Jump to content
Game-Labs Forum

The Civil War: Everything You Wanted to Know but Were too Afraid to Ask!


Mr. Mercanto

Recommended Posts

1 hour ago, Ned Low said:

Was it possible to just ship slaves back to where they came from? Why this idea was not considered? 

This was the policy Lincoln favored. See Liberia.

Of course, with the slave trade outlawed for generations, only a tiny minority of slaves had come from Africa. There were also only a few regions where coherent African customs survived intact.

Most slaves had deeper roots in North America than the Union Army that freed them (with its large proportion of immigrants).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Here is another question:

 Abraham Lincoln, supported banning slavery in all the U.S. territories at the time, something which the Southern states viewed as a violation of their constitutional rights

Can someone explain what constitutional part was violated. Does this mean original constitution allowed residents to own slaves? Why they relied on Constitution as backbone of their rights to own slaves.  

Edited by Ned Low
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hello fellow humans,

I have been wondering something about the civil war for quite sometime. Who started the Russian Civil War? What were the major battles in it? What type of warfare was used in the war (Guerrilla or Traditional)? Does anyone know some interesting books on the subject?

 

Thank You in Advance,

 

Axel

Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 hour ago, Ned Low said:

Was it possible to just ship slaves back to where they came from? Why this idea was not considered? 

Could they ship them back and give each money to start new life back home. 

Liberia

Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, Ned Low said:

Was it possible to just ship slaves back to where they came from? Why this idea was not considered? 

Could they ship them back and give each money to start new life back home. 

Don't have time for a proper response, (at work, on my phone,) but HERE is a quick read regarding President Lincoln's plans.

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 hour ago, Ned Low said:

Here is another question:

 Abraham Lincoln, supported banning slavery in all the U.S. territories at the time, ... 

Actually, no.

See my previous post with link.  Also, the emancipation proclamation banned slavery ONLY in the states in the rebellion, it did not address it where it existed in loyal union states.

Edited by A. P. Hill
Link to comment
Share on other sites

6 hours ago, A. P. Hill said:

Actually, no.

See my previous post with link.  Also, the emancipation proclamation banned slavery ONLY in the states in the rebellion, it did not address it where it existed in loyal union states.

 

 

6 hours ago, A. P. Hill said:

Don't have time for a proper response, (at work, on my phone,) but HERE is a quick read regarding President Lincoln's plans.

Actually the banning of slavery in all territories was the fundamental plank of the Republican party. He also stated his support for a strict ban on slavery in all new territories in several speeches, such as the Cooper Union speech and the Douglas debates. Lincoln wanted no slavery in the territories, it was pretty cut and dry. Lincoln essentially said that he could not touch slavery where it existed, but would not see it spread one more inch. It was upon this quiestion of slavery in the new territories that the Civil War was fought.

As for the EP. Alan Guezlo has written about this in great length. The EP was a military edict, and therefore could only be applied to territories in an open state of military rebellion. Lincoln could not, therefore, Constitutionally extend it to the slave states. Before and after issuing the EP, Lincoln urged the loyal slave holding states to adopt compensated graudal emancipation packages. He warned them that slavery would die, and that they'd best let it go slowly and be compensated for it, rather then losing it all in a desperate effort to save it. They refused. When Lincoln signed the EP into law, members of hsi cabinet expressed concern over loyal slave states responding aggressively. Of them, Lincoln said that he had repeatedly offered them the opportunity to accept the inevitably of the end of slavery, and now they would have to live with it. 

 

7 hours ago, Ned Low said:

Here is another question:

 Abraham Lincoln, supported banning slavery in all the U.S. territories at the time, something which the Southern states viewed as a violation of their constitutional rights

Can someone explain what constitutional part was violated. Does this mean original constitution allowed residents to own slaves? Why they relied on Constitution as backbone of their rights to own slaves.  

Ok so this is a really difficult question to answer in less then essay....and I don't feel like writing an essay. 

Basically the pro-slavery South argued that, because state law allowed them to hold property in human chattel, then Federal law had to protect state laws. As citizens of these states, they should be able to enjoy their State granted right to hold slaves in any territory controlled by the US, since the Federal government must protect their property rights, which were defined in detail by the state laws. This is called the "States Rights" argument. In the Dredd Scott case, udge Robert Taney tried to foist this precedent on the United States, and in so doing perhaps did more then anyone, save for John Brown, to bring about the great American Civil War.

