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kc87,

Hmmmm, I'm really confused.

Are you saying nobody died of disease during the ACW?

Typhoid was the leading “killer” and “diarrhea” was a universal ailment, its annual average being 73.8 per cent during the ACW.

The data from the U.S. Army & CSA Medical Corps show that 2/3 of all deaths during the war were not combat-related.

This number is typical of warfare prior to medical advances that included the discovery of bacteria.

During the war surgeons treated 6 million sicknesses as opposed to 400,000 wounds.

For an excellent reference on the casualties during the war see: Drew Gilpin Faust “This Republic of Suffering”

The statistics I'm looking at are for the entire war, in all theaters, for battlefield casualties vs. death by disease.

You can't include captures in casualty figures. ;-)

Not all captures are casualties.

There were 194,743 Union soldiers captured and 215,865 Confederates.

Of these 30,218 northerners and 25,976 southerners died in captivity.

Also the numbers you've included above are for the AoP and ANV vs. the ACW.

We need to figure out what we are talking about to ensure we are talking apples to apples.

``````````````````````

I didn't make any statements about the "performance" of the ANV vs. AoP.

This was not the topic of discussion.

I did say there is no statistical basis demonstrating superior Confederate firepower.

There is a vast difference between these statements.

The Confederates generally out-marched the Union, enjoyed superior morale, and had a clear edge in leadership; particularly early in the war.

Logistically our discussion would require further refinement/clarification of definitions.

I wouldn't call Southern logistics "superior" but they were certainly much "leaner".

"Leaner" logistics can be both a boon and a curse.

The "lost cause myth" is not up for redefinition.

It is already defined.

For example of a general summary see Wikipedia:

The Lost Cause is a regional American cultural movement, based in the white South, seeking to reconcile the traditionalist white society of the antebellum South that they admire, to the defeat of the Confederate States of America in the American Civil War of 1861–1865.[1] It forms an important minority viewpoint among the ways to commemorate the war. The United Daughters of the Confederacy is a major organization that has propounded the Lost Cause for over a century.

Supporters typically portray the Confederacy's cause as noble and most of its leaders as exemplars of old-fashioned chivalry, defeated by the Union armies through numerical and industrial force that overwhelmed the South's superior military skill and courage. Proponents of the Lost Cause movement also condemned the Reconstruction that followed the Civil War, claiming that it had been a deliberate attempt by Northern politicians and speculators to destroy the traditional Southern way of life. In recent decades Lost Cause themes have been widely promoted by the Neo-Confederate movement in books and op-eds and especially in one of the movement's magazines the Southern Partisan.

Here is another link to the topic: http://civil-war-journeys.org/the_lost_cause.htm

Note the similarity of the definitions.

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42ndMS,

Your questions with my answers...

Did you notice that both of the battles you use for examples were VERY early battles?

Certainly, and I explained why I chose these early battles.

If I chose incorrectly please course correct and present a case.

Please note that firepower superiority is usually identifiable by superior firearms.

I'm not clear on how you've claimed the CSA had prolonged firepower superiority when, by your own statements, the CSA had inferior firearms and experienced firepower inferiority.

I actually expected you to say that the CSA in these early battles was at a disadvantage in armament and still managed to inflict equal casualties with inferior arms.

Hopefully this argument helps you make your case.

On the flip side with 12,000 men vs. 5,000 it begs the question: "is this really a metric establishing superior firepower?"

In all theatres the Confederates at that stage were under-armed with Rifles especially the Trans and Western ones.

If you check the ordnance for the Union regiments in the Trans West they were also armed with smoothbore muskets in these battles.

My goal was to offer the best situation for the South I could think of.

If I missed the mark I'm happy to look at other data.

Why don't you take a whack at this?

I'm happy to alter my perspective - but I need some convincing evidence that I've got the firepower analysis wrong.

At both Wilson's Creek and Springfield the CSA picked up about 6,000 Union smoothbore muskets.

At this point in the war almost all of the rifled muskets were issued in the East.

Could you so dearly consider more future battles and show me the results when the Confederates were better armed?

Actually, I think you might do a better job trying to prove your own point.

I seemed to miss the mark on my previous post.

It was not my intention to piss you off.

A good start would be Gettysburg where the Confederates for the majority frontal assaulted every position at a terrain disadvantage complete with Union Arty.

Hmmmm, I thought you said the South held firepower superiority from the start of the war.

When the facts don't fit the evidence you want to jump to 1863? That's fine.

I thought Ewell's Corps arrived on both the front and right flank of XI Corps.

The XI Corps right flank collapsed on Barlow's Knoll rolling up the Union line on July 1.

The Union I Corps fought Heth to a standstill.

It was not until later in the day at about 4:00 when I Corps collapsed under the weight of the CSA reinforcements.

I'm not clear on how this demonstrates Southern firepower superiority - which was where you started the conversation.

It seems to me this demonstrate the advantage of reinforcements over fatigued troops more than firepower superiority.

And you definitely don't want to mention "The Wilderness" where Union Arty. was neglible.

Not sure what you mean by this. I'm open to any discussion you'd like to have.

The Wilderness was chosen as a battlefield by Lee to obviate Union artillery. He was successful.

