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kc87

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    Military history, Gaming

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Landsmen

Landsmen (1/13)

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  1. This game really needs to allow regimental control, that is the one major feature I feel that holds this game back, having static brigades severely limits the tactics you can employ and simplifies the gameplay. Also adding 2v2, 3v3 , 4v4 with larger full day scenarios with a chat lobby would do alot for this game or future games. This is all stuff that was available in 1997, with a thriving and social multiplayer community the game will become alot more popular.
  2. Well historically the Confederates were at a disadvantage in this battle given the terrain and size of the Union Army. Not being able to command troops on the regimental level like you could in SMG limits the angles of attack and approach that you can take. This also works both ways so you must use it to your advantage. I have won more games with the Confederates than I have lost since the new patch in multiplayer by carefully using the terrain and driving the enemy out out of their positions with overwhelming fire. I only charge or engage in melee combat under extreme circumstances. Example if Meredith is in the woods I would use 1 brigade to screen his fire while I send another brigade into the woods to shoot it out with him in equal terrain cover. Never needlessly waste your condition by charging or running, and never just shoot it out with the Feds in unfavorable terrain unless it's to screen an advance for your troops to get into better cover or to wrap around their flank. A tactic employed by the Confederates during the war was to attack in oblique (diagonal) angles. This meant that the whole enemy line's fire couldn't be brought down on their advance. This would result in either a shift in the enemy's battle line or their line being outflanked, this works great in this game . It requires a bit more planning and quick thinking to win as the Confederates especially if you don't know all the scenarios, since time is always against you and you are also on the attack. Some of the best terrain on the map is not sitting right on the VPs and that terrain can be used as stepping stones and cover for your troops as you move on to take objectives.
  3. Whether Shiloh was a victory in the eyes of some of the Confederacy at the time is subjective. While some Southern papers were touting victory, Northern papers were bashing on Grant accusing him of being a drunk who got 3000 of his troops captured and a large amount of his command killed. Having a free press means bias and misinformation alot of the time. The free press could be dangerous to an army on campaign. Example during the Chancellorsville campaign General Hooker wouldn't discuss any future plans or orders to his Corps commanders out of fear of them leaking it to the press for publicity. "If I had my choice I would kill every reporter in the world, but I am sure we would be getting reports from Hell before breakfast." - William T. Sherman
  4. The CSA had a large free press throughout the war, with different opinions and bias, and many critical of the government. Since regiments were composed of soldiers from the same counties it was up to the company and battalion officers to report directly to their towns and districts and their families would be informed through their local newspapers, not from the government.
  5. Peninsula Campaign and Jackson's Valley Campaign would be awesome.
  6. If the Army of Northern Virginia could not take the field at the end of the day, there would be hell to pay for months, not the political hell that the AOP would face, but starvation, lack of supplies, farmland and valuable resources destroyed, the officers knew this well. At the Wilderness the stakes were even higher and the Federals had their back to the Rappidan. Control of Telegraph Road, Old Turnpike road and Plank road and the Fredricksburg/Richmond railroad were on the line for this fight. Withdrawing and losing those junctions meant that the AONV from then on. would always have to protect those roads leading south and stay in between the Federal Army, those roads and Richmond making any kind of sustained defense or initiative impossible due to the Federal Army moving south exposing any kind of defense Lee could mount. The North Anna river was too long to protect all the vital junctions and rail lines in central Virginia so it was just a matter of time at that point. As far as battlefield superiority goes the Army of Northern Virginia was vetted, and the stakes were alot higher for them. That conviction and desperation made them very dangerous even under the most desperate circumstances. They knew what it was like to starve and suffer if they didn't carry the field at the end of the day. When you have an army of mostly capable leaders plus veteran experienced troops it is a deadly combination regardless of the circumstances.
  7. Firing from the prone and reloading prone was very awkward and would severely slow the reloading process, although it was in the manual of instructions for skirmishing. The amount of smoke constricting the view and the limitation on ammo would have made 200 yards and under ideal for any kind of decisiveness. The skirmishers screening the battle line would lead the way for these for these deadly engagements to take place at such close range. I would argue more for reload speed and discipline as being the deciding factor due to the nature of the fighting. At 3 rounds a minute troops generally had about 20 minutes or less worth of ammo in ideal conditions unless they captured or held a position.