Anti-slavery restrictionists like Lincoln felt that legal precedent indicated that the primary role of the Federal government was to uphold the human rights espoused in the fourth Amendment. As such, the Federal government could not legally hold people in slavery. Thus, while individual States could redefine property to include people, the Federal government could not enforce that independent of State law in territories. Since Territories were Federally controlled, the territories must obey Federal laws, which could not include slavery. 

Since the future of slavery rested on its expansion, the settlement of this question essentially determined the future of the institution's existence in the United States.
 

Edited by Mr. Mercanto
I forgot to answer the question
  • Like 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

14 hours ago, Col_Kelly said:

On a similar note do you have example of units hitting the 'veterancy threshold' ? By that I mean examples of veteran brigades who eventually lost their elan after a prolonged exposition to fighting (the Overland campaign fx) likely to cause PTSD and homesickness. 

Actually a great example is to look in Joshua Chamberlain's autobiography.  During the final campaigns in Virginia he talked about seeing veteran troops, men he had seen stand up to some of the worst of the war break and run to the rear.  As the war went on many of the commanders who served on the front lines for long periods of time cared less about soldiers who broke during a battle and ran to the rear so long as it didn't ruin the performance of the remainder of the unit.  It was generally known by many commanders that those veterans who ran due to battle fatigue or what we know today as PTSD would return eventually to their units once the episodes had passed.  Chamberlain talked of bringing up his brigade past men who had run from a fight and were huddled under cover.  He and his troops merely passed them by.  I think this was the best thing they could have done in the time period they served.  They knew far less about what the men were going through psychologically and most just called it various names.  Chamberlain and many officers realized that veteran units rarely had cowards or shirkers (see Armistad's speech in Gettysburg for a good explanation) and would do their utmost and sometimes it wasn't what it might have been otherwise, see the faltering of the 2nd Corps at Spotsylvania Courthouse when many a man was content to stay on the taken earthworks when a concerted effort might have broken the Southern center.  The Union army tried to alleviate the homesickness with offering leaves during the winter months and would offer leaves for men who re-enlisted after their term was up.  Not all units served from Day 1 until the end.  Even Mr. Mercanto's venerable 1st Minnesota saw their time up at the end of their 3 year enlistments.  Those who re-enlisted got a furlough to visit home for a time and this was the same for any unit.  When the 27th New York went home after their 2 year papers were up many re-enlisted but after their furloughs were put into other units.  Not a perfect system, but it was better than that of many a southern soldier.

Many of the units would have their élan broken at various times due to stress.  Not just in the Overland campaign.  For instance the Union 1st Corps is a great example of a unit crushed by prolonged exposure to fighting.  Essentially from 2nd Bull Run through the Mine Run campaign it was virtually ruined.

Part of it fought on the Peninsula and suffered heavily.  The other two divisions skirmished with the Confederates in Central Virginia until John Pope pulled them under his command.  They fought well under McDowell at Brawner's farm and 2nd Bull Run.  Then Corps underwent a command change with Joe Hooker taking the helm due to Pope's attacks on McDowell.  The Corps again engaged at South Mountain and finally at Antietam.  At Antietam their numbers had shrunk considerably and their leadership was strained arguably to the point they were not really an effective offensive force.  Despite it they still pushed Jackson back to Dunker Church only to fall apart.  Had they been at their best as they had been at Brawner's Farm or Gettysburg when they had received rest it is likely they would have accomplished much more against Jackson's flank.  Then after their ordeal at Gettysburg the Corps only continued to exist for the rest of the year until Grant folded what was left of their units into other Corps.  

Another example to look into would be Forrest's attempts to stop Wilson's raid late in the war.  His men were so worn through that they barely stood a chance even when defending good entrenchments.