But the lesson from the battle is not proof of musketry fire superiority - it is a clear demonstration of defensive terrain superiority in the ACW.

Cherry picking a lopsided defensive battle and saying, "There! That proves CSA fire superiority!" isn't an intellectually honest way to demonstrate fire superiority. We'd need a longer period of study where we can normalize the effects to understand CSA fire superiority.

Even battles on even terms with lopsided results would demonstrate fire superiority.

Can we agree on a battle where this might be the case and look at the numbers?

And there you go again with the blue-bellied cowards, you said that I didn't!

My apologies that this offended you - I was just having fun.

Still I have yet to see you present any compelling evidence of CSA fire superiority.

Are you trying to convince someone with the IQ of a Turnip that I'm an ignorant moron??

Nope. But I have yet to see you present any compelling evidence of CSA fire superiority.

... is that your nature really? if you are then it is back-firing.

I've already apologized - but I'm happy to apologize again if my response was too flippant.

(Had I realized you would take this so poorly I wouldn't have been as sarcastic.)

I'm very interested to see your evidence supporting CSA fire superiority.

I noticed you kinda skipped over the question of where the South developed their superiority in firepower in my previous post. I'm actually honestly very interested in what you believe to be the basis of your statement regarding Southern firepower superiority.

But one thing for sure that we agree on ... There was definitely strokes of brilliance on both sides with Generals, but none in the overall scheme was consistent enough to be called geniuses. But Lee came closer by far. Nathan Forrest on the more tactical side.

Hmmm, I'd be more convinced if you had proposed Jackson. Chancellorsville likely was the closest demonstration of military genius during the war. Jackson envisioned the plan then executed the maneuver. Jackson's Valley Campaign also stands out as exceptional. Lee was more of a blocking and tackling general. Effective - but he certainly paid a heavy price for his decisions during the Seven Days and Gettysburg for his offensives on July 2 & 3. Not much genius in those plans.

Forrest certainly was effective at leading smaller forces.

But generally I think of "military genius" at army command level.

We seem to have different definitions of the term.

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kc87,

Thanks for dealing in the reality of actual numbers!

Note the 10 X 10 target in the analysis. I'm not aware that many of the soldiers who fought the war were 10 feet tall.

All of the numbers need to be cut by about 50%.

Additionally, fighting from the prone position was very common which reduced the threat profile to about 2 square feet.

There is a reason millions of rounds were fired to inflict thousands of casualties during ACW battles.

Also note that the tests you've quoted are for volley fire. Which is exactly my point. It is difficult to argue superior CSA marksmanship when on battlefield results were cumulative.

I'd be more convinced if the discussion was about superior sniping/skirmishing capabilities where individual marksmanship is more important.

But again, few people had rifled muskets in their personal possession - so I'm questioning the logic of the CSA having superior firepower. It seems like Lincoln had this right when he observed that "we are all green alike" prior to First Manassas. Both armies learned the art and skill of war. They used the same weapons and tactics. There is no evidence that CSA held an innate advantage in superiority of musketry.

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kc89,

I re-read your post above on the casualty numbers. This seems like a good baseline.

Captured muddies the water a bit; but roughly the wounded tie closely enough to the KIA numbers.

After Gettysburg some sources cite Lee as intentionally and systematically reducing the number of casualties he reported.

My recollection is that the CSA and Union had different methods of counting who was "wounded." For the CSA men who could be dressed in the field and returned to recover with their regiments were not counted as wounded.

Additionally, Union numbers were tallied at the field/tent hospitals. CSA were tallied at permanent hospitals. Many in the South were encouraged to return to their homes to recover to keep bed space available in hospitals.

In the North men were sent to military hospitals to recover. That way the hospital had control over when a soldier returned to duty or was discharged.

Interestingly this difference may have only made about a 3% difference in the numbers.

(I expected the calculated number to be larger).

If we accept these numbers the question we initially were discussing was, "Southern musketry firepower superiority."

Specifically, are these numbers representative of the battlefield situation or does this difference represent superiority of the South on a man-for-man basis?

After thinking about the distinction a bit and looking at the numbers I've realized - I really don't care either way.

Thanks for the data!

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kc89,

I re-read your post above on the casualty numbers. This seems like a good baseline.

Captured muddies the water a bit; but roughly the wounded tie closely enough to the KIA numbers.

After Gettysburg some sources cite Lee as intentionally and systematically reducing the number of casualties he reported.

My recollection is that the CSA and Union had different methods of counting who was "wounded." For the CSA men who could be dressed in the field and returned to recover with their regiments were not counted as wounded.

Additionally, Union numbers were tallied at the field/tent hospitals. CSA were tallied at permanent hospitals. Many in the South were encouraged to return to their homes to recover to keep bed space available in hospitals.

In the North men were sent to military hospitals to recover. That way the hospital had control over when a soldier returned to duty or was discharged.

Interestingly this difference may have only made about a 3% difference in the numbers.

(I expected the calculated number to be larger).

If we accept these numbers the question we initially were discussing was, "Southern musketry firepower superiority."

Specifically, are these numbers representative of the battlefield situation or does this difference represent superiority of the South on a man-for-man basis?

After thinking about the distinction a bit and looking at the numbers I've realized - I really don't care either way.

