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fox2run

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Everything posted by fox2run

  1. Everytime the game begins to be fun to play, they change some kind of mechanic, so players leave. Its pretty weird.
  2. I rather fight and die than bow to good but inmature players from our weird nabour who bend our Scandinavian culture in funny ways. U outnumber us only because of German mercenaries...
  3. Better to keep the action high with a lot of battles and easy access to open battles going. And make the losses cheap instead. It worked well before when the game was playable and fun.
  4. For most players game is a couple of hours of escapism once in a while. Log on. Have fun. Log off. And NA doesn't provide this right now. Let me give you an example. I had fun when large battles was easy to get to. When Denmark and Sweden was at war and the joining times in battles where so long that you could log on, check the nation chat, sail out and join an on going battle. Fantastic to see and play. Now those mechanics doesn't exist anymore. It got clanbased and PB orientated. To get into a large battle takes preparation that exceed the time aviable. Hence it never really get any fun like before. So I log on and maybe fight an AI or two but that's kind of boring compared to old days, so I usually log off again and play Steel Division Normandy or similar. I love the age of sail but also like to have some fun when I play. NA isn't there yet. And maybe it will never come back to the time where it was playable and fun like before. It was like one or two month of great gameplay in February to April 2016. Then devs began to kill the fun by making it too realistic with ROE that killed large battles and later grinding for shipbuilding etc. The present clan system is not for normal players with ordinary life's. So off course it's a small player base and an opportunity wasted. Sad but also truth.
  5. I was arguing for the fact that it wasn't gold but more credit notes that where on board the vessels. (Except from far East trade where silver occurred often). Hence the present system mirror real life pretty good. Any view point that is not shared by admins are not necessary trolling. Keep this in mind. Tnx.
  6. Here is an overview from Oxford bibliographies. If you like to go beyond the Google level of things. It was much more complex than sailing around with gold in the cargo: Introduction Trade and commercial development in the Atlantic world required capital, investment, and financing, both directly and indirectly. Credit was allocated, extended, used, and abused to further growth in various commercial sectors. The circulation of capital was a requisite feature of trade activity, with implications on both sides of and across the Atlantic. It was also a very social activity involving networks of partners and players across time and space. Issues of credit and debt cannot be isolated, therefore, from the broader institutional context: technical, social, and cultural. This article presents selected readings on the role played by credit (and debt) in the economic development of the Atlantic world. The scope is restricted to private rather than public credit, and to the long 18th century. Readings reinforce the nature of credit operations across the Atlantic, including merchant trade, the organization of the slave trade, and agricultural production in the colonies; and within Europe, as merchants and traders sought out operating credit and refinancing of trading activities. The nature of credit and debt cannot be understood without some appreciation for the technical tools, mechanisms, institutions, and laws in which these systems operated. Equally, credit networks were social relations within extensive and extended networks of actors subject to social and cultural norms. These norms can be apprehended more readily through the examination of the attitudes, perceptions, and values of those involved in granting and securing credit. Credit evokes questions of confidence, insolvency, risk, reputation, and trust. How these concepts were interpreted, perceived, and operationalized are important in understanding the evolving nature of the broader institutional context. Finally, while not exhaustive, this entry incorporates readings that provide a comparative dimension to this history, enabling the reader to tease out the parallels in different national histories, the divergent adaptations in various settings and contexts, from which it is possible to weave a common thread to the story of credit and debt in the Atlantic world. General Overviews The structure and organization of trade and its impacts on credit and debt have been variously examined with different emphases in terms of networks, the technical evolution of credit and trade mechanisms, geography, and institutional practices. Sheridan 1958 examines the organization and operations of the slave trade and, by extension, offers evidence of the far-reaching web of relations involved in the trade, including the long chain of credit and debt obligations. Anderson 1970 offers an extensive analysis of the English context, confirming how credit and trust relations were linked to the growth of the credit economy and the rise of the bill of exchange. In a large number of studies, three of which are selected as a starting point, Price (Price 1980, Price 1989, Price 1991) has investigated and explored the simple yet intriguing question of “what did merchants do.” Their multifaceted role as purchaser, financier, agent, and social actor was transformed in light of institutional changes during the period. The credit and market