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  1. Chris - Lord Gareth, If you haven't already, I suggest you look at my posts at http://forum.game-labs.net/topic/23669-2nd-battle-of-bull-run/?tab=comments#comment-497943 and http://forum.game-labs.net/topic/23356-csa-washington-bg-level/?tab=comments#comment-482692 as to philosophical and tactical means that have been successful for me. I start allocating my points toward army organization and politics to assist me in creating the largest possible Southern army, and for me, the philosophy changes when going toward Washington to get MANY more cannon to help in both the attack and the defense. --Gael
  2. Hi Gimli and Mukremin, Major John Pelham was JEB Stuart's horse-artillery officer who took a section of two cannon to the side of Federal General George Meade's 4500-man division and fired into it until one of his guns was disabled, and later retired to his own lines (Jackson and Stuart) taking both guns with him. He disrupted and delayed Meade's attack for about an hour or so. In dispatches after the battle, General Lee wrote to President Davis about the "Gallant Pelham" which was quite a compliment. Major Pelham died from an artillery shell-splinter when riding in one of the Southern cavalry charges during the Battle of Brandy Station that occurred in June just before the 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania. He was excited to have an opportunity to charge with the cavalry and was away from his artillery command when the splinter hit him in the back of the head. Brandy Station is located on Route 29 just to the northeast of Culpeper, Virginia, and south of Kelly's Ford. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fredericksburg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Brandy_Station
  3. LAntorcha, The names came from the gentlemen who recruited, outfitted, and trained the troops for those units. Instead of waiting for the state they were in to recruit, outfit, organize and train larger units of regiments, it was more expedient for the important and wealthy to just do it themselves. Wade Hampton's Legion of approximately 600 ended up at Manassas, Virginia, for the first battle (Bull Run or 1st Manassas). Later they were made part of Hood's Division in Hood's "Texas" Brigade where due to losses, they entered the Battle of Antietam/Sharpsburg and the Miller Cornfield with ~78 men -- fighting part of what MG McClellan nicknamed his "Iron Brigade" alongside the Georgia Brigade along the Pike's wooden rail fences, while the 1st Texas would continue on into the corner and suffer 82.3% casualties. BG Law's 2nd and 11th Mississippi regiments were on the right of 1st Texas, and the 6th North Carolina State Troops were holding the East Woods. General Nathan B Forrest nicknamed his own personal company of about 100 cavalry as his "Critter Company". (A friend of mine's ancestor was about 15 years of age when he first was included in the "Critter Company".) Forrest had raised a cavalry regiment, which General Bragg took and assigned to someone else, and ordered Forrest to go back home and raise another such unit. When Bragg took that unit and gave it to someone else, and ordered Forrest to once again raise another company, Forrest informed Bragg that if he EVER did that again, he would kill him. Sometimes the senior officers took things a bit personal. --Gael
  4. Hi Sanny, Over here in the States, Gettysburg did get into the theaters when it was released. Opening night here in Baltimore, I think my brother said Jeff Daniels and Martin Sheen were big hits amongst the reenactors in the theater lobby, while Tom Berenger stood more off to the side with his body guard. If Tom had freely mingled, he would have made a HUGE HIT with the reenactors. Just like on set, Stephen Lang on his horse shouted that he should run for political office as he was mobbed and cheered by many of the reenactors who relished his presence made up as George Pickett. --Gael
  5. Mukremin, For a quick bit of info on CSS Alabama, check https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CSS_Alabama . Raiders like the CSS Alabama and CSS Shenandoah are said to have impacted the northern shipping owners in convincing many of them to register their ships under other countries' flags in case the South would eventually rise up once more. I don't know anything about a conflict in the Bering Sea. --Gael