Thanks for the data!

 

     

      Sorry for the Lost Cause jab. The numbers I posted represent killed, wounded, captured and missing from the major Eastern theater engagements.

 

 

       The captured earlier in the war were usually quickly exchanged, also I did not include minor engagements which would bring the          numbers  back to roughly where they started. A greater number of Union troops could have returned for duty than Confederate, there are all kinds of possibilities. Wounds caused disease and death, and some wounded returned to their units. I don't think  it's possible to get a 100% accurate set of statistics so it would be best to go by widely accepted statistics, then look for a disparity. Personally I don't believe there was any reason for Lee to under report casualties to the Confederate government given the dire situation on hand in Virginia after Gettysburg. At that point in the war it was very clear to himself and everyone at the top of the Confederate government he was the only person capable of commanding the army in those extreme circumstances, there was nothing to hide or accomplish by being ignorant about the situation, this is evident after his angry reaction at the outcome of his victory at Chancellorsville.

 

 

   Since a very low percent of battlefield casualties were not from musket, rifle or artillery fire, I'd say there is some weight to the "Southern  battlefield superiority" in the Eastern theater. What they were doing to achieve that type of superiority or advantage is another subject for  debate altogether, a more accurate result might come from Brigade ordinance and inspection/review reports, AARs and breaking the stats  down by year. In my opinion it was possibly a combination of desperation, training/experience and the Christian revival in the AONV, similar to the Swedish Carolean Army who ironically suffered a similar fate. Losing the field was detrimental to the survival of the AONV and all their field commanders knew this, the sheer size of the AOP and it's abundance of supplies ensured it's own safety in case of withdrawal. 

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kc87,

Thanks for dealing in the reality of actual numbers!

Note the 10 X 10 target in the analysis. I'm not aware that many of the soldiers who fought the war were 10 feet tall.

All of the numbers need to be cut by about 50%.

Additionally, fighting from the prone position was very common which reduced the threat profile to about 2 square feet.

There is a reason millions of rounds were fired to inflict thousands of casualties during ACW battles.

Also note that the tests you've quoted are for volley fire. Which is exactly my point. It is difficult to argue superior CSA marksmanship when on battlefield results were cumulative.

I'd be more convinced if the discussion was about superior sniping/skirmishing capabilities where individual marksmanship is more important.

But again, few people had rifled muskets in their personal possession - so I'm questioning the logic of the CSA having superior firepower. It seems like Lincoln had this right when he observed that "we are all green alike" prior to First Manassas. Both armies learned the art and skill of war. They used the same weapons and tactics. There is no evidence that CSA held an innate advantage in superiority of musketry.

 

Firing from the prone and reloading prone was very awkward and would severely slow the reloading process, although it was in the manual of instructions for skirmishing. The amount of smoke constricting the view and the limitation on ammo would have made 200 yards and under ideal for any kind of decisiveness. The skirmishers screening the battle line would lead the way for these for these deadly engagements to take place at such close range. I would argue more for reload speed and discipline as being the deciding factor due to the nature of the fighting. At 3 rounds a minute troops generally had about 20 minutes or less worth of ammo in ideal conditions unless they captured or held a position. 

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42ndMS,

Yep, Guilty.

I was having fun pulling your leg on the Clauswitz topic based on the sentence structure rather than your intent.

No malice intended.

I'm not really certain the ACW produced any generals of genius.

As a topic for books I'm quite certain it has produced few authors of genius.

Military genius is a metric based on results.

The ACW was a war of attrition and battlefield results were frighteningly predictable.

There was only one general during the war that successfully eliminated 3 armies - all by surrender.

But I don't consider the sieges of Vicksburg or Petersburg much to crow about in the annals of military brilliance.

If it wasn't the best war we've had we'd celebrate it less. ;-)

I always thoroughly enjoy your highly considered and incisive opinions. but on this point I must disagree. I'd say Sherman and Grant were two military geniuses created by the war. Sherman's Hard War doctrine was the only truly original strategy to emerge from the war, and Grant's ability to concentrate entire army groups and military departments on symbiotic objectives, combined with his ability to out-improvise and pursue his opponent to destruction would have, in the words of John Keegan, made him an exceptional general in any war. 

With regards to Petersburg and Vicksburg, we'll have to disagree my friend :). Vicksburg was incredibly military achievement. Grant moved his entire army astride the enemy's fortified position and deployed it on exterior lines within the enemy's rear, then interposed it between two major armies after winning critical victories at Jackson, Champion's Hill, and the Big Black River. This masterful abandonment of Jominian principle set's Grant and his campaign apart. The brilliance was not the siege itself but the actuation of the campaign by which siege was achieved. 

As for Petersburg, the breakthrough was achieved by the ingenious movement of two different departments collaborated by Grant and Sherman. Grant, through the extension of his lines and by forcing Lee into siege by outmaneuvering him on the James, and Sherman, through a brilliant shift in base, are able to force starve Lee's army to a point where offensive operations are possible. In doing so they are able to break Lee's entrenchments in such a way as that could only be envied in 1915.