  • Like 3
Link to comment
Share on other sites

13 minutes ago, Buford Protege said:

Actually a great example is to look in Joshua Chamberlain's autobiography.  During the final campaigns in Virginia he talked about seeing veteran troops, men he had seen stand up to some of the worst of the war break and run to the rear.  As the war went on many of the commanders who served on the front lines for long periods of time cared less about soldiers who broke during a battle and ran to the rear so long as it didn't ruin the performance of the remainder of the unit.  It was generally known by many commanders that those veterans who ran due to battle fatigue or what we know today as PTSD would return eventually to their units once the episodes had passed.  Chamberlain talked of bringing up his brigade past men who had run from a fight and were huddled under cover.  He and his troops merely passed them by.  I think this was the best thing they could have done in the time period they served.  They knew far less about what the men were going through psychologically and most just called it various names.  Chamberlain and many officers realized that veteran units rarely had cowards or shirkers (see Armistad's speech in Gettysburg for a good explanation) and would do their utmost and sometimes it wasn't what it might have been otherwise, see the faltering of the 2nd Corps at Spotsylvania Courthouse when many a man was content to stay on the taken earthworks when a concerted effort might have broken the Southern center.  The Union army tried to alleviate the homesickness with offering leaves during the winter months and would offer leaves for men who re-enlisted after their term was up.  Not all units served from Day 1 until the end.  Even Mr. Mercanto's venerable 1st Minnesota saw their time up at the end of their 3 year enlistments.  Those who re-enlisted got a furlough to visit home for a time and this was the same for any unit.  When the 27th New York went home after their 2 year papers were up many re-enlisted but after their furloughs were put into other units.  Not a perfect system, but it was better than that of many a southern soldier.

Many of the units would have their élan broken at various times due to stress.  Not just in the Overland campaign.  For instance the Union 1st Corps is a great example of a unit crushed by prolonged exposure to fighting.  Essentially from 2nd Bull Run through the Mine Run campaign it was virtually ruined.

Part of it fought on the Peninsula and suffered heavily.  The other two divisions skirmished with the Confederates in Central Virginia until John Pope pulled them under his command.  They fought well under McDowell at Brawner's farm and 2nd Bull Run.  Then Corps underwent a command change with Joe Hooker taking the helm due to Pope's attacks on McDowell.  The Corps again engaged at South Mountain and finally at Antietam.  At Antietam their numbers had shrunk considerably and their leadership was strained arguably to the point they were not really an effective offensive force.  Despite it they still pushed Jackson back to Dunker Church only to fall apart.  Had they been at their best as they had been at Brawner's Farm or Gettysburg when they had received rest it is likely they would have accomplished much more against Jackson's flank.  Then after their ordeal at Gettysburg the Corps only continued to exist for the rest of the year until Grant folded what was left of their units into other Corps.  

Another example to look into would be Forrest's attempts to stop Wilson's raid late in the war.  His men were so worn through that they barely stood a chance even when defending good entrenchments.

I absolutely love this answer. 

Though I have to note that despite all logic and reason, 50% of my beloved 1st Minnesota boys re-enlisted when their three year papers expired. Due to the already low numbers of the regiment, the 1st Minnesota was re-organized into the 1st Minnesota Special Battalion. Its new title gave it new muster roles, and is recorded separately in "The War of the Rebellion." So in actual-point-of-fact, the 1st Minnesota did serve through Appomattox, just as the 1st Minnesota Special Battalion. That being said, given their small numbers, they were rarely put into frontline action. Though I'd pity any Southron in front of them if they had been. 

There's also an interesting example of this in Lee's army on the retreat to Appomattox. One diaist recalled seeing some of the artillery boys shrugging of their guns and going home after Saylor's Creek. He wrote that none of the men begrudged these soldiers, for they had served their time and they were simply done. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

9 hours ago, Ned Low said:

Was it possible to just ship slaves back to where they came from? Why this idea was not considered? 

Could they ship them back and give each money to start new life back home. 

So this is a super important and touchy question. Since answering it means I can avoid the gym for another ten minutes, I'll give an answer. 


The short answer is, yes, people did consider this. In fact, the Colonization Society was set up for this very purpose. Someone else here asked about payment, the fact is that many wealthy "philanthropists" were happy to assist the project, and much was government funded. In fact, as someone has already pointed out, an effort was made in Liberia in 1862. It failed.