  8. Sorry for the Lost Cause jab. The numbers I posted represent killed, wounded, captured and missing from the major Eastern theater engagements. The captured earlier in the war were usually quickly exchanged, also I did not include minor engagements which would bring the numbers back to roughly where they started. A greater number of Union troops could have returned for duty than Confederate, there are all kinds of possibilities. Wounds caused disease and death, and some wounded returned to their units. I don't think it's possible to get a 100% accurate set of statistics so it would be best to go by widely accepted statistics, then look for a disparity. Personally I don't believe there was any reason for Lee to under report casualties to the Confederate government given the dire situation on hand in Virginia after Gettysburg. At that point in the war it was very clear to himself and everyone at the top of the Confederate government he was the only person capable of commanding the army in those extreme circumstances, there was nothing to hide or accomplish by being ignorant about the situation, this is evident after his angry reaction at the outcome of his victory at Chancellorsville. Since a very low percent of battlefield casualties were not from musket, rifle or artillery fire, I'd say there is some weight to the "Southern battlefield superiority" in the Eastern theater. What they were doing to achieve that type of superiority or advantage is another subject for debate altogether, a more accurate result might come from Brigade ordinance and inspection/review reports, AARs and breaking the stats down by year. In my opinion it was possibly a combination of desperation, training/experience and the Christian revival in the AONV, similar to the Swedish Carolean Army who ironically suffered a similar fate. Losing the field was detrimental to the survival of the AONV and all their field commanders knew this, the sheer size of the AOP and it's abundance of supplies ensured it's own safety in case of withdrawal.
  9. More multiplayer replayability. ( We need the random battles like SMG had!!! ) More commands for Infantry ( fire while advancing, Fire at will, volley )
  10. accidental double post
  11. Those statistics aren't relevant cross theater. A lopsided amount of the CS casualties were from the Western Theater. Vicksburg, Nashville and Atlanta. Those statistics are also not taking wounds into account, many of which were fatal but not added to the killed in action reports. You were far more likely to get wounded than killed in the ACW. Wounded and killed shows shows 282,000 dead or wounded Confederates and 394,000 dead or wounded Federals. Army of the Potomac total killed, wounded or captured in major engagements - 163,746 (.43%) Army of Northern Virginia total killed, wounded or captured in major engagements - 127,082 (.56%) I wouldn't call it a "lost cause" myth that the Army of Northern Virginia generally performed better than the Army of the Potomac in the Eastern theater, it's a fact. However I wouldn't credit it alone to individual southern marksmanship but rather to various circumstances and assets including leadership, morale, logistics, initiative etc. The "lost cause" myth would be that the Army of Northern Virginia could have won the war despite the horrible disaster the Confederacy faced in the Western theater. Even if Lee had won a major decisive victory the Battle of Gettysburg the situation in the West had deteriorated to such that the war itself was a lost cause.
  12. is there any way it could be added to multiplayer like the single player decisions? maybe the winner of the map gets to chose the next much like the decisions in the single player campaign?
  13. Lee's strategy revolved around isolating and attacking 1 or 2 Federal Corps. Doing this would result in the withdrawal of the rest of the Army of the Potomac. Engaging the entire AOP on a broad front would have been suicidal. Giving the entire AOP time to surround the AONV and threaten his supply lines with a much larger force would have also been suicidal. The only way to win was with aggression, defending and not taking the initiative was far more dangerous against a much larger opponent. Taking advantage of the size of the slower moving AOP and easily predicting logistic and movement routes, Lee would deny the AOP commanders their advantage in numbers. Lee was originally an Engineer and using his knowledge in logistics, transportation and topography, knew how to create bottlenecks in movement, and his aggressive nature prompted many AOP commanders to spread their forces out isolating them out of fear that an attack could come at any direction, slowing and paralyzing their movements even more. This often lead to an unease and constant paranoia in his enemy's minds. Time was always against Lee, especially when the Army of the Potomac was so large that it could dispatch entire divisions to go on missions around and behind the Army of Northern Virginia to destroy their supply lines, industry, crops, infrastructure, rail lines and telegraph lines, which would further cripple the already dwindling economy of the Confederacy. Just like at Chancellorsville, the Confederates managed to isolate Union Corps on Cemetary Hill and Ridge on the 2nd day at Gettysburg. Due to a series of unfortunate events where Hood and Pender were wounded and A.P Hill was not on the field, this lead to a deviation from Lee's original plan which was to ignore the Round Tops and roll the flank of the Union troops north of round top in a pincer attack with the 1st and 3rd corps. Bad intel and a delay in the 1st Corps on top of many key officers being wounded lead to the deviation of the original plan and the attacks on Devils den and Little Round Top. Union lines were stretched extremely thin and it could have very well been a huge disaster for the Army of the Potomac, especially with Dan Sickles leaving the entire northern flank of the AOP exposed. If everything had gone according to plan, 2 Union Corps could have been destroyed resulting in the withdrawal from Gettysburg much like at Chancellorsville. The Confederate attacks from the 3rd Corps on Cemetary Ridge also fed into the idea that the Union army was far more spread out and isolated resulting in the final attack on Day 3. The Confederates came very close to driving back Union troops from Cemetery ridge and Pender's Division (Pender was wounded) due to a lack of confusion and other unknown reasons never supported the rest of their Corps in the original attack. In my own opinion this was the result in the reorganization of the AONV prior to Gettysburg. The Confederates also seemed to be suffering the same problems that had been plaguing the Army of the Potomac for years at the worst most decisive time possible. Longstreet and A.P Hill hated each other. A.P Hill was not present on the field. Ewell and Hill were both new to Corps command (this was their first time commanding an entire Corps in battle) and Longstreet was not present at the battle of the Chancellorsville. No intel from Jeb Stuart meant that any plan at all could not account for the unknowns Confederate division commanders would encounter. General Hooker also reorganized the Army of the Potomac into a far more dangerous and efficient force by sizing down grand divisions into smaller more effective divisions, and this definitely showed at Gettysburg. Lee's actual plan for Day 2 at Gettysburg
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