After the Third Battle of Petersburg, which, like Five Forks. was conducted with considerable skill by Grant and his officers, Grant conducted the finest military pursuit of any army in that war. Yes it ended in surrender, but I feel the statement is misleading. This was because Lee was beaten into submission. Between the Fall of Petersburg and and Appomattox, Lee lost 30 000 men to Grant's constant harassment in the span of little more then a week. This is a stunning achievement. Lee surrendered because, had he not, Grant would have destoryed his army that day on the field, trapped as it was in a valley flanked by the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James on three sides. This was achieved through Grant's military genius. He defeated Lee at Five Forks and pursued him with extreme vigor until Appomattox. It is perhaps the only time in the war (with the possible exception of Nashville) in which an army was successfully pursued to its military destruction. Surrender was only allowed because Grant was, in character generous and had no great thirst for the effusion of blood. 

Also, just my opinion, but I've always though that it should be five armies, rather then three, that were captured/destroyed in the field. It seems to me that Thomas aught to receive credit for the destruction of the Army of Tennessee at Nashville, and then Sherman should receive credit for the capture of The Army of the South in North Carolina after the victory at Bentonville (and the subsequent surrender a few weeks later). Just that I'd add that because usually the three armies cited as destroyed/captured are Buckner's Army in Ft Donelson, the Army of Vicksburg, and the Army of Northern Virginia. I was curious as to your opinion on that pet opinion of mine lol, :)

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kc87,

Above you stated:

"I'd say there is some weight to the "Southern battlefield superiority" in the Eastern theater. What they were doing to achieve that type of superiority or advantage is another subject for debate altogether, a more accurate result might come from Brigade ordinance and inspection/review reports."

Now you're tapped into the issue we were discussing! "...the another subject for debate altogether..."

The factor that continues to be missing from inclusion in the discussion is that firepower is usually determined by superior firearms. Not only do you need ordnance report but also armament reports. For example, the "new fangled gimracks" that General Ripley resisted proved to give the Northern cavalry a significant firepower advantage (Spencer & Henry repeaters). The firepower advantage was based on repeating rifles - not the superiority of the men wielding them.

I agree with your point but we need to define "battlefield superiority" in this discussion - the term includes too many factors to isolate and credit individual man-for-man trigger pulling superiority.

Was Chancellorsville a demonstration of "battlefield superiority?"

In my mind it was a demonstration of "leadership superiority" - bordering on military genius. It took a great deal of testosculosity to divide the Southern army and march an half of it in column around the front of an army that was twice its size.

In that battle the leadership advantage gave the South "battlefield superiority" during the early phase of the battle on the Union's right flank. As the day wore on the Union re-established their lines and manged to fight their way out of a very difficult situation. At the end of the day the difference in casualties was minimal - and Lee was in a worse position relative to his position at the start of the battle.

So if the South ended in a relatively worse position after the Battle of Chancellorsville had the South gained or lost "battlefield superiority?"

Lee's behavior suggests he was frustrated that not only had the South lost "battlefield superiority" over the course of the day but that the officers under his command did not understand the concept of "battlefield superiority".

Lee wanted to gain and sustain battlefield superiority until the AoP ceased to exist. His officers were satisfied winning a battle.

Lee had his chance at Chancellorsville. He also had his chance at Gettysburg - but after July 1 "battlefield superiority" had again slipped from his grasp. Gettysburg was the last opportunity for Southern "battlefield superiority" in the East. From that point forward until the end of the war Lee was on the defensive and the war devolved to grinding attrition.

Did Lee gain battlefield superiority at the Wilderness? He inflicted more casualties but the North moved South, replaced their losses and ground on to the end of the war.

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Mr. Mercanto,

We have different definitions of "military genius".

Sherman's Hard War doctrine had been practiced over the course of history by Ghengis Khan, Alexander of Russia - inflicted on his own people as a scorched earth program, etc...

We agree that Grant's Vicksburg Campaign was "an incredible military achievement".

But true military genius in my mind is the ability to gain and sustain military superiority from an initial starting point of military inferiority. Alexander, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon are examples. It is not the ability to win on one battlefield that sets the metric. It is the sustained effort to replicate military victory that in my mind defines military genius.

The North held such tremendous resource advantages that the ACW looks like more of a war of attrition. It had moments of brilliance - but it was basically a blood fest.

I'd credit Hood with the destruction of the Army of Tennessee. What a dufus - Lee warned Jeff Davis that Hood would destroy any army under Hood's command before Jeff Davis appointed Hood to command.

I agree the South lost the war.

Need to run for the weekend with the family.

Cheers to all - its been a fun week with the debates.

Again my apologies to 42ndMS.

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kc87,

Above you stated:

"I'd say there is some weight to the "Southern battlefield superiority" in the Eastern theater. What they were doing to achieve that type of superiority or advantage is another subject for debate altogether, a more accurate result might come from Brigade ordinance and inspection/review reports."

Now you're tapped into the issue we were discussing! "...the another subject for debate altogether..."

The factor that continues to be missing from inclusion in the discussion is that firepower is usually determined by superior firearms. Not only do you need ordnance report but also armament reports. For example, the "new fangled gimracks" that General Ripley resisted proved to give the Northern cavalry a significant firepower advantage (Spencer & Henry repeaters). The firepower advantage was based on repeating rifles - not the superiority of the men wielding them.

I agree with your point but we need to define "battlefield superiority" in this discussion - the term includes too many factors to isolate and credit individual man-for-man trigger pulling superiority.