  6. Thanks Hussar91. I am really enjoying reading the different perspectives of everyone, especially you guys over in Europe (in your case Poland). We have our monuments, but I am one who sees the many monuments and fortifications in western and eastern Europe and elsewhere on the internet, and wish I could have seen and understood better the many things you and the others have studied and observed. Over here our school history books touch on the Romans and Greeks, and then all of a sudden they talk about the 1800's and our revolution, and those of us who are really intrigued have had to wander all over looking for good books and sources of information. East Asian history is somewhat like attempting to get info from the Moon. Thank you for your perspectives, and to Mukremin, and Andre, and all the many others. --Gael
  7. Hussar91, Where are you from? I currently live in Maryland, northeast of Baltimore. The movie was filmed partly on-site in several locations, and partly off-site to the west. I was there for portions of Pickett's Charge. I am a history buff just like so many (like Mercanto and AP Hill) who pass thru this site. My Great-Great-Grandfather was a private in Co. A, 6th Regiment, North Carolina State Troops, Hoke's Brigade (Robert Hoke had been wounded a few weeks before at Fredericksburg/Chancellorsville, so COL Isaac Avery led the brigade on the 1st and 2nd day - mortally wounded that evening), Early's division, of Ewell's II Corps flanking of XI Corps which regiment participated in the first day's "brickyard fight", and the second day's evening attack onto Cemetery Hill with ~75 of the 6th North Carolina and ~12 of Hays' Louisianan's breaking thru the XI Corps' line and capturing some of the guns of the batteries on the crest before being later pushed back down the hill that night. I thought the presentation on History Buffs was fairly good for the very small amount of time available for the show. The commentaries about the reenactors bringing their own equipment, uniforms, weapons, etc. was totally correct - they had a great deal of authentic items which you see on-screen, and when the actors and prop guys needed something such as a tobacco pouch, one of the reenactors would readily offer to lend the item to the actors. The cannons were real - when I heard one artillery group man-handling their cannon to go down the narrow paved walk-way in order to pick up speed to go up the shallow hill next to the Lee monument, I and EVERYONE got out of the way of the ~1200 lb brass cannon - lot of heavy rumbling by that gun. I was surprised at the one HISTORY BUFFS scene showing one of the make-up ladies powdering one of the re-enactors. The two ladies I remember (this was one of them) were going along the front lines, powdering faces and uniforms to make us look grimy from sweat and dust, and spraying our hair to look matted and grimy. There were other ladies who were reenactors who were in the soldiers groups, and the ~6-person band shown during Pickett's Charge was partially composed of 4 ladies - a couple fifers and a couple drummers. They were asked by the movie-makers to pull down their caps and not look into the camera so no one could readily see they were females. One point that was not shown was the blacks - free and slave. A doctor at Boonsborough right before the Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam counted about 20% of the composition of Stonewall Jackson's Corps was composed of blacks at that time. Zero mention was made in the movie and most books of the many Yank letters after the battle of Gettysburg mentioning the black corporal (possibly free black Greg Powers?) who lifted the fallen colors of the 57th Virginia and carried them part way up to the stonewall during Pickett's Charge when he was wounded or killed (per one of the articles in GETTYSBURG magazine of about 20 years ago.) Thank goodness for film, as I walked back to the tent city with who I think was the actor Stephen Lang - the gentleman who played Pickett was slightly smaller than me at 5'8", but the uniform makes him look good. He later plays the part of Stonewall Jackson in the movie Gods and Generals. The tent city was composed of a couple hundred white pup tents, but the location was extremely interesting. The woods on the one corner of tent city was where the hospital for AP Hill's III Corps was located during the original battle. Many reenactors complained to the film managers about guys fooling around at night in the woods - screaming and yelling. Management several times had to tell them that they had sent guys out there to prevent that but found no one there ... Other things were occurring such as observing a number of campfires(?) in the nearby fields at night that increased in number as the weeks crept closer to Pickett's Charge Week. Ghosts ...? The thing about Lee was that he was a good judge of ability and very familiar with a number of his former students at West Point, but with George Meade, he had actually shared a tent with him