linkages across the Atlantic are well documented in Price 1980, an analysis for the British tobacco trade; themes revisited more generally in Nash 2005 with respect to the English merchant trade and its related growth in terms of scale and specialization. Price 1989 is insightful in its analysis of the dynamism in domestic and export markets and their effects on institutional arrangements and infrastructure. Price 1991 provides an important reframing of the research discussion in terms of transaction costs and their impacts on the trading activities, commission sales, and credit operations. Mann 2002 demonstrates how the evolution in insolvency legislation represented or anticipated those of mentalities. Muldrew 2001emphasizes social and cultural practices, facilitating our understanding of the profound changes in thinking that took place at the end of the 18th century. Anderson, B. L. “Money and the Structure of Credit in the Eighteenth Century.” Business History12.2 (1970): 85–101. DOI: 10.1080/00076797000000001E-mail Citation » Examines the relations between money, credit, and capital formation. Outlines problems of circulation, coinage, and preferences for credit over specie, especially in areas of significant economic growth. Archival sources demonstrate the emergence of the bill of exchange, network, and trust relations as a turning point in the English credit system. Mann, B. H. Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. E-mail Citation » A rich work on the evolution toward legislation favorable to debtors and the measures aimed at enhancing the security of credit and motivating risk taking. The entirety was grounded in recurring debates on the nature of insolvency: moral fault or economic failure. Muldrew, Craig. The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England. New York: Palgrave, 2001. E-mail Citation » A stimulating work, at odds with the dominant vision of the beginnings of capitalism, based on multiple printed and archival sources. Examines the relations between credit practices and their cultural significance at a time, in the absence of specie, credit—in the reputational sense—was “cultural currency.” Nash, R. C. “The Organization of Trade and Finance in the British Atlantic Economy, 1600–1830.” In The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel. Edited by Peter A. Coclanis, 93–151. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005. E-mail Citation » Analyzes and compares the evolution in the roles of the various participants in the transatlantic trade to those of its sources of financing. If London maintained a central position, at the end the actors were not the same as those at the beginning: merchants had given way to industrialists and bankers. Price, Jacob M. Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade: The View from the Chesapeake, 1770–1776. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980. E-mail Citation » A pioneering study on the financing of the British tobacco trade. Examines in an extensive manner a wide variety of possible sources of financing in order to appreciate their respective contributions: merchant-firm capital, the issuance of “bonds,” bank loans and discounting, and finally commercial credit and the terms of payment agreed upon by intermediaries. Price, Jacob M. “What Did Merchants Do? Reflections on British Overseas Trade, 1660–1790.” Journal of Economic History 49.2 (1989): 267–284. DOI: 10.1017/S0022050700007920E-mail Citation » Demonstrates that the dynamism of international trade beyond England and Scotland can be explained in large part by the development of a wide variety of credit practices, by key institutional innovations with respect to commercial and financial affairs, and by the accumulated experience of thousands of firms. Price, Jacob M. “Transaction Costs: A Note on Merchant Credit and the Organization of Private Trade.” In The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350–1750. Edited by James D. Tracy, 276–297. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511665288E-mail Citation » Analyzes merchant trade in terms of transaction costs, noting the low cost and flexibility of the correspondent system. Insightful presentation of trade arrangements in various sectors, accounting and control systems, with rich examination of bills of exchange as a credit transfer instrument including the role of insurance in exchange operations. Sheridan, R. B. “The Commercial and Financial Organization of the British Slave Trade, 1750–1807.” Economic History Review 11.2 (1958): 249–263. E-mail Citation » In-depth examination of the slave trade and dynamic relations between slave-trade merchants, planters, factors, and commission agents. ATLANTIC HISTORY About Atlantic History » M
  7. Using notes where very common in the late 18th and in the whole of the 19th century. For Denmark the German town of Hamburg played a significant role as the bank system there where known for a high degree of reliability. The captain loaned money by issuing notes that the buyer could claim. And the other way around when a cargo was selled. The system required a high degree of personal trust and personal contacts where important. In mid 19th century the price on grain failed and many bankers went bankrupt as too many notes where issued without any real value. Out of this chaos began Carl Marx his analysis of some of the Hamburg bankers and thereby sparked the foundation of socialism and communism. The claim contract system we have in NA pretty much mirror the real thing. Gold dubloons is much more fantasy and something that belongs to a Pirates of the Caribbean universe 200 years before the period of NA.