Was Chancellorsville a demonstration of "battlefield superiority?"

In my mind it was a demonstration of "leadership superiority" - bordering on military genius. It took a great deal of testosculosity to divide the Southern army and march an half of it in column around the front of an army that was twice its size.

In that battle the leadership advantage gave the South "battlefield superiority" during the early phase of the battle on the Union's right flank. As the day wore on the Union re-established their lines and manged to fight their way out of a very difficult situation. At the end of the day the difference in casualties was minimal - and Lee was in a worse position relative to his position at the start of the battle.

So if the South ended in a relatively worse position after the Battle of Chancellorsville had the South gained or lost "battlefield superiority?"

Lee's behavior suggests he was frustrated that not only had the South lost "battlefield superiority" over the course of the day but that the officers under his command did not understand the concept of "battlefield superiority".

Lee wanted to gain and sustain battlefield superiority until the AoP ceased to exist. His officers were satisfied winning a battle.

Lee had his chance at Chancellorsville. He also had his chance at Gettysburg - but after July 1 "battlefield superiority" had again slipped from his grasp. Gettysburg was the last opportunity for Southern "battlefield superiority" in the East. From that point forward until the end of the war Lee was on the defensive and the war devolved to grinding attrition.

Did Lee gain battlefield superiority at the Wilderness? He inflicted more casualties but the North moved South, replaced their losses and ground on to the end of the war.

 

   If the Army of Northern Virginia could not take the field at the end of the day, there would be hell to pay for months, not the political hell that the AOP would face, but starvation, lack of supplies, farmland and valuable resources destroyed, the officers knew this well. At the Wilderness the stakes were even higher and the Federals had their back to the Rappidan. Control of Telegraph Road, Old Turnpike road and Plank road and the Fredricksburg/Richmond railroad were on the line for this fight. Withdrawing and losing those junctions meant that the AONV from then on. would always have to protect those roads leading south and stay in between the Federal Army, those roads and Richmond making any kind of sustained defense or initiative impossible due to the Federal Army moving south exposing any kind of defense Lee could mount. The North Anna river was too long to protect all the vital junctions and rail lines in central Virginia so it was just a matter of time at that point. 

 

   As far as battlefield superiority goes the Army of Northern Virginia was vetted, and the stakes were alot higher for them. That conviction and desperation made them very dangerous even under the most desperate circumstances. They knew what it was like to starve and suffer if they didn't carry the field at the end of the day. When you have an army of mostly capable leaders plus veteran experienced troops it is a deadly combination regardless of the circumstances.  

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I would like to add to this discussion what is going to come with the next patch (not final changelog):

 

v1.14 PRE-RELEASE rev.9140 Beta

 

Single Player

  • Radical gameplay improvements to make the game more realistic. Combat actions will have a "clear loop" meaning that each one of your decisions, to charge, assault an area will have devastating results with one clear winner.... melee and volley shots lethality as well as condition's better balance will not allow the very frequent fall back, charges and rapid change of decisions to correct your tactical mistakes. You will now be able to organise "Pickett's charge" style of attacks but beware, the cost shall be heavy, if you decide wrongly.
  • AI optimizations. AI should be more effective in attack and defend overall and is more active (mobilizes units to reinforce areas promptly).
  • AI improvement to concentrate more the forces in important areas.
  • AI deploys artillery more efficiently, and tries to keep it safe.
  • AI will protect flanks better.
  • AI will not choose hazardous maneuver paths as before.
  • Melee fixes to inflict more casualties. Previously the damage was too low.
  • Artillery damage tuned better. Previously it could be too powerful. Now artillery does modest, more sensible damage from long and medium range and is devastating as it should be from close range.
  • Artillery more vulnerable to projectile fire. Now you will think twice to risk your arty on the frontline,
  • Minor balances to Union and CSA combat effectiveness.
  • Slight rebalance of CSA/USA infantry rifle accuracy (previously it was favouring too much the Union).
  • Pettigrew and Brockenbrough will delay less to arrive so that Union is pressed more in defense at the first stages of the battle.
  • Balances in some Multiplayer/Custom Battles:
    • "Chance to change history" map got VP increase of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill so it is possible for the Union player to win after a successful delaying tactic. 
    • In "Battle of McPherson Ridge" the CSA get precious cavalry support.
    • In "Meeting at Cemetery Ridge" starting positions have been balanced so CSA can arrive faster to the ridges while 2nd Division of Sickles army has been removed, because Union had too many troops.
    • Vincent, Reserve artillery, Slocum and Stannard arrive sooner at "Battle of Devil's Den".
    • In "What if Buford had not held McPherson" the CSA get more reinforcements but tired. In the same scene it was fixed bug that did not show event message when Union arty arrived.
    • In "Union attack's Benner hill;" the objective's value is balanced to force Union for more offensive actions. Additionally Union receives more reinforcements and CSA cavalry will always arrive as reinforcements. (previously it could not arrive at all).
  • Fix of melee collisions issues after loading a save.
  • Fix of invisible units after loading a save.
  • Fix of units stuck at edges of map.
  • Fix of "eternal" melee collision bug that was especially frequent in multiplayer.
  • Other minor fixes in scenarios.

Multiplayer

  • All the Single Player improvements.
  • Melee balance is better so as to inflict casualties but will not be overpowered.