The fact is, Lincoln supporting this was a real blindspot for him. He made the same mistake that your question has made, if I may be so bold. "ship them back where they came from." Lincoln, like your question, assumed that these men were from Africa. They were not. They were born, lived, toiled, suffered, loved and lost, buried their loved ones, and more often were separated from their loved ones, in the United States. Africa was not their home, America was. The assumption that they should "go back" was based on an old racial narrative that they never belonged. When Lincoln presented this idea to various black leaders, including Frederick Douglass, Douglass responded that America was the home of the black man, and that the nation was his birth right as much as any white man. For Douglass, and hundreds of thousands of black men, the war was not simply to end slavery, but more radically to demonstrate that America was their home to. 

In the end, Lincoln understood this, and after 1862, never again attempted something so ridiculous. Having once condescendingly stated to the assembled black leaders that the white man would never be able to tolerate their presence in their land, and that black slaves would have to return to a land they had never seen; Lincoln by war's end understood that the white men of the nation would simply have to accept the reality that America belonged to more then just them. 

  • Like 3
Link to comment
Share on other sites

On 3/15/2017 at 1:06 AM, Slaithium said:

More than that, Constitutional Party, Republician, Democrat, Whig, Southern Democratic Party, just to name a few that is already more than 3 lol.

This is true but two of those parties had the following of today's Green party. So they were not of consequence.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

On 2017-4-27 at 0:41 AM, Mr. Mercanto said:

So this is a super important and touchy question. Since answering it means I can avoid the gym for another ten minutes, I'll give an answer. 


The short answer is, yes, people did consider this. In fact, the Colonization Society was set up for this very purpose. Someone else here asked about payment, the fact is that many wealthy "philanthropists" were happy to assist the project, and much was government funded. In fact, as someone has already pointed out, an effort was made in Liberia in 1862. It failed.

The fact is, Lincoln supporting this was a real blindspot for him. He made the same mistake that your question has made, if I may be so bold. "ship them back where they came from." Lincoln, like your question, assumed that these men were from Africa. They were not. They were born, lived, toiled, suffered, loved and lost, buried their loved ones, and more often were separated from their loved ones, in the United States. Africa was not their home, America was. The assumption that they should "go back" was based on an old racial narrative that they never belonged. When Lincoln presented this idea to various black leaders, including Frederick Douglass, Douglass responded that America was the home of the black man, and that the nation was his birth right as much as any white man. For Douglass, and hundreds of thousands of black men, the war was not simply to end slavery, but more radically to demonstrate that America was their home to. 

In the end, Lincoln understood this, and after 1862, never again attempted something so ridiculous. Having once condescendingly stated to the assembled black leaders that the white man would never be able to tolerate their presence in their land, and that black slaves would have to return to a land they had never seen; Lincoln by war's end understood that the white men of the nation would simply have to accept the reality that America belonged to more then just them. 

Actually read about this subject quite recently in James McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom. Apparently similar attempts were made to settle freed slaves in Central America, some were shot down by countries in the area that didnt approve of colonialism and other colonies, like one set up on an island near Haiti, collapsed due to disease and starvation. It seemed that while many Americans supported the idea of these colonies, the number of black volunteers during the war was quite small and attempts at colonies beyond Liberia were pretty half-hearted. 

In defense of Lincoln, up to the Emancipation Proclamation, the consensus in the North was in favour of colonisation and most of his enemies rode the fear of the alternative, millions of freed-slaves descending upon the northern states, stealing jobs and women and other such fear-mongering. Only radicals openly supported full emancipation and Lincoln was trying to hold together a new and diverse party. Well aware of the damage political division could do to a party, we can theorise that Lincoln was probably picking the safest ground when he came out in favour of colonisation, just like when he came out in favour of compensatory emancipation or only limiting slavery in new territories prior to the war. Whether he was in favour of full emancipation and citizenship or colonisation during the war, we may never know because politically, he couldnt afford to openly support the former without lending ammunition to his enemies and his open support of the latter may have just been a tactic to buy time until he could achieve full emancipation as he obviously intended in 1862.