during the Mexican War campaign toward Mexico City under General Scott. For Chamberlain's defense at Little Round Top, he was lucky MG Hood was wounded and BG Law on the extreme right was put in charge. When the Texans encountered stiff resistance at Devil's Den (the movie shows a small portion of the real thing), Law ordered his two right wing regiments (I think 44th and 48th Alabama) to go from the extreme right to his own extreme left to help at Devil's Den. If those two regiments had remained in place, Chamberlain & Vincent's brigade would have been out-flanked by a width of two regiments - leave this to your imagination as to what might have occurred. If anyone has the opportunity to visit the battlefield, be certain to visit the Pennsylvania Monument - go up the stairway, take an immediate left and take the internal stairway up the corner column to go out onto the roof to overlook a major part of the battlefield. The distances to different key features are all marked on top of the wall. Facing toward the Confederate position to the west, the monument to the attack of the 1st Minnesota of the 2nd day is on your left, and the stonewall focal point of Pickett's Charge is on the right. --Gael
  8. Hi Mukremin, A couple insights for the movie "Gettysburg" might be: 1. In my opinion, a better actor for General Lee would have been Sean Connery (instead of Martin Sheen), as GEN Lee had a presence about him that got everyone's attention. 2. In some scenes, the stunt men are semi-obvious as they are the ones with the rubber muskets that flex. The 4,000 re-enactors all had real weapons and real bayonets - it was a real effort for us not to hurt each other. 3. The scenes showing us marching in Pickett's Charge from a start in front of the Spangler's woods thru the cannons - some of those (especially the film from a distance) were performed on the Gettysburg National Battlefield Park grounds on the actual ground that Pickett's Division marched over going toward what is now Business Route 15. We were allowed by Park Rangers to only march halfway to Bus. 15 - although the first time, as we didn't know where to stop, we marched all the way to the picket fence on 15. All the people who had parked along the road hoping to hear and see something, got a real thrill as 4,000 of us marched up in front of them - they were cheering - we reenactors were cheering - the Park Rangers were going nuts as they didn't want us to go that far! The next five times we marched that route, we were only allowed to go half way. 4. When the 23 cannons fired in unison to start the Pickett's Charge, the original intent was to film each cannon going off one-by-one, but each time they attempted it there was always one or two mis-fires, so the guy in charge in his frustration, ordered them to fire all at once. This is a unique moment in the film and otherwise as none of the reenactor gun crews had EVER participated in an event where all 23 discharged simultaneously like this. They, and we 4,000, were all duly impressed! 5. The scene where Pickett says to give him his glass (binoculars) - that red building is the Codori barn on the Park. 6. The scene where the Southerners go up to the stone wall - this wall was built up on site about 1-2 miles west of the National Battlefield Park. 7. A command of "Right Shoulder - Shift" was given as we were about to march. This command is unfamiliar to today's military, but back then, one would maintain a good balance of one's musket on the collar bone. As the soldier behind was to maintain a gap 13 inches behind the in front, in case of the front soldier bobbing or falling wounded or whatever,this would offer some protection from the bayonet to the guy behind 8. The spoken lines were from the book "The Killer Angels", as that was also the initial title of the movie until the marketers determined "Gettysburg" would be the best title. 9. I was "recruited" for the film by my brother to march with his unit, the 116th Pennsylvania, during Pickett's Charge Week. For the two days I participated, we wore Southern gray as the "galvanized" 116th "Virginia". I had been attending school at the US Army War College during two weeks in July, and the local TV news was always showing clips of the filming that was leading up to Pickett's Charge Week in August. 10. In this stunt scene (below) used in Pickett's Charge, on extreme right with full face was the personnel manager for Hershey Park, next to the left is a tall 116th reenactor whose name I forget, next and shorter is my brother, and next to him with the flat hat is me (25 years ago in 1992). It is a memorable moment in my life, and this scene played at about 3/4 speed was used in TNT's TV and theater commercials.