  • Fix of artillery limbering animation that was not visible for opponent.
  • The Multiplayer maps balances mentioned above.

The patch currently needs more testing and fine tunes.

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snip.........We have different definitions of "military genius"....

...................I'd credit Hood with the destruction of the Army of Tennessee. What a dufus - Lee warned Jeff Davis that Hood would destroy any army under Hood's command before Jeff Davis appointed Hood to command....snip

 

I agree^^^, Thx for the added info concerning Lee with Davis, never knew that, I would like to know where you learned that, book?, If so could you tell me the name so I could obtain it..

 

The Book, 'The Confederacy's Last Hurray'  By ' Wiley Sword(Spring Hill / Franklin / Nashville) was an eye opener for me.. Especially at the Battle of Franklin....

 where Hood was n what he was doing when the battle was going on,,,Its very hard to believe....But I have come across a few sources...that pretty well state the same...

***********************************************

*The Battle of Franklin was fought on November 30, 1864, at Franklin, Tennessee, as part of the Franklin–Nashville Campaign of the American Civil War.

It was one of the worst disasters of the war for the Confederate States Army. Confederate Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood's Army of Tennessee conducted numerous frontal assaults against fortified positions occupied by the Union forces under Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield and was unable to break through or to prevent Schofield from a planned, orderly withdrawal to Nashville.

The Confederate assault of six infantry divisions containing eighteen brigades with 100 regiments numbering almost 20,000 men, sometimes called the "Pickett's Charge of the West", resulted in devastating losses to the men and the leadership of the Army of Tennessee—fourteen Confederate generals (six killed or mortally wounded, seven wounded, and one captured) and 55 regimental commanders were casualties.

After its defeat against Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas in the subsequent Battle of Nashville, the Army of Tennessee retreated with barely half the men with which it had begun the short offensive, and was effectively destroyed as a fighting force for the remainder of the war.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Franklin_%281864%29

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1st Tenn Reg. Watkins,

Lee was cautious about putting criticism in writing. Jefferson Davis knew Lee well enough to know that when Lee was not highly supportive in his comments he was telling Davis to "read between the lines" because Lee did not support the idea. This could, and often did, result in confusion between Lee and Davis.

Wikipedia has an incomplete account which states:

On July 17, 1864, Jefferson Davis relieved Johnston. He considered replacing him with the more senior Hardee, but Bragg strongly recommended Hood. Bragg had not only been impressed by his interview with Hood, but he retained lingering resentments against Hardee from bitter disagreements in previous campaigns. Hood was promoted to the temporary rank of full general on July 18, and given command of the army just outside the gates of Atlanta. (Hood's temporary appointment as a full general was never confirmed by the Senate. His commission as a lieutenant general resumed on January 23, 1865.[12]) At 33, Hood was the youngest man on either side to be given command of an army. Robert E. Lee gave an ambiguous reply to Davis's request for his opinion about the promotion, calling Hood "a bold fighter, very industrious on the battlefield, careless off," but he could not say whether Hood possessed all of the qualities necessary to command an army in the field.[30] Lee also stated in the same letter to Jefferson Davis that he had a high opinion of Hood's gallantry, earnestness, and zeal.[31]

The more complete text from Lee to Davis is in the "The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee":

By Telegram July 12, 1864:

Telegram of today received. I regret the fact stated. It is a bad time to release the commander of an army situated as that of Tennessee. We may lose Atlanta and the army too. Hood is a bold fighter. I am doubtful as to other qualities necessary.

The full letter Lee sent to Davis:

I am distressed at the intelligence conveyed in your telegram of today. It is a grievous thing to change commander of an army situated as is that of the Tennessee. Still if necessary it ought to be done. I know nothing of the necessity. I had hoped that Johnston was strong enough to deliver battle. We risk much to save Alabama, Mobile, and communication with the Trans Mississippi. It would be better to concentrate all the cavalry in Mississippi and Tennessee on Sherman’s communications. We had better therefore hazard that communication to retain the country. Hood is a good fighter, very industrious on the battlefield, careless off, and I have had no opportunity of judging his action, when the whole responsibility rested upon him. I have a high opinion of his gallantry, earnestness and zeal. General Hardee has more experience in managing an army. May God give you wisdom to decide in this momentous matter.

In addition to these statements in writing, one of the officers on Lee's staff stated that Lee had said something like Hood is a bold fighter, but I fear he may be too bold and loose the army.

I'll need to look for this second-hand statement a bit more. Hearsay is not fact; but, note that Lee may not have needed to say this directly to Davis. Saying it within earshot of a staff officer (who may have even delivered the letter) or discussed this with a member of the Confederate Senate may explain why Hood was never confirmed in his new rank as army commander.

The politicians wanted offensive actions after the long defensive by Johnston - but did not want the responsibility of putting Hood in command.

Also from Wikipedia:

The change of command in the Army of Tennessee did not go unnoticed by Sherman. His subordinates, James B. McPherson and John M. Schofield, shared their knowledge of Hood from their time together at West Point. Upon learning of his new adversary's reckless and gambling tendencies, Sherman planned to use that to his advantage...[After Atlanta] Sherman felt this development [Hood's movement North] furthered his [sherman's] current objective by removing opposing forces in his path, noting "If he [Hood] will go to the Ohio River, I’ll give him rations. ...my business is down south.”