I think it's key to understand how idiotic colonisation was viewed from the perspective of those who'd be subject to it. The assumption of the white abolitionist majority was that black people were Africans and therefore would be happier in Africa and that co-existence was impossible or dangerous. The view of most black people, echoed by Frederick Douglass, was that the USA was their home, they'd helped to build it and, once free, they'd stay where they were born and raised as free men. That seems like the most sensible outcome in the present but in hindsight, even the most progressive politicians of the time were still pretty racist and prone to fears over what black people might do with their freedom. What most did was keep doing what they'd done their entire lives, which is why many stayed in the South to the confusion of people who read about the history of their time there prior to being freed. But if you understand that much of the South's identity was tied to cotton and other agriculture and that a huge amount of this agriculture was facilitated by black people, then you understand that black people embraced this identity in their millions and werent willing to give it up simply because their ancestors had come from a land 3000 miles away. The best proof of this is in the experiences of freed slaves in Liberia. When they arrived, they shared nothing with the local Africans except their skin pigment. They didnt know the local African culture, language or religion and had little intention of learning, instead they treated the locals much the same way that Europeans treated Native Americans. They created their own colonial christian society based on American principles of liberty and democracy, spoke exclusively English and came to identify themselves as Americo-Liberians. Even when they were moved 3000 miles to another continent, it didnt change the fact that slaves saw themselves as Americans and no amount of colonisation would make them African again.

Edited by AJ McCully
  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

New Question. 

@Mr. Mercanto has suggested we add a Himilayan Panzer Kampfgruppen to the game manned by Yetis and Kameraden from the secret Vril base beneath Antarctica. (Long story, don't ask; just go with the premise)

What is the armor penetration rating of a 3" Ordnance Rifle? 

Ah! I think we found a job for the 20-pounder Parrott Guns!!!!!!!!!!!

 

  • Like 4
Link to comment
Share on other sites

15 minutes ago, Andre Bolkonsky said:

New Question. 

@Mr. Mercanto has suggested we add a Himilayan Panzer Kampfgruppen to the game manned by Yetis and Kameraden from the secret Vril base beneath Antarctica. (Long story, don't ask; just go with the premise)

What is the armor penetration rating of a 3" Ordnance Rifle? 

Ah! I think we found a job for the 20-pounder Parrott Guns!!!!!!!!!!!

 

Post of the month

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

How long a brigade is in line(not marching) formation?

 

IRRC, a regiment of 500 men size, alined 100 yards long, I wonder how about a brigade?

 

I know size of a brigade is varied, but let's suppose average, operating brigade in a campaign.

Edited by Pong
Link to comment
Share on other sites

One more thing!

When engage melee fighting, ACW of course, troopers throw themselves in a huge chaos bowl, break formation and poke someone in fornt him with bayonet? (Like current game descirbes)

Or did they keep formation as much as they can so only guys in first rank fight? (Like ancient and medieval infantry fighthing)

I haven't heard about formation melee figthing training in ACW, nothing more than just how to use bayonet well, which doesn't help much men to keep formation with discpline. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

10 hours ago, Pong said:

How long a brigade is in line(not marching) formation?

 

IRRC, a regiment of 500 men size, alined 100 yards long, I wonder how about a brigade?

 

I know size of a brigade is varied, but let's suppose average, operating brigade in a campaign.

Its really hard to say, brigade sizes fluctuated wildly. The Irish Brigade fell as low as around 300 by Gettysburg, though a good brigade should have at least 1500 men at arms. The other thing is that the Federals and Confederates deployed their brigades differently. Federals tended to deploy two regiments front and two more in reserve, deploying them as needed in the action. Confederates tended to place all four regiments abreast. Thus, a Confederate brigade arrayed for battle might have a longer length due simply to deployment methodology. 

9 hours ago, Pong said:

One more thing!

When engage melee fighting, ACW of course, troopers throw themselves in a huge chaos bowl, break formation and poke someone in fornt him with bayonet? (Like current game descirbes)

Or did they keep formation as much as they can so only guys in first rank fight? (Like ancient and medieval infantry fighthing)

I haven't heard about formation melee figthing training in ACW, nothing more than just how to use bayonet well, which doesn't help much men to keep formation with discpline. 

In theory, the formation was supposed to stay in a thin phalanx. Essentially an American "Think Red Line" (but blue or grey instead lol). Often times, opposing lines would retreat in the face of a concerted effort, however if the bayonet charge resulted in hand to hand fighting, obviously things would dissolve into an infamous blob. 