  9. Gael

    Guns per battery

    Casacerian, As to an optimal number of guns, I have never calculated this out. In my mind it has always been 2 guns in a section, 4 to 6 guns in a battery, and about 24 in an artillery battalion. In my CSA battalions, I always attempt to build them up to 24 so I match or outnumber the guns in the Federal units, and have massed fire capability in case of attack by the Federal units. Early in a campaign, I form one battalion per division of 2, 3, or 4 brigades of infantry. But, as a campaign wears on, I start building a 2nd (and sometimes a third) artillery battalion so I can hold off those huge mass-attacks that come at me at Cold Harbor and at Washington, DC. When one has less-capable or less-in-number troops than the foe, one must increase firepower by increasing the number of guns, as per one of Napoleon's dictums ~1813-1814 after he had lost huge numbers of experienced troops during the retreat from Russia. The double battalions also provide enough firepower to help clear the way when the inferior numbers of CSA troops launch their own attacks, such as by the artillery knocking the Federal units off the ramparts of the DC forts. See: Good luck! --Gael
  10. Gael

    Union Strategy at Cold Harbor

    map from Wikipedia -- Map by Hal Jespersen, www.posix.com/CW, CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=9063969 Being a descendant of one of Lee's soldier's, I would offer that the arrangement of Longstreet's highly successful attack and break-through at Chickamauga in 21 September 1863 was the model followed by Emory Upton in 1864. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chickamauga "Wood was perplexed by Rosecrans's order, which he received around 10:50 a.m. Since Brannan was still on his left flank, Wood would not be able to "close up on" (a military term that meant to "move adjacent to") Reynolds with Brannan's division in the way. Therefore, the only possibility was to withdraw from the line, march around behind Brannan and form up behind Reynolds (the military meaning of the word "support"). This was obviously a risky move, leaving an opening in the line. Wood spoke with corps commander McCook, and claimed later, along with members of both his and McCook's staff, that McCook agreed to fill the resulting gap with XX Corps units. McCook maintained that he had not enough units to spare to cover a division-wide hole, although he did send Heg's brigade to partially fill the gap.[78] At about this time, Bragg also made a peremptory order based on incomplete information. Impatient that his attack was not progressing to the left, he sent orders for all of his commands to advance at once. Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart of Longstreet's wing received the command and immediately ordered his division forward without consulting with Longstreet. His brigades under Brig. Gens. Henry D. Clayton, John C. Brown, and William B. Bate attacked across the Poe field in the direction of the Union divisions of Brannan and Reynolds. Along with Brig. Gen. S. A. M. Wood's brigade of Cleburne's Division, Stewart's men disabled Brannan's right flank and pushed back Van Cleve's division in Brannan's rear, momentarily crossing the LaFayette Road. A Federal counterattack drove Stewart's Division back to its starting point.[79] Longstreet also received Bragg's order but did not act immediately. Surprised by Stewart's advance, he held up the order for the remainder of his wing. Longstreet had spent the morning attempting to arrange his lines so that his divisions from the Army of Northern Virginia would be in the front line, but these movements had resulted in the battle line confusion that had plagued Cleburne earlier. When Longstreet was finally ready, he had amassed a concentrated striking force, commanded by Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood, of three divisions, with eight brigades arranged in five lines. In the lead, Brig. Gen. Bushrod Johnson's division straddled the Brotherton Road in two echelons. They were followed by Hood's Division, now commanded by Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law, and two brigades of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws's division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw. To the left of this column was Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman's division. Brig. Gen. William Preston's division of Buckner's corps was in reserve behind Hindman. Longstreet's force of 10,000 men, primarily infantry, was similar in number to those he sent forward in Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, and some historians judge that he learned the lessons of that failed assault by providing a massive, narrow column to break the enemy line. Historian Harold Knudsen has described this deployment on a narrow front as similar to the style of the German Schwerpunkt in World War II, achieving an attacker/defender ratio of 8:1. Biographer Jeffry D. Wert also cites the innovative approach that Longstreet adopted, "demonstrating his skill as a battlefield commander." William Glenn Robertson, however, contends that Longstreet's deployment was "happenstance", and that the general's after-action report and memoirs do not demonstrate that he had a grand, three-division column in mind.