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Thx David very interesting. I have put that on my list of things to order from amazon in the near future."The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee"

The Local Library here doesn't have in stock.

The University of British Columbia has it in ebook,

but is reserved for Registered Students in Studies.......

-----

Here's a link to a site you probably have read,

Also may be of interest to others....

 

Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 14..
'Reminiscences of field ordnance service with the Army of Northern Virginia—1863'

 

During the campaign of 1862, which, as General Gorgas says, was the hardest year upon his department,

the perplexities of ordnance officers in the Army of Northern Virginia were frequently relieved by important captures from the enemy.

-------

The troops at this time were armed in a heterogeneous fashion. Many of the men had smooth bore muskets, caliber .69. Others had rifled muskets, caliber .54; and others still had Springfield muskets, caliber .58. There were some other arms, as, for instance, some Belgian rifles, caliber .70, but the three kinds I have mentioned were the principal kinds in the hands of the infantry in January, 1863.

 

We were all anxious to replace the smooth bores with rifles, and especially with caliber .58, which was the model the Confederate as well as the Federal Government had adopted. The battlefields of the preceding summer had enabled many commands to exchange their smooth bores for Springfield muskets, but as nine-tenths of the arms in the Confederacy at the beginning of the war had been smooth bore muskets, it required time and patience to effect a complete re-arming.

 

This was finally done in the Second corps at Chancellorsville, but in the winter of 1862-‘63, there was often found in the same brigade the three kinds of arms above enumerated, and the same wagon often carried the three kinds of ammunition required..........

 

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2001.05.0271%3Achapter%3D7

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1st TN Reg. Watkins,

Thanks for the excellent reference on the CSA logistics. Great stuff!

I don't recall reading this article previously; but, I've used the Southern Historical Society Papers on other topics.

My apologies that I can't always put my fingers on sources immediately. Mostly I write from recollection. When pressed I need to hunt and peck my way through stuff that is decades old. It's been 30 years since I've read Shelby Foote's "Civil War" trilogy. My memory of the book was getting rusty so I re-read it this Memorial Day Weekend - enjoyed it thoroughly!

My guess is that some folks from the South may feel it is not pro-Southern enough for their tastes. But I thought is was a reasonably balanced summary of the war.

I'd forgotten the impact that the loss of Kentucky and Missouri had on CSA recruiting. It seems thousands of men simply returned home to sit out the war once their home states had been overrun by Grant after Ft. Donelson/Nashville and Curtis at Pea Ridge. This reserve of manpower certainly contributed to the guerrilla war in both states and the difficulty of keeping the Union supply lines open.

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kc87,

Above you stated:

"Personally I don't believe there was any reason for Lee to under report casualties to the Confederate government given the dire situation on hand in Virginia after Gettysburg."

I didn't intend to suggest Lee was failing to accurately report his casualties to the Confederate government.

My incomplete thought was that the CSA government was intentionally under-reporting casualties to the press and the public. Many of the casualty returns were destroyed later in the war. CSA casualty reports are often estimated from sketchy/incomplete sources.

Governments running short of manpower often under-report their casualties in the press. As Napoleon faced increasing longer odds his casualty reports released to the press were so obviously flawed that, "To lie like a bulletin" became so common as to become a cliche in everyday business dealings in France during those wars. I'd posit that after the invention of the printing press it has been far more common than not to mislead the press regarding casualty returns. Even today many countries are less than diligent and/or don't have the press scrutiny that we have in the U.S.

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1st TN Reg. Watson,

PS - I'm registered as a "student" on numerous educational sites. They often have very interesting information and low barriers of entry to the site.

"Student" is loosely defined if you go through the registration process.

It often requires the willingness to pay a small "student" fee.

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Governments running short of manpower often under-report their casualties in the press. As Napoleon faced increasing longer odds his casualty reports released to the press were so obviously flawed that, "To lie like a bulletin" became so common as to become a cliche in everyday business dealings in France during those wars. I'd posit that after the invention of the printing press it has been far more common than not to mislead the press regarding casualty returns. Even today many countries are less than diligent and/or don't have the press scrutiny that we have in the U.S.

 

Correct me if I'm wrong,

To lie like a Bulletin does not actually refer to casualties but to facts. Bulletins made by Napoleons more than often changed "facts" to accomodate reality. Most famously, those about the Russian retreat only let the reader undertsand something was wrong somehow. Numbers were not the primary business of Napoleon's bulletins.

What would be interesting to study, is when the propaganda press actually started to use "numbers" to bolster the home country morale. Certainly, that only started in the 19th century, and the ACW might very well be an early example.

Anyway, writing an article in a time of war is hardly an exercise of objectivism, journalist won't get the actual casualty numbers by themselves, but through the army, so from scracth the whole information line is flawed. If you look at the bulletins of WW2, this is very true.

I do not agree about your statement about today's US press scrutiny. The country is at war, and it's very hard to get the actual figures. Yes, there are the official military figures that we can believe, but concerning civilian casualties (Irak for instance) we only get rough estimates. What's more, it's very hard to get the proper numbers of casualties sustained by the mercenaries, often american themselves.

What's more, just remember when under Klinton's, the war of Kosovo was a war with "0 casualties".