That having been said, there is what was supposed to happen, and what did. The men were supposed to advance in lock step, with the bayonet poised at the correct height. In early war sketches, we see artists anachronistically imposing this order on their subjects; this was their projection, and not reflective of the reality. Men who read these illustrated papers scoffed at their absurdly good order portrayed in the papers. As the sketch artists became more experienced, and their perception less enamored with notions of Antebellum Victorian gallantry, these sketches began to reflect the disorder of combat. Men were not in lock step, some were faltering, some to far ahead, others behind, et cetera. This is likely a more accurate reflection of actual fighting. So, while the men were in theory supposed to advance in perfect formation, instead they probably advanced in a more disordered close order formation, and began to break up when the charge was ordered to "double quick" or when close combat was joined with the enemy. 

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 hour ago, Mr. Mercanto said:

Its really hard to say, brigade sizes fluctuated wildly. The Irish Brigade fell as low as around 300 by Gettysburg, though a good brigade should have at least 1500 men at arms. The other thing is that the Federals and Confederates deployed their brigades differently. Federals tended to deploy two regiments front and two more in reserve, deploying them as needed in the action. Confederates tended to place all four regiments abreast. Thus, a Confederate brigade arrayed for battle might have a longer length due simply to deployment methodology. 

In theory, the formation was supposed to stay in a thin phalanx. Essentially an American "Think Red Line" (but blue or grey instead lol). Often times, opposing lines would retreat in the face of a concerted effort, however if the bayonet charge resulted in hand to hand fighting, obviously things would dissolve into an infamous blob. 

That having been said, there is what was supposed to happen, and what did. The men were supposed to advance in lock step, with the bayonet poised at the correct height. In early war sketches, we see artists anachronistically imposing this order on their subjects; this was their projection, and not reflective of the reality. Men who read these illustrated papers scoffed at their absurdly good order portrayed in the papers. As the sketch artists became more experienced, and their perception less enamored with notions of Antebellum Victorian gallantry, these sketches began to reflect the disorder of combat. Men were not in lock step, some were faltering, some to far ahead, others behind, et cetera. This is likely a more accurate reflection of actual fighting. So, while the men were in theory supposed to advance in perfect formation, instead they probably advanced in a more disordered close order formation, and began to break up when the charge was ordered to "double quick" or when close combat was joined with the enemy. 

Just to clarify, that should read 'thin red line'; minor typo, but changes the meaning of the term substantially. 

Plus. Some units intentionally tried to close and melee. The Irish Brigade was famous for wanting to get in close and use Buck 'n Ball loads at close range before charging. And Hood's Texans were certainly not shy about wielding a bayonet. Oh, and Joshua Chamberlain also has a passing knowledge of the term 'fix bayonets!' when he ran out of ammo. 

But, yeah. Bayonet charges in any war are rare. Troops were almost always willing to break rather than face cold steel. It is notable that the American War of Independence ended with a bayonet charge by the Continentals when they spent most of the in terror of Redcoats doing the same thing to them. 

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, Andre Bolkonsky said:

Just to clarify, that should read 'thin red line'; minor typo, but changes the meaning of the term substantially. 

Plus. Some units intentionally tried to close and melee. The Irish Brigade was famous for wanting to get in close and use Buck 'n Ball loads at close range before charging. And Hood's Texans were certainly not shy about wielding a bayonet. Oh, and Joshua Chamberlain also has a passing knowledge of the term 'fix bayonets!' when he ran out of ammo. 

But, yeah. Bayonet charges in any war are rare. Troops were almost always willing to break rather than face cold steel. It is notable that the American War of Independence ended with a bayonet charge by the Continentals when they spent most of the in terror of Redcoats doing the same thing to them. 

Don't forget the 1st Minnesota ;) 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Taken from 1862 Army Officer's Pocket guide, regarding the amount of space occupied by an armed soldier and their position in rank and file. (which can be converted to battle front,)

"Frontage & Interval 21– The soldier occupies a front of 20-inches (1.67 feet) and a depth of 13 inches (1.083 feet), without the knapsack.  The interval between the ranks is 13 inches.  In column, therefore, one man, without a knapsack, occupies a depth of 26-inches (2.167 feet).  The knapsack added 3-inches to the total.  For general planning purposes, a soldier occupied a frontage of 2-feet and a depth of 2½ feet.  Assuming that men marched in a column of fours (A frontage of roughly seven to eight feet): ... " 

  • Like 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now
×
×
  • Create New...