[80] Longstreet gave the order to move at 11:10 a.m. and Johnson's division proceeded across the Brotherton field, by coincidence to precisely the point where Wood's Union division was pulling out of the line. Johnson's brigade on the left, commanded by Col. John S. Fulton, drove directly through the gap. The brigade on the right, under Brig. Gen. Evander McNair, encountered opposition from Brannan's division (parts of Col. John M. Connell's brigade), but was also able to push through. The few Union soldiers in that sector ran in panic from the onslaught. At the far side of the Dyer field, several Union batteries of the XXI Corps reserve artillery were set up, but without infantry support. Although the Confederate infantrymen hesitated briefly, Gregg's brigade, commanded by Col. Cyrus Sugg, which flanked the guns on their right, Sheffield's brigade, commanded by Col. William Perry, and the brigade of Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson, captured 15 of the 26 cannons on the ridge.[82] As the Union troops were withdrawing, Wood stopped his brigade commanded by Col. Charles G. Harker and sent it back with orders to counterattack the Confederates. They appeared on the scene at the flank of the Confederates who had captured the artillery pieces, causing them to retreat. The brigades of McNair, Perry, and Robinson became intermingled as they ran for shelter in the woods east of the field. Hood ordered Kershaw's Brigade to attack Harker and then raced toward Robertson's Brigade of Texans, Hood's old brigade. As he reached his former unit, a bullet struck him in his right thigh, knocking him from his horse. He was taken to a hospital near Alexander's Bridge, where his leg was amputated a few inches from the hip.[83] Harker conducted a fighting withdrawal under pressure from Kershaw, retreating to Horseshoe Ridge near the tiny house of George Washington Snodgrass. Finding a good defensible position there, Harker's men were able to resist the multiple assaults, beginning at 1 p.m., from the brigades of Kershaw and Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys. These two brigades had no assistance from their nearby fellow brigade commanders. Perry and Robertson were attempting to reorganize their brigades after they were routed into the woods. Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning's brigade turned north after crossing the Lafayette Road in pursuit of two brigades of Brannan's division, then halted for the afternoon near the Poe house.[84] Hindman's Division attacked the Union line to the south of Hood's column and encountered considerably more resistance. The brigade on the right, commanded by Brig. Gen. Zachariah Deas, drove back two brigades of Davis's division and defeated Col. Bernard Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's division. Sheridan's two remaining brigades, under Brig. Gen. William H. Lytle and Col. Nathan Walworth, checked the Confederate advance on a slight ridge west of the Dyer field near the Widow Glenn House. While leading his men in the defense, Lytle was killed and his men, now outflanked and leaderless, fled west. Hindman's brigade on the left, under Brig. Gen. Arthur Manigault, crossed the field east of the Widow Glenn's house when Col. John T. Wilder's mounted infantry brigade, advancing from its reserve position, launched a strong counterattack with its Spencer repeating rifles, driving the enemy around and through what became known as "Bloody Pond". Having nullified Manigault's advance, Wilder decided to attack the flank of Hood's column. However, just then Assistant Secretary of War Dana found Wilder and excitedly proclaimed that the battle was lost and demanded to be escorted to Chattanooga. In the time that Wilder took to calm down the secretary and arrange a small detachment to escort him back to safety, the opportunity for a successful attack was lost and he ordered his men to withdraw to the west.