I don't think the casualty numbers were hence flawed because of the shortage of manpower, but because it always happens to be flawed in times of war. That's just the way propaganda works.

Edited by Grognard_JC
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kc87,

Above you stated:

"Personally I don't believe there was any reason for Lee to under report casualties to the Confederate government given the dire situation on hand in Virginia after Gettysburg."

I didn't intend to suggest Lee was failing to accurately report his casualties to the Confederate government.

My incomplete thought was that the CSA government was intentionally under-reporting casualties to the press and the public. Many of the casualty returns were destroyed later in the war. CSA casualty reports are often estimated from sketchy/incomplete sources.

Governments running short of manpower often under-report their casualties in the press. As Napoleon faced increasing longer odds his casualty reports released to the press were so obviously flawed that, "To lie like a bulletin" became so common as to become a cliche in everyday business dealings in France during those wars. I'd posit that after the invention of the printing press it has been far more common than not to mislead the press regarding casualty returns. Even today many countries are less than diligent and/or don't have the press scrutiny that we have in the U.S.

 

 

The CSA had a large free press throughout the war, with different opinions and bias, and many critical of the government. Since regiments were composed of soldiers from the same counties it was up to the company and battalion officers to report  directly to their towns and districts and their families would be informed through their local newspapers, not from the government.

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Grognard_JC,

As requested - you've been corrected.

"To lie like a bulletin" distorted fact frequently including the reported casualty figures on both sides. This cliche predates the Russian invasion. Examples are numerous and include the casualty figures from Eylau in 1807 and Napoleon's Spanish Ulcer. In addition to major battles events such as the Tyrolean uprising/revolt were masked from the French public. Dupont's surrender of 17,600 men at Bailen in 1808 was misrepresented in the French press.

These bulletins often closed with a note that the Emperor's health has never been better; regardless of the previous content/distortion.

kc87,

Military personnel are representatives of the government and take an oath to that effect. Officers sending these reports were acting in their official government capacity.

Scoops often came directly from army officers; which were often "tempered" for public consumption. There is a vast difference between reporting casualty lists by town/county and rolling up all of the casualty figures and reporting these to the press in aggregate.

Friendly reporters had greater access to information/misinformation that they published which was then copied and propagated.

For example:

Shiloh was represented in the Richmond press as a CSA victory.

Davis did not retract or correct the exultant message he sent to Congress after the first day of the battle.

Subsequent articles covered the death of A.S. Johnston and the public on both sides were shocked by the casualty lists at the local level.

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Grognard_JC,

As requested - you've been corrected.

 

 

Thank you for the answer, but there's no need to use such a peremptory tone.

 

 

"To lie like a bulletin" distorted fact frequently including the reported casualty figures on both sides. This cliche predates the Russian invasion. Examples are numerous and include the casualty figures from Eylau in 1807 and Napoleon's Spanish Ulcer. In addition to major battles events such as the Tyrolean uprising/revolt were masked from the French public. Dupont's surrender of 17,600 men at Bailen in 1808 was misrepresented in the French press.

 

So basicly, we do agree, this is more about distorting facts and giving good impressions on the war resultats. Julius Caesar was not doing something else in its "Gallic Wars". Figures were just a tool, an argument, but it had hardly anything to do with reality. However, there is no general logical rule that would link manpower shortage and leaders hiding the "true" figures of casualties, that would result of this.

 

These bulletins often closed with a note that the Emperor's health has never been better; regardless of the previous content/distortion.

 

The goal is political. The Bulletin you refer to, and which is very famous and often "mocked" by historians, was written when Napoleon's heard of Mallet's failed coup that had happened during the Russian campaign. I can't recall other bulletins refering to his health in the same way.

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Grognard_JC,

When I mirror your post to "correct you if you are wrong" you call my response "peremptory".

Not sure what you want/expect in the way of a response given that opening.

When I note a correlation between manpower shortages and under-reporting casualty reports you've twisted my observation into a "general logical rule".

I'm not really certain what you're trying to achieve with your nuanced semantics arguments.

I'm happy to discuss anything you'd like to but I'm not really interested in semantics games.

For example above, casualty figures are "facts" - so I'm having difficulty understanding your point.

The first example of "numbers" used in propaganda, after the introduction of the printing press, that I've seen is following the battle of Culloden in 1746. The battlefield archaeology does not line up with the British press releases or battle description. British casualties were minimized while Scottish casualties appear to have been inflated. It is clear that the British were early in adapting the printing press for wartime propaganda.

I'd strongly suspect there are examples during the 30 Years War - but I haven't looked into this question closely.

Propaganda predates the 19th Century by thousands of years. Not sure why you are focused on when "numbers" were used in the propaganda. In some sense the Bayeux Tapestry represents "numbers". Numbers were just less formalized as images given the audience for the message of the Tapestry.

The Egyptian description of the Battle of Kadesh in 1274 BC may be the earliest written example of propaganda. It is clear from other sources the battle was a draw yet that's not what's carved into the Egyptian or Hittite Temples for public consumption. Both sides claim victory yet the post-battle result was a treaty along the territory lines that predated the battle.

Clearly battlefield casualties in times of war are almost always flawed.

This is not necessarily an indication of propaganda - in the Civil War it was usually just bad process.

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