Union. Both are a completion of Lee's ambitions for both the Maryland and Pennsylvanian campaigns. Perhaps there is a third alternative, but I cannot think of one. As Lincoln stated in his "Blind Memorandum," in the case of McClellan victory, Lincoln's administration must achieve victory before McClellan's inauguration, as McClellan would be unable to do so, on the foundation of his administration. 2. The Emancipation Proclamation. It undermined one of the key elements of the Confederate infrastructure empowering almost incalculable destruction to the Rebel war machine. It also raised 200 000 men, mostly Southern, for the defense of the Union. 3. No evidence exists that Grant was ever drunk during the Civil War. Some post-war legends emerged from his political opponents, but nothing substantial has ever been presented.
  15. Mr. Mercanto
    "Its those damn Blackhats again. They ain't no militia." - Unnamed soldier, Archer's Brigade, July 1, 1863
  16. Mr. Mercanto
    Some historians have actually argued this exact point! John Keegan most notably in, "A Military History of the American Civil War." I more or less concur, Col_Kelly :). Grant's campaign against Vicksburg violated several laws of contemporary warfare, all of which Grant had little interest in. The result was one of the most extraordinary campaigns in US military history. Grant made his own rules as he went. He just had a nose for war. Theory was of little interest to him, as its practical application was natural to his sensibilities. Sun Tzu wrote a treatise on the "Art of War." Grant was content to summarize his theory on "the Art" as "Find the enemy as fast as you can. Get at him as quick as you can. Hit him as hard as you can, and keep moving forward." As James McPherson put it, "Grant made it look easy."
  17. Mr. Mercanto
    The War of 1812 was the first war after the Revolution where America experimented with Volunteer soldiers. Volunteers were drawn from the militia. Volunteers were militia that agreed to serve on foreign soil and consistently for the duration of at least one year, as opposed to on an emergency basis. Militia would act in concert with the volunteers when defending their state, and otherwise would be encouraged to volunteer. It was a shaky and problematic system, which the United States did not being to really wield effectively until 1814. This method was the foundation of the US system through 1861 in the Civil War as well, where many of the volunteers of both sides were drawn from existing militia regiments, usually enlisting en masse. As the war developed, the militia became a part of the draft and conscription laws. In the Union, militia men were worth about one third of a volunteer in the monthly recruitment quotas set out by the Federal government. These quotas were to be met to avoid the implementation of the draft. It was a complicated system. Militia was called upon during the Pennsylvania campaign in the form of the Army of the Susquehena, where it aided in slowing Lee's army, and was assigned by Meade to defend Harrisburg in the event of a catastrophic defeat at Gettysburg. Many of these militia men also enlisted in the 9 month volunteer Pennsylvania Reserves during the 1863 Summer campaign, and provided invaluable service in the great battle there. In the Confederacy, the militia was also a substitute service for volunteer service. As I understand it, enlisted militia could be conscripted, or offered by the state governments for service. Militia officers were not available for conscription. Interestingly, in the state of Georgia, where Governor Joseph Brown opposed conscription, the number of Confederate militia officers lept considerably after the passage of the Conscription Act... Obviously, since the lion's share of fighting occurred in the Confederacy, Confederate militia was more often called to active military service, acting as home guard in support of, or at times in lieu of, the volunteer armies. Like 1812, both relied upon militias for initial enlistment, and aimed to convert militia units and militia men into volunteers throughout the war. Both also relied on militia for regular home guard. Both governments generally viewed militia enlistment as a less desirable, but nevertheless available, form of enlistment. Does this help?
  18. Mr. Mercanto
    There is a significant dip between the two, which greatly aided he 20th
  19. Mr. Mercanto
    Give the seceshia what-for!
  20. Mr. Mercanto
    Not Grant ;P. In fact he once admitted to knowing next to nothing about Napoleon. Grant made his theory of war on two principles, what worked, and old Zach Taylor.
  21. Mr. Mercanto
    Now THIS is a Rebellion I can get behind!
  22. Mr. Mercanto
    *tips hat* You are a gentleman and a scholar.
  23. Mr. Mercanto
    Well @Andre Bolkonsky, I think we've managed to satisfactorily derail another perfectly good forum thread...ummm sorry about that, @Major Grigg
  24. Mr. Mercanto
    I'm experiencing an odd mix of offense and satisfaction at this... You bastard(?) Actually, my Great Grandfather was a medic at Dieppe. He spent the rest of the war in a German POW camp.
  25. Mr. Mercanto
    Count yourself lucky, I was going to give you a Dutchman next. Enjoy your Englishmen, Sharpie. Now take that hill, I think its called "Hamburger"
×
×
  • Create New...