[85] All Union resistance at the southern end of the battlefield evaporated. Sheridan's and Davis's divisions fell back to the escape route at McFarland's Gap, taking with them elements of Van Cleve's and Negley's divisions. The majority of units on the right fell back in disorder and Rosecrans, Garfield, McCook, and Crittenden, although attempting to rally retreating units, soon joined them in the mad rush to safety. Rosecrans decided to proceed in haste to Chattanooga in order to organize his returning men and the city defenses. He sent Garfield to Thomas with orders to take command of the forces remaining at Chickamauga and withdraw to Rossville. At McFarland's Gap units had reformed and General Negley met both Sheridan and Davis. Sheridan decided he would go to Thomas's aid not directly from McFarland's gap but via a circuitous route northwest to the Rossville gap then south on Lafayette road. The provost marshal of the XIV Corps met Crittenden around the gap and offered him the services of 1,000 men he had been able to round up during the retreat. Crittenden refused the command and continued his personal flight. At about 3 p.m., Sheridan's 1,500 men, Davis's 2,500, Negley's 2,200, and 1,700 men of other detached units were at or near McFarland's Gap just 3 miles away from Horseshoe Ridge.[87] " --Gael The scene now presented was unspeakably grand. The resolute and impetuous charge, the rush of our heavy columns sweeping out from the shadow and gloom of the forest into the open fields flooded with sunlight, the glitter of arms, the onward dash of artillery and mounted men, the retreat of the foe, the shouts of the hosts of our army, the dust, the smoke, the noise of fire-arms—of whistling balls and grape-shot and of bursting shell—made up a battle scene of unsurpassed grandeur. Confederate Brig. Gen. Bushrod Johnson[81] The scene now presented was unspeakably grand. The resolute and impetuous charge, the rush of our heavy columns sweeping out from the shadow and gloom of the forest into the open fields flooded with sunlight, the glitter of arms, the onward dash of artillery and mounted men, the retreat of the foe, the shouts of the hosts of our army, the dust, the smoke, the noise of fire-arms—of whistling balls and grape-shot and of bursting shell—made up a battle scene of unsurpassed grandeur. Confederate Brig. Gen. Bushrod Johnson[81]
  11. Gael

    Antietam (Confederate Side)

    AegorBlackfyre, I don't think the CSA would have won the war solely on the basis of winning this battle. The army was so worn out by that time, they couldn't continue on their campaign to deliver a decisive blow to the north. The reasoning is that this battle was fought by Lee and the defense of the South Mountain passes two days earlier solely to shield Stonewall in his effort to capture the 11-12,000 Yanks bottled up at Harpers Ferry. OPINION: To lose a corps like that should have shaken the North but for the propaganda mill at work proclaiming a northern victory and Lincoln hurrying to issue the emancipation proclamation, which seems in hindsight to have distracted much attention. According to the book "North With Lee and Jackson", the army was heading north to destroy the anthracite (hard) coal mines in the six counties east of the Susquehanna River, when the very sudden and unexpected forward movement by McClellan occurred just two weeks after the severe thrashing of Pope's army and the subsequent reorganization of both Yank armies into a single entity. Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson were able to continue after 2nd Manassas and Chantilly (west of and right next to Fair Oaks Mall on Rt 50 is a tiny park with two boulders marking where both Generals Kearney and Stevens were killed) as DH Hill had led 3 divisions up from the Richmond area after the majority of McClellan's troops had shipped out and up north to reinforce Pope, while Lincoln was infuriated with McClellan's footdragging and slowness in reinforcing Pope who was "getting his lunch handed to him". Jackson's strategy on destroying the coal mines had been recommended just before the Peninsular Campaign and the Seven Days, so he had to wait til the Fall, and by then the CSA had to go slow as their shoes and clothes were already wearing out just as they were entering Maryland with its stone-paved roads ... The stone roads and worn-out conditions of the Fall of 1862 were definitely on Lee's and Jackson's minds when planning the 1863 campaign, so when they won at Chancellorsville, Lee within a few weeks sent Ewell off for the mines in Pennsylvania once more, only to bump into the battle at Gettysburg. --Gael
  12. Gael

    Antietam (Confederate Side)

    Hi Mukremin, I have been fortunate enough to arrive at Antietam a few times at BG-level and win. Wiping out or shattering the Feds at Shiloh, 2nd Corinth, and Malvern Hill has dealt body-blows to them and they have difficulty in gathering strength for the next battles. At this moment, I have once more wiped them out at Antietam. My starting numbers are: I Corps 12 bgdes 1 skirmish 5 artillery battalions 2 cavalry supply @35,000 22,054 Soldiers 3000 arty with 120 cannons 1,500 cavalry troopers II Corps 12 bgdes 7 artillery battalions 1 cav supply@35,000 21,900 Soldiers 3750 arty with 150 cannons 750 cav troopers III Corps 6 bgdes 4 skirmishers 5 artillery battalions 1 cav supply 13,763 Soldiers 1875 arty with 75 cannons 750 cav troopers Feds victory