67th Tigers

Another option, one that I use on tabletop, is available. Don't allow "out of command" units to move at all, but only to react. One obvious reaction should be the brigadier deciding to rejoin his commander, and march to the sound of the guns. That of course introduces a real use for generals.

They had well rehearsed plans to field 3 numbered armies under MacMahon, Bazaine and Canrobert and fight a much more realistic flexible action, but then Napoleon's wife said he should command it all in the field, and so he did - and got the lot encircled.

The flip answer obvious is the game mechanics, which are essentially those of SMG. The real life problem of how you commanded large bodies of men is quite a major one. It tends to be abstracted because the player wants to be in control. What I'm suggesting is actually giving a use to a corps commander, rather than a generic morale boost.

The Corps HQ was generally a static location (as was army HQ) because couriers etc. need to know where it is to find it. For further reading see: http://civilwarlibrarian.blogspot.be/2007/10/exercising-command-longstreet-better.html I find the current "command radius" unrealistic, and I'd rather do away with it. A Corps Commander unit would perhaps work best as a set rally point, and when clicked on would have a number of commands like "general retreat" (all corps brigades withdraw back to the CC), "gather artillery" (artillery units gather in and form a gunline on the CC) etc.

"Just give me Prussian formations and Prussian discipline along with it - you'd see things turn out differently here" - RE Lee, lamenting the poor performance of his infantry at Chancellorsville to a Prussian observer. The British of this era would be a mincing machine. They were the only army trained in proper rifle use, and their fire, man for man, was an *order of magnitude* more lethal than either side in the ACW or the Prussians of the FPW. The French did tactically extremely well in the FPW BTW. However the Emperor managed to get them bottled up because he was trying to impress his wife! At least he didn't get killed by the Zulus, like his son....

I agree units shouldn't be allowed to retreat "through" well ordered enemy brigades. If I may suggest a mechanic, that would be the constant loss of men related to the current "condition". If you throw men around the field with abandon large numbers will drop out of the ranks. Most will rejoin in a day or two, but they're gone for the time being. This would make constant pauses in movement to reorder even more critical. When a unit routs it should also lose men, and trying to rout "through" the enemy would cause them to surrender. If you study Pickett's charge for example, quite a lot of the Confederates got to the wall, and after a brief fight simply surrendered.

When gunpowder ignites a lot of it isn't completely burnt, and the "carbon" (more like charcoal, but we always called it carbon in the army - happens with modern cordite weapons too) deposits on the barrel. The heat of the barrel actually bakes it on after a while. Cold water doesn't shift it, only hot water and a scour. Because of this the barrel is constantly getting "tighter" and with every round the ramming becomes more difficult until ultimately the gun completely clogs. At that point it's a armourers repair. The weapon could become foul in fairly few rounds, and there are certainly accounts of Springfields fouling after as few as 5 rounds to the point of unusability. Hall discusses this page 328-89: http://www.amazon.com/The-Stand-U-S-Army-Gettysburg/dp/0253342589 Troops had space in their cartridge pouches for 40 rounds. They were issued in packs of 10 and one of the rounds was a "cleaner" with a zinc washer, but these were so dangerous the troops threw them away and so usually had 36 rounds. Extra wraps were issued before marching, but these were invariably discarded. The best coverage of this specific to Gettysburg is Bilby, but it's been give years since I read it: http://www.amazon.com/Small-Arms-Gettysburg-Infantry-Americas/dp/1594160546

There is no need for ammunition counts for infantry. It was essentially impossible to fire off the assigned ammunition before the musket became unusable. The average Confederate or Union soldier engaged only fired about 20-30 rounds in the whole battle. See: http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2010/12/small-arms-ammunition-expenditure-at.html for my attempt to pin numbers down. Condition almost certainly covers it. When troops got a break they'd scour their muskets, and if time permitted pour boiling water down them (which is why units carried kettles into combat). Also, most casualties were caused by the first volley (unless the firefight is very prolonged), as the troops have had time to load their (clean) muskets properly, and have a clear sight picture due to the lack of smoke. This is why the defenders of the ridgeline held their fire against Pickett until he was only about 80 yards off. Arguably this is also modelled by condition?

There was a debate going on in the mid-19th century about whether the new rifled weapons had made cavalry obsolete. The new theories were that cavalry could no longer charge infantry due to the increased range of the infantry weapons. Hence a lot of early war generals did not train their troops in the use of the sabre and instead picked up the carbine for dismounted fighting. Few early war troops were really capable of mounting sabre charges because it requires a much higher level of training. Some of the very early cavalry regiments in the East (i.e. those that were with McClellan's army in the autumn-winter of 1861) were so trained, but those that joined after never really were. McClellan's cavalry made a few sabre charges on the Peninsula, but not at much more than squadron strength (he had very little cavalry, the vast majority of his available cavalry was held back by Lincoln), and famously charged at the small Battle of Boonsboro on the 15th Sept '62. However, Hooker's "Cavalry Corps" meant a doctrinal change away from charging, towards dismounted action. This suited the Confederates as they carried infantry muskets instead of carbines and proceeded to shoot the Federals to pieces. The major change came when Sheridan took over. The cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland was some of the best the Federals had, and because one of the brigadiers, Minty, was a ex-British soldier he knew a lot of the American bluster about the inability to charge the new weapons was just due to a lack of drill, and so trained the "Saber Brigade" to deliver shock charges against infantry. Under Sheridan the cavalry eventually made successful shock charges against entrenched infantry in 1865 (see Five Forks). At Gettysburg the ability to charge was essentially about the confidence of the commander. Perhaps the game has it right, as Buford was a "dragoon" type who didn't believe in shock tactics. One should note that Buford was in fact not seriously engaged at Gettysburg. His casualty counts are, by tactical regiment*: 8th Illinois: 7 out of 567 combined 12th Illinois/ 3rd Indiana: 52 out of 675 8th New York: 40 out of 707 combined 6th and 9th New York: 23 out of 731 combined 17th Pennsylvania/ 1st Sqn, 3rd West Virginia: 8 out of 528 * understrength regiments were combined into single tactical regiments, but remained separate on paper.

It sounds like you got seduced by a "magic hill" (a reference to the Telamon episode of Time Commanders: ). High ground in (real) combat is good only for extending the range of artillery. Infantry should probably be positioned at the base of the hill, with the supports and artillery up it.

In fact Union cavalry did make massed sabre charges. If you look at 3rd Winchester (where the 3rd attempt to invade the north was defeated) there is a successful massed charge by a whole cavalry division! At Gettysburg there were sabre charges (against cavalry) on the 3rd day.