  8. Nah. I always quit when I end up in a fps with bots in it. No. Cheaper ships to loose is the way to go. And a logbook for each player....
  9. I guess they made a PvP server for a reason? I like to battle versus humans more as they are harder and more fun to play with. Also more cruel. But this is well known.
  10. The new ship is still ugly. (Not bad programmed). Nice to be reminded of the difference in design. Can we soon have some Danish ships in the game? They where almost all beauties instead of this sailing mistake. It's like a mix between a German pub and a Brazilian carnival. It looks like it would sail sideways instead of forwards.
  11. Is it just me or is that ship a bit ugly? Looks like a tavern with sails on it.
  12. To be casual means not having too much time to play. To have some rewarding xp out of this game is hard. PvP is hard to get as too few are online. It takes too much time to figure out where to find the enemy. I remember many hours of wasted time sailing around, moving outpost etc to no avail. This is the key to a larger player base. Not some UI.
  13. UI and tutorials doesn't add to gameplay at all. Gameplay is lacking depth and easier access to PvP. PvP is somewhat broken. To fix this require new ways of thinking. Which seems hard at the moment.
  14. Why don't you understand that it is never the players fault if a game population fails? The game lacks fun. It had some of it back in 2016. I have made a lot of feedback on this. But I'm met with an army of bezzerwizzers. If I don't find the game fun, it's my own fault. Ok. What about this: NA is crappy and gets bad reviews. It's a bad game with big flaws. You can change things or you can blame the players. What do you think will work the best? Have fun blaming, dude.
  15. Get a boat? What an insult. I'm level 50. You cannot put an admiral in a boat. But I'm also a single player mostly, even though I'm founder of a clan for casual players. I'm missing the days where easy access to stuff meant action every night. Now things are too grindy and takes too much effort. But I guess I have stated this 100 times or so. To no avail.
  16. It has come to this. Roughly 80% has left the game. It's all about the fun factor. When game is made for the elite it exclude the rest. This cannot be stated enough. Don't exclude players to get ships of all sizes. No player will play a game where he should play a minor roll.
  17. That would work great but it can't be done with land in battles. My advice would be to make ships multi duras again. Open the battles so that each battle in reality could develop into a 25 vs 25 ship combat. This would be a cool game to work from. With basics in place further stuff could be implemented down the road.
  18. Then ask yourself this: how can we keep bad players in the game? An average player would loose every second battle. A below average will win maybe 1:3. Etc. The goal must be that each player is capable of loosing one-two fights every day and still be in the game. This should enhance PvP.
  19. Blaming players to be bad just make them leave.
  20. PS: do you have any Lignum Vitae, becourse I have none. I have asked in national chat and made contract. But nothing... not that any players are on chat anymore. I'm stucked.
  21. The ones that plays it like me have left. It's very grindy now compared to old multi duras days. If you want more players you need to make things easier to get. Less grind-more fun.
  22. No. I have turned into a PvE carebear as I can't afford to loose ships. I lost a Constitution and now I'm trying to build a third rare as a replacement. In old days I would have 3 more Constitutions to throw at the enemy. But not now. I have 30.000 gold and no Lignum Vitae. It takes forever to build just one ship. PvP seems so far away for me. I'm average and there's a reason why I only come back sporadic. I guess I'm not the only one. Please consider how the casual player can come back to this game and find it playable again.
  23. But then it's a game. And it's fun to be in a battle with other players. I think most of the PvP user will agree on this. The question is... How do we achieve this and make the right balances? Boredom versus action...
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