CSA inf 58,399 58,617 cav 2315 3,000 Guns 306 345 cas/losses inf 43,071 22,096 guns 210 10 cav 1,350 546 missing 3293 0 Some months back I had read about moving my forces up even with the farthest north line of fence of the Miller farm, so I put weak forces there and straight east, and angled up from the farm to the tip of woods of Nicodemus hill on the left. I placed two artillery battalions behind the fence and one in the open space leading to the hill, and sent two groups of skirmishers out to the left and swung behind the Yanks to knock off their artillery battalion there by the group of trees. Played defense until the group of reinforcements arrived, slowed and stopped their forward motion and started pushing them north, while using skirmishers to gradually make a pocket with the north and east map edges. The cavalry and 3-4 skirmish units started going after the supply wagons and slowly destroying Fed artillery battalions, and then destroyed or captured all Fed units to the northeast. When the units at the sunken road appear, (I had read this tactic earlier), I immediately send 4 inf brigades and 2 arty battalions to the middle bridge - placing one on each side facing the bridge with and arty battalion directly behind each, and place a back-up inf brigade behind each arty battalion. A 5th inf brigade is sent to the woods to the north of the previous units to await a 1,000 trooper cav unit that attempts to clear the road to the bridge - and fails. Once the Feds crossing the bridge are all smashed (inf-cav-arty), then move all your units back to form a quarter circle around the area where a few new units will arrive from across the middle bridge. (I never received a Yank attack at the sunken road.) At Burnside's bridge to the south, bring all available infantry brigades and artillery units to the bridge or to the depression or on the hill directly behind and pour all firepower into any Fed attacks. I always take the unit at the southernmost ford to the bridge while leaving its skirmishers to hold the ford. Eventually I bring all CSA units in the north and at the sunken road to the southeast part of the map, driving all remaining Feds into the SE corner and shattering or capturing them. It sure is easier to win when you start off even in numbers ... --Gael
  13. Gael

    2nd Battle of Bull Run

    Mukremin, I note you are starting the battle with a very small number of soldiers and no funding. I follow a somewhat different philosophy of accumulating as many troops as possible - which also has a few personal twists of big artillery battalions (24 cannons each) and a few cavalry brigades (750 each) for speed and distance. In starting another new Southern campaign on BG-level I have reached the 2nd Battle of Manassas once again. In response to your frustration in your first note, I have the following numbers to compare to yours in starting this Battle: 1st Corps 4 Div's 3 Inf Bgdes each 1 arty Batt/Div (1st Div has 2 arty batt's) 2 cav Bgdes 28,517 Soldiers 120 guns 1500 cav 26,897 inf 3000 arty supply @ 35,000 2nd Corps 4 Div's 3 Inf Bgdes each 1 arty Batt/Div 1 cav Bgde 24,335 Soldiers 96 guns 750 cav 23,465 inf 2400 arty supply @ 35,000 3rd Corps 2 Div's 2 Inf Bgdes each 1 arty Batt/Div 1 cav Bgde 9,728 Soldiers 48 guns 750 cav 8,858 inf 1200 arty supply @ 35,000 Here you can see the first two corps are fairly stout and ready to receive and give battle, while I am in process of building a 3rd corps to eventually resemble the other two. Seeing that you have nothing available as to funding gives me pause. I hold off on buying fancy but costly weapons, but do so only gradually upon making certain I have emptied the "recruits" box down to zero if at all possible -- I have to watch the "funding" pile and balance each to the other. I tend to wait to see if a large number of weapons and cannons have been captured after a big battle, that I can supply new recruits at zero or minimal cost. Also, as soon as I can I will boost each corps' supply up to the 35,000-level so I don't have to pay attention to it during any following battle or camp (BUT - do NOT allow your supply to captured!!!). I put my leader points after each victory toward army organization and politics. The politics will provide batches of extra recruits to help build the size of your force. Hopefully, the above will provide insight to you of a different perspective that seems to work for me. As the campaign progresses, I start doubling up on artillery battalions - 2-3 per division. (Check my topic BG-level win at Washington in this forum, where I describe what I did for my first BG-level victory there.) Good luck, --Gael
  14. Gael

    2nd Battle of Bull Run

    Gmoney7447, you are most welcome! --Gael
  15. Gael

    2nd Battle of Bull Run

    Gmoney7447, COL & BG levels: During the 1st moment of 2nd Manassas (or 2nd Bull Run for the Yanks), I always send cavalry units and all available skirmisher units into most all of the wooded areas of the map - skirmishers into the right/East side of the map can go to wooded or built-up areas in front of the CSA fortifications, but not into the little white banner locations on the railroad as those just get your troops shot up. The skirmishers and cavalry on the middle and left/West - I send all I can get my hands on into the wooded areas - spread out - one skirmisher into Groveton, all others into wooded areas - one in the far left woods toward map bottom - two into woods south of Groveton, three spread north to south in the thin woods north of Groveton, and a couple others into wooded areas in middle and middle-south of the water-way. Watch for any and all targets of opportunity to ambush - supply wagons to capture and send back to be used by CSA during the 1st day - and to wipe out Fed artillery units that are not escorted ( this can really play havoc with the other side's ability to conduct battle. Be certain to remember you need to play "hide-and-seek" and to "run" when the Feds come chasing your skirmishers and cavalry.) There is one artillery battalion that shows up SW of Groveton following 3 Yank brigades - I always stalk that battalion and wipe it out - no matter how long it takes and no matter how much cat-and-mouse I have to do. Realize that supply wagons and artillery (and infantry) flow from East (crossing Bull Run) to far West and to north west. When things work well I can capture 4-6 supply wagons and knock off about 2-4 artillery battalions during the first day. Route those supply wagons SAFELY to your artillery units backing the fortifications at middle and ESPECIALLY the East. These captured supply wagons are the ONLY way to keep my troops supplied with ammo and in the fight during the 1st day's heavy fighting in the East section of fortifications. As CSA, I utilize the fortifications north of the tracks - mid-way between the unfinished railroad line and the woods, and on the bottom edge of the woods toward the West. For the fortifications of middle and East, I put brigades into those with the white banner locations, and put another brigade behind each one in the fortifications - the fire of both are sufficient to turn away the Yanks. When the first one gets worn down, put the 2nd into the fortifications and put the first in the rear position. Although the Yanks take quite a beating, they can still eventually push your troops away from the fortifications - at that time position your troops up the hill and into the edge of the woods. Move reserve troops of the West gradually to the East as those CSA of the East will be wearing down fairly fast once the serious mass attacks start rolling. During the next day -- realize the actual terrain of Bull Run is uniquely formed - there is a portion starting a bit north of stone bridge and starting to turn West, where the Eastern bank of Bull Run forms a "cliff" about 15-25 feet higher than the West bank, and this runs almost all the way over to the Sudley Ford / Sudley Church area. (Sudley Church is there, expanded, and still used by the local community. I lived in the Manassas area for about 5 years. ) There is criticism in some books about Stonewall's not pushing hard and attacking after Porter's attack was beaten back. -- Realize, that he/you WANT to trap the whole Yank force against that cliff area - they can't take their artillery and supply wagons into Bull Run's water (the 3-4 foot banks are steep, and then up that cliff - it is there and it is real. Jackson did not want Pope's Army to move away from Sudley Ford / Bull Run "cliff". This is also why Pope's Army (and McDowell in 1st Manassas) was desperate to retreat everyone across the stone bridge area (E.P. Alexander was the engineer in charge of blowing up stone bridge during Johnston's retreat down to Richmond during the Spring of 1862 - it was rebuilt by the National Battlefield Park Service about 20 years ago so all can once again walk on it.) During the retreat there was another of McClellan's Corps that had pulled up and stationed themselves between Cub Run and Bull Run East of the stone bridge area and would have provided covering fire. This is why Longstreet's attack had to swing around Henry House Hill, sweep past stone bridge, and trap Pope's army against those cliffs, while Jackson had to hold his position around the Sudley Ford and Sudley Church area. When the attack did not go thru the woods to the stone bridge, this is the moment the strategic movements of Jackson and Lee/Longstreet failed in this 2nd attempt to surround Pope's Army for either surrender or destruction. In your game, the strategy is the same - block Sudley Ford, have Longstreet swing around - taking Stone Bridge and the two northern fords, and then pull the noose tighter and tighter while destroying as much of Pope's Army as possible. (Easy ....? ) --Gael